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To Roma  
 
“The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing 
these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves 
so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against 
those who had initially imposed them; controlling this complex 
mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers 


















The thesis explains the socioeconomic differences among the Roma through a 
historical exploration of the relations established between Roma and significant 
Others at local, regional, and central levels in different, overlapping spheres of power 
(state, politics, religion, informal economy). Through a historical-ethnographic 
analysis of difference and power struggles, the thesis seeks to bring the political 
aspects of Roma lives back into the discourses of empowerment which are highly 
depoliticized by both the state and transnational neo-liberal governance (World 
Bank, UNDP, EU etc.). It is largely an explanation of transformations undergone by 
two Roma groups in Romania who experienced utterly different living conditions 
(while some got ’poorer’, the others became more affluent) in the period from 
socialism to post-socialism.  
The qualitative analysis, based on 7-months of ethnographic fieldwork, 
overcomes the flaws of policy-oriented research based primarily on statistics. The 
latter is produced by state and transnational development actors and ignores 
qualitative differences between Roma groups, the context of Romanian and Eastern 
European transformations (e.g. clientelism, informal economy, neopatrimonial state) 
and constitutes ’identities’ (’the poor’, ’the marginal’, ’the vulnerable’) through 
which the Roma are governed and maintained in  a subordinate position. These 
symbolic categories are used as part of a larger neoliberal problematization of 
governance called ’social integration’, which constitutes itself as a ’regime of truth’ 
and  follows an economic rationality which reproduces the status quo and does not 
necessarily empower the Roma. 
In addition, these ’regimes of enunciations’ are adopted un-reflexively as 
objects of study in social science and Romani studies. Distancing itself from these 
academic and policy practices, my comparative historical ethnography of power 
relations and discursive practices among the Roma challenges and brings a 
reconsideration of the current mentality of governance as social integration. 
Furthermore, my thesis constitutes an important contribution to Romani 
studies by 1) challenging a unilateral perspective directed by political agendas, and 




historical study of power struggles as “an ascending analysis of power” (Foucault 
1980: 99) is more beneficial in terms of empowerment than the study of predefined 
themes of governance (e.g. poverty and marginalization). The Roma continuously 
negotiate their relations with the Others in interaction with an uncertain 
socioeconomic environment, and these struggles constitute mechanisms of 
transformation in their lives.  
My thesis thus reveals different interactions Roma have had within and across 
spheres of power struggle (economy, state, politics, religion), which suggest an 
explanation for the two Roma groups’ different living conditions. A ‘mobile’ or a 
‘sedentary’ interaction with the socialism-to-postsocialism socioeconomic 
transformations provided opportunities or restrictions for the improvement of the 
Roma’s material living conditions. While a ‘mobile’ and trans-local approach was 
adopted by Caldarars, a ‘sedentary’, localized socioeconomic practice was 
experienced as a restriction by the Romanianized Gypsies. Although these ‘patterns’ 
largely correspond to the groups studied, there was a variation in terms of mobility 
and wealth within both. Nevertheless, the mobile-sedentary distinction is relevant as 
it shows different ways of governance. While a trans-local mobile approach with low 
levels of subjection to state governance worked as a form of self-governance, a local 
‘navigation’ of limited field of possibilities restricted access to better living 
conditions and increased the subjection to state governance.  
My thesis also draws attention to possible sources of empowerment (Roma politics) 
which are blocked by particular transformations of state and politics (patronage 
politics and political patronage), or translated by the state into the language of ‘social 
integration’ (e.g. Pentecostalism as self-governance). To sum up, I consider that my 
thesis undertakes a re-evaluation of the existent problematization of social 
integration and constitutes a reflexive knowledge base for the support of genuine 
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1. Research Questions and Thesis contribution 
 
 
The thesis is an analysis of a history of power relations, from socialism to post-
socialism, among two Roma groups living in the same geographical area - a cluster 
of villages - but with different historical life trajectories: the Caldarars1, former 
nomadic Gypsies, who are portrayed by locals and media as the wealthiest Roma and 
the Romanianized Roma2, former seasonal labourers and workers during socialism, 
who generally experience poverty and are portrayed as the poorest. My thesis is 
based on an ethnographic case study, which arose out of numerous field research 
observations I made as a sociologist involved in community development projects, in 
different Romanian regions3 (see Voiculescu 2003, 2004a, 2004b, Radu 2007a, b). 
 
1Caldarars is the English translation of the Romanian ethnonym ‘Cldrars’ used by former nomadic 
Roma themselves and locals. The term can be literally translated ’Cauldron makers’. 
2 Romanianized Roma is the translation of ‘Tigani Romanizati’, the name Roma, former seasonal 
labourers and workers in cooperative farms and state factories, use to characterize themselves. 
3My BA in sociology and two Masters degrees in Sociology and Anthropology were all based on 
research with different Roma communities in the various localities and regions: 1. Fieldwork with 
Gabors (former nomads) and Hazi Cigany (‘Home’ Gypsies in Hungarian) in Sangeorgiu de Mures – 
Transylvania was the basis for my BA dissertation in Sociology (University of Bucharest) and an 
article about identity construction among Roma communities; 2. Fieldwork with communities of 
Gabors (former nomads) and Hazi Cigany in Atid, Harghita, Transylvania was the basis for my MA 
dissertation in Anthropology and Community Development (NSPAS, Bucharest) and a book chapter 
on the temporary migration of the Transylvanian Roma to Hungary; 3. Fieldwork with Caldarars 
(former nomads) and ‘Romanianized’ Roma in Costesti, Moldova, constituted the research basis for 
my MA dissertation in Sociology and Social Anthropology (CEU, Budapest). Other field trips with 
Roma have been carried out in Veresti and Patrauti (Moldova), a study on Caldarars and 
Romanianized Gypsies, as part of an integrated community development project funded by the Open 
Society Foundation, Romania. The report was published in the Soros Foundation’s publications series 






Over the last 10 years of doing research 4 I have noticed that different Roma 
groups in Moldova and Transylvania (Caldarars and Romanianized Roma, 
respectively Gabors and Hazi Cigany) with different life and occupational 
trajectories (former nomadic groups with entrepreneurial activities, respectively day 
labourers and workers in socialism) who share the same geographical space, display 
sharp socio-economic differences. While the former ‘nomadic’ groups have decent to 
opulent housing conditions, historically ‘settled’ groups such as Romanianized Roma 
or Hazi Cigany can best be described as people living in poor to extremely poor 
living conditions. The pictures below illustrate the polarity I noticed throughout the 




It is worth mentioning that my research on and with the Roma were commissioned to the Romanian 










Figure 1 Romanianized Roma. Photos taken by the author, 2010  
 
Upper left: Romanianized Roma woman outside her house. Upper right: Romanianized 
Roma father and child, Barlad River in the back. Lower left: Romanianized Roma house 










Figure 2 Caldarars. Photos taken by the author, 2010.  
Upper: Caldarars’ houses and courtyards in Costesti. Lower: Caldarars’houses and gardens 
in Liveni, a neighbouring village. Lower left: a Caldarar bulibasa outside his house. Lower 
right: two Caldarar women watering their garden. 
 
It cannot be assumed that the two Roma groups have always had the same status or 
economic condition. During socialism, the Romanianised Roma were either seasonal 
labourers or workers in state factories and had access to better living conditions than 





accepted territorial sedentarisation and were less affluent than today. The two groups 
have experienced the political and socio-economic changes from socialism to post-
socialism differently. Connected to these observations my thesis answers to the 
following research questions:   
1. Why these two Roma groups, usually included by national and 
international development organizations in the category of the ’poor’ or 
’disadvantaged’ seem to experience strikingly different living conditions?  
2. How these sharp socio-economic differences within the presumably 
homogenous Gypsy population can be explained?  
3. How do the power relations and discursive practices, in conjunction 
with larger transformations from socialism to post-socialism, participate in 
the differential transformation of the two Roma groups? 
The questions show a research gap in both the field of Romani studies and the 
international programs of development / empowerment, which communicate and 
inform each other. Therefore, my thesis primarily aims to contribute to the field of 
Romani studies by explaining qualitative differences between Roma groups, through 
an analysis of power relations in a historical relational approach.  
Secondly, it offers a contribution to the field of empowerment programs for 
the Roma. The latter blur qualitative differences and largely subsume the variety of 
experience within the Roma population5 in un-reflexive categories of ’the poor’ and 
’vulnerable’, which create their subordinate position in society and reproduce the 
status quo. Without being over-reliant on statistics6 the exploration of qualitative 
 
5
In  reports issued by international organizations for  development (World Bank-WB, United Nations 
Development Program-UNDP, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - FRA, European 
Commission) Roma of Central and Eastern European are defined from the outset as  ‘the poorest’ and 
‘most vulnerable minority’ of Europe: “The report (...) shows that  Roma are amongst the poorest of 
the poor in Central and Eastern Europe” (UNDP 2003a:1) ; “Europe’s largest and most vulnerable 
minority” (WB  2005:3); “Roma – Europe’s largest minority (...) live in deep poverty lacking access 
to healthcare and decent housing” (European Commission 2012:5); “Roma Europe’s largest minority 
of 10-12 millions (...) they are marginalized and mostly live in extremely poor socio-economic 
conditions” (FRA, UNDP and European Commission 2012:3).
6 Most of the time the identificatory categories are established in opposition to the majority and are 
mainly based on statistics: “Half of all Roma surveyed are found to live in poverty, and more than one
in five live in extreme poverty, compared to the average of one in seven and one in 25 of the 
respective majority populations (...) Assessing poverty rates requires categorizing individuals or 





differences can suggest alternative and more effective models of empowerment for 
the Roma.    
On the whole, my thesis produces a new reflexive research basis for looking 
at the governance and empowerment of the Roma. Following Inglis’ (1997) 
suggestion that any form of empowerment should start with an analysis of power, my 
thesis is an inquiry into the historical aspects of power relations of the two Roma 
groups who experience utterly different conditions of living. 
Generally, throughout my thesis, I concentrate my attention on relations 
between individuals and their discursive practices in different spheres of power 
struggles (informal economy, politics, state, religion). I pay special attention to the 
aspect of struggle through which the Roma negotiate their social relations with local, 
regional, and central government actors. Local and central state representatives, 
Roma leaders, local and regional politicians and bureaucrats act in different spheres 
of power struggle and have different degrees of participation in the power dynamic.  
In my analysis of power relations among the Roma, the difference between centres 
and margins is blurred (Massey 1999). The Roma are not studied in opposition to the 
dominant society (Sibley 1981; Guy 2001). On the contrary, their practices and local 
level relations are entangled in the on-going history of power dynamics.  
Both individual practices and relations and state discourses of power are 
sources of transformation in the lives of the Roma. Socialist programs of 
modernisation and assimilation were received and experienced differently by the 
Roma, through either resistance or compliance. The Caldarars’ collaboration with the 
local state representatives during socialism and their resistance to the central state’s 
repression of their nomadic lifestyles are illustrations of negotiation with 
programmatic forms of power. In the thesis, I use an analysis of power from below, 
which emphasises local level power7 relations and Roma as active and full 
participants in historical processes and not as victims, or passive recipients of the 
larger structures and state programs of assimilation and integration. 
 
7The phrase ’local level power relations’ is used in correspondence with ’local level politics’ 
conceptualized by Shwartz (1969) to argue that local politics is not local per se but  






To contextualize the importance of my research questions, I continue my 
introduction with an important discussion on the implications of studying power. In 
the first section, I concentrate my attention on Roma empowerment and discourse of 
social development for the Roma in Europe and reveal a research gap in policy-
oriented research. In the second and the third sections of the introduction, I expand 
the discussion to incorporate my analysis of the historical micro-power dynamics in 
the analysis of power and empowerment. 
2. Why Power? Importance and Implications of my Thesis 
  
Most European policies (see note 5) informed by sociological research (see for 
example Sandu 2005) describe the Roma as a poor and marginalized population 
excluded from minimal conditions of living. NGOs and state representatives aim at 
improving their lives by emphasising the ‘option’ of their empowerment through 
‘integration’ within the larger society (Barany 2001). In line with this option, there is 
also a great amount of academic work still focused on issues of poverty, 
marginalization or exclusion among the Romanies (Cretan and Turnock 2008; 
Barany 1995, 2001, 2004; Gabel 2009; Guy 2001; Ladanyi & Szelenyi 2003, 2006; 
Ruzicka 2012; Stewart 1997). These contributions adopt or reiterate the general 
political discourse on Gypsies, depicted and analysed as a powerless and helpless 
population. Nevertheless, a new literature questioned  the degree of utility of the 
categories of ’marginalized’ and ’vulnerable’ used by ’image makers’, researchers, 
politicians and journalists, in Romani studies, media productions and Roma 
empowerment programs (Clark 2004, Saul and Tebbutt 2004, Woodcock 2007). For 
instance, Matras (2004) criticises researchers of Romani studies for “subordinating 
their findings to a political agenda” (p.132) and Hancock (2004) calls for critical 
scrutiny regarding the use of popular culture in Romani studies, which might 
romanticise Roma existence.     
My thesis argues that Roma do not have any fixed status (e.g. weak, poor, 
marginal, or powerful): their knowledge, actions and discourses vary in the course of 
different relations they have with local authorities, political, religious and economic 





argued, power does not exist in a “substantive sense”. Power is not a stable 
ascription, but rather “relations, a more-or–less organized, hierarchical, coordinated 
cluster of relations.” (p.198). Power thus emerges from interactions and social 
relations from past to present, enacted by the Roma and ultimately transforming their 
lives.   
On the other hand, the Romanian Gypsies’ history has been full of 
interventions by the state and, more recently, supra-state institutions such as the EU. 
All these ‘intrusions’ into the Roma's existence were aimed at imposing external 
categories and classification schemes (Brubacker, Cooper 2000). From enslavement 
of some Gypsies to the boyars’ courts and monasteries in the late Middle Ages to 
subsequent processes of peasantisation, proletarianisation, categorisation as an 
underclass, nomadisation, and sedentarisation, the Roma have been subjected to 
various forms of symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1991) through categories of 
identification aimed at transforming their socio-cultural identities and ways of living.  
These days, transnational organizations like the European Union, the World 
Bank (WB), the United Nation Development Program (UNDP), the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have all became interested in the 
governance and social integration of the Eastern European Roma. All these 
international actors are partners in the Roma Decade8 initiated in 2005 - an EU 
framework, which monitors states’ implementation of policies aimed at reducing the 
socio-economic gaps between the Roma and the majority populations. It claims to be 
a project for the ’social integration’ of the Romanies, who are considered to be part 
of the larger category of  the “poor and disadvantaged” (UNDP 2003b, FRA,UNDP 
and European Commission 2012, World Bank 2000, 2005), almost ’outsider’ groups 
or “groups in waiting” to be accepted into the larger society. (Drakakis-Smith 2007). 
          Both the states and international organizations, which promote development 
and social integration of the Roma in Europe use the rhetoric of sameness and 
homogenisation for a large variety of Roma groups to devise a stable basis for 
planning, policy-making and control. In Foucault’s terms (Foucault 1984: 86) it is 
 
8The Roma Decade involves a number of European governments: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia, Hungary, 





the “the power of normalization [which] imposes homogeneity”, “a system of formal 
equality” (p. 86), a fertile ground for general norms to be introduced and enforced. In 
the World Bank report (2005) the Roma are defined as “Europe’s largest and most 
vulnerable minority”, who “have no historical homeland” (p. 3). Similarly in the 
UNDP, EU, OSCE reports and website outlines9, Roma’s ’vulnerability’ 
marginalization and discrimination are emphasised: the “Roma in the region [Central 
Europe and Central Asia] are excluded from economic, social and political life. 
Compared to non-Roma citizens, Roma are more likely to live in poverty, have a 
higher risk of unemployment, stay in school for fewer years (...)”10.  
Nevertheless, nowhere in Europe have the Roma been a homogeneous group. 
As acknowledged by Zamfir and Preda (2002) there are almost 40 groups of Roma in 
Romania, each claiming different identity and status according to their traditional 
economic occupations (Sandu 2005, Badescu et all 2007). Among these, there are the 
“rudari (wood carvers), aurari (gold washers), lingurari (spoon makers), caravlahi 
(coal miners), caramidari (brick makers), blidari (bowl makers), and caldarari 
(boilermakers)” (Barany 2004: 257).  
However, the policy statements regarding  governance for Roma in Europe 
have created a symbolic division between them and Non-Roma, who are considered 
to be less poor and better  educated, and a symbolic homogeneity among a variety of 
Roma groups  generally included in the category of ’poor’ and ’vulnerable’. These 
profiles and descriptions imposed by outsiders upon Gypsies are not devoid of power 
and symbolic value. They are ways of envisioning the world, “the power to make 
things with words” (Bourdieu 1989 : 23), official discourses which establish the truth 
and “tend to picture the world as evident” (p. 21). As Rose (1999) warns, “language 
is not secondary to government; it is constitutive of it” (p. 29). The symbolic 
 
9UNDP- Roma in Central and Eastern Europe- 
http://europeandcis.undp.org/ourwork/poverty/show/2180B041-F203-1EE9-B598F2648BEACB5D 
The World Bank and the Roma. World Bank Involvement in Roma Issues- www.worldbank.org. 
Roma and Sinti issues – http://www.osce.org/odihr/roma   






categories are part of larger discourses of empowerment, which impose themselves 
as authoritative maps of understanding the social, opaque layers over a much more 
complex dynamic of power relations enacted at the individual level.  
In this sense, post-developmental studies (Rapley 2004) showed that 
programs of development/empowerment designed by states and transnational 
organizations decontextualize the social and political aspects of the problem 
(Iordache 2011) and follow a depoliticising discourse of governance. The act of 
’depoliticising’ is understood as a discursive practice that reduces the complexity of 
the social and projects it as divested of conflicts, struggles and hierarchies and 
composed of ’horizontal power relations’ (Ferguson 1994, Harris 2001, Inglis 1997, 
Miraftab 2004). 
For instance, in international programs of development “[p]articipation and 
empowerment are treated as independent of the structures of oppression”(Miraftab 
2004:242). Furthermore, the governance’s projection of empowerment and 
development through the lens of social networks or social capital creates the image 
of  horizontality of social relations (Harris 2001) and silences conflicts, hierarchy, 
and differences of power (patron-client relations). In practical terms, instead of 
empowering Roma communities in their material contexts of power relations, these 
projects can reproduce existing inequalities (e.g. patron-client). Resources could 
remain in the control of some prominent leaders, who pursue political interests rather 
than the community’s. Moreover, qualitative differences between Roma groups, 
which can place different demands on governance, are ignored.   
In the next lines, I provide a short analysis on a World Bank report (2005) in 
order to show how policy oriented research with claims of reflexivity, part of a 
neoliberal formula of development, follows an instrumental rationality and 
depoliticises the Roma's conditions of existence.  
World Bank (2005) as other neoliberal forms of national and transnational 
governance (Romanian state, EU, UNDP, OSCE) promote discourses of  social 
integration of the ’poor’ and ’vulnerable’ Roma in order to solve the so-called 
economic and social “disturbances” created by a “group problem”, considered to 
“perturb” the market,  the majority and  the state welfare. The latter is a serious 





state withdrawal from the markets, as part of a neoliberal formula of ’good 
governance’ (World Bank 1998 a, b). These references are the main elements of   
neoliberal development and likewise in the World Bank report (2005).   
The report is mainly based on quantitative and qualitative research and 
analyses on Roma from Central and Eastern European Roma with focus on Romania, 
Slovakia and Hungary. The instrumental rationality of the neoliberal project of 
governance for the Roma population is asserted from the first lines :  
Because of higher birth rates, the Roma population’s relative size is increasing 
across the region (...) Policies to address Roma poverty therefore need to be an 
integral component of each country’s economic and social development 
strategies. (p. xiii)  
This statement clearly shows who will benefit from these development projects: 
economies and member states threatened by ‘problems’ posed by an ethnic group in 
continuous demographic expansion. The devised problematic of governance clearly 
follows a general economic rationality of neoliberal development projects, which 
subordinate and adjust the social to the economic functionality of the liberal markets 
(Ferguson 1994; Inglis 1997; Harris 2001; Miraftab 2004). In the following section 
of the World Bank’s report, that precedes the research results, a clear answer to the 
question of who the Roma are is given.  
Who are the Roma? The Roma are Europe’s largest and most vulnerable  
minority. Unlike other groups, they have no historical homeland. (p. xiii).  
The projected identity does not come out as a result of a reflexive understanding of 
the Roma conditions of existence, but as an a priori self-generated category of 
identification, which legitimises the larger problematization of neo-liberal 
governance presented at  the beginning of the report, which can be summarized in the 
following statement: ’the poor’, ’the excluded’, and ’the vulnerable’ produce socio-
economic disturbances and the main solution, ’social integration’,  needs to address 
the economic problems of the market and the state, and social  ones ’faced’ by a 
majority.  Therefore, to define ’who the Roma are’ is to decide in which way they 
need to be governed (e.g. subaltern or autonomous groups). Identifying Roma as “the 
most vulnerable minority” with no “historical homeland” generates a victimization 




internal forms of governance (e.g Caldarars’ social and political organization). On 
the other hand, without the exercise of a reflexive and dialogical exploration, these 
identification categories act as forms of ’symbolic violence’ able to define 
populations through selected categories of  meaning, which fit specific neoliberal 
interests and not those of the populations for whom one is aiming at empowerment or 
social integration.   
The question of identity is a question of governmentality. Following 
Foucault’s conceptualization, the latter is a way to define a problem of governance. It 
is a problematization (Rose 1999) which sets the frame of governance, which seeks a 
solution to an already defined problem (van Baar 2011). In the World Bank’s (2005) 
report, identifications as ’vulnerable’, ’marginalized’, ’poor’ constitute the terrain for 
a depoliticised understanding of Roma conditions of existence. These identifications 
blur the qualitative difference between Roma groups with distinct historical paths of 
social and political organization (Caldarars' self-governance and Romanianized 
Roma subjection to state power/external forms of governance) and living conditions 
(affluence or poverty). In my thesis I show that the Caldarars’ successful model of 
self-governance, largely ignored by neoliberal programs of development could 
provide, in this case, a different direction for governance, and challenge and change 
the existent unproductive problematization of social integration, envisaged for an 
allegedly homogenous poor Roma population.  
The most problematic issue is the twofold definition of Roma as “poorer than 
other groups, more likely to fall into poverty, and more likely to remain poor” (p. 5) 
and the great variety of Roma population which “creates significant challenges for 
researchers and policy makers” (p. 11). For the Romanian case, the World Bank 
(2005) underlines Roma diversity without specifying the nature of the differences. It 
is also interesting to notice that a case study briefly presented in the analysis shows 
the existence of wealthy Caldarar Gypsies.  
Primarily, relatively well-off Caldarari Roma populate the Ciopeia village in 
Hunedoara. (p. 94) 
Surprisingly, there is no explanation for their wealth, which is largely explored in my 
thesis as explained by their detachment from state structural power, which leaves 




post-1989 neopatrimonial context. Depoliticised discourse becomes obvious in the 
report when the authors make reference to the delicate political alliance between the 
Roma Party and Social Democrat Party:  
While this has granted the Roma Party greater influence over Roma affairs, it 
has also prompted criticisms about the politicization of Roma appointments in 
the public administration. (p. 121) 
This statement is the only reference to political patronage of Roma politics and local 
patronage politics in the Romanian state administrative structures and probably 
intentionally not developed further in its implications for Roma politics, which is an 
important source of empowerment and self-governance. As I show in my thesis, 
political patronage and patronage politics, as fields of politics, captured Roma 
politics. On the other hand, Roma experts appointed by the state became patronage 
brokers, the subjects of patronage politics, who mainly follow political interests 
rather than the governmental strategy of ’social integration’.  
Nevertheless, similar to their resolution to the problem of the diversity of 
Roma groups, the report acknowledges the existence of a politicised environment 
(party interests ruling bureaucratic practice) but ignores the whole dynamics of 
power relations produced in this context. The authors of the report do not seem aware 
that the development and the empowerment of the Roma is blocked by local and 
regional patronage interests and that Roma citizenship rights (e.g. voting, access to 
social welfare/services) are mediated by local patronage politics. Furthermore, the 
report discounts the relational and historical contextualizations which make sense of 
differences between rich and poorer Roma and continues to claim, in the same 
depoliticised manner that the ’vulnerability and poverty of Roma’ makes their ’social 
integration’ a priority. 
Statistical data on Roma poverty becomes a strong source of legitimacy and it 
is used extensively to authenticate the already pre-defined categories of identification 
and identities of governance: Roma as ’the poor and the vulnerable of Europe’. 
Furthermore, the statistical inquiry also serves as a justification for the exclusion of 
all the other cases of affluence among the Roma that contradict the statistical pattern 
of poverty. These evasions, ignoring  the complexity and variety of Roma conditions 




and produce, what is called in post-developmental studies, the “effect of closure”:  
“devoid of reference to questions they cannot address, or that might cast doubt upon 
the completeness of their diagnoses or the feasibility of their solutions” (Li 2007: 
11). Moreover, the diversity among Roma is seen as a barrier to the practice of 
governance itself, which follows the already defined problematization of ’social 
integration’: 
The socially heterogeneous nature of Roma society also influences the 
integration level of various Roma communities, their political participation, 
and relations among different Roma groups (p. 12). 
This stands again as an argument for blurring and even ignoring differences and 
therefore proceeding in explaining poverty in terms of “low education levels, limited 
employment opportunities, and unfavourable health status” (p. 53). It is also a 
depoliticising discourse through which the problem of poverty becomes 
individualized and decontextualized from larger Romanian post-socialist 
transformations (e.g. informal economy, neo-patrimonial state and patronage 
politics) which are major references in the understanding of Roma power relations.  
Furthermore, the World Bank’s explanations dismiss Roma’s local 
knowledge and informal economic activities, used successfully by Caldarars as part 
of a form of self-governance. Discussing the Roma’s local knowledge would 
certainly challenge the whole paradigm of governance, which emphasises the lack of 
state education, self-exclusion and imperative need for social integration. The World 
Bank’s discursive choices legitimize external forms of governance which come to 
help the ’poor’, ’vulnerable’ populations not able to govern themselves, people in 
’stringent’ need of being governed. If this seems the case of Romanianized Roma 
communities, who have a long  experience of state dependency covering  different 
historical regimes, it is clearly inappropriate  for Caldarar communities who have 
followed a mobile and independent model of existence, detached from the authority 
of external forms of governance.  
The question remains : Are the World Bank and other neoliberal institutions 
of governance, that pretend to produce research-based reflexive governance for the 




to external homogenizing discourses of ’social integration’ with implied instrumental 
economic rationality?  
In my last chapter on Pentecostalism as a discourse of power and 
empowerment I show how state representatives did not considered Roma Pentecostal 
conversion to be a form of self-governance and empowerment, but a good 
mechanism of  ’social taming’ which largely corresponds to state programs of ’social 
integration’. Additionally, in the World Bank (2005) report  Roma culture is opposed 
to modernisation:  
aspects of Roma culture and living conditions have reinforced stereotypes and 
spurred marginalization. Members of more traditional groups, such as Roma, 
can benefit from integration if it facilitates individual growth and well being (p. 
12.) 
Interestingly, the second statement suggests a transfer of governance from 
community to external authorities (state, international organization of development), 
which promote ’social integration’. In addition, ’social integration’ is equated with 
modernization and human development, which are opposed to culture and ’tradition’. 
In my view, the latter are the source of difference and self-governance, which are, in 
this case, rejected and considered a source of marginalization and self-exclusion.  
To sum up, the World Bank (2005) makes a minimal and merely superficial 
acknowledgement of Roma diversity and social and political contexts in which Roma 
live and creates a false image of reflexive governance. It generally blurs the political 
aspects of Roma conditions of existence and ignores forms of self-governance in 
order to legitimize the problematization of ’social integration’ and categories of 
identification (’poverty’, ’exclusion’, ’vulnerability’) articulated from the outset. 
From this perspective, ’social integration’ is considered to be the process through 
which the Roma can receive full citizenship rights through a process of collaboration 
between Roma activists, states and transnational forms of governance.  
Van Baar (2011), in his exploration of the issues of Roma transnational 
governmentality claims that these development and empowerment programs are acts 
of ”repoliticisation”’ which call for “citizenship participation” and struggle by Roma 
activists to challenge the problematic of transnational governance constructed around 




my viewpoint, ’social integration’ as a process implies from the start a position of 
subordination (as ’marginalized’, ’excluded’) of the Roma in relation to a majority 
which needs to accept and integrate them. Therefore, the problematization of social 
integration itself is not a base for  ”citizenship participation” but, to use Bourdieu’s 
(1984) words11 , it is rather “a reproductive struggle, since those who enter this chase 
... are beaten before they start” (Bourdieu 1984: 125, Bourdieu 1985).  
Moreover, as I show in my thesis, the Roma Party representatives who may 
be profiled by the World Bank and other neoliberal forms of governance as 
Romanian Roma activists do not struggle for Roma citizenship rights, but follow the 
paths of clientelism and patronage and generally do not challenge the external 
problematization of governance. This lack of fight and resistance is also confirmed 
by the main Roma activist leader and sociologist Nicolae Gheorghe who claimed the 
following: 
integration or even partial assimilation, which would lead to an 
undifferentiated incorporation of the Roma into mainstream society, can be 
regarded as a worthy ideology by Romani elites. (PER12 1997, cited in World 
Bank 2005: 22).  
On the other hand, from the position of marginalized, excluded and vulnerable, the 
Roma are considered almost incapable of producing their own forms of governance 
and challenging the imposed subaltern position in society and Europe. They are 
rather expected to follow external directions imposed by a transnational neoliberal 
governance, which is rather interested in solving economic and social problems 
created by a ’group problem’. 
Furthermore, World Bank (2005), which promotes the ’social integration’ of 
Roma, uses a model of social reproduction which locates power in a reproductive 
game of positionalities. They identified the Roma as a ’vulnerable’ population and 
then undertook  research  in four countries (Slovak Republic, Romania, Hungary, 
 
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In this statement, Bourdieu refers at his conception of power struggles and symbolic power as an 
expression of reproduction of habitual structures and positions in the social space. However, my 
reference reflects the process of reproduction of a position of subordination implied in the 
problematization of governance for Roma as social integration.   





Spain) in order to manufacture explanations for a problem  defined from the outset 
(poverty, marginalization, vulnerability).  
Through ’effects of closure’ and pretences of reflexivity (researching the 
governed) neoliberal governmental power “continually seeks to give itself a form of 
truth” (Rose 1999: 7), to “structure the possible fields of others” (Foucault 2000: 
341) and apply general categories of governance and identification (’exclusion’, 
’poverty’‚ ’marginalization’) to the complex Roma conditions of existence. 
Therefore, I consider that research on Roma should start from 
conceptualizations and themes (e.g. power relations), which do not carry the danger 
of imposing rigid identities (’the poor’,’ the vulnerable’) or the reification of Roma's 
marginal position in society. In this sense, my historical ethnography of power 
relations deactivates the power of larger discourses of governance, which can act as 
categories of identification and subordination (’marginalization’, ’poverty’, 
’vulnerability’) and deconstructs a projection of a rigid homogeneous identity on a 
diverse Roma population. 
 
Empowerment and the Study of Power dynamics 
 
The examination of local power relations needs to precede any project aimed at 
empowerment (Inglis 1997; Miraftab 2004). Aspects of power capilarity (local 
individual practices and relations) were considered by scholars of post-socialism in 
Eastern Europe to be crucially important in the understanding of the unintended 
consequences of post-1989 capitalism (Grzymala-Busse, Luong 2002; Burawoy and 
Verdery 1999). The transition to the market economy, transformations of the state 
and political pluralism have produced a general politics of clientelism in which local 
patrons were linked to central state actors through political favouritism (Burawoy 
and Verdery 1999, Gadowska 2006, Stoica 2004, Verdery 1996). This context can be 
better understood through its local level dynamics, which reveals the individuals’ or 
groups’ participation in these transformations.  
According to these observations, my thesis takes a micro-power approach. It 
echoes a desideratum expressed by Hearn (2012): “if we want to have an effect on 




human power” (p. 3). More specifically, in the study of the Roma and other 
populations subjected to a large degree of governmental power, the relational power 
dynamics become essential in revealing both sides of the coin: the power of large 
structural transformations and the power released by the relational dynamic created 
through individuals’ and groups’ practices. Both forms of power interact and 
participate in the transformation of their life trajectories and are accountable for 
social change and transformation of the Roma communities.  
In the following section, I offer an overview of different and complementary 
theoretical and ethnographic views on power in relation to history, neo-Marxist and 
post-structuralist streams of thought, as they prove relevant to my Ph.D. thesis. I 
conclude with a presentation of the main theoretical and methodological guidelines 
for the study of power relations I follow throughout my thesis. 
3.Theoretical and Ethnographic Considerations for the   
study of power  
 
Post-structuralist approaches to power 
 
For Foucault power works and flows through connections, and circulates “in the form 
of a chain” (p. 98) never localized or possessed by individuals. This lack of a fixed 
location for power poses challenges to its empirical exploration. However, what 
Foucault (1980) suggests, is that power should not be studied as a stable referential 
object with clear-cut hierarchies, but as a relation and dynamic through which 
individuals are both controlled and empowered. The network-like character of power 
is not necessarily a trap. The individual can “circulate between its threads” (p. 98) 
and” has at his disposal a certain power, and for that very reason can also act as the 
vehicle for transmitting wider power” (p. 72).  
Also, Foucault (1980) considers that power and acts of resistance coexist and 
that “the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the 
point where relations of power are exercised” (p. 142). In this sense, he was very 
much concerned with the practical character of power, which starts from its 
“infinitesimal mechanisms, which have their own history, their own trajectory, their 




own history, might differ from the history of the social and political programs 
coordinated from the centre by the state or big institutional actors. In my thesis, I 
endorse this localized dynamic of history and power, which can alter and change the 
enactments of state programs of assimilation, social integration and modernisation.  
Furthermore, Foucault’s (1984) perspective on power and history has recently 
become attractive to geographers who were interested in developing his 
conceptualizations of power. Sharp, Routledge, Philo and Paddison (1999) developed 
the relational understanding of power, in their geographical writings. They go 
beyond the neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian conceptions of power to look at 
’entanglements of power’, in which resistance and domination shape each other as 
constitutive of social relations. The metaphor of “entanglements of power” is a 
critique of Pile and Keith’s (1997) understanding and theorisation of resistance as 
dislocated from the space of domination. Domination and resistance are considered 
two interdependent phenomena, each acting within and upon the space of the other. 
However, the struggle or negotiation of meanings is experienced differently by 
different groups (group). As Fletcher  (2001) and other authors (Gledhill 2000, 
Guttmann 1993, Ortner 1995) remarked, there were very few studies on power and 
resistance examining  the divisions and different reactions to power ‘within’ groups. 
In this sense, my thesis will take a historical comparative approach to this issue of 
power and reaction to power for the two Roma groups studied. 
 
Neo-Marxist approaches to power  
Steven Lukes (1974), who is a well-known neo-Marxist sociologist for his 
sociological theorizations on power, drawing on Foucauldian conceptualizations, 
discusses on domination and consent and their implications for the analysis of power. 
For Lukes (2002) power is simply defined in terms of parts’ unequal relational 
interests: ”A may exercise  power over B by getting him to do what he does not want 
to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining 
his very wants”. (p.42). Through this definition, Lukes (2002) brings the element of 
consent into the definition of power, which has been considered for a long time in 
sociology as conflictual. In Lukes’ view, since entity B is influenced in his wants by 




acquiescence through the internalization of norms and wants. However, in this 
definition, power remains intentional, a perspective Lukes himself criticises. Power 
is directed by an entity A, which can be an institution or individual, towards other 
similar entities. The idea that power can exist outside conflict and can create, 
constitute subjects of desire is very much Foucauldian but it is still framed in old 
terms of domination, which is that of intentional power imposed by an entity to 
another.  
Also, for Lukes (1974), while one entity A seems to have the entire control 
over power, B is just the subject of it. In a Foucauldian understanding, the controller 
of the power game A gets itself controlled through the relation established with the 
Other (B). In order to increase his control over the Other, A goes through a process 
of self- mastery or self-control mainly dictated by the power relation itself. From 
here, it can be inferred, in a Foucauldian understanding that power and subjection to 
power are part of the same game, which applies to all entities involved, irrespective 
of who is entitled or legitimate to dominate the other. This interpretation resonates 
much better with my understanding of power, which is less focused on individuals’ 
capacities to control the other and more on power relations themselves, which bring 
transformations for those engaged with them.  
Nevertheless, Luke’s emphasis on consent improves the understanding of the 
exercise of power but it is nonetheless entity focused. He considers that power 
relations can be characterized by ‘latent conflict’ between two entities rather than 
overt, observable conflict as it used to be considered in the classic formula of 
domination. ‘Latent conflict’ refers to the “contradiction between the interests of 
those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude” (Lukes 2002: 
44). Through this definition, power appears as a struggle between opposite interests, 
which may not be openly affirmed but may be shaped by the one who exercises 
power. In these terms, the intentional character of power is not removed but it is 
rather strengthened in terms of opposite interests, identified, endorsed and affirmed 
by the parts. That is clearly revealed when Lukes (2002) defines the effective sense 
of ‘exercising power’: ”A’s intervention can be said to make a difference to the 
result. Let us call this sense of ‘exercising power’ the effective sense” (p.54). 





the case where B’s change of course corresponds to A’s wishes, that is, where A 
secures B’s compliance” (p.54). The latter definition brings his conceptualization 
close to the classical understanding of domination as subordination.  
In a Foucauldian understanding, there is not clear awareness of opposite 
interests and entities with capacities to exercise power over the others. As Lukes 
(1974, 2002) himself discusses, Foucault has mainly explored ‘power to’ constitute 
subjects through relations and knowledge and almost excluded ‘power over’ as 
domination of some agents over others. In this sense, Luke’s theorization can be 
considered an improved Marxist perspective of power as domination focused on 
latent conflictual interests, which can be shaped by the main part that exercises 
power (A). Nevertheless, in his definitional terms power is still intentional, entity 
based and almost unidirectional oriented (from A to B). In my view, both parts are 
involved in the constitution of the power relation and both are subjected to the power 
produced. Furthermore, actors’ actions are constituted in a dynamic with the macro 
historical transformations of what I call in my thesis ‘spheres of power struggle’.  
In connection to this dynamic approach of power, Wolf (1982) is an 
important neo-Marxist anthropologist, who used ethnography in the analysis of 
power relations and linked the micro to macro levels of political and historical 
analysis in a “systematic attempt to write a history of the present as a history of 
power” (Ghani 1995: 32).  He considered that historical processes can be seen as sets 
of relations set up around different modes of production and sources of capital 
fostering “uneven development of regions and social spaces” (p. 33).  
Wolf (2001) considers that ’structural power’ is in a way similar to Marx’s 
conception of social relations of production and Foucault’s conceptions of 
’governance’. Foucault (1991a, 2000) generally defines the latter as the power “to 
structure the field of possibilities of others” (p. 428). Nevertheless, Wolf (1982, 
1990) distanced himself from Foucault (1980) by paying a special attention to 
political economy and the transformation of capital and relations of production at the 
local, national, and global scale. Also, his interest in ideology differentiates him from 
Foucault’s (1991) understanding of power discourses within which practices and 
ideas are entangled and convergent in discursive practices. The latter, as well as the 




interest in the study of power within and across spheres of contest (politics, state, 
informal economy, religion) for the two Roma groups. 
For both Wolf (1982, 2001) and Foucault (1980), power is a capability, 
which can be located in relations or structures. While I endorse this perspective, I 
consider that power manifests and works through relations between individuals and 
groups and has the capacity to transform groups and individuals’ lives. In addition, 
Wolf and Foucault use a similar historical approach to the understanding of power, 
which is crucial to my study. They understand history as contingency, rather than a 
teleological, progressive narrative in which one event or action causes the other. A 
contingency approach to history is concentrated on particular events and relations, 
which are able to produce, at different levels, transformations in individuals’ and 
groups’ histories and life trajectories. Therefore, particular events and discursive 
practices, located in different spheres of power struggle and manifested locally, can 
reveal important power relations and have relevance for the transformation of the 
Roma life trajectories. Therefore, as emphasised earlier, my thesis highlights the 
space of communication and interaction between macro and micro-power 
manifestations. In this sense, Bourdieu’s (1977, 1985, 1989) theorisation on fields 
and power struggles at the individual level offers this kind of communicative ground 
regarding micro–macro connections and manifestations of power.  
 
Bourdieu on power struggles and fields 
 
A well-known sociological view on power relations and struggles is Bourdieu’s 
(1977, 1985, 1989). In Bourdieu’s understanding, power relations between 
individuals are the reflection of an already constituted social structure. Power 
relations are employed and manifested in competitive struggles, which take the 
“form of class struggle (...) a reproductive struggle, since those who enter this chase 
are beaten before they start” (Bourdieu 1984: 125). Conversely, in my thesis, power 





For Bourdieu (1989) the social distances between groups and individuals are 
reflected in the distribution of capital13 in the social space, while the relations 
between individuals are objective, expression of “the relations between positions 
occupied within the distribution of the resources which are or may become active, 
effective” (p.16). As Connell (1983), Bohman (1999), Butler (1999) and Hearn 
(2012) argued, Bourdieu’s class-based analytical model of understanding power 
“leads him to an account of social order and its stable reproduction, with minimal 
consideration of why things change, of why power sometimes fails and falls apart” 
(Hearn 2012: 100). Therefore, his reproductionist model poses serious challenges not 
only to the analysis of power but also to the mechanisms of producing ’a change in 
world view’(p.23) discussed by Bourdieu (1989), in relation with the concept of 
symbolic power and  presented earlier in my chapter.  
Furthermore, his understanding of power relations is confined to his 
conceptualization of the social field, which is the place where the so-called power 
struggles take place. The social field is described as a “multi-dimensional space of 
positions such that (...) agents are distributed within it, in the first dimension, 
according to the overall volume of the capital they possess and, in the second 
dimension, according to the composition of their capital” (Bourdieu 1985: 724). 
Economy, politics, culture and art are social fields of power struggles, which follow 
the logic of the capital’s distribution. Furthermore, Bourdieu (1985) claims that the 
fields carry their “own logic and hierarchy” (p. 724) and have, in this sense, relative 
autonomy in relation to other fields. Unlike Bourdieu, in my thesis I consider that 
what I call the spheres of power struggle (economy, state, politics, religion) are 
interrelated at both macro and micro-power levels.  
The projected stability of power relations, which I consider a problem in 
Bourdieu’s conceptualization, is produced through the accumulation of resources 
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13The main forms of capital, in Bourdieu’s understanding, are: ”1. economic, in the usual sense of 
material resources and wealth; 2. social, that is, networks and other useful social relations; 3. cultural, 
recognized forms of valued knowldge and expertise; and 4. symbolic, markers of honour and prestige” 





which “are not the same thing as power and the exercise of power” (Allen 2004: 30). 
For Bourdieu, power relations are not struggle per se but rather stable expressions of 
the distribution of capital (economic, social, cultural, and symbolic) in the social 
fields. In this context, power relations follow a pre-existent social order and power 
struggle does not capture the dynamic of relations between individuals.  
Conversely, from my point of view, power relations and struggles are not 
expressions of stable structures of capital, but mechanisms of transformation and 
change. They can be characterized by different dominant forms of relationality (e.g. 
clientelism) without being subjugated to its main raison d'etre. On the other hand, 
individuals do not necessarily have a fixed socio-economic status and their life 
trajectories do not necessarily take a business-like route of capital accumulation, as 
Bourdieu suggests (1984), but they are always transformed through a temporal 
dynamic of individual relations.     
In addition, I consider that Bourdieu’s (1977, 1985, 1989) conceptualizations 
downplay the temporal dimension of power struggles. His a-temporal approach leads 
to a static understanding of the social and to an endless social reproduction. 
Nevertheless, Bourdieu (1984) does not exclude the idea of movement of actors 
within social fields. In Distinction (1984), Bourdieu mentions two forms of 
movement:  
a. Vertical movement - upwards and downwards - within the field, which 
entails a decrease or “increase in the volume of the type of capital already 
dominant in the asset structure” (p. 113);  
b. Transversal movement, which ensures a reproduction of the position 
produced in the vertical movement through “a shift into another field and the 
reconversion of one type of capital into another or of one sub-type into 
another sub-type” (p. 131).  
However, as Vigh (2009) observed, Bourdieu’s fields are rather static and exclude 
two other important forms of movement.  
1. Movement of the environment, or fields themselves, in Bourdieu’s 





2. Movement of individuals, their interactions with the continuous 
transformations of the environment, or what I call here the spheres of power 
struggle. 
These two forms of movement bring the temporal dynamic back in the theoretical 
framework of power relations and struggles. Relations between individuals and 
groups are included in a processual understanding of transformation. In my thesis, I 
consider these two forms of movement/transformation suggested by Vigh (2009):  
 a. transformation of spheres of power struggle (state, politics, economy, state 
education, religion) from socialism to post-socialism;  
 b. the interaction of the two groups of Roma with these transformations, 
manifested in local level relations and discursive practices.  
An additional aspect of Bourdieu’s theory of capital and fields deserves attention 
here. His understanding of individuals as almost rational actors, who can develop 
strategies, invest and translate capital into strategic resources, proves problematic. 
This approach is mainly challenged by the continuous movement and transformation 
(Vigh 2009) of the social, economic and political environment. Vigh (2009) argues 
that in countries with high levels of economic and political instability, individuals 
and groups do not develop coherent strategies, but follow ’tentative mappings’, 
which fit an unsettled, fast-transforming socio-economic-political environment. As 
he further argues, individuals need to manage the movement of the environment, 
while they move themselves with practices and projects. In short, they ’socially  
navigate’ their social worlds set in continuous transformation. 
It is worth noting that ethnographic studies on Eastern Europe (Burawoy and 
Verdery 1999; Verdery 1993, 1996, 2002) confirm Vigh’s (2009) elaboration on 
continuous movement of the social, economic and political environment, which 
cannot be viewed as a stable structure, but rather as a process in which the 
individuals’ practices and relations participate actively in the larger transformations. 
Burawoy and Verdery (1999) argue that people in post-1989 Eastern European 
countries including Romania experienced high levels of uncertainty14 and were, in 
 
14
By making references to uncertainties Burawoy and Verdery (1999) mainly refer to high levels of 
inflation, difficulties in the restitution of private property, deindustrialization and high levels of 




this way, locally involved in domestications and contestations of the law and 
institutional practice (Verdery 2002).    
Burawoy and Verdery (1999) state that what is usually understood as 
structural change and almost linear process from A to B, becomes a continuous 
process in which the centre no longer dictates a unique direction, but leaves space for 
micro-power relations to participate significantly in larger transformations.  In my 
study, the micro-power is one of the explanatory variables in the understanding of 
the differential transformation of the two Roma groups.  
4.Thesis structure 
The Ph.D. thesis is divided into 9 main chapters: methodology and methods, 7 main 
chapters, conclusion, bibliography, and notes.  
 
The first main chapter sets out the historical context of my research and presents 
the main transformations in Eastern Europe and Romania that occurred from 
socialism to pos -socialism, as studied by social scientists. It maps all the relevant 
larger transformations (e.g. the emergence of the informal economy, clientelism, 
neopatrimonial state) related to local power relations and discursive practices in the 
main spheres of power struggle. It argues primarily for a decentralized, de-reifying 
understanding of power, which is not always located in the state, but in local level 
relations and practices. The latter participate in the post-socialist transformations and 
alter the directions of governance. 
 
The second main chapter is an analysis of the two Roma groups in the interactions 
with the transformations in the economic sphere of power struggles from socialism 
to post- socialism.  It develops a critical dialogue with Ladanyi and Szelenyi’s (2003) 
model of macro-historical and unidirectional transformation of the Roma socio-
economic condition. In the chapter, I follow the two Roma groups’ modes of 
adaptation, alteration and innovation within the economic sphere (the socialist 
second economy and the post-socialist informal economy). I argue that the Caldarars 




sphere can be summarized by two models, which involved unequal access to 
opportunities: the mobility and the sedentary approach of economic practice.   
 
The third main chapter is a retrospective historical analysis of the Roma forms of 
leadership. In the previous chapter on the informal economy, the Caldarar leaders 
were presented as important actors connecting and disconnecting the community 
from the state sources of power. In this chapter, I explore the idea of brokerage 
capacity to create a space for both Roma empowerment and contestations of power. 
It shows that the Roma leaders, who were co-opted as Roma experts were less able to 
act in the interests of their community and started to forge connections with 
important actors within tight webs of power. On the other hand, those who remained‚ 
’informal’ leaders and do not occupy official positions are able to move smoothly 
between loose power webs and negotiate clientelistic relations in their own interests.   
 
The fourth main chapter maps the web of Roma power relations in the sphere of 
politics, in connection to post-socialist transformations of the state and politics (e.g. 
neopatrimonial state, Roma politics). In this chapter, I show that local-level power 
relations among Roma were affected by the transition from ’restitution politics’ (the 
restitution of gold associated with the early 1990s PSD politics) to local patronage 
politics materialized through the Roma leaders’ support for the patron and his 
followers and a central political patronage (Roma Party politically subordinated to 
the Social Democrat Party). The resulting fields of politics produced a double 
structure of patronage, which captured the Roma politics as source of power and 
empowerment for the two Roma communities. While the Roma experts/patronage 
brokers experienced local patronage as a form of limitation in representing the 
interests of the community, the Roma informal leaders/power brokers used the 
context in their own interests. In this way, the Roma communities were deprived of 
political support and representation.  
 
The fifth main chapter continues, in a present manner, the inquiry into the Roma 
relations with the state, which is mainly explored retrospectively in Chapter three on 




subjection to local patronage politics through an analysis of individuals’ everyday 
encounters with the local state within the clientelistic dynamics. I argue that 
transformations in Roma leadership in the local development of patronage politics 
produced for both Roma communities a relative individualization of encounters with 
the local state and patron. In the case of the Romanianized Roma, the leaders who 
became patronage brokers, less able to advocate on behalf of their community, 
subjected Roma to direct clientelistic relations with the local patron. With regard to 
the Caldarars, the bulibasi, who became power brokers, have pursued personal 
clientelistic interests and thus reduced their involvement in the Caldarars’ 
interactions with the local state.  
 
The sixth main chapter follows the strategy of the previous one and develops, in a 
present but also a historical prospective approach, a view of everyday local politics, 
explored retrospectively in the Chapter four. The chapter analyses the dynamics of 
clientelism in the two Roma communities. A special section is devoted to the 2009 
presidential elections in Costesti, a prospective event, able to reveal and transform 
local power relations. By exploring patterns of voting behaviour, I argue that 
patronage brokers, through their clientelistic actions, reproduce patronage politics 
and neopatrimonial power. However, for the Caldarars, the contests between multiple 
power brokers give space for the democratization of voting behaviour and bring 
challenges to the local patronage politics.  
 
The seventh chapter moves from the analysis of power relations towards the 
discursive practices of power in the sphere of religion. It explores the dialectic 
power-empowerment in religious discursive practices. The Caldarars’ conversion to 
Pentecostalism produces both empowerment and subjection to power. In this sense, I 
show that the Pentecostal religious practice, locally and independently organized, 
challenges forms of external authority and produces genuine forms of self-
governance and empowerment from within. Pentecostal Caldarars no longer submit 
to their ’traditional’ leaders – bulibasi - and situate ’authority’ in their everyday life, 
in close connection to their relations with God ( the new bulibasa), their normative 




administrators of the church), the Pentecostal discursive practices change patterns of 
voting, which are no longer influenced by bulibasi, but relocated to the private 
sphere of their relations with God.  
 
The eight chapter is the concluding chapter which closes the circle of discussion 
started in introduction and reveals two models of interaction with historical 
transformations within and across different spheres of power struggles (state, 
politics, economy and religion). Caldarars through a mobile approach in economic 
practices, use of practical knowledge and new models of self-governance (e.g. 
Pentecostal religious practice) succeeded to adapt to a fast transforming post-socialist 
environment. On the other hand, Romanianized Roma, with a sedentary approach 
navigated the field of limited possibilities within the local dynamics of power 
relations. My thesis argues that neoliberal discourses of social integration for Roma 
use identificatory categories sourced from statistics to depoliticise and 
decontextualize a qualitative complex reality. They discount and reproduce two forms 
of subordination of the Roma, reflexively explored in my thesis. First, there is a 
general disregard for local clientelistic dynamics and the double structure of 
patronage, which captures the Roma politics and disempowers the Roma. Secondly, 
they overlook qualitative differences between Roma groups who are largely 
subsumed under the category of ’poor’ and ’vulnerable’ people of Europe. Therefore, 
my thesis suggests that, in order to produce social change and the empowerment of 
the Roma, both academic and policy oriented research should pay attention both to 
the local level dynamics of power relations, discursive practices and qualitative 
differences between Roma groups in their history of power relations. In this sense, 
the Caldarars’ mobile approach to relations and  economic activities, and their new 
religious discursive practices challenge categories of symbolic violence (’poor’, 
’marginalized’, ’vulnerable’) and suggest the development of alternative  mentalities 
of governance, willing to identify and underpin  Roma models of self-governance and 







Chapter 1. Methodology and Method  
1.1 Methodological and theoretical references for the study 
of power relations   
 
Generally, the methodological approach used in my thesis is an adjusted framework 
for the study of power, inspired by Wolf’s (1990, 1999,  2001) and Foucault’s (1980) 
historical-relational perspectives on power and discursive practices. 
Foucault (1980) considers that “power is co-extensive with the social body” (p. 142) 
and that power relations cannot be disconnected from other relational manifestations 
enacted in different spheres of social life. In this context, individuals’ economic 
practices, interactions with the state, political actions, religious practices are all 
connected through the webs of power. In my thesis, I generally follow a Foucauldian 
relational perspective on power, which goes into the complex analysis of its 
capilarities of local power practices and manifestations enacted by individuals, 
groups and institutions. 
By looking at individuals and local groups’ practices in interaction with 
larger transformations of state, economy, politics, I consider that my main 
methodological focus is on the dynamic micro-power (individual /group relations 
and practices) vs. macro- power (spheres of power struggles) with an ethnographic 
focus on micro-power. I define micro-power as the relations between individuals and 
groups enacted within and across different spheres of power struggle, including 
state, politics, economy and religion. In this context, power relations and discursive 
practices are mediums of transformation, which take the form of struggles. More 
concretely, my analytical operationalization of power relations and discursive 
practices includes the following sets of conceptual dimensions: 
 
A. The content and operations of power relations and discursive 
practices which refer to what post-structuralist geographers called 





subjection to power, resistance and empowerment coexist in any power 
relation and discursive practice :    
1. Subjection to power refers at adoption of values and models of 
practice (e.g. clientelism), which lead to subordination and dependence on 
external actors. These forms of power are frequently generated by the state’s 
discursive practices of governance (identification, education, social 
integration), but also by new religious discourses of power (Pentecostalism). 
Both claim to produce empowerment. 
2. Contestation of different forms of power comes from individual 
discursive practices (e.g. the Pentecostal religious doctrine vs. religious 
reflexivity). Dialogues with the religious self are forms of contestation and 
rejection of the Roma leadership.   
3. Empowerment is a mixture of elements of individual discursive 
practices (e.g. religious reflexivity, dialogues with God) and large discourses 
of power (e.g. Pentecostalism doctrine) which leads to self-governance.  
 
B. Implications of power relations and discursive practices.  
They have the capacity to generate long-term constraints or opportunities for 
action,   human and economic development for the parties involved.  
1. Opportunities give access to entrepreneurial activities and 
connectivity to larger webs of power (e.g. forms of self-governance are 
favourable to entrepreneurial activities, which are symbolically supported 
by religious practice). 
2. Constraints come as limited possibilities of action and economic 
development confining individuals to local or particular sets of relations.    
In my thesis, I look at the capacity of the temporal dynamic of individual and group 
power relations and discursive practices to produce transformations in the life 
trajectories of the two Roma groups. From this point of view, it constitutes an 
historical analysis of power relations and discursive practices. It follows seven 
methodological and theoretical references: 
1. As Hearn (2012) argued, a dichotomy between structures and agency 




Following this argument, as well as Foucault’s (1980) relational perspective, 
my study goes beyond the duality of structure–agency, and  locates power in 
relations, which are treated here as social processes in their temporal 
transformation from socialism to post-socialism.  
2. The study is concentrated on both power relations and discursive 
practices within and across different spheres of power struggle. The chapters 
on informal economy, state encounters, leadership and politics are mainly 
focused on events and relations between individuals at different 
administrative levels. The last chapter on religion analyses the dynamic 
between state discourses of power (social integration) and the Roma religious 
discursive practices.   
3. The spheres of power struggles are inter-related (e.g. state-politics-
informal economy, or politics-religion). The Roma micro-power relations and 
discursive practices are explored in the intersectionality of these spheres of 
power struggle. I follow the historical transformation from socialism to post-
socialism and the micro-dynamics of power relations in each sphere of power 
struggles. Looking at local level power struggles within and across different 
spheres resembles what Foucault (1980) proposed as an ’ascending analysis 
of power’ (p. 99). 
4. Inspired by Wolf (1990), Schneider (1995) suggested that an analysis 
of power that links micro- to macro-levels should pay attention to brokers. In 
my thesis, I identify and inquire into the brokerage practices, which connect 
different levels of power and make the power dispersed and effective in its 
capilarities. The brokers’ actions and involvement in events constitute a map 
of the power webs, which expands beyond the local level of practice.   
5. Inspired by Vigh (1999), I concentrate my analysis on two 
movements/transformations. First, it is the transformations of what I call 
spheres of power struggle, including state, politics, economy, and religion, 
from socialism to post-socialism. Second, it is the individual/group 
movement and interaction with the macro-transformations. In this regard, I 
mainly concentrated on the transformations of state and economy: from a 




economy with a small second economy sector to decentralized deregulated 
markets and the development of significant informal activity. These larger 
transformations created both constraints and opportunities for the two Roma 
groups, which interacted differently with the post-socialist transformations.  
6. Following the Foucauldian and Wolfian perspectives on power, I 
approach history as contingency. The historical analysis of micro-power is 
mainly concentrated on events and relations involving individuals and 
groups. Power relations have a transformative capacity for the historical 
trajectories of the two Roma groups studied.    
7. Ultimately, power relations are power struggles, processes in 
continuous transformation. As Hearn (2012) advises, power should not be 
essentialized, but rather “used to characterize tendencies in the relationships 
between social entities, and should not be construed either solely as 
observable events, or as some substances or quality found in the powerful” 
(p. 16). In this sense, my methodological construct that includes (a) power 
relations expressed in local level events and individual vs. groups practices 
and (b) individual/group discursive practices of power, avoids any form of 
essentialization of power. In sum, my thesis captures the dynamic of power as 
social process. The temporal dynamic of power struggles within and across 
spheres of contest ultimately creates the transformative tendencies of what I 
call in my thesis power relations. 
1.2 Method: Political-Historical Ethnography and Event 
Analysis  
  
As emphasised, my attention here is concentrated on power as a process and 
relational dynamic that reveals itself through its manifestations in individual and 
group relations and discursive practices. I argue that ethnography is the most suitable 
method for the exploration of power relations at individual and group level in their 
historical transformations, which cannot be captured through surveys or isolated, 




Due to multiple influences coming from a wide range of philosophical and 
theoretical streams (phenomenological, hermeneutics, structuralism, feminism, 
constructionism, post-structuralism), a core definition of ethnography is generally 
avoided (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). Nevertheless, ethnography can be 
considered the research approach and method used by social scientists to carry out a 
reflexive immersion in a group, or several groups of people, in a location, or several 
locations, through participant observation and interviews aimed at the study of 
practices, norms, and relations. As argued (Joseph, Mahler and Auyero 2007), 
“ethnography is uniquely equipped to look microscopically at the foundation of 
political institutions and their attendants set of practices” (p. 2). In my research I 
used political ethnography to unravel the mechanisms of what Foucault (1980) called 
micro-power and capilarities of power relations. In my thesis, politics has a specific 
meaning, which is related to voting behaviour, local distribution of resources, and 
political parties, discussed in two chapters on politics. Power largely refers to 
struggles and negotiations of meaning and access to socio-economic opportunities. 
Political ethnography refers largely to power struggles and is useful for 
understanding the dynamics of practices and discourses of power in their ’peripheral’ 
and relational enactments (Tilly 2007), but also in their connections to higher scales 
(regional and state actors, state discourses of modernization etc.). 
Moreover, a consistent political ethnography includes the historical 
dimension of the power relations under consideration. Kalb and Tak (2005) remarked 
that history, as approached by sociologists and anthropologists, has been understood 
as periods of time, “as static temporal blocks of meaning,” (p. 12) that serve to 
explain social phenomena. Moreover, micro-historical analysis has often been treated 
in an a-temporal manner. In my thesis, I use a historical-ethnographic approach, 
which concentrates, on the processuality of power relations and discursive practices 
in different spheres of struggle. However, there are different ways of approaching 
history. Horowitz and Haney (2006) identified four models of historical analysis in 
ethnographic work: history as context, history as process, history as comparison and 
history as explanation. A historical comparison approach takes as its data the social, 
political and economic changes occurring at fixed temporal references (socialism and 




temporal reference to another. In this way, the process of transformation becomes the 
‘black box’ of the study’. On the other hand, historical explanation adopts a 
deterministic approach and evolutionary teleological thinking to explain present 
social conditions through previous historical actions, structures and discourses.  
In my thesis, I use the other two approaches presented by Horowitz and 
Haney (2006): history as process and history as context. History as context is used 
mainly in my first chapter on historical transformations from socialism to post-
socialism, which provides a general overview of the main processes and changes 
which occurred in the Romanian economy and society (e.g. expansion of informal 
economy), law (restitution of property and minority rights), the development of 
clientelistic networks (patronage and patrimonial politics), changes in the elites’ 
composition (e.g. state representatives as political entrepreneurs). History as a 
process is nonetheless the main approach in my thesis. By process I understand the 
transformation of power in its temporal (socialism to post-socialism) and relational 
extensions (relations between individuals diversified and expanded through social, 
economic, and religious practices).  
Historical-processual ethnographic research “addresses theoretical issues that 
are not limited to period, place or group” (Handelman 2005: 30). Rather than starting 
from larger events and structures, my research approaches issues of power 
ethnographically by looking at the people’s practices and relations as they are 
performed and transformed. Similarly, Sider (2005) looked at the lived history of 
various indigenous groups in North America. He suggested that two historical scales 
- macro and micro - can be linked within ethnography through the micro-historical 
research which connects “contexts of decision-making at high levels of authority, 
such as the World Bank or government departments, to local concerns, 
mobilizations, and outcomes” (Kalb, Tak 2005: 19). My thesis follows this model 
and explores local Roma practices and historical transformations within Roma 
communities in order to challenge transnational neoliberal problematizations of 
governance (neoliberal governmentality Foucault 1991a) promoted by the World 
Bank, the UNDP, the OSCE and the EU.  
This methodological engagement is called ’extended case method’ and it was 




school of political anthropology. It is able to capture the “translocal in the local” 
(Glaesar 2005: 30; Burawoy 1998) and individual case studies are approached in 
their historical expansion, articulation and general impact on a population or 
phenomenon. Gluckman (1958, 1961, 1968) also has the merit of emphasising the 
understanding of the social as a process in the everyday events that can reveal 
discontinuities at larger levels of practice and decision. This ethnographic approach 
to history has been called ‘prospective micro-history’. In Gluckman’s terms, the 
prospective character is given by the capacity of current social events (e.g. 
presidential elections experienced locally) to change structures and life-courses. 
Nevertheless, the ‘retrospective’ historical approach in ethnography remains 
important mainly for enabling the understanding of individual past experiences as 
negotiated relations with local level actors, which have the capacity to challenge the 
large authoritarian programs of the state.   
My ethnographic study is informed by a Gluckmanian perspective on local histories 
as both retrospective and prospective. I explore the ways micro-histories of the Roma 
individuals and groups expressed in specific events and relations are linked to larger 
transformations and the ways in which the local level relational and discursive 
practices changed their life trajectories.  
1.3 Ethnographic approaches in Romani studies 

Research already done on Romanies has come to constitute the field of ‘Romani 
studies’. Significant research in Romani studies has been carried out by means of 
ethnography (Sutherland 1986; Okely 1992; Williams 2003; van de Port 1998; Gay y 
Blasco 1999; Stewart 1997).  
One of the key monographs on Eastern European Gypsies is Stewart’s The 
Time of the Gypsies (1997), based on an 18-month fieldwork in a Hungarian small 
town in the socialist 1980s. It adopts a new approach to Romanies, just as much as it 
constitutes a continuation of the previous culturalist approaches on American 
(Sutherland 1986) and British Gypsies (Okely 1992). The novelty is given by the 
constant suggestion that the Gypsies’ destinies and lives have to be seen as a narrated 




of Gypsy marginality and suggests an analytical shift in viewing the Roma as central 
to their own lives. It constitutes one of the first historical ethnographies of the Roma. 
Nevertheless, history is mainly treated as context and general frame for the 
individuals’ actions and practices. Stewart’s (1997) ethnography has a less 
Gluckmanian processual perspective and focuses mainly on the Roma cultural 
practices, rather than on specific processes in which their individual practices, 
interactions, trajectories, are entangled.  
Nevertheless, Stewart’s (1997) analysis of socialist and post-socialist Roma 
proves the advantages of ethnographic studies, which give subjects their own voice 
in accounts attempting to describe their life trajectories. Methodologically, this also 
counted as an important monograph in Romani studies, in so  far as all studies which 
preceded Stewart’s – Acton (1974), Okely (1992), Sutherland (1986), or even 
Stewart’s contemporaries (van de Port 1998, for example) – were less successful in 
this ethnographic desiderata.  
Nevertheless, Stewart’s book continues a certain ‘tradition’ in Romani studies 
that could heuristically be characterized as ’culturalist’. The author places much 
emphasis on symbols and the semiotic power of ‘texts’ the Gypsies engage with, in 
their performances of identity (songs, dialogues in market deals, meanings of 
sexuality, purity and pollution, death etc.). Similarly, Okely’s detailed treatment of 
death rituals has been replicated by an entire volume by Williams (2003), who wrote 
about the rituals of the ’dead and the living’ amongst the French Gypsies. Gypsies’ 
economic life, including their representations of wage labour and horse-dealing, 
found importance in Stewart’s (1997) monograph. Similarly, Okely’s closer look at 
Gypsy women and gender relations was an important concern for Gay y Blasco 
(1999) in her volume about Gitanos in Madrid. However, Stewart’s ethnography 
sketches a sometimes rich texture of social practice which includes the interplay 
between the Gypsies and state policies, local or central authorities, peasants, worker-
townsmen etc. The degree of conceptualisation is generally incipient. For instance, 
the theme of power and resistance among Gypsies during socialism are mere 
suggestions, rather than issues theoretically developed and dealt with, in the 




It seems to me that the field of Romani studies has expanded over decades 
through the multiplication of ethnographic sites of inquiry and empirical 
instantiations of Roma lives. Adaptation (Sutherland 1986) and ‘modernity’ became 
influential frameworks in which the authors sought to understand the relation 
between the Roma and the state (see Acton 1974, Bancroft 2005). Less concern was 
shown towards the possibilities of conceptual exploration of the interaction between 
Gypsies and political and socio-economic transformations. Therefore, in my thesis I 
follow an historical-processual ethnographic perspective in order to understand the 
transformation of power relations and discursive practices in interaction with larger 
transformations of state and economy, in groups of Roma who experience utterly 
different conditions of living.  
1.4 The field site  

Previous fieldwork experience and access 
My Ph.D. field research was a continuation of the field inquiry I made in 2007 for 
my MA thesis written for Central European University. My first visit to Costesti15, 
the field site of my research, was in 2005 when I participated in a qualitative study 
on Roma health issues, co-funded by the Roma NGO Romani CRISS16. After the 
2005 and 2007 field trips in Costesti, I went back to the village in October 2009 to 
start my long-term Ph.D. fieldwork, which lasted approximately 7 months. I 
considered important to continue with the same case study and explore further 
ethnographically the historical trajectories of the two Roma groups.  
I lived in Costesti during the autumn-winter of 2009 and the spring-summer 
of 2010. While based in Costesti, I made short research visits to nearby villages 
including Liveni and Moroieni, where I conducted interviews with leaders and 
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15 For ethical and confidential reasons the name of the locality was changed.
16Report: Fighting against tuberculosis in Roma communities in Romania (co-author),  commissioned 





families from different Caldarar groups. In the next section, I concentrate on a 
general description of Costesti and the two Roma groups studied.  
 
The geography of the commune  
Costesti is a commune in Eastern Romania. It is composed of two villages - Costesti 
and Buteni with an equal number of inhabitants. According to the 2002 census, 
Costesti had a population of about 10,000 people, out of which roughly 2,000 were 
recorded as Gypsies: Romanianized Roma and Caldarars, almost 1,000 persons in 
each ’community’. 
The mayor and deputy mayor described Costesti as one of the richest villages 
in the county. It has good road and rail access to two important towns in the region as 
well as access to facilities such as gas, running water, electricity and the internet. 
There are: 4 primary and secondary schools, 2 health clinics, a hospital (threatened 
with closure due to lack of local funding), a police station, two orthodox churches 
and a Caldarars’ Pentecostal church, a ’house’ for cultural events, a hostel, two large 
supermarkets, an open-air market, two main pubs and many other small cheaper pubs 
where Romanianized Roma, Caldarars and local peasants go for drinks. In the centre 
of the commune there are several important institutions all located on the main road 
which links the locality to the two main towns in the county:  
 
1. The local council - a one-storey building with a large parking area outside.   
2. On the same side as the local council there is the main Orthodox Church, built in 
1943, a stylish old building with a large park surrounding it.  
3. One of the four schools of the village, attended primarily by Romanianized Roma, 
faces the local council. 
4. On the same side as the school there is the Hortensia Papadat Bengescu (an inter-
war Romanian novelist) memorial house/museum .  
5. Close to the council, on the same side, there is the main police station in a very 





Figure 3. Costesti local council. Photo: local council website, 2012 
 
 






Figure 5 Hortensia Papadat Bengescu museum. Photo: local council website, 2012 
 
 
Figure 6 The village's cultural centre, one km south from the centre. Photo: local    council 
website, 2012 
 
One kilometre north from the centre, in the area of the hostel, there are a petrol 
station and two large stores selling construction material. These stores and other 




large houses. Across the road from the petrol station and the hostel, there are two 




Figure 7 Construction material store. Photo: local council website, 2012 
 
 






The districts where the Roma live are located in different parts of the village. The 
Romanianized Roma district is located in the valley that lies between the Barlad river 
and the main road, just behind the hostel and petrol station. It is a crowded area of 
small dwellings with un-asphalted small alleys. Houses are generally in a poor 
condition, made of baked clay and with improvised roofs. Yet, some of them look 
newer and better, resembling the peasant ones. Asking Romanianized Roma living in 
the area one can find out that the better-looking houses were built in the last few 
years, after the 2005 heavy floods, when the government provided funds to help the 
victims and recover their belongings.  
 
Figure 9Romanianized Roma district seen from the river side. Photo taken by the author, 





Figure 10Romanianized Roma district background. Photo taken by the author,  2009. 
In the background: the Orthodox Church (left), local council (building with the red roof on 
the right) facing the school (grey building) mostly attended by the Romanianized Roma. 
 
The Caldarars’ district is 300 metres away from the hostel in the part of the village 
opposite to the river. Their district is located on a large asphalted road going to the 
East, perpendicular to the main road. Before the 1990s, the Caldarars used to live on 
the outskirts of the village, in a sort of hamlet close to the forest, with almost no 





Figure 11  The old Caldarars’ district. Photo taken by the author, 2009  
In the background (right) there are some new Caldarars’ houses located on a large 
asphalted road.  
 
Their relatively new district used to be a different village, belonging to the commune 
and inhabited mainly by peasants until the early 1990s. However, in the mid-1990s, 
many Caldarar families who had been successful in informal commercial 
businesses17 succeeded in  buying peasants’ houses and began building their own 
multi-storey, large residences, usually called by the Romanianized Roma and 
peasants ’Gypsy palaces’18. For both locals and outsiders, the Caldarars’ streets, full 
 
17In the mid-1990s, in full process of deindustrialization, the Caldarars started to buy and refurbish old 
technology and materials still owned by state plants and resell everything to small private firms all 
over the country. 
18 In Romania, both Romanians and other groups of Roma, including the Romanianized Roma, use the 
word ‘palace’ to suggest the specific architectural style of the Caldarars’ multi-storey houses. The 
Caldarars’ houses were portrayed by the three Italian authors (architects and photographers) of the 
coffee table book “Gypsy architecture: Houses of the Roma in Eastern Europe” as “striking, violent 
and vulgar” with “Indian-style” roofs, which “represent the family, its standing, its power and its 




of ’palaces’ on both sides, are impressive. They are well-known by people living in 
the region, journalists and even foreign tourists attracted by the ’bizarre’ and 
conspicuous architecture. However, not all Caldarars used the ’palace’ model in 
construction of their houses. Some of those who live on the first half of the street, 
closer to the main road have smaller houses, usually crowded around smaller 
courtyards. The Caldarar families with smaller houses and more crowded gardens are 
usually portrayed by the locals as poorer Gypsies. Walking along the street one 
notices that the aspect of the houses changes: from smaller, modest residences to 
more and more conspicuous ’palaces’. The biggest ’palaces’ populate the upper part 
of the street. Their owners were the first Caldarars who settled in the peasant area.  
The richest Caldarar families moved in first, in the mid-1990s when some 
peasant owners were attracted by the good prices offered by Gypsies. Also, 
following the example of the richer families, poorer Caldarars still living, in the late 
1990s, in their old district, with almost no access to facilities, associated as groups 
and bought the unsold Romanian houses, which were situated closer to the main 
road. These movements significantly changed the power geography and the 





Figure 12Caldarar man on the first half of the street, close to the main road. Photo 
taken by the author, 2009.  
In the background two smaller peasants’ houses (on the right, the white and yellow 
buildings) followed by poorer Caldarars’ houses (on the right, the buildings with red and 









Figure 13Caldarars’ houses on the first half of the street, closer to the main road. Photo 
taken by the author,  2009. 
 
Figure 13 The Caldarars’s upper district - where the richest Gypsies live. Photo taken by 




Today, in the new Caldarars’ district there are three important institutions: 1. an 
orthodox church mainly attended by the few Romanian families who still live in the 
area, a primary school attended mainly by Caldarar children, the Caldarars’ 
Pentecostal church. While the Orthodox Church is located on the main street that 
crosses the district, the primary school and the Pentecostal church are on a peripheral 
alleyway running parallel to the main street. The large area where the Pentecostal 
church is built was previously owned by a peasant family who sold the land to the 
Caldarar Pentecostal community.  
 
Figure 14Caldarar woman with her child in front of the primary school  attended mainly by 
Caldarars. Photo taken by the author, 2009. 
 
The general aspects of the two Roma districts are quite different. Infrastructure and 
landscape differ as well. While in the Romanianized Roma’s crowded, un-asphalted 




in the Caldarars’ district  is populated by speedy expensive cars (e.g. Mercedes, Audi 
Q6, Audi Q7).    
 
History, economy and people   
The historical references to Costesti draw extensively upon an unpublished 
monograph written by a local history teacher, and upon documents he provided after 
an interview conducted at his house in April 2007. As stated in the monograph, the 
first reference to the place was made on the 15th of July 1448. The presence of the 
Romanianized Roma in Costesti was acknowledged in the 15th century, when they 
were slaves on the local boyars’ lands. From 1856 onwards, when Gypsy slavery was 
abolished19, Costesti became a large regional market town inhabited by different 
ethnic populations (Gypsies, Jews, Greeks, Tatars, and Armenians) involved in 
commercial activities (store keeping, workshops). Romanianized Roma, now 
released from slavery, began to work for the local Jews and other entrepreneurs. 
While women worked as housekeepers in Jewish houses, men worked as day-
labourers in Jewish or Greek workshops (as furriers or knitters), in restaurants, or as 
brick-makers for Romanian peasant households. Some Romanianized Roma families 
were fiddlers at local parties and weddings. After the WWII, they gave up brick-
making and during socialism they worked in the socialist state economy as seasonal 
labourers in regional state farms, as well as members of the Costesti collective farm. 
Few were employed as unskilled labourers at the steelwork plant of Goteni.  
Beginning in the 1960s, the socialist state began to enforce a program of 
sedentarisation for nomadic Gypsies. All nomadic Gypsies with no proof of 
residence were considered ’illegal’, fined and not allowed to continue travelling. 
Since the early 1960s, nomadic Caldarar Gypsies started to come to Costesti. They 
were not a unified, compact group of newcomers. Some came from Transylvania, 
others from Banat, while others came from the today’s Republic of Moldova. After 
settling in Costesti, the Caldarars received land from the local council to build 
houses. However, while settled, most of the Caldarar families continued to travel 
seasonally and practice their ’traditional’ activities until 1989 and even after. Since 
 
19In the mid-19th century, the Gypsy slavery was abolished in all principalities, which nowadays form 





the 1990s, some Caldarar families started to become successfully involved in semi-
informal businesses. They used to purchase old materials and assets from large 
industrial state plants that were in the process of dismantling old machinery and 
privatization and sell them to small new commercial companies. 
On the other hand, the Romanianized Gypsies were laid-off from the socialist 
state farms and factories and began to work informally as day-labourers in 
agriculture for peasant households, as well as working as construction workers for 
the Caldarar houses. State and local council benefits became their main sources of 
income. Unlike the Caldarars, the Romanianized Gypsies speak only Romanian, 
wear casual clothes, hardly differentiated from the local Romanian peasants. Most of 
them claim they feel ’almost Romanians’. During my fieldwork, the Romanianized 
Roma discussed their identity in terms similar to those of the Romanian peasants’ 
socio-economic practices (subsistence economy) and in contrast to the Caldarars’ 
lifestyles. They generally emphasised several characteristics, which, from their point 
of view, bring them closer to a ’Romanian identity’: a. during socialism they were 
settled and employed in state farms and factories, b. they only speak Romanian, and 
have no knowledge of Romani, c. compared to Caldarars, they spent at least 4 years 
in local schools and do not marry their children at a young age (16-18 years old is a 
common marriage age for the Romanianized Roma). 
On the other hand, the Caldarars claim to be ’genuine’ Gypsies and despise 
the Romanianized Roma who, from their point of view, are ’poor’ and ’dirty’, and 
therefore not ’real’ Gypsies.  
As a participant observer, I noticed the differences in the social landscape of 
the two Roma groups. Walking down the street where Caldarars live, one meets 
colourfully-dressed Gypsy women wearing long, wide skirts and headscarves, sitting 
with children and husbands wearing suits on benches outside their opulent houses. In 
the Romanianized Roma area, the image is slightly different: poorly dressed people 
gather on the narrow alleys to drink, smoke and chat and they often wait for peasants 





Figure 15 Romanianized Roma chatting on a narrow alley in their district. Photo taken by 
the author, 2010. 
 
Other differences and similarities between these people of the village are reflected in 
production and consumption. All the local peasants own small pieces of agricultural 
land and livestock and are involved in subsistence agriculture. Neither the 
Romanianized Roma, nor the Caldarars own these means of production. While the 
first offer small services to the others in exchange for a little cash, the Caldarars are 
involved in handicraft production, trading, making cauldrons and engaging in 
businesses with old technology.  
In terms of leaders, there are some general differences between the 
Romanianized Roma and Caldarars. The Romanianized Roma have never had a 
specific leadership ’formula’. Nowadays they have both a formal and an informal 
leader, well connected to the state structures of governance. The formal Roma leader 
(Roma expert) at the local council represents both Roma communities. He is a 
Romanianized Roma appointed by the Roma Party and employed by the government 




On the other hand, the Caldarars have a long ’tradition’ of leadership. Since they 
were nomads, they used to organize in small travelling groups represented by leaders 
called bulibasa, empowered to negotiate interactions with local authorities. The term 
bulibasa is a Romani word similar to Rom baro – Rom (man), baro (big) - translated 
as ’big man’ or ’big boss’20. However, the term and its corresponding institution 
altered during socialism and both are much contested today by Caldarar leaders and 
common Gypsies alike. For both Gypsy communities, informal and formal leaders 
play an important role in connecting the Roma both to local authorities and patronage 
actors (mayor, deputy mayor, local patron/administrator). The next section is a brief 
description of the main research instruments used in my historical-processual 
ethnographic study.  
 
 
Figure 16Peasant with his child driving a cart in the Caldarars’ district in Liveni, Photo 
taken by the author 2010. 
In the background: Liveni Caldarar houses, a peasant driving his motorcycle and a Caldarar 
woman outside her house. 
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Figure 17Peasant from Liveni smoking outside his small house situated in between two 
impressive Caldarar houses, Photo taken by the author 2010.  
 
 
Figure 19Liveni Caldarar house interior, unfinished construction . Photo taken by the 
author, 2010.  






1.5 Data collection and analysis  

The main research instruments used were semi-structured interviews, oral histories, 
and participant observation recorded in rich field notes. The collected data comprises 
40 recorded interviews, some in the form of oral history, and 100,000-words of field 
notes transcribed electronically.  
The people interviewed were Romanianized Roma and Caldarars, and other 
local actors21 relevant for understanding practices and relations in each sphere of 
power struggle (state, politics, economy, education, religion). Selection of the 
respondents was based on the snowball sampling method.  In the following section, I 
give details of my respondents and instruments. 
a. Interviews with five Roma leaders: two Romanianized Roma leaders, 
(one informal and one formal) and three Caldarar bulibasi.  
b. Interviews with four Romanianized Roma.  
c. Interviews with sixteen Caldarar Gypsies, interviewed in family and 
individual situations. 
d. Interviews with three former mayors of Costesti. 
e. Interviews with three local councillors representing political parties 
from the 2009-2010 local opposition: the National Liberal Party (PNL) and 
the Liberal Democrat Party (PDL).  
f. Interviews with two Romanianized Roma acting as school and health 
service mediators for both Roma communities.   
g. Interviews with two administrators of the Caldarars’ Pentecostal 
church. 
h. Interviews with three significant actors within the village: a PDL 
councillor and school teacher, the former collective farm manager, a former 
head of the Costesti police station. 
 
21It is worth mentioning that the number of people I had informal conversations with is significantly 
higher than the number of the recorded interviews taken. I appreciate I had informal conversations 
with roughly 100 people including Roma, local peasants and bureaucrats, which are all present in my 




i. Interviews with two teachers, coordinators of the ’Second chance to 
education’ program mainly attended by adult Caldarars with no primary 
schooling.  
j. Interviews with two local peasants about their experience and 
interactions with the Roma in the village.  
The data were collected over a period of at least 7 months in 2009-2010.  Additional 
observational field notes22 were written down at the end of each fieldwork day.  
 
Participant observation sites     
 
My observation sessions were distributed equally amongst the two Roma groups, 
which allowed a comparative perspective on relations and practices. The main sites 
of observation were the Gypsies’ residences, sites of work23 and local institutions 
(local council, schools, and churches). Important observations were made at 
following local institutions:   
a. I regularly visited two offices at the local council: 1. the Social Work 
Office, where three clerical officers work with the council’s Roma expert to 
produce and organize the necessary paperwork for social benefits (e.g. 
housing, heating, child benefits); 2. the Land  Registry Office, where two 
council workers (a land surveyor and his secretary) produce land and house 
property paperwork and establish levels of property taxation for villagers. 
The Land Registry Office’s paperwork is also needed for identification 
purposes. Both offices are visited daily by a large numbers of Caldarars and 
Romanianized Roma looking for social benefits. For several months, while 
visiting these offices, I observed interactions, negotiations, and conflicts 
between the Roma and the local state representatives. These aspects reflected 
significant power struggles in the sphere of the local state encounters, 
discussed in the chapter on the Roma and the state.  
 
22All informal talks, interactions and meetings were described in my fieldnotes.
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b. Another important field site for observations was the Caldarars’ 
Pentecostal church in Costesti.  For three months, I attended its services on a 
weekly basis and observed the modes of prayer, the themes of the sermons, 
interactions, and negotiations of meanings and practices. I also attended 
church services at a Romanian Pentecostal church, in a neighbouring village, 
where I observed, by comparison, different preaching styles. The 
observations made during the church services are important for grasping the 
negotiated meanings of self-authority and Roma leadership, which are 
enacted across spheres of religion and politics. All these aspects are discussed 
in the chapter on religion and empowerment.    
c. Participation in two meetings on Roma issues: a. one local council 
meeting which took place at the local council before the first round of 
presidential elections in November 2009. The participants were: local 
councillors, the mayor, deputy mayor and one Roma PSD (Social Democrat 
Party) councillor and b. a meeting of the regional joint working group (JWG), 
made up of informal and formal Romanianized Roma and representatives of 
local and regional public institutions' representatives (mayors, lawyers, police 
officers, school and health mediators). The group was constituted as part of 
the national governmental strategy for the social inclusion of Roma.     
As previously stated, both the interviews and observations are part of my historical 
and political ethnography, which has two forms of historical content: retrospective 
and prospective.   
 
Retrospective history 
The retrospective historical approach reveals the Roma interaction with historical 
transformations from socialism to post-socialism in different spheres of power 
struggle. My interviews often took the form of oral histories through which specific 
important events and experiences were revealed. Local events such as the settlement 
in the village and the relations produced through the Roma-socialist state encounters 
proved crucial to understanding transformations of the two Roma groups. Oral 
histories reflect relational continuities and discontinuities. For example, they were 




leaders and the socialist authorities transformed the Caldarar organization and 
leadership. In addition, the great significance of local power relations is best 
understood through the individual experiences the Roma went through from 
socialism to post-socialism.  
 
Prospective history  
 
For the prospective historical approach I used interviews and participant 
observation concentrated on one important local event – 2009 presidential elections - 
which constitute the focus of one chapter –Everyday politics.  
The 2009 presidential elections in Costesti revealed the dynamics of 
clientelism, patronage politics, political brokerage and Roma voting and political 
options. During the pre-election run up, I attended the Social Democrat Party’s 
meetings and one local council meeting. On both rounds of voting, I was present at 
the poll stations for informal conversations with Roma voters and leaders. Their 
narratives showed not only conflicts and cooperation with local patronage actors, but 
also connections between local level politics and national-level political discourses. 
Table 1 The research instruments and data sources summary 




Local council – public interactions 
 
Pentecostal church service 
 
Local and regional meetings on 
Roma   issues  
 
Work sites of the two Roma 
groups 
Oral histories with 
Romanianized Roma and 
Caldarars, including 





Participant observation  
November 2009 presidential 
elections   
Recorded Interviews  
with Romanianized Roma and 
Caldarars about socio-economic 
and religious practices, voting 






Analysing data: realism versus constructivism   
There are different ways of writing ethnography which can be positioned on a 
continuum between 1) ‘realist’ ethnography and ’literary therapy’ ethnography 
(Marcus 1986: 262) and 2) ‘social’ ethnography versus ‘cultural’ ethnography 
(Gluckman 1965; Geertz 1973). Wolf (1990) and Burawoy (1979), exponents of the 
Marxist realist ethnography, consider that relations, individual practices and events 
are facts which can be documented by the researchers. In a distinguished lecture, Eric 
Wolf (1990) declared that he endorses a ‘realist’ position in the study of power:” I 
subscribe to a realist position. I think that the world is real, that these realities affect 
what humans do and that what humans do affects the world, and that we can come to 
understand the whys and wherefores of these relationships”(p.587). 
Nevertheless, Wolf (1990) does not essentialize his realist position and 
considers that cultural productions are historically contingent, while researchers 
should be in a continuous “quest for explanation as approximation of truth rather 
than truth itself” (p. 587). In this sense, I consider Wolf’s perspective on ethnography 
appropriate. The sense of social practices, relations and events should not be lost in 
over interpretative literary acts and novel like descriptions, a view supported by 
Clifford and Marcus (1986) in their Writing Culture. I generally endorse Wolf’s 
(1990) critique of the post-modernist ‘writing culture’ approach in ethnography: 
“Writing culture may require literary skills and genre, but a search for explanation 
requires more. I think we must move beyond Geertz’s “experience-near” 
understandings to analytical concepts that allow us to set what we know about X 
against what we know about Y, in pursuit of explanation” (p.587). 
Moreover, both Wolf (1990) and Burawoy (2009) inspired by Gluckman 
(1958) argue for an ethnography of social processes, focused on social relations, 
practices and events, rather than on free floating individualized meanings or cultural 
symbols and cultural texts, in a Geertzian understanding. My historical ethnography, 
without being subordinated to an imagined overarching story of the people or the 
fieldwork location, follows a Gluckmanian perspective to reveal discontinuities in 




past and present revealed by events and individual narratives and moves itself on a 
continuum between social realist and reflexive culturalist perspective.   
1.6. Ethical and reflexive considerations on my ethnography 
 
Practical considerations and emic perspective on fieldwork  
 
The methods I used in the field involved certain practical and ethical challenges 
related to the opportunities and barriers posed by the fieldwork itself. First, I needed 
the informed consent for every method I used. Participant observation and informal 
conversations were constantly used in my fieldwork as part of my everyday 
immersion in the field.  
Also, my participation in pre-election meetings, council meetings, office 
work, school classes, and church services required the participants’ permission and 
careful management of my intrusion into people’s lives and narratives. All the 
methods used required empathy, “involvement and enmeshment, rather than 
objectivity and distance” (Lofland, Lofland 1995: 17). Contrary to the classical 
“separation between the observer (autonomy, rationality) and the observed (object, 
dupe of social forces)” (Burawoy 1991: 291), I was actively involved in the locals’ 
lives and many times, I became their ’object’ of their exploration. The details 
presented in this section show not only my awareness of the emic perspective, but 
also the informants’ views about who the researcher is and what she does. During my 
fieldwork, the informants had various questions and interpretations about my work. 
In their attempt to find an identity for me, both the Romanianized Roma and the 
Caldarars were curious to find out details about my private life: “Where do you live? 
Are you married? Why you do not have children? How much do you earn from what 
you do?” 
All these questions could be construed as intrusive, but I always considered 
them legitimate as they explained: “You ask us so many questions; we also want to 
know more about you”. I think my openness and relaxed approach greatly helped to 
manage their direct questions, which were persistent at the beginning, but diminished 
as friendship and closeness developed. Often, the Caldarars and Romanianized 





of us”. Nevertheless, in the first days of my second session of fieldwork, my new 
landlord introduced me to his friends, police officers: ’She studies Gypsies’. After 
this, one police officer looked a bit disappointed and replied: ’I am sorry that you 
came. Why do you need to study Gypsies? We have enough of them’. There were 
similar statements coming from local council workers, schoolteachers, and 
shopkeepers who complained that the Gypsies were involved in scandals and created 
many problems.  I sought to overcome these issues by talking about my historical 
holistic frame of my study, focused on relations between all villagers including the 
two Roma communities.  
On the other hand, the negative statements about the Roma were not 
substantiated by the everyday practices I observed. Everywhere in the village, I saw 
Roma and peasants sitting close to each other, joining each other in pubs and 
terraces, chatting and making plans for the next day of work. Many peasants were 
happy to tell me that they became godfathers for Caldarars and Romanianized 
Roma’s children and that they love to exchange gifts with their Roma relatives. 
My presence was more than welcomed in the village. Everyone got to know me very 
well and I was frequently invited to dinner or lunch by both peasants and Roma. The 
Romanianized Roma were the happiest  to see me in their district as they knew that I 
wanted to chat with them about everyday problems in the poorest district of the 
village, rarely visited by other locals. Besides that, both the Romanianized Roma and 
the Caldarars were excited and happy to have pictures of themselves. At a rough 
count, I took almost 500 pictures of families, grandparents, children, friends and 
relatives inside or outside their houses and gardens. I considered photography a good 
strategy of immersion in the field, especially in the Caldarars’ district, which was 
portrayed by the locals, including Romanianized Roma, as difficult to get to: “You 
can’t go there. They’ll reject you, don’t go!” Following these warnings, I could have 
asked a Roma leader for help but I decided to go alone and not to associate my 








Ethical issues in data collection  
 
The richest Caldarar families are known in the area as local dealers in old 
technology, bought from enterprises, which dismantle factories, re-sold by Caldarars 
to smaller firms around the country. Some who succeeded into big businesses and set 
up firms needed to use bank accounts for large payments. Although they use the 
banking system, they do not pay taxes and VAT to the state for the transactions they 
make. Consequently, financial control institutions and the police often raid their 
settlements to force them pay their taxes.  
Their impressive houses have attracted significant sensational media attention 
and sensation. The Caldarars told me that they had been portrayed in the media as 
illegal businesspersons who made their fortunes from cheating the state. Since I first 
visited them in 2005, and then in 2007 and 2009, many of the rich Caldarar families 
were cautious about talking openly to me, and were also very reluctant to allow me 
to take pictures of their families and houses. However, they became more relaxed, 
when I assured them that I was not a journalist and I was not going to publish any 
newspaper articles and criminalize them in my writing. I told them that my intention 
was to write a Ph.D. thesis/book about the history of their everyday lives. Many rich 
Caldarar families, including bulibasi, became friendly and invited me to visit their 
houses for barbecues, dinner, drinks. Some of them were happy to have pictures of 
their houses, family and children. Nevertheless, the Caldarars used to avoid detailed 
discussions about their informal businesses and during my fieldwork, I did not raise 
specific questions about their economic activities. However, a problematic situation 
did arise with regard to my visit to the local financial office. In the last weeks of my 
fieldwork – June 2010 - I visited the director of the local financial office and asked 
his permission for an interview. He told me to expect his call in a few days.  In 
planning to interview him, I wanted to explore electoral strategies of former 
candidates for the mayor’s position. Usually, electoral strategies are associated with 
clientelistic practices of exchange (local services or money in exchange of political 
support). Both the mayor and the administrator of the village performed clientelistic 
exchanges in order to attract Roma voters, who represent 10 percent of the 




Within a number of days, I received no answers to my calls. In the meantime, 
I found out that all the rich Caldarar families had learned about my visit to the 
official. Some of them including one of the bulibasi complained to me directly: 
“Why did you go there? What did you want to find out? That man is our friend. You 
will find nothing. Do not go there again; you will not be well received here again”. 
After these interventions I realized that I had touched on a sensitive topic and told 
them that, it was not my intention to raise questions about their businesses and that I 
would not visit or have an interview with the director. By respecting my respondents’ 
will I consider that I took an ethically informed decision. Their disappointment 
vanished in less than a week and I was able to continue my work in a friendly 
atmosphere.   
This experience showed that the ethnographer inevitably acts within a 
dynamic of power relations (Ong 1995; Coffey 1999), which makes the field study of 
power struggles a complex process and that ethnography is “a collaborative 
enterprise of participant and observer” (Burawoy 1991: 291). People in the village 
used to inform each other about my everyday activity and were very interested to 
give me the necessary support in my snowball sampling. As in any small locality, 
people knew each other very well and had their own likes and dislikes for specific 
people. From this viewpoint, I treated all personal opinions, negative or positive, in a 
confidential manner and I did not disclose my conversations to the other participants. 
As Reinharz (1997) noticed about her research on the Israelian kibbutz, it is an 
advantage to know who is in conflict with whom, who talks to whom, and in the end 
“to be able to get along with everyone” (p. 9). Furthermore, my actions were 
explored and discussed in advance with multiple local actors, who assured me that 
they were devoid of possible negative implications for my respondents. In my Ph.D. 
thesis, in order to ensure confidentiality, all the names of my interviewees and other 








Ethical reflections on researcher’s positionality in the study of 
power relations  
 
On the other hand, doing research with the Romanianized Roma, who live off 
minimum resources, revealed an aspect of the unequal power balance. It was an 
unequal power relation between me as a researcher looking to find information about 
their lives without having too much to offer in exchange and them as my respondents 
who were more interested in receiving direct material help instead of questions. 
Since my first visit in 2005, I was aware of the difficulties of these poor Gypsies and  
I was happy to observe that after the 2005 floods the government improved their 
housing conditions. I found them more relaxed and interested to chat about their lives 
and family histories. For my part, I did not use any form of deception. I made no 
material promises and I clearly stated from the beginning that our relationships will 
inform research on a comparative history of the two Roma groups. Nevertheless, 
compared to other sociological methods in which the researcher does not come into 
contact with his respondents (survey, archival research etc.) ethnographic fieldwork 
comes closer to people’s needs and problems and offers psychological support to 
those who experience poor conditions of living, who might be ignored by local 
authorities or despised by their neighbours.  
Moreover, participant observation indirectly involves participant intervention 
(Fine 1993) and requires a more active role, when needed. Thinking of the 
ethnographer’s roles during fieldwork, I was inspired by Scheper-Hughes’ (1995) 
suggestions for a moral research involvement. In her view, the ethnographer has to 
be more than an observer. She needs to be “a responsive, reflexive, and morally 
committed being, one who will take sides and make judgements” (p.419): a witness, 
companheira, comrade. In my case, such roles of companheira or comrade were 
adopted when ‘Romanianized’ Gypsies faced difficulties in understanding how to 
apply for social benefits or how to fill in different forms. Many other conversations 
concentrated on their everyday problems such as children’s education at school, 
health, intimate fertility/contraception issues and interactions with local authorities. 




Romanianized Roma and the Caldarars with information, psychological support and 
advice, when needed or requested.   
However, being a comrade or companheira was not always easy, as many 
times it interfered with the local Roma leaders’ actions. Therefore, I did not consider 
helpful to become a permanent ’political representative’ or, in Scheper-Hughes’ 
terms, a negative worker, a role usually played by the informal leaders who are 
supposed to act against formal powers to support their community. Attempting to do 
so would have been read by both the state bureaucrats and local leaders as an act of 
domination (Friedman 1995; Harris 1995; Nader 1995; Noblit and Flores, Murillo 
2004; Madison 2005), likely to create conflicts and harm the community studied. 
From this viewpoint, I sometimes needed to distance myself from the political issues 
(patronage, clientelism, brokerage) related to their everyday lives. For instance, when 
various leaders and Romanianized Roma felt that I intervened too much, I switched 
my attention to the Caldarars’ community, showing in this way that it is not my 
interest to represent one or the other community. Studying two Roma groups offered 













Chapter 2: Romanian Historical Transformations 
and their Local Manifestations     

The chapter provides  an outline of 18th and 19th century Romanian history and 
discusses the historical transformation from socialism to post-socialism in detail. In 
the context of my thesis, the chapter examines the element of power located in the 
movement or transformation, from socialism to post-socialism, of what I call 
‘spheres of power struggle' (politics, the state, the economy, religion), which is 
challenged by individuals’ engagements with these transformations. The principal 
focus of this chapter is on the state, politics and the economy, while religion, due to 
its specificity, is mainly discussed here in its relation to the other spheres, and 
explored separately in the last main chapter of my thesis.  
This chapter also sets the historical context of the thesis and establishes the 
main tools for the analysis of historical transformations. It pays special attention to 
economic and political processes, more specifically, surveillance and the local 
domestication of state control, as well as the post-socialist emergence of the informal 
economy, patronage and clientelism.  
The chapter is largely based on empirical case studies from various social 
sciences, but also on my previous personal experiences obtained during field 
research. It shows that larger transformations of the state, politics and the economy 
were altered, negotiated, and sometimes, constituted by local level practices. Local 
level practices and relations generated a dynamic of power relations, as well as 
alternative pathways of transformation in the lives of individuals and groups. The 
next section outlines key developments in the Romanian history from the 16th to the 
20th century, suggesting ways of looking at large historical transformations and local 















Figure 18Map of Romanian principalities  late 18th century-early 19th  century  
Source: Foaie Nationala.ro, Revista libera de lupta culturala si spirituala.   
[National Paper.ro, Free magazine for cultural and spiritual struggle.]  
 
In the Middle Ages, when the Romanian nation state was not yet formed, the 
territory was split between three principalities: Wallachia, Moldavia (including what 
now constitutes the Republic of Moldova and the Southern regions of current 
Ukraine) and Transylvania. Unlike the other two provinces, Transylvania had been , 
under the Magyar occupation, a part of the Kingdom of Hungary, until the 16th 
century. Between the 16th and the end of the 17th centuries, Transylvania was an 
independent province, and after that it was annexed by the Hapsburg Empire 
(Varkonyi 2001, Djuvara 2002). 
Wallachia, bordering the Ottoman Empire, was under its suzerainty during 
the 15th century. Moldavia was defended by Voivod Stephen the Great against the 
Ottomans until the 16th century when it also became a suzerainty of the same empire 




autonomy in relation to the Ottoman Empire. In 1600, the Wallachian Voivod 
Michael the Brave conquered and united under his rule all the three principalities for 
the first time and for a short period of one year. It is important to mention that there 
has been evidence of Roma slavery in both Wallachia and Moldavia since the 14th 
century (Marushiakova and Popov 2009) and Wallachia and Moldavia had a complex 
system of Roma slavery by 15th century (Achim 2004).  
According to  Kogalniceanu (cited in Marushiakova and  Popov 2009), a 
well-known Romanian intellectual active in the 1848 revolution, in Wallachia and 
Moldavia “there were three distinct categories of slaves according to whom they 
belonged to - slaves of the Prince, of the monasteries, and of the boyars” 
(Marushiakova and Popov 2009: 5).  Some of the Roma belonging to first category 
worked on the rulers’ estates, while the others were nomad Gypsies, allowed to roam 
and practice different professions24 on the condition that they paid annual taxes to the 
crown. Among the Roma slaves who belonged to monasteries and boyars, a small 
part were nomads paying taxes to their owners, while the rest “worked the land of 
monasteries (monasteries were large landowners), and some were rented out” (p. 5). 
In the same category, there were slaves recognised as craftsmen and domestic 
servants. In Transylvania, the situation of the Roma showed some differences. While 
some Gypsies living close to regions bordering Moldavia or Wallachia were slaves, 
other Roma had the status of ‘royal serfs’ (Achim 2004). The latter were free to 
roam, with the obligation to pay annual taxes to the crown, “but they were never 
citizens with full rights” (Voicu, Tufis 2008: 12), neither in the Hungarian Kingdom, 
nor in the Hapsburg empire.     
In 1699, Transylvania became a part of the Habsburgs’ Austrian Empire. 
During the 18th century, Empress Maria Theresa and her son Joseph devised drastic 
programs of assimilation for the Roma (Achim 2004). Gypsies were expected to 
become peasants. They were no longer allowed to travel, wear traditional clothes, 
and possess horses and carriages. They were forced to engage in agriculture and their 
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24According to Kogalniceanu (1837) cited in Marushiakova, Popov (2009: 6), Gypsies of the prince's 
courts were recognized as ‘state’ or ‘crown’ Gypsies further divided into four categories: Rudars (or 
miner-Gypsies), Aurars (gold prospectors), Ursars (bear trainers and public entertainers), Lingurars 




children were sent to school or church, and sometimes raised by non-Roma foster 
families. These rules were applied differently by local authorities and were only 
enforced during the rules of these two monarchs (Voicu, Tufis 2008). The 1848 
Revolutions aimed at producing changes in both Walachia and Transylvania: the 
independence of both in relation to the Ottoman Empire, free trade with the rest of 
Europe, and the unleashing of national feelings in Transylvania. Without fulfilling all 
these aims, the movements raised the consciousness of a common language and 
territory among the local rulers and population. They also prepared the ideological 
terrain for the abolition of slavery and the reforms made under Cuza’s regime.  
In 1859, Moldavia and Walachia, in their attempt to withdraw from their 
Ottoman suzerainty, and with no support from external powers, united under Cuza’s 
rule (Bobango 1979). Alexandru Ioan Cuza, the first reformist prince of the new 
union, and Prime Minister Mihail Kogalniceanu launched democratic reforms in the 
social, economic and political domains: agriculture (land and agricultural reforms), 
state (universal suffrage, a new constitution, tax and revenues), education 
(compulsory primary education), army etc. The land reform entitled peasants to own 
land and partially liberated them from their servitude to the boyars. However, with 
no technology and without alternative means of subsistence, the peasants were not 
able to cultivate the land properly and were unable to raise their social and economic 
condition (Dobrogeanu-Gherea 1910).  
The liberation of the Roma, which advanced with the abolition of the slavery, 
had begun even before Cuza’s rule, in the 1830’s, when many boyars, under the 
influence of European enlightenment ideas started to release their Gypsy slaves 
(Achim 2004). Among others, the intellectuals Mihail Kogalniceanu and Cezar 
Bolliac initiated campaigns to support the abolition of slavery (Achim 2004). 
Principalities progressively issued laws to free the slaves. The process of slavery 
abolition was completed in 1855, in Moldavia, where Prince Grigore Alexandru 
Ghica issued a law, later adopted by the government, which transformed the Roma 
slaves into tax payers. Similarly, in 1856, the National Assembly in Wallachia 
adopted the same law for the Roma (Achim 2004; Djuvara 2002). The year 1856 is 
thus recognised as the symbolic moment for the abolition of Roma slavery in 




After abolishing slavery, the government of the two principalities adopted 
social engineering programs for assimilating the Roma: Romani language was 
forbidden, Roma families were allocated houses alongside the other Romanians, and 
children were forced into compulsory education. In addition, the government 
preferred to refer to the Gypsies as ‘the emancipated’, instead of ‘tigani’ (Gypsies) 
(Achim 2004; Djuvara 2002).  
The abolition of slavery and serfdom in Transylvania came later, through a 
set of emancipation laws in 1861. However, after abolition, many Gypsies continued 
either to work on the boyars’ land or to join groups of nomadic Roma and their 
professions (Achim 2004). On the other hand, all Roma who were released were 
required to pay taxes to the state, but many were unable to pay (Achim 2004; Voicu, 
Tufis 2008). Considering these aspects, Achim (2004) argued that the abolition of 
slavery worsened the economic condition of the Roma in the three principalities. I 
would add that the source of their impoverishment was not the end of slavery, but the 
lack of reforms for the Roma. Compared with the peasants, the Gypsies did not 
receive land and they were offered no alternative resources for survival. These 
developments echo the abolition of slavery for black people in America. After 
release, lacking living resources, black people continued to live and work for their 
former masters (Du Bois 1903). 
In Romania, Cuza’s reformist regime was short-lived. In 1866, a radical 
liberal coalition supported by the conservative party, which did not agree with the 
new reforms, forced Alexandru Ioan Cuza to abdicate. In his place, the government 
proposed that a foreign prince, Carol de Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, rule Romania, 
which at that time comprised only Wallchia and Moldavia. In 1877-8, as a result of 
the Ottoman-Russian war, Romania became independent from the Ottoman Empire. 
Later, in 1881, the Romanian state was transformed into a kingdom, under the rule of 
King Carol I (Kellogg 1995).   
The other principality – Transylvania- fell   under the rule of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in 1867. It was incorporated into Hungary, whose government 
was distinct from the Austrian one (White 2000).  During this period, Transylvania 





language and all the important state institutions being held by Hungarians (Bideleux, 
Jeffries 1998).  
After the First World War, when the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires 
collapsed, Transylvania, Bucovina and Bessarabia (former territories of the Austro-
Hungarian and Russian empires) joined the rest of the Romanian territories in 1918, 
and  united into the Kingdom of Romania, which  formed  Greater Romania until 
1940 (Scurtu, Stanescu- Stanciu, Scurtu 2002).  
 Between the two wars, the Roma were “the country’s sixth largest ethnic 
group in terms of number, after the Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, Jews, 
Ukrainians and Russians.” (Achim 2004: 147-8). Many Roma lost their source of 
living as their professions were challenged by industrialization. Some Roma families 
living in villages were small-holders. During the national agrarian reforms, between 
1918 and 1920, the government granted small plots of land to some Roma families 
who lived in the rural areas and took part in the war (Achim 2004). However, the 
Roma, lacking technology and resources could not afford to cultivate the land, which 
was either rented or sold to peasants. Moreover, as Achim (2004) documents, many 
other Roma, including nomadic groups, who were not settled residents did not 
receive any land.  The Second World War resulted in significant losses for both the 
Romanian state and the Roma population. During the war, the Romanian state was 
forced to cede Bessarabia and northern Bukovina (Deak 2001). After this substantial 
loss of territory, King Carol II abdicated and the government fell under the rule of 
the Iron Guard, a far right nationalist party led by Marshal Antonescu. In order to 
regain the lost territories, Antonescu joined the war in 1941 allying himself with 
Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union (Scurtu, Stanescu-Stanciu, Scurtu 2002). 
Under Antonescu the Jews and the Roma were oppressed in a way 
reminiscent of   Hitler’s Germany, but to a lower degree.  Some of them were killed 
and many others25 deported to concentration camps in Transnistria, a territory 
awarded by Nazi Germany to Romania (Bachman 1991). In an attempt to publicly 
justify the deportation, the fascist government claimed that the Roma families had 
been  deported because they were ‘nomads’ who disturbed  public order (Achim 
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2004, Radu 2006). In Costesti, my fieldwork location, many Caldarar families and 
some Romanianised Roma were deported to Transnistria. As many Caldarars told 
me, the government was also interested to seize their gold during the deportation. 
Members of those Roma families who survived the deportations received Holocaust 
reparations in cash from Germany, in the 1990’s.  
On 23 August 1944, as Nazi Germany started to withdraw its troops, the 
Romanian political regime changed once more. King Mihai I of Romania, son of 
King Carol II, came to power and arrested Marshal Antonescu. Under King Mihai’s 
rule Romania joined the Allies in the war against Germany (Scurtu, Stanescu-
Stanciu, Scurtu 2002). At the end of WWII, as a result of the Paris Peace Treaty, 
Romania regained Transylvania but did not get back Bessarabia, Bukovina and the 
South of Dobrogea (Bachman 1991). 
After the war, Romania fell within the USSR zone of economic and military 
influence and Russian troops were stationed on Romanian territory until 1958 
(Granville 2008). From 1945 till 1952 the country was ruled by a Soviet Union 
imposed government led by a Communist Party member, Petru Groza. During his 
regime, in 1947, the Communist Party forced King Mihai to abdicate and leave the 
country (Roper 2000).  After 1952 Romania became a People’s Republic ruled by the 
Romanian Workers’ Communist Party and its First Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-
Dej (Granville 2008). After Gheorghiu-Dej’s death, in 1965, Nicolae Ceausescu 
became the First Party Secretary and later on the President of the Socialist Republic 
of Romania (Sebetsyen 2009). He continued his predecessor’s politics of pursuing 
independence from the Soviet Union but also of suppressing dissidents. State 
violence was also directed against other groups of citizens, considered by communist 
activists26 to be reactionary elements, hostile to the party (Ionitoiu 2000). 
Ceausescu’s regime was one of the most repressive communist regimes in Eastern 
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forbidden. Party activists occupied positions of authority and many other people, who were 
encouraged to become members of the apparatus, were informers of the state intelligence services. 




Europe (Sebetsyen 2009). Under his 25-year rule, almost 2 million people27 were 
imprisoned or killed for their ideological and political convictions.  
During the same period, ethnic groups, including the Roma, were not 
recognised as minorities and the party pursued an intensive nationalist political 
agenda to assimilate the population within a common socialist proletarian identity 
(Verdery 1991). During the 1960s the socialist state forced nomad Gypsies to settle 
and enforced violent measures to seize their gold. 
In the 1980s, the regime became increasingly draconian  and lost all  popular 
legitimacy when Ceausescu began to pursue an ‘independent foreign policy’ in 
relation to Western countries, and aimed at paying off  all Romania's  international 
debts at  the cost of shortages and people’s starvation (Cioroianu 2007). The 
escalated pressures and tensions brought about revolts, which started in Timisoara on 
16 December 1989 and spread throughout the country, culminating in the Romanian 
Revolution that resulted in a large number of deaths. The Communist government 
was overthrown and Ceausescu was tried, convicted and executed on the 25th of 
December 1989.  
A new political grouping called the National Salvation Front headed by Ion 
Iliescu ruled the country until the first elections. In 1992 Ion Iliescu was elected 
President of Romania. During his term, the state started the process of property 
restitution. Parts of the land cultivated by collective farms were returned to the 
peasants, while gold was given back to the Roma, especially the former nomad 
groups. Iliescu’s reparations were welcomed by the Gypsies and the first post-1989 
president is still an iconic politician for many Roma today.  
Iliescu held the presidency until 1996, when Emil Constantinescu, the main 
representative of the Democratic Convention (CDR), headed by so-called ‘historical’ 
political parties such as the conservative National Peasant Christian and Democratic 
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27 See ‘Recensamantul Populatiei concentrationare din Romania in anii 1945-1989’. Raport pentru 
“Centrul International de Studii asupra Comunismului” [Population Census of those imprisoned in 
Romania between 1945-1989- Report for the “International Centre for the Study of Communism”]. 
Sighet, 2004.  
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Party (PNTCD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL) won the election with new 
promises of democracy and the Westernisation of the country. However, the harsh 
measures such as the privatization of the economy, imposed on the new government 
coalition by international sponsors including the IMF, triggered a dramatic 
impoverishment of the population which resulted in the CDR’s failure to win the 
2000 election. In this  context of  a  significant decline in living standards, Ion Iliescu 
and the Social Democratic Party were re-elected in 2000 and held power until 2004, 
when the  PDL (Liberal Democrat Party) candidate, Traian Basescu (the current 
president – now in his 2nd consecutive term)-  won the elections. During Traian 
Basescu's first term of office, Romania entered NATO, in 2004, and the EU, in 2007.     
Both socialism and post-socialist capitalism engaged in forms of violence 
against the population, undertaken either by the Communist Party or produced by an 
uncertain transition towards a market economy. Nevertheless, scholars have shown 
that violence expressed either by laws and coercion, or  by the lack of reforms and 
state protection  was  challenged, altered, transformed and locally domesticated by 
people and authorities who actively participated in the transformation of their lives. 
(Burawoy, Verdery 1999; Hann 1987; Hann 2002; Verdery 1996)      
To sum up, this section concentrated principally on major political 
transformations directed from the centre. Nevertheless, it showed that important 
social historical transformations such as the 1848 Revolutions and the abolition of 
Roma slavery, which were strongly connected to each other, started from local 
practices by individual boyars, which were influenced by exposure to Western 
Enlightenment ideas. In long run, these practices generated central reforms, through 
a series of decisions, and laws. Two points can be made here.  
1. Local practices are frequently the source of change and cannot be 
disentangled from ideas, values, and discourses in the understanding of larger 
transformations. This insight becomes crucially important when analysing the 
transformation from socialism to post-socialism through the lens of local level power 
relations and discursive practices. Historical transformations are often performed 
and enacted from below through local initiatives and relations, influenced in their 




involvements of practices and ideas are called discursive practices and are analysed 
in detail in the last main chapter. 
2. The historical outline shows that the transformations of the Roma lifestyle 
have to be done in terms of their dynamics and interactions with larger historical 
transformations. Nevertheless, the state, by distributing land, abolishing slavery, 
making education compulsory, employing large numbers of Gypsies in socialist 
industry etc., did not necessarily improve their living conditions and did not 
decisively contribute to their transformation. As Achim (2004) argues, after the 
abolition of slavery, different Roma groups had different trajectories. While some 
migrated, joining nomadic groups, others continued to work for their former masters.  
Some Roma groups preserved their mobility while others remained sedentary. This 
second observation indicates that the transformation of Roma communities can be 
better understood through the study of local communities, their relations and their 
discursive practices.  
These reflections buttress the analytical frame of my historical ethnography 
focused on two movements/transformations, which interact and depend on each 
other: transformation of spheres of power (e.g. the state, politics, the economy, 
education, and religion) and transformation of local individual relations and 
discursive practices. In the next two sections of this chapter, the movement from 
socialism to post-socialism is discussed in relation to individual and local practices. 
 2.2. The socialist state and second economy in Romania 
  
Individual experiences are always connected to larger political and economic 
transformations. Investigating power relations in the Romanian context cannot 
exclude everyday understandings of socialism as an economic and political system28, 
which influenced individual lives for almost 50 years.  
Political, social and economic aspects were intertwined in such a way that the 
whole socialist system involved centralised decisions, control and surveillance, as 
well as individual innovation, creativity, and resistance. Central decisions were taken 
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by the Romanian Communist Party, which enforced two large programs: the 
dissolution and collectivization of private property, and the industrialization and 
centralization of institutions and services. For the socialist planners industrialization 
was the main instrument of economic development and collective farms provided   
the agricultural platform for industrial production (Cole 1985; Ionescu 1964). Since 
the early 1960s, peasants were forced to work the land in cooperative farms (CAPs), 
conceived as associations based on collective property and the equal participation of 
members in decision making processes. Those who worked in such farms used to 
receive small amounts of agricultural products and money and were entitled to 
cultivate limited plots of land in order to cover their subsistence needs (Brezinski, 
Petrescu 1986; Kideckel 1993; Voiculescu 2008). However, the entitlement was tied 
to their active participation as part of the workforce in the demanding29 tasks of the 
cooperative farm. While the elderly accepted this form of unfair exchange based on  
the CAPs, the young went into industrial work for formal employment and proper 
salaries. In rural areas, these limiting relationships established by the socialist state 
entrenched a peasant subsistence economy (Voiculescu 2008) mixed with industrial 
work (Sandu 1984).   
Beside the proletarianisation of a large percentage of the population involved 
in agriculture, industrialisation involved many other complex transformations: the 
movement of people from rural to urban areas, the development of public services 
and infrastructure, and the emergence of new social lifestyles. Yet, through its 
bureaucratic structures, the Communist Party implemented an ideology meant to 
legitimate  state power, and generate disadvantages for those not having “healthy”, 
working class origins, which included such disadvantages as having no access to 
higher education, few state benefits, limited access to good job positions and 
exclusion from party membership (Cole 1985; Ionescu 1964).   
This reorganization was part of the Communist Party’s paternalistic social 
engineering program. Verdery (1996) notes that during socialism, Romania had a 
paternalist state that claimed to take care of everyone, whose programs covered all 
those who proved compliant. Through the centralization and planification of the 
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economy and of industrial production, the socialist state attempted to eliminate   
individual initiative and minimize involvement in private arrangements for the 
supply of goods. 
Nevertheless, the lack of economic rationality and the autarchic model of the 
socialist economy entailed serious weaknesses: “chronic shortages of goods, labour 
and investment funds, rather than markets as in capitalism” (Cole 1985: 248).  
As Verdery (1996) argues, the redistribution of resources and rewards, 
created to legitimize the communist ideology, was a powerful state apparatus of 
control over individuals and families. Shortages of goods seriously affected the 
population, especially in the 1980s, when Ceausescu dramatically increased exports 
(agricultural products, technical and electric equipment, clothes etc.) to pay back the 
international debts (Verdery 1993). As a reaction to the regime, people started to get 
more involved in the ’second’ (informal) economy by manipulating state resources, 
such as stealing products from the workplace and collective farms in order to use 
them in their households or sell them on the informal (black) markets. This second   
economy was the tolerated offspring of the state economy’s inability to deal with 
individuals’ consumption needs and, as scholars argued, the two economies cannot 
be dissociated in the understanding of socialism (Burawoy, Verdery 1999; Hann 
1987, 2002).  
The interdependence between the state and second economy becomes 
extremely important when we look at individual practices and relations during 
socialism. An illustration of this comes from my previous research (Radu 2007; 
Voiculescu 2003, 2004) which shows that Roma, like any other Romanian citizens, 
were often involved in activities outside the socialist state's sphere of control. The 
Caldarars, who were small tinkers and cauldron-makers, used to supply their private 
activities with copper stolen from large plants. The success of their business was 
dependent most of the time on the good connections they regularly made with 
Romanian workers or factory administrators, able to steal and sell them the necessary 
materials. The shortages of goods produced by an inefficient centralised economic 
system generated informal practices and collaborations. In short, socialism was not 
only a planned and highly regulated state and economy, but also a diversity of 




contexts of living. Yet, the capacities to respond by innovation and by alternative 
social practices were different amongst different social groups. An argument made 
throughout my thesis is that the two Roma groups I refer to had different ways of 
handling the challenges posed by both socialist and post-socialist economies and 
state apparatuses of repression. With reference to my field site – Costesti village - the 
state’s paternalism  had a significant  impact on the Romanianised Roma, who were  
deeply involved in the socialist formal economy, but had less  impact on the nomadic 
Caldarars who showed resistance to and also adaptation to forced settlement 
programs, formal employment, and state politics in general. In Verdery’s terms 
(1996), the state was the father of the nation and society was an extended family for 
which the state provided rules, goods, and services. Nevertheless, the paternal care 
was not genuine, as the state’s sons and daughters often repudiated it.  
 
2.3 Control, surveillance and local domestications of 
socialism 
 
Besides care and support programs, the paternalist model of governing the 
population entailed strategies of control and surveillance based on both coercive 
practical methods and on discursive strategies. These proved to be critically 
important in the perpetuation of both the communist ideology and the socialist 
economy. In Romania, as in other East European communist countries, the main state 
control apparatus was embodied in the secret police service - the Securitate – which 
aimed at producing files and profiles of people, who were suspected of betrayal or of 
undermining the Communist Party and its ideology (Verdery 1996). Networks of 
informers and collaborators, which provided information about dissidents and the 
internal organization of various groups (e.g. ethnic groups of Hungarians and 
Gypsies), supported the state mechanisms of surveillance. Local leaders of various 
groups were not only working in the service of their communities, but they were also 
collaborators of the Securitate providing the constant and updated data needed for 
their control. These people used to receive various rewards in exchange: better jobs, 
party positions, better supplies of consumer goods and household equipment hardly 




protection. This was the case of many Roma leaders who became collaborators of the 
Securitate and disclosed information about the Caldarars’ gold possessions and their 
informal activities.  
This spying infrastructure led to  a decline in social relations and trust among 
people belonging to the same group or locality. While enhancing the power of the 
few over the many, the Securitate’s use of networks of collaborators disempowered 
large communities, who became more and more dependent upon their leaders, party 
activists and the police state. Most of the people were aware that in this game they 
lost control over their lives and possessions. For instance, the Caldarar Gypsies were 
frequently harassed by the police and forced to divulge information about their own 
or their relatives’ savings and belongings. Although they knew that the main provider 
of information was their leader (bulibasa) they were never sure exactly who his 
collaborators were, people who were often members of their own community.    
As Verdery (1991, 1993) documented, the Communist Party used an 
additional control strategy grounded in the ideology of the nationalist state, aimed at 
homogenising the society by forcing adherence to the same socialist values. Aiming 
at erasing differences between ethnic groups and social classes, it promoted a 
homogenous proletarian model through nationalist discourses and socio-economic 
policy. Yet, these goals were never achieved. Differences have always existed 
between groups. Different economic practices and modes of existence performed by 
different Roma groups and different conceptions of self-identification (e.g. 
Romanianised Roma, Caldarars) are a good illustration of the failure of the socialist 
state’s ideological program. Even though they were subjects of forced settlement, the 
nomad Gypsies (Caldarars) continued to travel seasonally, pursue informal activities, 
and to resist assimilation. Also, the Romanianised Roma, with no land or commercial 
abilities, but with a ‘sedentary’ lifestyle, accessed both seasonal labour opportunities 
and the state’s provision of work and social benefits. 
The apparatuses of the socialist state developed different forms of repression 
and control. However, the centre was always dependent on the peripheral units in 
terms of enforcement, ideology diffusion, and the redistribution of production 
(Emerson 1962; Gross 1989, cited in Verdery 1991). As many authors argued (Hann 




control over the local administrative units, produced the opposite result. Local 
populations and authorities domesticated and altered the central state rules. The 
delegation of responsibilities from the centre to periphery generated tensions 
between various political and administrative levels of organization (Campeanu 1986; 
Ionescu 1964) and, in turn, often resulted in local consensus against the communist 
ideological programs of the state.  
As Verdery (1996) acknowledges, the socialist apparatus aimed at creating a 
‘new, socialist man’ through the development of an aggressive nationalist ideology 
and an ‘economy of shortage’. People had to spend more time looking for specific 
products and services (food and clothes supplies, heating fuel etc.). To get easier 
access to resources, many developed informal social connections both outside and 
inside the socialist bureaucracy (Cole 1985). These individual initiatives led, on one 
hand, to the development of the second economy and, on the other hand, to an 
informal socio-economic stratification within a presumed egalitarian system. Party 
membership and hierarchy often brought with it the power of redirecting goods and 
services towards certain groups and individuals. In their struggles to obtain scarce 
resources30, locals would court party representatives and authorities who were 
involved in distribution. Local party activists, leaders and nomenclatura (technical-
industrial/agricultural personnel, teachers, physicians, intermediate medical 
personnel), who held privileged positions granted by the Communist Party, 
facilitated connections to the central apparatuses of the state (Campeanu 1988; 
Ionescu 1964). They channelled information from central to peripheral 
administrative units (local councils) and constituted important connections in the 
allocation of positions and resources.     
       These developments were established and negotiated at the local level. 
For instance, Gypsy leaders were concerned to expand and extend their connections 
to mayors and regional party representatives, who were able to provide them with the 
necessary goods and services, including protection. Individual accommodations can 
be considered forms of social innovation, domestication and transformation of the 
planned rigidities of the socialist regime. As Cole (1985) suggests, actions by the 
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30My assumptions are partly based on my current and previous research findings in various Romanian 





socialist bureaucracy were entangled with individual and family practices. Therefore, 
the Romanian variety of socialism was highly coercive and repressive in its 
strategies, but rather weak in managing the complicated local relationship dynamics 
that prompted further transformations.  
My thesis takes these suggestions and arguments one step further and 
considers this entanglement between socialist forms of organization and local 
accommodations to central policies, to be a source of developing dynamic power 
relations between Roma groups and local state representatives and nomenclatura.  
2.4 Romania after socialism: major changes or continuity?  
 
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, many Eastern European states experienced not only 
political changes, but also complex socio-economic transformations, which affected 
their citizens’ lives, their practices and projects.  
For some political scientists the demise of socialism has brought “the end of 
history” (Fukuyama 1993) and “the triumph of liberalism, of capitalism, of the 
Western democracies over the vain hopes of Marxism” (Latour 1993: 9). This model 
of understanding change in Eastern Europe emphasised ruptures and discontinuities 
and portrayed the socialist structures in total opposition to the post-socialist ones31. 
While sociologists and anthropologists (Burawoy and Verdery 1999, Hann 2002, 
Verdery 1996) generally agreed that the fall of communism produced a transition 
from a totalitarian regime to a democratic one, they were critical of the effects and 
rationality of the imported liberal reforms which involved privatisation, 
marketisation, law reforms etc. Numerous ethnographic studies which investigated 
everyday practices showed continuity between socialism and post-socialism in its 
“both regressive and progressive” transformations (Burawoy, Verdery 1999). The 
economic reconfiguration of the social led to a complex mixture of “backward” 
informal markets based on barter and illegal trade and formal institutions developed 
to support the rule of law, free markets, and private property (Burawoy, Verdery 
1999; Verdery 1996).  
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31See, for illustration, Berdahl, Bunzl, and Lampland (2000), Burawoy and Verdery (1999), Hann 




Some authors (Platz 2000; West, Raman 2009) claimed that liberalisation in 
Eastern European countries had an effect of ‘demodernisation’. Similarly, Verdery 
(1996) characterized the attempt of Romanian society to move towards capitalism as 
a failure and a return to a ‘feudal’ economy. Yet, post-socialist economic and social 
organisation were not necessarily states of backwardness as some researchers of 
Eastern European societies argued (Burawoy 1999; Hann 2002; Verdery 1996). 
These transformations were rather expressions of an endless transition in which the 
large processes of economic liberalisation were interacting with social and economic 
practices of local institutions and populations from small villages as well as from big 
cities (Berdahl, Bunzl, Lampland 2000). The very term ‘post-socialism’ designates a 
complex process and continuity between two apparently opposed political and 
economic orders.  
Romania, like other Eastern European countries, experienced complex 
processes of de-industrialization and the de-collectivization of property. 
Decentralization of economic production left a space for massive innovation and 
engagement in the informal economy that re-linked spheres of production, 
distribution, and consumption in new ways (Burawoy, Verdery 1999). 
Large unproductive factories were dismantled and sold by the state to 
international investors, often for small financial gains and with little protection for 
the workers (Verdery 1996). The privatization of industry often involved corruption 
and clientelist relations between the government, plant directors, and investors. State 
representatives and plant directors were interested in gaining personal financial 
benefits by selling the former socialist industrial companies, their machinery and 
assets. For example, in 2001, Derex Goteni 32, the largest South-East European steel 
plant underwent a privatisation in which the government and the then prime minister 
, Adrian Nastase, were suspected of corruption33. Before privatisation, large parts of 
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32Derex Goteni steel plant is an important reference in my ethnography carried out in the village of 
Costesti. Since socialist times, both Romanians and Romanianized Roma used to be employees of the 
steel plant.    
33‘Plangere penala impotriva Cabinetului Nastase privind privatizarea Sidex’[Derex privatization 
criminal complaint against Nastase’s cabinet], Wednesday, 18th August 2009, Available at: www. 
ziare.com.; ‘Parlamentarii cer desecretizarea dosarului Sidex’ [Members of Parliament request Derex 




Derex were dismantled and its technology was sold to private traders. As both 
Caldarars and other villagers in Costesti told me, directors of Derex Goteni used to 
sell materials to dealers and traders. For each transaction, the director would receive 
an amount of money from traders who were happy to buy cheap and resell dear. 
During the 1990s, some Caldarar Gypsies who were used to engaging in trade and 
who had had sufficient financial resources under socialism bought old pipes from 
Derex to resell to small firms. This proved to be an important source of enrichment 
for the Caldarars who filled the gap between old forms of industrial production and 
the new channels of consumption. 
This shows that the privatization of industry created opportunities for 
Caldarars to exploit abilities and knowledge they had used under socialism and 
illustrates the continuity between the socialist mode of organisation and new forms 
of capitalism, which, as many authors have stated, are strongly connected and 
interdependent34.  
The privatisation of property was a powerful symbol of the liberalization of 
the state and the market economy. Yet, as the above illustration suggests, it revealed 
socialist legacies, as well as growing, fast-transforming informality: “change is rapid 
and characterized not by the development of formal institutions alone but by the 
recombination of the formal and the informal” (Grzymala-Busse and Loung 2002: 
535). The Caldarars were active players in this game of informality and their 
interactions with the informal economy are developed in the chapter on the informal 
economy.  
Besides this, it is important to note that in the development of new markets,  
state regulation was an important aspect that produced various effects in the post-
1989 context of growing informality. In Romania, as Verdery (1996) argues, the 
liberal restructuring produced both “de-statising” and “re-statising” effects. 
Privatisation and liberalisation processes needed the state’s involvement and 
 
34 Many authors explored this interdependency. Among those, one can see Berdahl, Bunzl, and 
Lampland (2000), Benacek (1994), Burawoy and Verdery (1999), Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley 
(1998), Hann (2002), Harloe (1996), Kolankiewicz (1995), Stark (1990), Sick (1994), Szelenyi, 





oversight, as the “emerging markets were inadequate to solve the problems of 
decreased production and living standards, endemic corruption, labour unrest, and so 
on” (p. 213). The central state frequently intervened in the legal and bureaucratic 
practices (Abrams 1988) of various local representatives.  
On the other hand, law enforcement was often altered by a process of 
contextualization (Verdery 1996) and the local political level became crucially 
important as it brought important unintended consequences (Burawoy, Verdery 
1999; Grzymala-Busse, Luong 2002) for the macro-social projects of 
transformation. In this sense, similar to the privatisation of industry, the de-
collectivisation of land property entailed a series of interactions between law and 
practice, individual claims and local state (Verdery 1996). As Verdery argues, the 
requirement of efficiency demanded that the state manifest a stronger presence in the 
privatisation process. For instance, many landowners who encountered local 
difficulties in receiving their properties back were compelled to make appeals to the 
central state institutions in order to solve their legal problems.  
Paradoxically, the privatisation and liberalisation pursued by the state 
produced both “re-statisation” and the perpetuation of the post-socialist disorder, 
which, in its turn, created both constraints and opportunities for individual 
innovation and adaptation to uncertainty.    
As Verdery (1996) documents for Romania, households and individuals 
coped with the changes and shortages of money by engaging in more than one 
occupation and by availing themselves of state transfers and interventions. These 
observations reveal some similarities between socialist and post-socialist economies 
and continuities between the two. In socialism, the state, which held an excessive 
control over the economy produced shortages of goods and consequently pushed 
people into the second economy (exchange of goods, petty trade). In post-socialism, 
the state, using the rhetoric of liberalisation, withdrew from its own creation and left 
individuals and groups to deal with a new sector of informal economy generated 
through de-industrialisation and de-collectivization (restitution of property). Without 
state reforms, de-industrialisation produced high levels of unemployment among the 




fragmentation and rural impoverishment35. In this sense, it has been argued that the 
post-socialist state itself was reconstituted using “informal structures and practices 
utilised by political elites, factory managers, and ordinary citizens alike, which have 
survived the collapse of communism” (Grzymala-Busse, Loung 2002: 535; Stark, 
Bruszt 1998). While I agree that there are continuities between socialism and post-
socialism, I go beyond a historical deterministic explanation and I consider that 
different reactions by Roma groups to post-socialist transformations were produced 
by a complex dynamic of power relations and discursive practices. The power 
struggles were more intense after 1989 when the state withdrew both its support and 
its control over the economy and society. 
In my thesis I consider that these rapid, multiple post-socialist 
transformations, which are connected to socialist legacies, but not so much to the 
actual  control exercised by the state, take the form of power struggles and are called 
in my thesis spheres of power struggle (e.g. the state, politics, the informal economy,  
and religion) in which individuals participate through  their relations and practices 
in  the transformation of their own lives. Individuals and groups were driven to 
experience post-socialist transition as a struggle for connections, resources, 
adaptation and innovation. All these gave rise to a local dynamics of power 
struggles. The local level power relations and discursive practices participated 
actively in the transformation of the groups and individuals’ conditions of existence. 
They produced constraints or opportunities in the economic conditions of existence 
for local populations including the two Roma groups I discuss in my thesis.  
In the ethnographic study presented in my thesis, the post-socialist experience 
of the transformation in the economic sphere is illustrative. After 1989, most of the 
Gypsies who worked in state farms and factories under socialism were laid off 
(Stewart 1997, 2002) and engaged in informal economic activities such as day labour 
in agriculture and construction for peasant or Caldarar neighbours. These practices 
and relations, which serve to reveal interactions between larger transformations and 
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35Peasants, lacking advanced technology, were not able to cultivate their land. They were compelled 
to hire technology or rent out parts of their plots to large farmers and associations for relative small 
amounts of money and were able to exercise only indirect   control over the exploitation of their land 




individuals’ practices, generated limited possibilities for adaptation for 
Romanianized Roma at the local level, which are discussed in the next Chapter. In 
my thesis they are the capillaries of power of the whole dynamic portrayed above.    
Scholars of Eastern European studies mentioned in this chapter also 
emphasised the importance of local practices and relations in post-socialist 
transformations but they tended to overlook their interaction with the multiple 
overlapping spheres where power struggles take place (religion, the economy, the 
state, politics) in the continuous movement from socialism to post-socialism. More 
importantly, they failed to notice the capacity of these local practices and relations 
to differentially enact, for one  group or another, constraints or opportunities for  
economic improvement. My historical ethnography on the Roma concentrates on 
these two main aspects in order to explore differences in the patterns of interactions 
with the transformations and the different life trajectories of Caldarars and 
Romanianized Roma.    
In the next section I discuss the intersection between the informal economy, 
politics and the state, as emergent spheres of power struggle with which individuals 
and groups actively interacted during the post-socialist transition. They constitute the 
main themes of interest which will be extensively developed throughout the thesis.        

2.5. Intersectionalities between the state, politics and the 
informal economy: clientelism and enrichment in 
Romania 
 
In this section I show that the emergence of reconfigured new spheres of power 
struggle (e.g. the informal economy, politics, the post-socialist state) or the re-
emergence of suppressed spheres of struggle (e.g. religion), which were nonetheless 
not disconnected from the former spheres of struggle (e.g. the socialist second 
economy) are interrelated in their local manifestations (relations and discursive 
practices).  
In other words, power relations are not confined to one sphere or another, 
but influence one another and interact with different discursive practices which are 




emerged under post-socialism is that between the informal economy, the state and 
politics, expressed locally in the form of patronage politics and individual 
clientelistic relations. This post-socialist emergence was mainly triggered by large 
scale processes such as de-industrialisation, state withdrawal and privatisation of the 
economy. 
As was shown in the previous section, Romanian de-industrialisation set in 
motion a whole world of connections, small businesses and intermediaries. 
Intermediaries connected the state plants’ directors interested in selling assets/ 
products to private companies interested in buying cheap products for their economic 
activity. These transactions were publicly translated into a discourse about the Mafia, 
which emerged in the 1990s in reference to the rampant corruption and informality 
(Verdery 1996). The ‘Mafia’ as a discourse was not only an expression of the 
declining trust that the population had in the chaotic privatisation of the economy, 
but also an indication of their anxiety about  not getting fair access to the market’s 
opportunities and resources. It was a reaction to ‘clientelistic relations’, ‘local 
bosses’36 (Humphrey 2002b) and what Verdery (1996) called a state of 
‘statelessness’, “in which it is completely unclear who owns what, who is exploiting 
whom” (p. 218).  
In theory, clientelism connects people vertically to unequal resources and 
influence, „the higher status person having access to goods and services of a higher 
market value than the lower status person who can generally offer only political 
support or labor” (Hilgers 2011:570). It is a dyadic personal relation „between two 
parties who develop trust in each other’s commitment” (p.573) by exchanging a 
series of goods and services. In order to maintain the relation, both parts are 
informally obliged to reciprocate in time. However, the client has less to offer in 
comparison with his higher in rank partner, who is able to channel funding to the 
whole community the client belongs.  
Besides self-interest, either obligation or loyalties dominate the relationship 
(Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981; Gadowska 2006; Grødeland 2006). It is a simple 
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terms to designate the concept ‘local patron’: ‘local boss’ or ‘local baron’. In the rest of my thesis I 




power relation, which takes the form of domination between an influent actor (e.g 
mayor, local administrator, and prefect) who sometimes is established as a local 
patron in relation with his clients. The partner higher in rank offers protection and 
support to people with low access to financial resources, connections and 
information. In exchange, the influent actor receives support for his/her position, in 
elections or in any other situations where her/his leadership role is questioned or 
challenged37. However, this relation of subordination is often contested by clients 
and has its own dynamic, which is discussed extensively in my chapters on everyday 
politics and local-level politics.    
Part of the same family of concepts, clientelism and patronage were many 
times considered interchangeable (Hilgers 2011). Nevertheless, Hilgers (2011) 
argues that patronage is different from clientelism and mainly refers to “the 
distribution of public sector jobs by a candidate or party to loyal supporters who have 
helped to generate votes” (p.575). Moreover, this feature of patronage, which she 
considers is not specific to clientelism, establishes a local patronage of a political 
party run by main local leaders, who become, in this equation, able to control the 
local public resources and the local distribution of positions. Patronage includes all 
those members who actively support a main parliamentary political party, including 
the patron, followers (e.g. local bureaucrats) and patronage brokers. Moreover, 
clientelistic dyadic relations can exist and develop outside of an established local 
patronage team, which follows the main interests of a political party. They can take 
shape between local bureaucrats and citizen, public administration representatives 
and citizen, but also between local patrons and upper level party members or local 
patrons and voters.    
Brokers are usually those middlemen who “have organizational and 
leadership skills but lack access to distributable resources and therefore use their 
abilities to act as middlemen between clients and higher levels of power” (Scott 
1977, cited in Hilgers 2011: 580). They are also those who convince people to vote 
for one party or another, supporting the local patron or upper-level party members. 
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Between all these actors mentioned above, clientelistic relations are 
established, at individual level. The patron is in clientelistic relation with his political 
party superiors, but also with followers, voters (clients) and brokers. At their turn, 
brokers (e.g. Roma leaders) and followers (e.g. local bureaucrats) are in a 
clientelistic relation with voters (e.g. Roma clients).      
In Romania, local patrons have long been called ‘local barons’. The 
ascription is given to people with strong political connections and significant 
obligations, often representing parliamentary political parties, while at the same time 
holding local or regional administrative positions (mayor, prefect, local or county 
councillor etc.). Those who are already established as patrons are portrayed by media 
and popular discourses as people who deal in the ‘traffic of influence’, who have 
access to public funds and who abuse their political/administrative positions to gain 
large amounts of  money, business contracts, protection, or to fund electoral 
campaigns. In 2011, Romanian journalists identified 65 ‘local barons’ corresponding 
to five political parties, all members of the present parliament: the Social Democrat 
Party (37), the Liberal Democrat Party (17), the Liberal National Party (8), the 
Conservative Party (2) and the Romanian Hungarian Democratic Union (1)38. The 
‘local barons’ are very well connected to businessmen across the country. The latter 
can ask for administrative favours and offer their generous financial and political 
support.  
Patronage make a good case for demonstrating  that politics, state and the 
informal economy act together in the development of post-socialist economic 
informal networks. Usually, the ruling political party or coalition sets the agenda of 
interests and power relations and facilitates their enactment by establishing strong 
connections between the low and high levels of politics. The channelling of resources 
from the centre to regional and local administrative structures of power is done 
through the local patrons. As Gadowska (2006) argues for Poland, the redistribution 
of positions at the local level is conducted on political principles (main politcal 
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38 “Cine conduce Romania! Harta baronilor locali din Romania. Baronii vechi si noi” [Who is ruling 







party’s directions) and that is the main expression of the way patronage politics 
works. The same happens in Romania. A change in the government entails a change 
in the managerial structure of local institutions (schools, tax offices, healthcare 
institutions etc.). Political favouritism ensures that leading positions are occupied by  
people who do not necessarily have the skills to run institutions, but who are able to 
return the gifts by supporting the ruling party and local patrons’ interests “even if it 
would be contradictory to the interest of the office” (p. 11). Nevertheless, as  long  as 
the ‘local barons’ or patrons keep their relations and subordinate their actions to the 
central state representatives, their actions cannot be considered to be, in Verdery’s 
terms, part of a process of the ‘privatization of power’. Verdery’s explanation 
suggests that these transformations entail a switch in control from the central state 
structures to local bosses, a “parcelisation of sovereignty”, as Humphrey (2002b) 
argues in the case of post-soviet Russia. Conversely, in this section and in the 
chapter on everyday politics I argue that patronage is an expression of a dynamic of 
power relations between local clients, patrons, followers and central state actors.  
From another viewpoint, the discussion on social and political sytems based 
on patronage politics, characterized by intersectionalities between politics, informal 
economy and state practice comes closer to the critical analysis of power elites made 
by Mills (1958, 1959), with reference to American society. Mills was mainly 
interested to uncover the control dimension of the decision making processes in 
American society, which, in his view, expresses the very idea of power. The 
development of the main types of bureaucracy (corporate, political, military) lead to 
the emergence of a new elite in the control of the social, economic and political life 
with „access to the means of decision and of power by which history can now be 
made” (Mills 1958:31). Power has been centralized in the hands of a few top leaders, 
able to exercise control over the rest of society, which progressively lost models of 
self-organization and political power. This development dissolved the demarcations 
between military, political and economic spheres, which became interdependent and 
represented by leaders with shared interests, able to interchange their positions in the 
leading structure of the main realms of the societal decision making. As Mills (1958, 
1959) shows for the case of American society, leaders of corporative sector became 






These observations on intersectionalities between different realms of 
leadership and institutional power and the analytical conceptualization of power 
centralization in the form of ’power elites’ are valid for a comparison with the 
Romanian post-socialist economic and political context. It is important to notice that 
the common feature of the two systems is the intersectionality between different 
realms of action and decision making (e.g. informal economy, politics, everyday 
state practices vs. military, formal economy, formal politics) which source power for 
those exploiting the overlapping(s) and getting control over the distribution of 
resources and positions (e.g. regional, local patrons vs. power elites). Nevertheless, 
as showed above, in the Romanian post-socialist state, the power is neither 
completely centralized in the form of power elites nor localized in the form of 
chiefdoms, able to act independently from the political centre. There is no doubt that, 
at the centre, there are some prominent political and economic leaders, who have 
more access to power than local patrons/barons have. However, the first do not 
necessarily dictate the actions of the latter, which are most of the time deeply 
localized in clientelistic relations with local, regional economic, political and state 
actors. Without losing the relation with the central political parties, which give the 
main direction of governance and distribution of resources and positions, local and 
regional patrons, who are most of the time state representatives, have a good degree 
of local autonomy and control. They are nodes of power in a complex irregular web 
of power relations and in a clientelistic relation with upper level representatives of 
the parliamentary politics.  
Interestingly, Mills (1958) makes a parallel between the Western society’s 
gradual centralization of power and the Soviet society’s authoritarian model of 
centralized authority. In this case the parallel is even more relevant as far as socialist 
societies, as it was the case of Romania, were under the rule of one single party, 
Communist Party, setting the economic, social and political agenda and controlling 
the distribution of positions and resources. The Party used to entitle the leaders of 
main bureaucracies, the Communist activists and officials, to get control over the 
decision making in their sectors. Therefore, it can be implied that in Romania and 
Eastern Europe, in general, the Communist Party brought a centralization of power 





Nevertheless, as I already suggested, in the Romanian post-socialist context, 
power is more decentralized and there are more local leaders to get access to the 
benefits of these intersectionalities and control of decision making. In this context, it 
would be difficult to speak of a power elite and more useful to speak about a  
neopatrimonial system
39
, in which the power of decision making is fragmented, 
divided between local/regional patrons and their followers, under general directions 
given by the central politics.  
Furthermore, the East-European post-1989 capitalisms can be seen in analogy 
with Southern Italy and Sicily (Harloe 1996; Putnam 1993; Verdery 1996). 
Capitalism developed in similar ground: local informal businesses somewhat 
detached from the administrative centre, informal connections, and market 
speculations (Schneider, Schneider 1976). However, the Italian pattern does not 
entirely fit the post-socialist Romanian context. As Gadowska (2006) shows, local 
patrons are not primarily businessmen, but state and political representatives with a  
strong connection with the centre of power. They do make use of their positions to 
control resources and give preferential support to the development of local 
businesses and infrastructure. For example, Grødeland (2006) documents a case in 
which the mayor of Botosani, a Northern Romanian town, used his political 
connections to redistribute resources from the government to the locality under his 
administration. From this point of view, ‘local barons’ or patrons were critically 
important for the uneven regional economic development in Romania. In Costesti, 
the location of my field research, the actual administrative manager, Sorin Comsa, a 
Social Democrat Party (PSD) member, occupied  various positions: from teacher to 
school director to vice-mayor, and then a councillor with the Ministry of the Interior 
in the government offices in Bucharest. Following this route and using his political 
influence and connections to redistribute government funding and support local 
infrastructure, he succeeded in becoming the local patron of ‘his community’. Many 
of his “clients” are Romanianized Roma who give him their votes in exchange for 
administrative favours or small amounts of money. He is also involved in various 
civic, cultural and community development projects in the village. Through his 
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various positions and actions, the local patron has been part of multiple spheres of 
power struggle: state, politics, and civic-social. The source of ‘ his power’40 derives  
not only from a clientelistic relation with higher state officials and party 
representatives of  which he is a client himself, but also from  the  close relations he 
developed as a neighbour41,  teacher and vice-mayor with the Romanianized Roma. 
The latter habitually give allegiance and respect to their former teacher, neighbour 
and supporter in their everyday difficulties. On the other hand, Comsa is both a local 
patron for the Romanianized Roma and a client of higher state representatives and 
PSD party members to which he shows complete allegiance during elections. All 
these relations are productive of power and show a dynamic much more complex 
than that depicted by the classical understanding of clientelism as a relation of 
domination. The local patron’s actions are embroiled in this double dynamic of 
power with the Roma, local communities and leaders, on one hand, and upper-level 
officials and party members , which take the form of clientelistic relations and give 
consistency of what I call patronage politics.  
In my thesis I explore the power manifestations as a complex temporal 
dynamic of both horizontal and hierarchical (clientelist) relations which produce 
continuous transformations in the lives of two Roma groups. My analysis focuses on 
power as a set of processes, struggles for authority or control, which can involve 
both empowerment and subjection to power of the actors involved. This dynamic of 
power struggles can be a source of changes in the material and socio-economic 
conditions of the two Roma groups studied. The changes are explored comparatively 





40I am using reverted commas to emphasise that even if the terminology of power indicates individual 
possession, power is produced and negotiated through individual relations and discursive practices 
and it is the expression of a dynamic sustained by a multitude of individuals.  
41Comsa was born in the village and lived very close to the Romanianized Roma district. He was in 





Explaining changes in the material conditions of Roma groups in 
Romania 
 
Although all Gypsies were full actors in the socialist second economy, not all of 
them secured important gains and continuity after 1989. There are various theses 
which aim at explaining these divisions and the emergence of the post-socialist 
entrepreneurs. One of them is the ‘capitalism from below’ developed by Szelenyi 
(1988) in the Hungarian context. Szelenyi (1988) considered that small commercial 
farming and the second economy in socialist Hungary were sources of 
embourgeoisement that continued after 1989. In his terms, post-socialist 
entrepreneurs are socialist entrepreneurs who made use of their economic capital, 
skills and expertise to set up formal or informal businesses, gaining affluence, 
prestige and power (Sik 1994).  
His main argument is that it was the variation in abilities and competences 
which made the difference between the successful businesses and failures. In simple 
terms, according to this thesis, the Caldarars, as cauldron manufacturers and traders, 
were socialist entrepreneurs able to make significant profits and develop informal 
businesses in the uncertain transition that followed 1989. The Romanianised 
Gypsies, as informal labourers without sufficient skills and material resources, had 
less access to opportunities to improve their material conditions in the post-socialist 
environment. In this sense, the latter seem to fit a different thesis - the “refuge from 
poverty” model, which asserts that self-employment is a choice made by those who 
lack alternatives in an uncertain economy (Hanley 2000; Laky 1996). The self-
employed are considered to work at the margins of the economy and “unlikely to 
innovate, expand, and diversify their activities” (Stoica 2004: 245). Nevertheless, for 
Caldarars self-employment is a source of affluence and creative development of 
informal businesses, in which important external actors are involved (company 
directors, state and governmental representatives). To sum up, both explanations of 
enrichment seem stuck in a deterministic explanation which claims that the new post-
socialist economy and the peoples’ engagement derive from the former institutions 
and structures and ignores power dynamics and individual and group interactions 





On the other hand, while these theses are meant to provide explanations for 
what happened in the Central Europe (Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary), they 
are not fully appropriate to understanding the emergence of the new rich in Romania. 
The nouveaux riches became highly visible in post-1989 Romania through their 
opulence and conspicuous consumption (Stoica 2004): expensive cars, big houses,  
designer clothes etc. Similarly, some Caldarar families in Costesti became incredibly 
affluent through their involvement in the informal economy. To support their 
economic conditions and strengthen their relations with important economic actors, 
they chose as godparents non-Roma who had important political positions, or who 
managed important companies and institutions. An interesting illustration that 
emphasises the degree and strength of connections between political actors and 
Gypsy businessmen is the personal relationship between the brother of the current 
president Traian Basescu and the interloper figure Bercea Mondial, a rich Gypsy 
man, well known within  the country. He has been investigated in no less than 119 
cases of tax evasion, bribery, money laundering, fraud, illegal VAT refunds and false 
paperwork.  He has been put under preventive arrest several times but he has never 
been prosecuted. 
In January 2010, the president’s brother, Mircea Basescu, became the 
godfather of Bercea Mondial’s granddaughter. One year later (February 2011), the 
Gypsy leader was implicated in an attempted murder and was arrested. In this 
context, journalists accused Mircea Basescu of paying 300,000 Euro to secure 
Bercea's release from prison42. Many other influential people, from within the 
judiciary and the political system, have become godparents for his children and 
nephews. The journalists’ explanation for this was accurately summarized in 
Bercea’s statement: “I was not arrested by the whole country, but my friends arrested 
me. They are stupid”43. In this statement the Gypsy leader claimed extended 
 
42Mircea Basescu accused of having been bribed with 300,000 Euros by Bercea Mondial' Bucharest 
Herald, April 27,  2011. Avaiable at: www.bucharestherald.ro; ‘Mircea Bsescu, despre implicarea în 
cazul lui Bercea Mondial: În niciun caz!’ [Mircea Basescu, about his involvement in Bercea Mondial 
case: No way!], Mediafax.ro, March, 24, 2011, Available at :  www.mediafax.ro.   
43Slatina: Interlopul Bercea Mondial: „Nu m-a arestat toat ara, m-au «arestat» ai mei. Nite proti!”’ 
[Slatina: Interlope Bercea Mondial. I was not arrested by the whole country, my friends arrested me. 





clientelist connections to higher-level actors (politicians, government officials and 
lawyers), who have supported him financially or collaborated with him in informal 
actions. The clientelist relationship through which individual actors exchanged 
informal favours made them indebted to each other and ensured that they exercised 
reciprocal control of the information and goods they exchanged. Friendship provided  
the source of the commitment and trust between the actors, which neutralised the 
possibility of violence involved in  such exchanges (informal or illicit transactions 
outside the public gaze, which if discovered can be detrimental to  both parties 
involved in  the exchange) which would otherwise result if the deal was broken.  
Where such a commitment is broken, both parties lose. Therefore, the statement 
shows that the actors see the source of their power as lying in the nature of the 
hidden exchange: high officials assist the Gypsy leader’s businesses, which 
financially supports their positions.  
The statement ‘they are stupid’ implies that those high officials who informed  
on him were not aware that the exchange was  going to be divulged and therefore 
would harm themselves and make them lose the source of power which was located 
in the informal exchange. The analysis of this statement shows that power involved in 
a dyadic clientelistic relation sourced by a complex relational dynamic.  
As already mentioned, at a lower scale and with no ‘criminal’ activity 
involved, clientelism is used by the richest Caldarars in their informal businesses44. 
Nevertheless, many Caldarar families in Costesti are still involved in small-scale 
informal economic practices such as cauldron-making and roof-painting. These 
mobile activities, which do not involve clientelist connections, produce conditions of 
living which are much better than those of the local peasants and Romanianized 
Roma. On the other hand, the Romanianized Roma, who experienced the same 
transformations (the development of the clientelism, patronage and the informal 
economy in Romania) did not succeed in getting rich. On the contrary, they became 
dependent on their local patron’s favors and remained more or less subordinate to the 
local dynamic of patronage and clientelism, extensively discussed in the chapters on 
state encounters and everyday politics.  
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Therefore, I consider that an explanation for the differences in material 
conditions of the two Roma groups goes beyond models which focus exclusively on 
clientelism and local patronage or the reproduction of resources and positions. 
Throughout the thesis, I show that different approaches (mobile or sedentary) to 
relations, economic practice and interaction with the transformations from the second 
economy to the post-socialist informal economy, underpinned  changes in the 
material conditions of  the two Roma groups.  
On the other hand, without confining power to clientelism and patronage, 
power relations include clientelist relations which are understood as the expression 
of the intersectionalities between state, politics and the informal economy. Yet, in all 
the spheres of power struggle analysed in my thesis, other different relations relevant 
to the transformation of the socio-economic trajectories of the two Roma groups can 
be observed. For example, in the sphere of the informal economy discussed in the 
second chapter, relations between the village groups (Caldarars, Romanianized 
Roma, and peasants) and the relation with the state in its shift from socialism to post-
socialism contain both elements of empowerment and subjection to power. Power 
and empowerment are entangled in individual and group practices and produce either 
constraints or opportunities for action and economic improvement for Romanianised 
Roma and Caldarars. In addition, clientelism and other relations between Roma and 
actors such as patrons and brokers are challenged by discursive practices in the 
sphere of religion. Pentecostal discursive practices in Costesti change the Caldarars’ 
locus of authority, their relations with the state and their leaders.  
Pentecostalism emerged as a new sphere of power struggle after 1989 and 
manifested itself in everyday Caldarars discursive practices. It influenced and 
interacted with relations manifested in other spheres (e.g. the state, the informal 
economy).  
Similar to religion, state education is a discursive practice, which comprises 
both aspects of ‘empowerment’ for the Roma and elements of subjection to state 
power. Forms of educational control are often challenged by the Caldarars’ practical 
knowledge, underpinning their self-governance and manifested in their successful 





subjection, contestations of different forms of power (e.g. state, leaders, local 
patron), and/or empowerment.  
Therefore, as defined in the introduction, power is the product of both inter-
individual relations within and across groups, and discursive practices. These are 
entangled in their manifestations in different spheres of power struggle (the 
economy, the state, politics, religion), influence each other, and act together in the 
transformation of the two Roma groups. Roma discursive practices in the sphere of 
religion are analysed in interaction with state discourses and local meanings of 
leadership in the last chapter. 
2.6 Concluding summary  

This chapter indicates that history has to be studied as a continuous process of 
interactions between central state decisions and local individual practices and 
relations. In their turn, the latter are influenced by discourses and ideas and often 
constitute particular sources of change for the whole society (see, for example, the 
abolition of slavery in the mid-19th century, or the second economy in socialism). 
The local-level relations and practices have their own dynamic and power of 
transformation of groups and individuals.  
In the chapter, I also suggested that Roma lives and histories need to be 
firmly understood in terms of their connections and interactions with larger 
transformations, and are produced by the ways in which different Roma groups 
reacted to central state decisions and interventions. These observations ground my 
analytical approach to the study of local-level dynamics for the understanding of 
transformations of the two Roma groups: Caldarars and Romanianised Roma.   
The last two sections of this chapter reveal continuities between socialism 
and post-socialism within which the individuals’ and groups’ trajectories were 
continuously transformed by the movement of spheres of power struggles (the state, 
politics, the economy, religion) and local individual relations and practices. I 
suggested that the transformations of the two Roma groups were produced by the 
interactions of individuals and groups with the transformations of the state 





informal economy), but also with new religious formations. These interactions were 
manifested in different relations and discursive practices: relations between 
Romanian peasants and the Roma, relations of the Roma with state actors, relations 
between the Roma and local and religious leaders. Discursive practices, in their turn, 
challenge other power relations with the state, leaders and local patrons. 
These relations and discursive practices are expressed in local level power 
struggles between individuals and groups, and are manifested in different spheres of 
power struggles in their continuity (e.g. from the second economy to the informal 
economy) and intersectionality (e.g. politics, the state, informal economy and 
religion) from socialism to post-socialism.  
To sum up, my interest is to explore double dynamic of power suggested by 
Foucault’s (1980) and enclosed in the content of individual and group relations and 
discursive practices: empowerment versus contestation and subjection to power. I am 
interested to evaluate the degree to which one can dominate or replace the other. I 
inquire into the capacity of Roma relations and discursive practices to enact 
restrictions or opportunities for the economic improvement of their conditions of 
existence. Therefore, my thesis analyses the nature of power involved in Roma 
individual/group relations and discursive practices manifested in different spheres of 
power struggle (the economy, the state, politics, religion) in their temporal dynamic 
and interaction from socialism to post-socialism. 
 












     Chapter 3. On the Move within Movement: Roma 
Interaction with the Socio-Economic 
Transformations from Socialism to Post-socialism  
 
Costesti local economy from socialism to post-socialism  
The socialist local economy in Costesti followed the model of the lowland villages 
which underwent the collectivization of land imposed in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Costesti had a cooperative farm where peasants worked collectively and shared the 
produce. There were also two state farms (one for livestock and an agricultural farm 
incorporating a vineyard) and a so-called handicraft cooperative (Cooperativa de 
consum), which used to be the main employer for the villagers. In order to obtain 
both cash and agricultural produce, many Romanianized Gypsies worked for both 
collective and state farms. The cooperative farmers and seasonal workers were 
entitled to a plot of land for family use. Some Romanianized Gypsies who worked on 
the collective farm benefited from this entitlement.  
From the conversations I had with many Gypsies, including Ioader Candel, a 
former state farm team leader and currently an informal Romanianized Roma leader, 
most of the Romanianized Roma worked in the neighbouring state farms during the 
warm seasons. Roma who worked in the state farms told me how they used to 
receive good payment compared to the cooperative work and large amounts of goods 
at  the end of the season. The disadvantages were mainly related to family life, which 
was not easy to manage during seasonal work. Children were either left in the care of 
grandparents or joined their parents at the farms missing several months from school. 
Many Romanianized Roma were, as they said, “brought up in farms”. Seasonal work 
was not sufficient to provide resources for the whole year, allowing for only daily 
expenses and food consumption over the cold season when the Roma were largely 
unemployed. During socialism, unemployment was prohibited and the employment 
status of the Romanianized Roma during the winter was ambiguous,  often  subject to 
negotiation with the local police and the state farms’ engineers, who would  send 
evidence of their work on  the state farm to Costesti local council. 
  During the winter, Romanianized Roma used to help local peasants with 







sometimes informal loans with flexible terms of repayment. Today Romanianized 
Roma still provide services during the winter for the whole village: delivering 
firewood from the forest to the locals, including the Caldarars. All these activities 
ensured their survival, rather than bringing about an improvement in their socio-
economic condition. Most of them told me that the money gained from the farms was 
sufficient for food and clothes, but insufficient to invest in their houses which 
generally are in bad shape, made of wattle and daub.    
During the 1960s, people from Costesti sought employment in the cities, in 
the new state enterprises such as the huge steel plant Derex in Goteni. Many peasants 
and several Romanianized Roma in Costesti were permanent employees at Derex. 
Situated close to a big city, the locals would commute daily for industrial work and 
work their small plots of land during the weekends. However, while peasants 
obtained employment in qualified positions, the Romanianized Roma were the lower 
grade or unskilled personnel of the factory.  
In the 1960s, Caldarars started to settle in the village. Caldarars sometimes 
informally employed the Romanianized Gypsies in construction work for their 
houses built on the village outskirts. From the Caldarars’ accounts, their houses in 
the old district were made of brick and had an attractive appearance, but were much 
smaller than the ones they have today. The enforced settlement imposed by the 
socialist state changed their socio-economic structure. Until the 1960s, the Caldarars 
were organized in small mobile groups, with one bulibasa representing the group in 
interactions with local authorities, in negotiations over camping and making deals as 
cauldron makers.  
Although settled by the state, the Caldarars were in a way attracted by 
Costesti as it is served by a railway station. Since then, their social life has split into 
two socio-economic forms: a mobile and a settled condition. In other words, the 
Caldarars were never quite settled. During the warm season, they travelled over the 
country in small groups based on close kinship relations. The other socio-economic 
form of existence occurred in the winter, when they were settled. From 1960s 
onwards, staying in their village or camping in one place over the winter brought 
them under the direct control of a main bulibasa (Iancu in Costesti and Traian in 







Therefore, while the Romanianized Roma and local peasants confined their 
activities to the socialist state economy, the Caldarars based their existence on 
mobile ‘traditional’ practices, defined by the socialist state as part of the second 
economy. The relations between Caldarars, Romanianized Roma and peasants in 
Costesti were limited by their involvement in different areas of the socialist 
economy. During the 1960s, although Caldarars possessed gold, both Romanianized 
Roma and peasants stigmatized and avoided them, and characterized them as ‘poor’.  
The economic landscape deteriorated after 1989 when collective farms and 
cooperatives were dissolved and large state enterprises in nearby towns and cities 
were partly dismantled and privatized. The local population faced high 
unemployment and a retreat to the household economy and agriculture. The 
dismantling of the socialist state farms and plants left most of the Romanianized 
Roma unemployed and with no regular source of income. They started to look for 
day and seasonal labour in the village and nearby localities.  
 In the early 1990s, peasants received their land back from the state. With 
inadequate technology, resources and labour they either rented out the land or 
cultivated it with the help of locals including the Romanianized Roma. The early 
1990s was also the time when some Caldarar families became rich as they became 
involved in trading outdated technology and materials, purchased cheaply from 
Derex Goteni and sold to small firms all over the country. Using labour force, 
offered by Romanianized Roma and peasants, they were the first group who moved 
from the old district and started building their “palaces”. The rest of the Caldarars 
continued their mobile economic practices as cauldron makers and roof painters. The 
financial returns were usually invested in land and houses. Romanianized Roma, 
Caldarars and peasants looking for means of survival or wealth, met in the local post-
socialist informal economy, where they interacted and developed specific relations.     
After the 1990s the reconfiguration and perceptions of local stratification changed. 
The Caldarars are considered to be the richest by the Romanianized Roma and the 
peasants. The Romanianized Roma are considered to be the poorest by Caldarars and 
the peasants. The peasants, owning land but with insufficient resources to cultivate it, 






Questions and theoretical framework  
 
These socio-economic differences between the two Roma groups rest upon changes 
in local perception and changes in the material conditions. However, an external 
observer would easily notice the poor housing conditions of the Romanianized Roma 
and the Caldarars’ opulent palaces. Relations and practices they developed during the 
socialist economy underlie their interactions with the post-socialist transformation 
and suggest the two Roma’s economic conditions changed in different ways. Starting 
from these observations, this chapter aims to answer the following questions: 
How can the socio-economic transformations of the two Roma groups be   
explained?  
How did the interaction with the economic transformations from socialism to post 
socialism affect their living conditions and self-perceptions? 
Do the socialist-post socialist variations in socio-economic relations between groups 
produce different opportunities and constraints for the two Roma groups? What are 
those constraints and opportunities?  
To account for the post-socialist poverty of the Hungarian Roma, Ladanyi 
and Szelenyi (2003) provided a historical model of explanation based on structural 
dependencies, levels of integration and exclusion produced by different economic 
and political systems in different historical periods. Based on local archives and 
population censuses, they conducted a historical analysis of the Roma social 
condition in terms of segregation and assimilation in a Hungarian village over the 
last 150 years. They argue that the Roma underwent a cyclical transformation 
through different waves of assimilation and segregation, which affected their status 
in the social structure. The authors consider, that while in the 18th century under 
Maria Theresa's regime, the Roma serfs were almost assimilated into Hungarians, by 
the 19th century they had become relatively integrated in the lower strata of local 
society. The authors claim that during the inter-war period, the absence of specific 
supportive policies cemented their position as an under-caste, while after the war, the 
socialist policies of assimilation brought them once more to the position of lower 






changes increased their levels of exclusion and segregation and brought them to the 
position of underclass. .  
In their analysis, Ladanyi and Szelenyi (2003) treat macro-historical 
processes and state policies as the main forces that exert structural influences and 
produce entrenched positions which allow almost no exit for the Roma. The Roma 
are seen as passive recipients of state policies and their movement in social space is 
limited and determined by exclusionary, segregationist, and assimilationist historical 
processes. In my study, historical processes are seen not only as structural domains, 
but also as the realms of everyday practices and relations, which provide the 
parameters for the dynamics of change of both the Roma lives and socio-economic 
spheres which they simultaneously navigate and transform. In order to come to an 
understanding of the  differences between the present socio-economic organization 
of the two Roma groups I look at the history of their economic practices starting with 
the socialist sedentarization of the 1960s, when the Caladarars settled in Costesti.  
The post-1989 Roma economic practices are specific to the transformations, 
which occurred in post-socialist Romania and Eastern Europe. The state’s 
withdrawal from the economy (Wallace, Latcheva 2006; Round, Kosterina 2005) left 
a large proportion of the population unemployed, looking  for survival in the 
informal economic sector ( e.g. petty trade, exchange of goods, domestic work etc.). 
These changes intensified informal patterns of relations, interactions and reciprocity. 
As most scholars of Eastern Europe45 argued, these relations emerged in socialism in 
the sphere of the second economy46 and continued to develop further in post-
socialism as economies of informal exchange, reciprocal support and coping 
strategies (Caldwell 2004; Dunn 2004; Ledeneva 1998; Pattico 2008; Stenning et al 
2010; Wallace 1995).  
Various terms were used to indicate the use of informal economy: “cash in-
hand”, “undeclared”, “shadow”, “informal“, “black” and “underground” economy 
(Williams 2009). Some authors (Grabiner 2000; Thomas 1992; Williams and 
Windebank 1998) identified informal work  as the production and commerce of licit 
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45See Gabor (1979), Stark (1986), Szelenyi (1988), Williams (2009). 






goods47, which are not declared to the state and therefore not taxed, a definition 
which accurately fits Romanianized Roma’ informal work and the Caldarars’ 
informal businesses.  
Research has shown that informal economy in CEE countries was practised 
not only for survival, but also for enrichment (Wallace, Latcheva 2006).  In the early 
1990s, the lack of clear laws and regulations fostered opportunities for informal 
entrepreneurship 48 which were partly developed and formalized later (Neef and 
Stanculescu 2002, Okolski 2001, Piirainen 1997). As many authors argued, in post-
socialist countries a clear-cut boundary between formal and informal economic 
practice could not always be established (Williams 2009). Employers used a mixture 
of formal and informal work practices (‘informal wage arrangements’) in official 
employment49, while employees were often involved in both formal and informal 
activities50. However, in Romania, the state actors did not consider these qualitative 
observations and, as Chelcea and Mateescu (2005) argued, the informal economy 
was heavily criminalized in the 1990s, and ‘the informal’ was seen as ‘illegal’. In 
this sense, the authors suggested that ethnography is the most appropriate 
methodological approach to deconstruct the criminalized image of the informal 
economy.   
Drawing further on Granovetter’s (1985) argument that economic practices 
are socially embedded (Swedberg 1991, 2008), authors of post-socialist studies 
noticed that these informal economic activities are embedded in webs of social 
relations. Taking this suggestion further, I consider that a comprehensive 
understanding of Roma informal economic practices and their adaptations to 
economic transformation requires a careful exploration of the dynamics of social 
relations, occurring at individual and group level, from socialism to post-socialism.  
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47‘Licit goods’ is a reference to all goods which are allowed to be sold on the free markets. Example 
of illicit goods would be drugs, guns etc.  
48From my experience, in the early 1990s, when the state had no clear taxation system, people used to 
sell everywhere on the streets and opened shops, paying no taxes.
49 See Gibson- Graham (2006), Samers (2005), Smith and Stenning (2006), Williams (2009, 2010).
50Lee (2006), Neef (2002), Round and Williams (2008), Round, Williams and Rodgers (2008), 






In the following section, I examine the socialist period where the two Roma 
groups stood in different relations to the state and were involved in different forms of 
economic activity. The accounts I use in the following sections come from 
Romanianized Roma and Caldarars, but also from two people who held key positions 
in the socialist socio-economic life of the village: Senica Pamandi, former director of 
the local collective farm and handicrafts cooperative, and Bratita, a school teacher 
and former mayor and manager of the village cultural centre during socialism. Some 
of the Caldarars were Senica’s employees and friends. His narrative focused on the 
interactions and collaborations between Caldarars and state institutions. Bratita used 
to teach Romanianized Roma children in school and supervise their parents as 
performers (fiddlers) at educational and cultural events organized according to 
directives received from the centre. He is also the author of the unpublished village 
monograph, which includes references to the history of Roma settlements. At present 
Bratita is currently a member of the local council and a PDL representative. 
 
Sedentarization: the Caldarars’ mobile economy, the socialist second 
economy and state repression  
 
According to Bratita and other locals, in the 1960s, different mobile groups of 
Caldarars started to settle in Costesti. Many Caldarars emphasised, on one hand, the 
benefits brought by sedentarization and, on the other, the oppression practised by the 
socialist state. Mateiescu Xandru and his son, George, who come from a relatively 
rich family of Caldarars, offered me further accounts about the way their community 
had to adapt to state repression and to inefficient programs of integration. Xandru’s 
father was a ‘traditional’ Gypsy leader - bulibasa – for one of the nomadic groups 
which later settled in Costesti.  
 
Xandru: We have been here since the 1960s. We came from Pufesti (...) 
My father went to the local council with evidence from Bucharest that we 
were allowed to get land to build houses. After collectivisation, we 
received land to build our houses and we did not live in our tents any 
more. We still travelled a lot but we were happy to get houses and land. 
(Mateiescu Xandru, son of a former bulibasa) 







C: Why did you decide to settle?  
G: They did not let us wander any more. ’Militia’ [the former police, 
under socialism] used to come and check our IDs to check our  residence 
and work permits. If we had none we needed to leave the village [where 
they settled temporarily] in 24 hours. Then the bulibasa decided to give 
gold for us to receive land for construction. My grandfather went to 
Bucharest and gave gold and they all received the ‘governmental’ 
decision to settle in Costesti. When the local council saw the document, 
they distributed land to Gypsies. The whole land was in a single family 
name. My grandfather, the bulibasa, had a house there but no papers for 
that, neither did I. No one had. (Mateiescu George, Mateiescu Xandru’s 
son).  
 
Xandru and George’s statements complement each other. Citing an improvement in 
their family’s housing conditions, Xandru, the son of former bulibasa emphasises the 
advantages of sedentarization. On the other hand, George’s narrative reveals that the 
Caldarars’ desire to settle evolved from the constraints imposed by the socialist state 
on their travelling. The Caldarars became interested in settling as their travel was 
limited by the evidence of a permanent residence status. However, these 
arrangements imposed from the political centre created space for debates and 
quarrels between the local population, Caldarars and the local administration. The 
Caldarars’ decisions to either settle or travel were caught in between the central state 
decisions of sedentarization, enforced by regional police, and the local authorities 
and populations, which often refused them permission to settle51. As stated by 
George and other interviewees, the Caldarars had to negotiate and bribe their 
settlement in the village. Bratita, the school teacher, and other locals claimed that 
during the 1960s and 1970s, the mayors of Costesti received gold from the Caldarar 
groups who were interested in settling in the village:  
 
B: Toru Costin and Perinas Mitrea, mayors at that time, were paid by the 
Gypsies, but these were  unofficial decisions  (...) The Gypsies gave 24 K 
gold and 20,000 lei [by comparison, the value of a car was 70,000 back 




 Local people including the Romanianized Roma were against the Caldarars’ settlement in the 
village. The Caldarars, called “nomads”, were considered ‘dirty’ and ‘uncivilized’. Perinas, a former 
local mayor of that time, considered that it was a major problem to follow the central state’s directives 







However, as George Mateiescu stated, after the refusal by the local authorities of 
permission for his group to settle, his grandfather, the bulibasa, suggested that he 
adopted a different strategy. His grandfather went directly to the central government   
and bought their right to settle in the village with gold. Other decisions created 
further discontent among the locals. The land received by Caldarars was part of the 
collective farm. Senica Pamandi remembers his dissatisfaction with the local 
administration’s decision to settle them on the farm’s land:  
 
S: I was the CAP [collective farm] director. After 1963, the Caldarars 
wanted to erect buildings on our vineyards. I brought the issue to the 
county level where I said: These people are settling on our territory. 
[County level official]: Comrade Pamandi, they are citizens of the 
Socialist Republic of Romania, they have all the rights of a citizen, I was 
told. (Senica Pamandi, former cooperative farm director). 
 
Pamandi’s conversation with the regional party activist reveals once more the 
disconnection between central and regional directives and attitudes by local 
authorities, who were not interested in enforcing the directives. The locals did not 
want them and the local administration found governing the Caldarars a difficult and 
demanding task. The recently settled nomads were almost unidentifiable52, people 
with no IDs or birth certificates. The local priests and teachers were supposed to 
implement the state programs of integration and convince them to get identification 
papers and go to school. Those involved in these state programs suggested that the 
requirements involved in ensuring the Caldarars’ integration were difficult and time 
consuming tasks. It was also very difficult for the local council and state companies 
to collect taxes and bill payments from them. Yet, the Caldarars themselves had to 
accept sedentarization and all the consequences to get permission to continue to 
travel.  
Caldarars continued to travel all over the country during the warm season. 
The railway station facilitated travelling and transport of their tools and materials. 
Another advantage was the proximity of the steel plant from which, through informal 
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arrangements, they purchased working material. Mateiescu Minu and Mateiescu 
Mirea are two Caldarars in their 40s who come from moderately affluent families 
and still practice their ‘traditional’ occupations. They have both experienced the 
restrictions imposed by the socialist state on their travelling practices and possession 
of gold. Under socialism, they travelled to Transylvania to make cauldrons for 
peasants producing alcohol53. They were organized in small groups under the 
leadership of a bulibasa, who was authorised to mediate between local authorities 
(police and local councils) and the Caldarars looking for permission to camp and 
local authorization for  their economic activity. Cauldron-making for alcohol was 
forbidden and so was access to the material needed for its manufacture, and was 
usually not available on the open market. Therefore the group’s bulibasa had to 
negotiate informally with local police and councils. The arrangements with the local 
authorities were usually agreed, but the regional police would make periodic controls 
to seize copper, cauldrons and gold from Caldarars.  
 
M: They confiscated our copper and we ran in the forest. We got beaten. 
C: Was it regional or local police?  
M: It was the regional police.  
C: Did the mayor know that you were making cauldrons?  
M: He knew and supported us and after we finished he had an enquiry 
into who had done what. We used to hide the cauldrons on the river 
banks and in bushes. We got copper from the state plants.  
C: Who were the providers? 
M: Romanians – [steel plant] workers, managers, but if we were caught 
that would have meant arrest. Copper was like gold -valuable and not 
much available. Regional police once caught us with cauldrons in Teius 
[a Transylvanian town] and my family (father, mother, and child) were 
beaten. They asked me for the copper receipts and I didn't have any. 
They seized 350 kilos of my copper. In Campia Turzii [Transylvanian 
town] they seized my truck, full of cauldrons. What was it like during 
Ceausescu’s time? So much poverty but we were all hard working 
(…) (Minu Mateiescu , Caldarar). 
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production. Local farmers wanted to purchase the Caldarars’ boilers. However the Gypsies doing this 






Minu’s last statement is relevant as it shows that both local authorities and 
Caldarars supported each other in the socialist second economy. As already 
mentioned, the Caldarars cultivated good relations with peasants from Transylvania54 
who needed their manufactured products. To secure a living in the restrictive 
socialist economy, the Caldarars and Transylvanian peasants depended on each 
other. As many Caldarars explained, exchanges were based on trust and reciprocity. 
The Caldarars received not only money, but also goods and gifts from peasants, who 
sometimes became godfathers to their children.  
These relations between mobile Caldarar groups and local populations 
formed part of the second economy and generated both ‘systems of survival’ 
(Voiculescu 2004b) and welfare accumulation. However, local authorities were not 
always able to defend them against the socialist state. Regional police and Securitate 
monitored the Caldarars’ activities and collaborated with bulibasa Iancu, a Caldarar 
leader who did not travel too much but who was authorised by the state to exercise 
control over the Caldarar mobile groups resident in Costesti.  
 
C: Was Bulibasa Iancu from Costesti helpful in negotiating with the 
authorities?  
M: Bulibasa Iancu was a ‘communist’. 
C: Then, was the other, travelling bulibasa helpful?  
M: Yes, he helped us to make cauldrons and he worked only with the 
local police.When they came from Cluj, they seized a truck full of 
boilers. But here, in Costesti, Iancu didn’t always tell us when the police 
were coming and, in the middle of the night, we would have to run to the 
forest [to seek refuge]. However, when there were problems at county 
level the big bulibasa Iancu would try to deal with it and he would go 
with us to the regional police and sort things out.  
C: What did you have to do to be supported by Istrate?  
M: I had to give gold, at least 3 gold coins every time. If I had said no, I 
would have gone to jail. Bulibasa Iancu used to tell us how much gold 
we need to give and the police were there to beat us to make us hand over 
the gold.  
C: Did Iancu have to give any gold?  
M: He did not have to. He was our boss. It was so hard during 
Ceausescu’s time. Some say it was better.” (Minu Mateiescu , Caldarar).  
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The informal arrangements with the central state representatives were 
performed by bulibasa Iancu, who was supposed to deal with the everyday problems 
of the settled community and urgent issues raised by the travelling groups. He was 
also the principal collaborator and source of information for Militia and the 
Securitate, and also a gold collector. He offered information on the Gypsies’ gold 
possessions and participated, in this way, in the institutionalized gold seizure 
practices of the socialist state. Minu’s narrative and many other accounts coming 
from Caldarars show also a paradox in the state’s activities, which involved 
restricting their trade in copper and steel products, but also involved the  seizing of 
their gold, which was ultimately the product of these trading activities. In this 
context, on the one hand, Iancu was a Securitate collaborator maintaining the state's 
interests and dealing with its paradoxes. On the other hand, he supported the 
Caldarars against violent actions by the state. In his narrative, Minu, like many other 
Caldarars, showed his dissatisfaction with Iancu’s forms of control, which were not 
used by bulibasi for mobile groups. As many Caldarars characterized him, Iancu was 
no longer a genuine community representative, but a communist ‘boss’ to whom they 
had to listen and subordinate their economic activities 
The mobile groups’ leaders, the ‘traditional’ bulibasi55, who were 
subordinated to Iancu, were the real supporters of the Caldarars. As many Caldarars 
told me, these bulibasi never acted with duplicity56, but mediated relations with the 
local state in the interest of their community. They were the only ones who had the 
papers required for the activities of the entire teams. Minu Mateiescu claims that 
many Caldarars were poor and unable to pay individually for the work permits. In 
addition, many had no property papers for the land received from the local councils 
to build houses. Those proofs of residence were necessary in order to claim 
individual work permits. Without properties and papers, the Caldarars fell outside the 
official fabric, while at the same time they were vulnerable in their relations with 
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55Before 1960s there was not a clear hierarchy among bulibasi. They were leaders of the small mobile 
groups. After sedentarization, bulibasa Iancu stopped traveling himself and, with support from 
outside, took the leadership of all Caldarar mobile and settled groups resident in Costesti. 
56Duplicity refers here to the bulibasi of the settled groups (e.g. Iancu in Costesti, Traian in Liveni) 





trans-local authorities who used to raid their settlements and camp sites. In general, 
they resisted identification, while the local authorities at their residence in Costesti 
were either unwilling or unable to bring them into the official structure.  
Bratita and Senica Pamandi’s accounts show the Caldarars’ forms of resistance to 
identification and their independent approach to economic activities. 
    
B: The mayor wanted to open a small bucket shop for them but they did 
not want to. The Caldarars said ‘we want to practice our profession 
independently’. The county-level police frequently raided in order to 
seize their gold and collect taxes. Many used to run to the forest and hide 
their gold in their carts. (Bratita, school teacher, PDL councillor, Costesti 
mayor in 1991).   
                                              ____________ 
 
C: Were they registered?  
S: I do not think so, as they have never been army conscripts. The army 
was a danger for them (…) they used police intervention to make them 
pay taxes, bills (…) With these people you cannot impose your will: you 
must understand that. You won't get anywhere. . No one was able to 
discuss with them in a peaceful way” (Senica Pamandi, former 
cooperative farm director)  
 
Bratita and Pamandi’s statements show that the Caldarars were hardly approachable 
and identifiable. They also show that the hoped for Caldarars’ accommodations with 
the local authorities were overridden by the regional state administration and police 
with the collaboration of their main leader, bulibasa Iancu. However, in Costesti, as 
everywhere else, relations between local actors, institutional representatives and 
Caldarars were based on reciprocal exchanges aimed at meeting the economic 
demands of the autarchic socialist economic system.  
Bulibasa Iancu and his family used to work and sell their products to the 
cooperative farms in the Costesti area. Similarly, in the nearby villages, the Caldarar 
leaders of settled communities signed contracts with state farms which needed their 
products for alcohol production. Senica Pamandi, at that time a cooperative farm 
manager in Costesti had the idea of using the Caldarars’ labour force in the local 
craft cooperative. As he told me in an interview, he was expected to raise local 
agricultural productivity and generate higher outputs for the centralized socialist 





financial input, this expectation was hardly achievable. Moreover, the local 
agricultural output was purchased by the state at very cheap prices. In this context, he 
thought that the Caldarars’ skills could be translated successfully into financial 
capital and used to generate the high productivity requested from the centre. Senica 
Pamandi organized a special handicrafts department for bulibasa Iancu and his 
settled group, who used to manufacture cauldrons and sell them to neighbouring 
cooperative farms. Their profits were shared with the Costesti cooperative, which 
licensed their activities57. Bulibasa Iancu and his group were also pleased with the 
collaboration as they were able to perform ‘legally’ their ‘traditional’ practices.  In 
this way, the socialist state’s demands were met locally through the Caldarars’ 
activity, which was usually considered backward and inefficient in comparison with 
industrial production. The inefficiency of the socialist economy was counteracted in 
this case by local cooperation between local authorities and Caldarars. 
Two types of relations were established: 1) between Transylvanian peasants 
and Caldarars and 2) between   the bulibasa’s group and Costesti authorities. They 
do show that, at local level, the Roma, peasants and local authorities either ignored  
or domesticated central state directives. These relations which evolved as a reaction 
to a restrictive and autarchic socialist economy, brought opportunities either for 
economic survival and wealth accumulation for the groups involved. The Caldarars 
were able to continue their profession for reasonable returns. The peasants 
conducted their small alcohol businesses and the Costesti cooperative was able to 
meet the production directives.  
The state control over the Caldarars’ economic practices was highly repressive but it 
did not bring about the subordination of their ways of life and economic activity to a 
sedentary ideology. They continued to travel seasonally in small groups across the 
country and to maintain a relative independence in relation to state institutions and 
structures. The 1960s settlement restricted their movement in territorial space but 
did not restrict their subjective understanding of mobility and economic practices. A 
series of relations, which started to develop with peasants and local authorities, 
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enabled them to achieve some continuity in their mobile economic activities and 
ways of life.  
 
 Romanianized Roma at the margins of the socialist state economy  
 
As compared to Caldarars, the Romanianized Roma were sedentary subjects who fell 
within the ambit of the socialist state. In the 1960s, none of them owned land as they 
started to work for the Costesti and neighbouring state farms. While some were 
employed as low-skilled workers in Derex Goteni and other state factories, others 
were unskilled labourers in state and collective farms. As unemployment was 
criminalized by the state, the local police used to inform the regional authorities 
about the unemployed and asked them to keep them under surveillance. 
Romanianized Roma temporarily employed as seasonal labourers or freelancers 
(such as fiddlers) had to show periodically proof of their employment/work. Their 
employment status was not always confirmed by the state farms and the 
Romanianized Roma were sometimes fined or asked to do community work. For the 
Roma fiddlers and Caldarars, as for all the other people with liberal professions, the 
situation was different. They were required to hold work permits provided by the 
local councils of their place of residence, to whom they paid annual taxes. However, 
all fiddlers I talked to and who held permits under-reported their incomes in order to 
pay lower taxes.  
Some Romanianized Roma fiddler families accessed considerable cash 
incomes. The Sotu family, the richest among the Romanianized Roma, are now 
involved in local and regional politics and leadership. Adrian Sotu comes from this 
family and his condition is more modest than his siblings’. His father was a fiddler, 
and his mother an informal trader. He is an informal labourer for local peasants’ and 
Caldarars’ households. He is not satisfied with the temporary work and low payment 
he gets in Costesti.   
  
A: At Tariceni [pub] we made a lot of money as fiddlers. During 
Ceausescu’s regime my mother traded cigarettes, chocolate - she was a 





from our family. Later, when I was 12 I got a contract of my own and 
played myself. We had permits for our profession.  
C: Were there many fiddlers at that time?  
A: No! My father and Sotu family. My father played for a lot of cash. 
Although we were not allowed to bribe the police, my father gave gifts to 
policemen (...) With the money, he bought two houses on a large area of 
land . (...)  
C: Have you ever worked for the state farms?  
A: Yes, since I was 14. Many people say life was much better then. At 
the farm, it was crowded, dirty, but we had work and a salary (...) 
(Adrian Sotu, Romanianized Roma) 
 
Adrian’s story shows how working in the socialist second economy permitted some 
Romanianized Roma families to negotiate their relationship with state representatives 
and generally moderated their subjection to state forms of social and economic 
organization. These activities were sometimes mixed with agricultural work in state 
farms. Adrian’s portrayal of agricultural work in the socialist state farms is 
constructed in comparison to current informal labour he performs locally for peasants 
or Caldarars, which is temporary and uncertain. Although demanding and performed 
in insalubrious conditions, regular work and salary in state farms produced a 
minimum of stability for the Romanianized Roma. Nevertheless, wealth did not 
come from seasonal agricultural work, but from an independent activity – fiddling. 
The latter depended on clientele and the performer’s skills, fame and their ability to 
broaden  trans-local connections.     
Most Romanianized Roma relied however on work offered by the socialist 
centralized economy. Their socio-economic practices were connected to the fixity of 
state arrangements and institutions. This created a relative dependency on the state. 
When asked to compare their socialist and post-socialist experiences, the 
Romanianized Roma emphasised more the advantages of the socialist economy (jobs 
provided and decent salaries), and less its forms of repression, which were more 
enforced against Caldarars.  
The Roma fiddlers are an example of an independent approach in relation to 
the socialist state economy, which comes closer to the Caldarars’ approach. Except 
for the bulibasa and his family who collaborated closely with the authorities, most of 
the Caldarars struggled to live and act outside state structures. On the other hand, the 





state's rules from within its structures and thus occupied the best socio-economic 
positions among the Romanianized Roma. This domestication of the state’s 
institutional practices took place from within its own structures , and from inside the  
fragile boundaries of control that maintained the second economy. Peasants 
considered that fiddlers were among the richest people in the village.   
 
The Caldarars’ social navigation within the post socialist economic 
uncertainty 
 
After 1989, the state proceeded to the restitution of private property seized during 
socialism. After 1991 peasants started to reclaim their land and the Caldarars, their 
gold. Through Government-initiated programs in collaboration with the National 
Bank of Romania, Caldarars were able to claim their gold by using their confiscation 
certificates, which registered the amounts to be compensated. The gold restitution 
has been a long process mediated by bulibasi. Not all the Caldarars in Costesti 
received the full amount confiscated, and some confessed that they donated a part to 
bulibasa Iancu who helped them make the applications. The restitution started during 
the Social Democrat governance and was associated by Caldarars with the party 
leader Ion Iliescu. For these reasons the Caldarars have been long-time supporters of 
the Social Democrat Party58.  
Along with the restitution, the state started dismantling/privatizing large 
inefficient plants like Derex. These processes created opportunities for various 
middlemen to facilitate trading between large factories and small firms seeking to 
utilise the reclaimed technology. Many Caldarar families sold some of their gold and 
mediated such transactions around the country. Both the local peasants and the 
Caldarars claimed that these businesses were the main source of the Caldarars’ 
enrichment.  
 
B: They [Caldarars] made a fortune from Derex and dealt with former 
managers and other state officials, including the mayor of Goteni. After 
1989, they went there with cash, bought materials and sold them 
somewhere else, until the new owner, came. Until then, the Romanian 
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managers made big businesses with the Gypsies from Costesti, Toclea 
and Liveni. They asked for huge bank credits and never paid them back. 
At that time there were roughly 100 unregistered firms. When they came 
here in 1960s, they [Caldarars] just made cauldrons - it was their job.” 
(Bratita, school teacher, PDL councillor, village mayor in 1991)    
 
As shown in Bratita’s statement and confirmed by many other informal 
conversations,  peasants, local council bureaucrats and Romanianized Roma all seem 
to emphasise the ‘illegal’ aspect of the Caldarars’ practice, which, from their point of 
view, produced fast and illegitimate enrichment. However, these narratives ignore 
the Caldarars’ trading skills and their mobile entrepreneurial approach. The 
narratives seem to be part of a larger discourse about transitional informal economy 
in Romania and its ‘post-1989 nouveaux riches’59. Many Romanians who struggled 
with poverty in the first years after 1989 considered themselves ‘cheated’. Transition 
was characterized by a regulatory void, marked by state corruption and complicity in 
shady state factories’ privatization 60.  In this context, state representatives and 
politicians were “interested in ‘grabbing’ state resources in their own interest” 
(Wallace, Latcheva 2006: 83; Sik 2004).  
Nevertheless insofar as no clear laws and taxation systems existed in order to 
regulate transactions, many informal activities cannot be considered ‘illegal’, but 
rather ‘a-legal’ or unregulated activities (Wallace and Latcheva 2006)61. From this 
viewpoint, the Caldarars’ businesses were not ‘illegal’, but informal ways of 
exploiting legal and economic gaps. The ‘transition’ from cauldron makers to 
intermediaries between companies is intriguing. What seemed to be a ‘traditional’, 
rudimentary occupation was actually the performance of their trader’s abilities and 
connections to an expanded network of relationships.  Travelling around the country 
during socialism brought them into contact not only with local populations, but also 
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59Details about 'nouveaux riches’ phenomenon in Romania is discussed in Chapter one - Historical 
transformations.     
60See Benacek (1994), Eyal, Szelenyi, Townsley (1998), Szelenyi, Szelenyi, Kovach (1995).
61 In early 90s in Romania, there was no clear taxation system and laws to organize commercial 
activities. Therefore, Caldarars did not have to pay taxes for their economic transactions and establish 
firms for money transfers. In mid and late 90s this double taxation was enforced by the state (tax for 
commercial company, money transfer-VAT ) and  Caldarars’ businesses were categorized by the state  





with state company managers from whom they bought copper informally, and other 
materials they needed for their work. In relation to their constant territorial mobility 
and ‘independence’ from the state, the Caldarars acquired a common flexible  vision 
with regard to the informal economy sphere. Gold was an important start-up 
resource, although not all Caldarars who possessed it were able to invest in this kind 
of business. Therefore, their participation in socialist second economy, their 
adaptable approach when interacting with post-socialist transformation, the available 
gold resources and their connections with high level officials, combined and enabled 
them to pursue their highly lucrative businesses.   
As many locals claim, Caldarar families, who succeeded in doing big 
business with Derex, were well connected to state factory managers and “covered” 
by high officials who were involved in privatization. Some of these families were 
bulibasa Iancu’s relatives, who continued to play an important leadership role in 
post-socialism by facilitating informal businesses and connections. In the business, 
both factory managers and Caldarars were interested in circumventing state rules and 
exploiting its benefits. The cash involved was not always documented, but negotiated 
between the parties according to their personal interest.  Compared to other groups 
involved in the post-socialist informal economy, who were less active and mobile in 
socialism, the Caldarars had from the outset the advantage of their mobile trading 
practices. As former nomads and seasonal travellers, they were always ready to 
travel far from home in order to make the best deals.  
In addition, the Caldarars were preferred as they were prepared to risk large amounts 
of cash and had an open, informal approach to everyone in the business:  
 
If you wanted to go to Constanta, Gypsies were the only ones with access 
because they had money to give to everyone. There were very few 
Romanians able to do this sort of business (local peasant). 
 
Marius, a Caldarar from a leading family, explained that their transactions were the 
most sought after. Used pipes from Derex were sold for competitive prices to small 
construction firms, repairing gas or running water networks. Marius, a Caldarar man, 
had many storage areas, filled with used industrial materials, in different locations in 





a substantial downturn affected all those involved. I asked him if he ever made any 
business with other Caldarars. Laughing, he told me that “we do business with 
‘Romanians’ only”. This is to show that relations between rich Caldarars in the 
informal economy sector are very competitive, rather than collaborative, and that 
they compete to get in contact with ‘Romanian’ business partners or high-rank 
administrative or political figures. The informal collaborations between state 
representatives and Caldarars via various companies in good business relations with 
the state were made possible by the new ‘clientelistic’ relations which emerged in 
1990s and generally dominated politics and economy.  
However, some Caldarar families never succeeded in getting into this sort of 
business, while others were not able to keep on with it, and faced progressively 
substantial declines in their cash flows. The less successful Caldarars changed 
direction and combined their former occupations with simpler forms of informal 
economic activity. Mateiescu Ion comes from a  medium-wealth Caldarar family 
who started a business  dealing in  old pipes in the 1990s, and after experienced 
decline in the early 2000s returned to copper manufacturing and trading and other 
activities such as roof-painting.   
 
C: What is your occupation now?  
I: We make cauldrons like our fathers did, and paint roofs and do 
anything else possible. 
C: Where do you usually go for work?  
I: Ardeal [Transylvania] - there are people with money there.  
C: Do you sell pipes?  
I: Sometimes I do, when I can. 
C: When was the last time you did business with pipes and how much did 
you sell ?  
I: Last year, and I sold 3 big trailers full of pipes and sold them wherever 
I found someone interested. Sometimes it works, other times it does not. 
But, I mainly make cauldrons and paint roofs. (Mateiescu Ion, Caldarar 
man). 
 
 Mixed occupations started to prevail among Caldarars in the last years. In informal 
conversations, the Gypsies showed that they expect this business to end at some 
point, and that they will need to look for other opportunities. Former state-owned 
large factories were privatized and the new owners were no longer interested in 





good economic position had to be maintained through other connections on the 
market. It is not only financial resources that made them persevere in strengthening 
their socio-economic and symbolic status, but something else which differentiates 
them from the Romanianized Roma who regard the state as a source of both welfare 
and pauperization. The explanation emerged in many  informal conversations with 
Caldarar families, who have never been middlemen involved in pipe businesses, and 
especially from an interview I had with a young man coming from a  middle income  
Caldarar family who travels seasonally and practices ‘simple’, ‘traditional’ 
occupations. 
 
N: I bring money from Ardeal [Transylvania]. Here I could starve, I have 
no job here. But in Ardeal I make cauldrons. This year I left the village 
for 7 months, May until November (…) If you come here in the summer 
you will not find anyone in our district. We all leave. We [his family] 
have our rented house there and have been staying there for 6 years now.  
C:  How long will you keep on doing it for? 
N: I also wonder how long it is going to last. But, you know how it is if 
you see all the Gypsies [the Caldarars] leaving the village (…) I would 
manage here as well, but not as comfortably  as I do there.  
C: How much money did you make last year?  
N: Last year we, as a family, brought home almost 1 billion (old lei) 
(around 22,000 Euro) (Nicu Mateiescu, Caldarar Gypsy).   
 
Nicu and his family travel seasonally to make and sell their cauldrons to support the 
construction of their children’s houses. The Caldarars use to marry their children at 
early ages (5, 6 to 12 years old), as they claim that waiting too long would make it 
harder for parents to find partners for them later. Many families struggle to make 
sufficient money to build large beautiful houses for their boys. The cash they claim 
to get in a six month period  is almost five times the average annual salary62 an urban 
Romanian citizen can expect to earn (in 2012 the medium monthly salary was 1.575 
RON approximately 359 Euro). It is not certain whether my respondent judged his 
earnings correctly, but all the Caldarars who travel to Transylvania to make 
cauldrons or paint roofs reported high earnings, usually invested in building and 
decoration of new houses.  
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The houses of the Caldarars who are not involved in the pipe business are in 
good condition and are larger than the peasants’ houses. Their living condition and 
facilities are superior to those of the Romanianized Roma. Interestingly, peasants and 
local council employees claim that these families are ‘the poorest’ among Caldarars. 
From my observations, this statement seems to be associated with the supposedly 
illegitimate enrichment of some other Caldarar families. On the other hand, the 
‘poorer’ Caldarars, as well as the Romanianized Roma portray the richest Caldarars 
as ‘arrogant’. Also, the ‘richest’ Caldarars despise those they consider poor, 
especially the Romanianized Gypsies, but also other families, both Caldarars and 
peasants. Rich Caldarars consider poverty a sign of ‘inferiority’ and a stigma in 
someone’s life and for these reasons they do not greet or talk to Romanianized Roma 
and ‘poorer’ Caldarars63.  
Although relatively well-off and active, Nicu’s family could not involve itself 
in the pipe business: “This occupation was invented by someone - we do not know 
where it came from. My father tried that but it did not work”. There is also an 
interesting contradiction between two statements he makes: ‘Here I could starve, I 
have no job here’ and ‘I would manage here as well’. While the first is a pragmatic 
vision on local resources and work opportunities, the latter is an optimistic vision on 
life management. 
An optimistic outlook is rare among the locals, including the Romanianized 
Roma, peasants, and local bureaucrats, but is often expressed by almost all Caldarars. 
In Costesti, as elsewhere in Romania, people show a pessimistic, or reserved, 
approach to the ‘management’ of their lives, most of the time connected to their 
mistrust of  state institutions, low quality of services and low -salaried jobs available 
on the market. The Caldarars, who always cultivated a sort of self-reliance and 
worked/lived most of the time outside the state structures and formal markets, do not 
depend on formal organization and therefore do not experience this disappointment 
directly. They use their flexible forms of socio-economic practice to produce wealth.    
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Nicu’s narrative, also common among other Caldarar families, explains his 
optimistic vision on life management. It also suggests how these Caldarars, unable to 
get involved in the pipe business, still avoided poverty and coped with situations of 
scarcity and uncertainty. By referring to the role education and occupation played in 
his life, Nicu Mateiescu offered me a key explanation for his family’s economic 
status management: 
 
C: Do you find formal education useful? 
N: No. Someone asked why I do not want a degree. Why should I have 
one? Gypsies [Caldarars] will never have a profession as they say, a 
qualification in their life.  
C: Are you sure?  
N: I cannot say for sure because you can't be sure what is going to 
happen in the next 5-6 years. First, they were with the cauldrons, and 
then they started to invent something new. Painting roofs was invented. 
We saw it works and we decided to keep doing it. (Nicu Mateiescu, 
Caldarar Gypsy).   
 
The statement shows a rejection of formal education and stable employment, which 
are not considered reliable way of adapting to an uncertain economic environment. 
The latter is affected by corruption, clientelism, low salaries and unemployment, 
which offer less than expected.  
The term “to invent” comes close to, but differentiates from what usually 
Romanians call in their everyday life ‘a te descurca’, which in English translation is 
‘to cope’. However, the term ‘a te descurca’ goes beyond the English understanding 
of ‘to cope’. It is rather connected to informal ways (connections, bribes etc.) of 
getting access to services and wealth, or overcoming difficulties created by an 
inefficient bureaucracy and an unstable economic environment. On the other hand, 
the verb ‘invent’ used by Nicu suggests a different interaction with economic 
uncertainty. The actor adapts to uncertainty through invention and improvisation, 
acting in an ad hoc way, rather than searching for clear-cut, permanent solutions  
Invention captures both the activity of the agent in an uncertain and fast-
transforming economic sphere, and the imaginary adaptation to opportunities to be 
exploited. It is the Caldarars’ own fluid approach to labour and economic practice, a 





map is never a static set of coordinates but a dense and multi-dimensional imaginary, 
which is constantly in the process of coming into being.” (Vigh 2009: 428).  
As already discussed, most of the Caldarars, when asked what they would do 
if their activities were no longer be available or lucrative, invariably answer: ‘I will 
always find something else.’ It is their trust in relations they already have or which 
can be developed with economic partners in the sphere of informal economy. 
Therefore, ‘invention’ expresses the way Caldarars interact with the economic sphere 
and navigate across its constraints and opportunities, avoiding the first and exploiting 
the latter.    
The relation between resources and movement, between gold possession and 
invention is an interesting one. Gold is clearly a valuable resource and the preferred 
form of accumulation among the Caldarars. Nicu offered a further explanation for 
that: 
C: Why do Gypsies buy gold? 
N: It is a long story, since they travelled by carts. When travelling, they 
could not buy and keep so many things and were obliged to invest 
everything in gold and carry it on their journeys.  
C: But now don’t they keep their money in bank accounts?  
N: Yes, but the gold was 12 units last year and it is 13 units this year. 
Gold's price rises each year. (Nicu Mateiescu , Caldarar Gypsy)   
 
As Nicu explained, gold has been a form of accumulation perfectly suited to their 
mobility. This form of accumulation lies outside institutional control (state, banks), 
and is an expression of their independent way of life. The possession of gold is not 
an indication of a fixed form of resource accumulation, but of a mobile and 
autonomous form of wealth.  
The Caldarars still avoid contact with the state. Their possessions - houses, 
cars - are often unregistered and in this way almost non-existent from the viewpoint 
of state institutions. Due to their unofficial character, possessions are compatible 
with their seasonal mobility. Unrecorded possessions are no longer constraints. They 
are objects which do not necessarily belong either to state authorities or banks as 
identifiable resources. They lose fixity, escape attachment to sites of power and 
become part of the flow of possibilities and opportunities, part of the movement 





All the peasants and Romanianized Roma I talked to underlined the striking 
difference between the Caldarars’ quite marginal status in socialism and the high 
socio-economic positions they got in the early 1990s.    
 
C: Do Caldarars have power in Costesti?  
Costin: The Gypsies?! It is not that they have power - they dominate 
everyone! They simply dominate us! (Costin, Romanian, former car 
driver for Caldarars). 
                                               ___________ 
 
They come to the post office with their BMWs to collect their child 
benefits - 42 RON (local post office worker).  
 N: How can you see them driving cars worth thousands of Euros when I 
know they starved before? (Nicu Cristianu , Romanianized Gypsy). 
                                            __________ 
  
C: How were the Caldarars under socialism?  
A: They travelled and sold cauldrons – clearly they were not as they are 
now. They were poor and ate left-over’s from our garbage bin and stole 
food from peasants. (Adrian Sotu, Romanianized Roma)  
 
Both Romanians and Romanianized Roma portrayed Caldarars in socialism as 
‘dirty’, ‘uncivilised’, ‘poor’, interested in selling their products for food and small 
amounts of money. However, the Caldarars were not necessarily ‘poor’ as they 
always had gold, but they did not have the large houses they have today. Their 
mobile ways of life made them look very different in local population’s eyes. The 
‘poverty’-image was associated with the Caldarars’ nomadic way of life 64. Adrian’s 
statement is one of the most common remarks among both peasants and 
Romanianized Roma. Also, many Caldarars confirmed the disrespectful and 
sometimes aggressive ways in which the locals treated them during socialism. Since 
both peasants and Romanianized Roma had similar views on the Caldarars it cannot 
be claimed that they were rejected as Gypsies. Moreover, locals used to call the 
Caldarars ‘nomads’ but not Gypsies. They were considered to be very different from 
the local Romanianized Gypsies, who were settled and dressed similarly to peasants. 
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The Caldarars themselves told me they used to look differently. The men were long-haired and both 
women and men lived in tents and made copper cauldrons, which made them look unclean. As a child 
spending time with my grandmother in the countryside, I saw Caldarars once when they camped in the 





As emphasised above, the Caldarars’ discrimination and marginalization by both 
peasants and Romanianized Roma can be explained in terms of the nomad–sedentary 
distinction. ‘The nomad’ is the Different, the Other who opposes the ideology of 
sedentarism used as a control strategy by the modern state (Deleuze and Guattari 
1986, McVeigh1997, Scott 1998)     
After 1989, the Caldarars became visibly richer, challenging the local 
hierarchy and adopting an attitude of disrespect similar to the one Romanians had 
against them during socialism. The perceived socio-economic positions were 
reversed in the development of the post-socialist informal economic sphere, 
differently managed by Caldarars, peasants, and Romanianized Roma. On the other 
hand, it cannot be ignored that many locals, including Senica Pamandi (cooperative 
manger), who worked with them in the cooperative farm, appreciated their abilities 
and readiness to travel to sell their products.  However, as already discussed, due to 
their perceived illegitimate behaviour in the sphere of informal economy, the rich 
Caldarars are still not well seen by peasants and Romanianized Roma. Costin, like 
many other locals, considers that the Caldarars dominate in the village. Domination 
refers here to access to power and control over local institutions (e.g. local council 
and police) obtained through informal connectivity of some Caldarar families with 
upper-level officials involved in different businesses. Therefore, while the new 
contexts of informal economy brought new opportunities for Caldarars, they offered 
limited possibilities or even constraints for both peasants and Romanianized Roma.  
The next section concentrates on Romanianized Roma informal economic practices 







Figure 19Caldarar man from Costesti demolishing the peasant old house in the courtyard 
of his new property in order to build a house for his son, Photo taken by the author 2010. 
On the roof the Caladarar owner,wearing a yellow t-shirt. Behind him stands a 
Romanianized Gypsy man hired as construction worker for the new house to be built. 
Another Romanianized Gypsy man stands on the site's ground. 
  
Figure 20 Interior decorations in middle income Caldarar families, Photo taken by the 






The longing for stability across survival possibilities: the 
Romanianized Roma experience of informal economy as a sphere of 
social relations  
 
After 1989, the Romanianized Roma either lost their temporary jobs or fell into long-
term unemployment and became the most pauperized group in the village. Almost all 
families sold their plots and now survive on state benefits and local seasonal work in 
agriculture and construction. Approximately ten families have members who left for 
Italy and Spain to work seasonally in agriculture. The others rely on the local labour 
offered by peasant subsistence agriculture and by Caldarar families who build their 
large houses or need other casual labour.  
 
 
Figure 21Romanianized Roma working for Caldarars and building their houses, Photo 
taken by the author 2010.    
On the left, the Caldarar woman, owner of the household. In the middle, Romanianized 
Roma workers taking their lunch. Behind them, the foundation of the new building and in 






Many Romanianized Roma were involved in thefts and local fights. More accounts 
about these come from Romanianized Roma themselves. Adrian Sotu is a 33-year 
old  Romanianized Roma who worked as a guard for a company. Now he works 
locally for Caldarars and peasants and receives social benefits that guarantee free 
health care to his family.   
 
C: How many people from around here were imprisoned? 
A: 90% - ask all people here – they will tell you the same thing.  
C: What about you, what did you do?  
A: A boy was walking along - I took his necklace. And I served 5 years, 
3 months and 13 days for that.  
C: Are there people who got more?  
A: Yes, lots. My cousin got 12 years.  
C: How do you see these people’s future?  
A: No future for them. All of them are bandits and look for opportunities. 
None of them is any good. (Adrian Sotu,  Romanianized Gypsy)   
 
Adrian’s statement reflects a common practice seen as necessary adaptation to 
extreme living conditions. When Adrian says “no future”, that means there is no 
planning and predictability in the way people use resources and connect to 
institutions. Lacking resources and structural support, the Romanianized Roma throw 
themselves into the informality of economic practices and  frequently get involved in 
petty theft or random fights for money.   
    
A: That is the main source of income - the Caldarars! They wait here for 
them [Romanianized Roma] each morning to be taken to work.  
C: How do you make a living?  
A: Look at the scrap there, plus the transport I do for local stores! This 
morning I  made three trips  to  carry  concrete by cart, and I made 60 lei 
(15 Euros). It is not like that every day, but now I do it every two days. 
My brothers do that and have their pockets full of money... 
C: Are there more people who were imprisoned here than among the 
Caldarars? 
A: Yes, sure. The Caldarars travelled to other villages and worked, but 
these ones here started stealing -  a horse, a cow - and they went  to jail. 
It is hunger here! If they [the Caldarars] leave and return in the autumn, 
they make no problems here. (Adrian Sotu, Romanianized Roma). 
 
Adrian, like many other Romanianized Roma, considers that the main source of 





peasants who practice subsistence agriculture. However, it frequently happens that 
Caldarars do not offer them work and the Romanianized Roma often get involved in 
scrap collection throughout neighbouring villages. However these small informal 
activities bring low returns compared with the amount of cash the Caldarars make 
from selling cauldrons all over the country.  
Adrian’s last statements suggest that the Romanianized Roma’s petty 
‘criminality’ is the product of a local approach to limited economic possibilities, in 
contrast with the Caldarars’ mobility, which brings opportunities on the move. It is a 
way of survival. The Romanianized Roma who were formerly employed as low-
skilled workers also emphasised the insecurity and uncertainty that characterize their 
lives. Nicu Cristianu is a Romanianized Roma who worked in the mining town 
Moldova Noua for 16 years and experienced good salaried work. After the mines 
were closed, Nicu returned to Costesti as an unemployed man with serious worries 
about his future.   
 
C: How did you earn your bread when you got back from Moldova 
Noua?  
N: I came back in 2004, and I worked as a day-labourer in agriculture 
and pipe-cleaner for Caldarars.  
C: What were the relations with the Caldarars, before 1989?  
N: At that time, there were no relations. There were no businesses. They 
travelled with their tents, had no cars, but only their traditional 
occupations. Since I got back I have mostly been working with them, I 
had no other jobs. They [the Caldarars] are different. They travel and  
have gold. As for me - I am just like you. I have education, I learned a 
profession in school, I obtained a qualification as a mechanic, and since 
1986 I worked as a mineworker. I was an army conscript, like everyone 
else. I have done everything.  
C: Were you happy as a mineworker?  
N: Sure - I had a job, good money, and my wife was employed too. I was 
a stable man. I was on a par with the others. I had holidays, a flat in 
Moldova Noua  and many benefits. There were people who did not know 
what a permanent job was as they just worked as day-labourers for state 
farms.  (Nicu Cristianu , Romanianized Gypsy) 
 
Like other Romanianized Roma employed in socialist state factories, Nicu Cristianu 
expresses here his longing for the stability offered by the socialist state from which 
he got education, a profession, a permanent job. Interestingly, he emphasises that he 





resources and stability. However, the benefits of his attachment to the state’s 
structure and economic organization were severely challenged in the 1990s.  
His statement”At that time there were no relations. There were no 
businesses” is crucially important for the Romanianized Roma experience of post-
socialist transformations and their understanding of the new socio-economic 
reconfigurations. As already showed, the Caldarars’ economic practices were 
embedded in their social relations with peasants and local authorities in the places 
they travelled to. Their relations continued and even expanded (e.g. connections with 
dealers, factory managers etc.) in post-socialism, and were experienced as a kind of 
continuity by the Caldarars. On the other hand, in socialism, the Romanianized Roma 
were mostly inactive within the second economy sphere, and relations with the 
peasants and Caldarars were not locally developed.   
In the 1990s, the Romanianized Roma were alienated from the state’s 
organized field of opportunities and forced to seek survival in local relations with the 
Caldarars. This is the moment when the two groups started developing local social 
and economic relations with each other, which constrained and limited the 
Romanianized Roma’s likelihood of improving their socio-economic conditions. On 
the other hand, these local relations facilitated the Caldarars’ exploitation of 
opportunities offered by the new informal markets. Many Caldarars travelling for 
business around the country employed peasants as drivers and generally used the 
Romanianized Roma’s cheap labour force in their businesses and house construction. 
The potential these new connections have in producing either constraints or 
opportunities for the two Roma groups creates a power relation within which the 
Romanianized Roma are not, however, totally subjected to its  forces.  
There are two forms of interaction that show the dynamic, but also restrictive 
character of this power relation: 1) Romanianized Roma labour for the benefit of the 
Caldarars’ entrepreneurial activities, and 2) the Caldarars informal arrangements to 
set up firms  in  Romanianized Roma names. Since the early 1990s, many 
Romanianized Roma provided cheap labour for both the construction of Caldarar 
large houses and the pipe business. However, these informal economic possibilities 
held a serious risk of cheating/non-payment, and consequent legal sanctions. Iorel, 






and, after 1996, he worked for the Caldarars’ pipe business. Similar to Nicu Cristianu 
,he cleaned and painted pipes, and also dismantled metal structures from former state 
companies. In the summer of 2010 he was worried about his last collaboration with 
the Caldarars, and he wanted to share his experience with me. He did tell me a week 
in advance that he was about to leave with a Caldarar man to dismantle a greenhouse 
near Bucharest. In two days he got back, disappointed. 
 
I: They did not pay us. They had a different business there which we 
didn't  know about. We did not like that and left for home. I do not want 
to go to jail. I prefer not to eat, but to be able to sleep on my pillow. I was 
convicted in the past so I did not want new trouble.  
C: What happened after you left?  
I: They took other boys from here. It was their chance to make money 
and be imprisoned.  
C: Were they not afraid that you could report them to the police? 
I: No, because we were there too and now we are in the same boat. (Iorel, 
Romanianized Gypsy) 
 
Iorel did not receive any money for his work and left for home after he realized the 
illegal aspect of the Caldarars’ work. He related how the Caldarar man started 
begging them to stay and continue to work for him at the greenhouse. This indicates 
how the two parts are dependent on each other. The Caldarars know that the 
Romanianized Roma are a cheap labour force and amongst the few willing to get 
involved in risky deals. As far as an informal economic relation does not have any 
legal-institutional external basis, the power of relation  is produced by the reciprocity 
of exchange between parts, which creates constraints but also survival possibilities 
for the Romanianized Roma, and opportunities for economic improvement and 
wealth for the Caldarars.  Due to the bad treatment and  shady  businesses which 
could trigger imprisonment, some Romanianized Roma gave up working with the 
rich Caldarars and relied instead on casual agricultural work, scrap collection, 
begging and state benefits.  
As often portrayed by the Romanianized Roma themselves, this renunciation 
is a contestation of informality and risk, and the constraining power of the socio-
economic relation with the Caldarars. It also shows how Romanianized Roma 
socially navigate locally-limited possibilities of survival. However, this renunciation 





inefficient. Although in the narrative Iorel revealed his anxiety about not being paid, 
he concluded that he would still continue to work for rich Caldarars if these ‘illegal’ 
actions could be avoided. Confidence in the ability to avoid risk varies among the 
Romanianized Roma and is sometimes connected to their experience in  these 
informal activities.    
As already mentioned, the Caldarars make informal arrangements to set up 
firms for selling and buying  pipes and other materials from factories. However, they 
do not want to pay taxes and become identifiable/controllable subjects. Therefore 
they use the Romanianized Roma’s identities and papers in order to set up or transfer 
firms when huge debts are accumulated. For small cash amounts, the Romanianized 
Roma agree to become administrators in many of the Caldarars’ firms. Usually, the 
informal Romanianized Roma leader Ioader Candel, former team leader of seasonal 
work in state farms, currently a Roma Party representative, mediates the transactions. 
He collects the Romanianized Roma’s ID’s in order to enable the Caldarars to set up 
firms. Many of them confessed that they are ‘administrators’ for more than one firm 
and that they received small amounts of cash for each (between 100 and 200 RON). 
The people who accepted the deal lived in bad housing conditions and were 
investigated by the financial police for several years. Some of them tried to obtain 
further benefit from these exchanges when they duly realized that the financial police 
were interested in prosecuting the real actors behind these informal transactions. As 
Chelcea and Mateescu (2005), and Chelcea, Radu and Constantinescu (2005) argued, 
informal economic activities constitute a form of security for all those left at the 
margins of the formal labour market. This is also the case with the Romanianized 
Roma. In this sense, the Caldarars’ informal opportunities and state circumvention 
offer them survival possibilities65. However, these actions also involve high 
insecurity, risk of conviction and even imprisonment.  
While some Romanianized Roma accepted work in the Caldarars’ businesses 
and households, others started to refuse their job offers. Paradoxically, many who 
refused work did accept the Caldarars’ informal arrangements to set up firms under 
 
65Compared to ‘opportunity’, which refers to a mix of high risks and high financial returns, 
‘possibility’ implies low economic returns and high levels of social insecurity. The first are associated 





their names. Although they are not work relations, these arrangements are forms of 
indirect economic exchange. In this sense, both Caldarars and Romanianized Roma 
circumvent state rules in matters of economic practice. They unequally exchange 
favours in the dynamics of the informal economic sphere produced by 
deindustrialization, lack of state control over markets, and general disinterest in 
supporting Roma communities who experience poor conditions of living. 
These contradictory approaches in relation to Caldarars show both subjection 
to the power of an interdependent relation and its implicit contestations. The 
constraining and sometimes exploitative relations the Romanianized Roma have with 
the Caldarars are counterbalanced by the reciprocal ties they developed with the local 
peasants over time. 
Peasants, shopkeepers and other locals sometimes rely on the Romanianized 
Roma labour force in subsistence agriculture, household and shop keeping chores in 
exchange for small amounts of money and goods. On the other hand, Romanianized 
Roma buy on credit from local shops and borrow money for undetermined periods 
from peasants, who sometimes pay their labour in kind. The money Romanianized 
Roma owe to their lenders is either returned by work or paid when they receive the 
monthly state benefits from the local council. In this way, peasants with low cash 
resources ensure cheap labour for their subsistence agriculture, while the 
shopkeepers can keep their survival entrepreneurial source of income going with the 
help of the Romanianized Roma clientele.   
As was shown  in an article on socio-economic relations between Roma and 
Hungarian peasants in Transylvania (Voiculescu 2004b), these relations between 
unemployed Romanianized Roma and peasants form local ‘systems’ for survival, 
which come close to what Sahlins (1999) called ‘generalized reciprocity’. Compared 
to the socio-economic relations they have with the Caldarars, their relations with the 
local peasants and shopkeepers maintain social characteristics that prevail and are 
often  strengthened by the kinship ties they establish (e.g. the peasants act as 
godparents for Gypsy children). Nevertheless, the relation is not always welcomed. 
Both Romanianized Roma and peasants criticise each other. While Romanianized 
Roma complain that peasants give small payment for demanding work, peasants 





reply, most peasants portray their demands or refusal as laziness. For the 
Romanianized Roma, however, refusing either peasants’ or Caldarars’ work offers 
shows a certain contestation of these relations, which are not always beneficial in 
terms of either economic returns (with the peasants) or social security (with the 
Caldarars). As Nicolae (2005) showed in the case of informal economic exchanges 
(in the context of numerous legal disputes over property) between woodsmen and 
villagers in Romanian Apuseni Mountains, the local informal economy creates 
relationships and intensifies interactions between locals.      
However, these relations and interactions between Romanianized Roma, 
Caldarars and peasants seem contradictory and constantly changing. These 
contradictory aspects can be explained by the content of these relations, which 
involve, as any power relation, both 1) confinement to a restrictive form of exchange 
and 2) multiple forms of contestation. The Romanianized Gypsies sometimes work 
with Caldarars and peasants, while at other times they refuse to, and go for scrap 
collection or begging in neighbouring towns. They often mix all these activities in 
their everyday life. Also, most of them consider that all local relations have more 
disadvantages than advantages and sometimes look confused about their day by day  
prospects, as they are never sure what work they will get the next day. The 
contradictory and restrictive content of these relations push the Romanianized Roma 
into a sort of irregular movement.  It is the navigation of a local social labyrinth with 
limited and restrictive possibilities for economic practice. The Romanianized Roma 
themselves confirmed that these types of exchange and relationships confined to the 
local do not offer them economic opportunities: “What can we do here? There is 
nothing to do”.            
In Szelenyi and Ladanyi’s (2003) terms, the Romanianized Gypsies’ 
movement within the relational sphere of informal economy can be seen as 
navigation within poverty, which generally indicates a passive approach. However, 
in my view, this movement across socio-economic relations constitutes a form of 
social navigation within a locally restrictive labyrinth of the informal economy, a 
dynamics of power struggles in which the Romanianized Roma are actively 
involved. The emphasis is on the local character of these struggles, which are limited 





The Romanianized Roma living conditions are not only the product of 
structural transformations  reproducing their marginal economic position, but also the 
outcome of their interaction with post-socialist informal economy - based on the 
sedentary approach  the state enforced over time. As already mentioned, this mode of 
interaction varied however among the Romanianized Roma, who, since socialism, 
had an approach to the economic sphere of varying degrees of independence. The 
fiddlers involved in socialist second economy are a case in point. In post-socialism 
the fiddlers integrated  well with  state and political structures and became Roma 
political representatives (e.g. Corina Sotu- Roma expert at the Goteni prefecture) or 
even local employers of the poorest Romanianized Roma (e.g. Cristian Sotu- local 
entrepreneur in construction). These influential Roma were connected to patronage 
politics as a field of opportunity in which members of the local patronage (mayor, 
vice mayor, local administrator/patron) supported and promoted their positions in the 
local economy and politics. A detailed analysis of the field of patronage politics is 
developed separately in the chapters on politics.   
 
Conclusions  
This chapter presented a historical comparative analysis of the two Roma groups’ 
informal economic practices, relations and interactions during the economic 
transformation from socialism to post-socialism.    
The exploration went beyond the causal, static, unidirectional model of 
historical transformation proposed by Ladanyi and Szelenyi (2003). It developed a 
dynamic understanding of individuals and groups’ historical trajectories, which are 
not solely the result of state policies, but arise out of interactions with an economic 
sphere in continuous transformation. As the data shows, the sharply different socio-
economic conditions of the two groups can be explained by two relational patterns, 
influenced to different degrees by state intervention: 
1. The sedentarist model of economic practice is aligned with the state policies 
of integration and assimilation. This was a centuries-old model, with its roots 
in Roma slavery, which was massively reinforced under socialism. The 
Romanianized Roma gravitated around this model. They were identifiable 





recipients. Most of them were seasonal or unskilled workers and therefore 
were able to act on the margins of the socialist economy. Others were fiddlers 
and acted in the sphere of the second economy, the informal ‘entrepreneurial’ 
sphere that could provide better incomes, falling outside the recording and 
controlling structures of the state. The fiddlers approached the spheres of 
economy and state more independently, which prepared them better for an 
active interaction with the uncertainty of the rapid post-1989 transformations.  
Post-socialist transformations intensified the sphere of informal economic 
practices and relationships and generated opportunities and also limited local 
possibilities, which were exploited differently by the Roma groups. The 
Romanianized Roma developed relations locally with those able to access 
opportunities (e.g. the Caldarar informal entrepreneurs), but also with those 
operating at near subsistence levels in the local informal economy (e.g. the 
peasants). The Romanianized Gypsies had limited mobility across these 
relations, which I have called the social navigation of a limited field of 
possibilities
66
 within the local labyrinth. Possibilities are local, dependent on 
labour activities, restricted by weak economic resources such as land 
cultivated using poor technology, and local relations such as the 
Romanianized Roma-peasant survival system. I call this form of informal 
economy a local informal labour economy of survival, in contrast to the 
translocal informal entrepreneurial economy practised by Caldarars.  
2. As compared to the sedentarist model, Caldarars adopted a mobility 
approach in the sphere of informal economy. Sedentarization did not wipe 
out the mobile approach to economic activity and relations as they continued 
travelling seasonally. Post-socialist transformations unleashed informal 
economy from the anxious and repressed socialist second economy and raised 
its velocity through deindustrialization, which generated irregularities able to 
be exploited by those who were ready to transform them into opportunities. 
Some of the Caldarar families translated economic uncertainties into 
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opportunities because they had resources such as gold to start with, a 
geographically mobile and flexible approach to economic practices and 
externality in their relations with the state institutions. They also avoided 
falling within the rigid controlling structures of state by making themselves 
and their belongings hardly identifiable. They continued and extended their   
connections and relations, developed in the informal economic sphere, from 
socialism to post-socialism and navigated fields of opportunities by the use of 
social invention.  
Invention is related to the concept of social navigation coined by Vigh (2009), which 
brings back the dynamic perspective on the socio-economic environment. Social 
navigation refers to the individuals’ movement within a socio-economic sphere in a 
state of change, “an environment that is wavering and unsettled” (p. 420), and 
reflects the interaction individuals have with the self-transforming contexts, or what I 
call ‘spheres of power struggle’ (economy, politics, state etc.). Vigh (2009) refers to 
African countries where socio-economic contexts underwent dramatic 
transformations, while populations had to face everyday uncertainties, adopt short 
term strategies, and imagine what he calls ‘tentative mappings’. Similarly, as 
Burawoy and Verdery (1999) documented for Eastern Europe, post-socialist 
transformations67 generated high uncertainties and an irregular 
movement/transformation of the economy in which groups of people became 
unemployed and, released from the state control mechanisms, needed to adapt to fast 
transformations.  
Authors of Eastern European studies (Gabor 1979; Rodgers, Williams 2009; 
Stark 1986; Szelenyi 1988) suggest that these informal economic relations should be 
seen not only as a response to post-socialist uncertainties, but also as relations 
developed within the socialist second economy. However, not all the people were 
heavily involved in the second economy. Their differentiated involvement and 
experience triggered different ways of adaptation to the post-socialist informal 
economy. On the other hand, the social ties prevalent in post-socialism were not 
 
67Post-socialist uncertain transformations refer to state withdrawal from economy, privatization of 
property, deindustrialization, inflation, and deregulation of markets, high levels of unemployment 





necessarily the same as in socialism, as scholars (Polese and Rodgers 2011, Rodgers 
and Williams 2009, Stark 1986; Szelenyi 1988) suggest.  
Therefore, my explanation is that the Caldarars and Romanianized Roma 
fiddlers, who worked in the sphere of second economy, were more informally 
engaged in the sphere of economy (as relations and economic practice) and thus 
more prepared to connect to new reconfigurations.  Compared with large parts of the 
population who had a more local approach within the socialist second economy, the 
Caldarars had a translocal, continuously mobile interaction within the sphere of 
economic transition from socialism to post-socialism. The post-socialist local 
informal economy was restrictive and limited, but opportunities appeared on the 
move, in trading activities, spanning different localities.     
Nevertheless, the Caldarars’ mobile approach when interacting with 
transformations is not necessarily a resource that can be translated into wealth. For 
instance, in Moroieni, a village close to Costesti, the Caldarars are state benefit 
recipients and live in relative poverty and dependency with almost no success in 
mobile informal activities. Therefore, affluence cannot be guaranteed by resources 
(e.g. gold), a mobile approach, or connections alone, but by all of them together, 
connected to an economic sphere in continuous movement. Generally, the Caldarars 
were less connected to the state- promoted fixity and territorial dwelling -space, and 
therefore  more likely to develop a translocal entrepreneurial economy.  
To sum up, the socialist state economy was experienced as an opportunity by 
the Romanianized Roma and as a constraint by the Caldarars, who acted outside the 
state structures, in the sphere of the second economy. In the 1990s, the position of 
these groups and their access to opportunities/possibilities changed. The withdrawal 
of the socialist patriarchal state developed uncertainties exploited as opportunities for 
entrepreneurial activity by Caldarars and possibilities for informal low-paid labour 
by the Romanianized Roma. The gaps created by inefficient state interventions, 
corruption and economic clientelism were filled with local and translocal relational 
dynamics. In post-socialism, both Romanianized Roma and Caldarars needed to 





patronage:  the local patron and his followers, Roma leaders acting as brokers68 etc. 
For both groups, relationality became an interaction with uncertainty, experienced as 
possibility or opportunity.       
This chapter also suggested that a historical analysis focusing on both individuals 
and groups should not concentrate solely on state policies or the accumulation of 
resources, but also on the two forms of movement suggested by Vigh (2009): 1) the 
movement/transformation of environments/spheres (e.g. state, politics, economy) and 
2) the movement of actors within these spheres. Later chapters focus on the social 
dynamics of Roma power relations in connection with these two forms of movement 
involved in each sphere of power struggle - state, politics and religion.  














68An analysis of the local patronage and clientelistic relations extended at regional and central levels 





 Chapter 4. Historical transformations of the state 




The previous chapter discussed the different historical trajectories of the two Roma 
groups, their relations with the state and interactions with the transformations in the 
sphere of the economy. This chapter focuses on an important theoretical and 
methodological aspect of my analysis of power brokers’ relations and practices, 
which link different power levels and their manifestations. The Roma leaders often 
acted as brokers, connecting or mediating between the Roma communities and two 
different sources of state power: socialist apparatuses of control and surveillance and 
post-socialist governance and social integration apparatuses. Distinct forms of 
mediation performed by Caldarar and Romanianized Roma leaders created various 
forms of Roma subjection to a changing state power structure that generated further 
socioeconomic and political constraints and opportunities for the two Roma groups 
discussed.      
The Roma leadership in Costesti does not comprise a stable, homogeneous 
category. As this chapter shows, it comprises a diverse, unstable, fluid relation 
between the Roma leaders and state, politics, and patronage actors. Under socialism, 
both Romanianized Roma and Caldarar leaders were informal, with roles adapted to 
the social organization of their Roma group. During the state enforced 
sedentarization of 1960s, a part of the Caldarar leadership was co-opted as Securitate 
collaborators - the socialist state’s main apparatus of repression and control. The 
Securitate aimed at protecting the Communist Party’s achievements and it 
continually sought to extend its network of informers and collaborators into every 
domain of activity (education, commerce and industry, health, culture, politics etc.). 
Collaborators were appointed to collect information about all those acting against the 
ruling party, to work with local police and persecute so called ‘conspirators’. In 
relation to the Caldarars, the socialist state wanted to seize their gold , as the private 
accumulation of  gold was illegal. The bulibasi who signed up with the Securitate 
were expected to provide information about Caldarars possessing large amounts of 






with the state apparatus of control produced critical transformations in the institution 
of the Caldarars’ leadership (bulibasa) and in its meanings. These transformations in 
the institution of leadership resemble to some extent the changes in traditional 
chiefdoms which occurred in former African colonial states, when colonial 
governments co-opted ‘traditional’ leaders from rural areas into their administration 
(Bennett 2004; Keulder 2010; Miller 1968; Murray 2004). A number of the local 
African chiefs agreed to support the administration and received “local 
administrative and court responsibilities” (Miller 1968: 189). This was a colonial 
administrative mechanism used to build colonial states (Ray 2003) and govern 
extended rural areas. However, in the Romanian case, the socialist state was less 
preoccupied with the social governance of Caldarars. Rather it was interested in 
seizing their private possessions and confining their economic activities and 
restricting their mobility.  
In colonial Africa, the reconfiguration and absorption of indigenous forms of 
polity into  colonial rule was made using  customary law enforced by the local chiefs, 
who had extensive coercive powers over local populations (Keulder 2010). Similarly, 
in Romania, during socialism, the bulibasi, were given coercive powers over the 
Caldarar groups and were empowered by the state as the main leaders of settled 
communities69. However, unlike the colonial chiefs, the bulibasi formed no part of 
the socialist state’s administration and were not officially paid for their informal 
positions.  
In post-socialism, following EU directives, the Romanian government 
initiated social inclusion projects as part of the larger ‘Roma decade 2005-2015’ 
program70. As part of the social inclusion strategy for Roma, in 2007 the government 
 
69 When talking about bulibasa Iancu in socialism, the Caldarars alternatively used terms like 
‘security officer’ and ‘communist boss’.   
70“The Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–2015 is an unprecedented political commitment by European 
governments to improve the socio-economic status and social inclusion of the Roma. The Decade is 
an international initiative that brings together governments, intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations, as well as Romani civil society, to accelerate progress toward improving the welfare of 
the Roma and to review such progress in a transparent and quantifiable way. The Decade focuses on 
the priority areas of education, employment, health, and housing, and commits governments to take 






formalized and developed a parallel form of governance and a network of Roma 
experts and mediators for public institutions in all localities with large Roma 
populations71. The project aimed at improving relations between Roma communities 
and public institutions and implementing the state program of social integration for 
Roma communities.  
The Roma mediators have specific roles related to education, police/public 
order, health and they connect institutions to communities. The second category of 
leaders formed by the Roma Decade is the Roma expert and comes closer to the 
understanding of brokerage and representation of state inside the Roma communities. 
Roma experts engage in mediation with local public institutions and are expected to 
implement the government’s social inclusion strategy at the local and regional level. 
These days, both Romanianized Roma and Caldarars’ forms of leadership are split 
between ‘established’ leaders who perform their roles of mediation and 
representation in an informal way, and Roma experts who work for the local council 
and are part of  the state programs of social integration. This relative formalization of 
the Roma leadership was accepted by some informal leaders, but rejected by others. 
Furthermore, as part of the strategy, the government built a complex  infrastructure 
of governance and communication involving both informal leaders and Roma 
experts, who are part of regional/county level joint working groups (JWGs), local 
initiative groups (LIGs), and local working groups (LWGs)72. Generally, the groups 
include representatives of local public institutions (e.g. mayors, deputy-mayors, 
teachers, doctors, lawyers and police officers), local council members and 
representatives from NGOs. Regular meetings are organized and all leaders are 
 
71Formarea reelei naionale a experilor locali romi, mecanism de sprijin în implementarea msurilor 
de incluziune social a romilor, grup vulnerabil suspus excluziunii sociale [The formation of a 
national network for local Roma experts, a mechanism to support the implementation of measures for 
the Roma social inclusion, a vulnerable group exposed to social exclusion]. Source: Romanian 
Government, the National Agency for Roma population, 
http://www.anr.gov.ro/docs/proiecte_pdf/2275.pdfb 
72 See Governmental Strategy for the Inclusion of Romanian Citizen Belonging to the Roma Minority 







invited to participate. All the local Romanianized Roma and Caldarar leaders  in the 
county are supervised by a regional Roma expert, Corina Sotu, a Romanianized 
Roma woman from the Sotu family of fiddlers. These meetings, facilitated by the 
government, between leaders and public institutions produced changes in the 
Romanianized Roma and Caldarars’ informal leadership. In addition, the post-
socialist informal economy and local forms of clientelism and patronage served to 
facilitate the continuous transformation of Roma forms of leadership.  
Different forms of Romanianized Roma and Caldarars’ leadership became an 
expression of the variation in the relations that Roma leaders progressively 
established with a multitude of actors from different spheres of power struggle, 
especially with state and political actors. In this chapter I explore these multiple and 
sometimes contradictory relations. The next section provides a brief examination of 
the Caldarar and Romanianized Roma leaders in Costesti and neighboring villages 
Liveni and Moroieni under socialism and post-socialism.    
 
Different leaders and forms of leadership in Costesti 
 
In the first years of socialism, from late 1940s to 1960s, when the state had no clear 
policy of assimilating Gypsies, the Caldarar leaders were the product of their 
community organization. They were bulibasi traveling with their groups and had the 
role of settling everyday disputes and negotiating interactions with local authorities 
in the places where they used to camp. These mobile groups did not have a lot of 
contact with each other and were autonomous in their forms of socio-political 
organization. However, links between groups were created through marriage73. The 
bulibasi of different groups knew each other and cooperated but without this having 
any effect on the groups’ hierarchies and leadership.  
From the 1960 onwards, the socialist state initiated a coercive program of 
sedentarization for nomadic Roma, including the Caldarars. Many groups and leaders 
settled in Costesti and neighboring villages (Liveni and Moroieni). In Costesti, Iancu, 
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73 The Caldarars always looked for marriage partners from other Caldarar groups and that provided an 






one of the Caldarar leaders, was co-opted and agreed to collaborate with the 
Securitate. His aim was to get the necessary support for a position of authority over 
all the groups settled in Costesti, which, at that time, had different bulibasi. On the 
other hand, the Securitate was interested in getting information about the possession 
of gold by the Caldarars and in seizing it. Thus, bulibasa Iancu often provided 
information and assisted the police in raids against Caldarar families. He was able to 
impose himself as the main leader for the settled Caldarar community in Costesti, 
part of which continued to travel in small groups organized by other bulibasi. 
However, the bulibasi of small groups became subordinate to bulibasa Iancu who 
was recognized as the main ‘boss’.   
In Liveni, a neighbouring village, Traian was the main bulibasa, while in 
Moroieni the most powerful position went to Ionel Torea’s father. Both were 
collaborators with Securitatea. While supporting some Caldarar families, they 
assisted in the persecution and harassment of others they considered to be acting 
against their own interests. The bulibasi from Moroieni and Liveni considered that 
Iancu from Costesti had the most power and their decisions were often subject to his 
influence.  
In interviews and informal conversations I had with Caldarars and former 
socialist authorities Iancu was portrayed as a man who was prepared to use his 
influence against even those prosecutors who opposed his actions.   
 
R: ‘Bulibasul’ had unlimited powers, I can’t say powers on life and death 
over his community members, but anyway... He had the power to say: 
’Hey you!  The police want to see you. Follow me to the post’. He was 
called in whenever there was any litigation. When two families had a 
quarrel they would ask bulibasa to help them. (Racov, former head of 
police in Costesti). 
                                                _____________ 
C: Was Iancu working for the police?  
I: My understanding is that he defended his Gypsies who had problems 
during their travels. On the one hand, he helped them. On the other, he 
disclosed information about them and asked them for bribes, to keep 
Gypsies out of the hands of the police. One day he beat up a prosecutor. 
His nephew killed a man in a car crash. Iancu went to the hospital and he 





C: Why did he beat him up?  
I: He just had power to do that then. (Ioader Candel, Romanianized 
Roma informal leader).  
 
Racov, former police officer in chief in Costesti, suggests that bulibasa Iancu was 
able to act with all the authority and impunity of the police, being able to force 
Caldarars to comply with his orders, which were often illegitimate. When Racov says 
“bulibasa had unlimited powers”, he is referring to Iancu’s ability to threaten 
Caldarar families with action by the police as he pleased. In an interview, bulibasa 
Traian from Liveni confirmed that he had acted in similar ways against the Caldarars 
in Liveni. He claimed that Iancu would incriminate Caldarars for no reason and send 
them to the police station merely in order to demonstrate that he was backed by the 
power of the Securitate.  
In the second interview fragment, Ioader Candel suggests that Iancu acted 
within dual frameworks of power. On one hand, he was empowered to lead the 
Caldarar community and help them in their dealings with the regional police when 
needed. On the other hand, he was subject to the security services’ power and was 
therefore expected to provide information about the Caldarars who possessed gold. 
However, as Ioader Candel suggests, bulibasa Iancu could challenge and overrule 
local/regional police officers’ decisions to imprison Gypsies prosecuted for informal 
trade. He could also use violence, not only against his community, but also against 
people from the institutions of the socialist state (e.g. prosecutors).   
These observations identify further similarities between the Caldarar bulibasi 
under socialism and traditional political leadership in colonial Africa. Colonial 
leaders were given “extensive powers, especially power of coercion” (Keulder 2010: 
150) over populations. Adopting administrative colonial positions, “many traditional 
leaders transformed themselves from custodians of their people into custodians of the 
colonial order” (Keulder 2010: 151) and became ‘local despots’ (Mamdani 1996). 
Similarly under socialism, the main Caldarar bulibasi performed the role of local 
despots and informal Security officers.   
Under post-socialism, the leadership changed dramatically. In Costesti, the 
aging bulibasa Iancu lost his support from the security services and his authority 





got rich. The new rich, including Leonard, Iancu’s son started claiming the role of 
bulibasa. Leonard fulfills only a limited version of his father’s role. He mediates 
between community and local police in matters of local fighting or disputes, but he is 
not always recognized as a legitimate mediator by  some Caldarar families, nor does  
he occupy the same kind of  privileged position with the authorities that his father 
had.  The other two competitors – Razar and Sterea  - come from rich rival families  
connected to Iancu through kinship ties (marriages between their children or 
nephews). Razar is the son of a former Caldarar bulibasa of a small mobile group 
who accepted Iancu’s collaboration with the Securitate under socialism. Sterea is 
considered by many Caldarars in Costesti to be the richest Gypsy and the most 
successful businessman. As the other Caldarar bulibasi, Sterea acts as a broker for 
political parties and persuades the Caldarars to vote for one party or another during 
elections. In Liveni, Traian, former collaborator of Security services, is still a 
bulibasa, but with dramatically diminished authority over Caldarars. He is in 
competition with another Caldarar family which claims the leading position. Traian 
is also a Pentecostal convert enjoying very good relations with the Gypsy believers in 
Costesti. 
In Moroieni,  where the Caldarars did not  become as rich as in Costesti or 
Liveni, Ionel Torea , the son to a former bulibasa, became a Roma expert with the 
local council, mediating  between the Caldarars’ queries and the local council in 
matters of papers, social benefit applications etc. As previously mentioned, all these 
leaders have known each other since the time of socialism, and  often come into 
contact with each other at meetings organized by the government.           
Corina Sotu, the Romanianized Roma woman who oversees the other leaders 
of the region, is originally from Costesti. However, while talking with Romanianized 
Roma about leadership in their community, almost all of them told me that they 
never had leaders. The members of the Sotu family, who acted for a considerable 
period as mediators with the local council , are not generally considered as legitimate 
leaders. However, their conception of leadership is the Caldarars’ bulibasa: ”We do 
not have leaders, we do not have bulibasi like the Caldarars do”.  Rather they suggest 
they just had mediators. Today there are two Romanianized Roma from the Sotu 





Dinica Sotu is Corina Sotu’s brother and Ioader Candel is her cousin. While under 
socialism Ioader Candel used to organize seasonal work at state farms in the 
neighboring villages, Dinica Sotu was a regionally well-known fiddler.   
Nevertheless the development of the Romanianized Roma leadership took 
shape after 1989, when the Roma were recognized by the state as a minority and 
allowed to set up NGOs, which could also function as political parties74 and 
participate in elections. In the early 1990s, the Roma Party developed a nationwide 
network of activists. The Roma Party representatives were more or less informally 
appointed at each administrative level75.  
Upon Viorica’s recommendations, the Sotu family became the informal 
representatives of the Roma Party in Costesti. On the other hand, in an interview, 
Ioader Candel claimed that he was elected by the Romanianized Roma themselves, 
who chose him in an informal vote at a large meeting in the local stadium. Ioader 
told me that the crowd refused to accept his relative and partner Dinica Sotu then. 
However, Dinica did not comment on the event and merely mentioned his 
collaboration with Ioader in matters of institutional mediation on behalf of the 
Romanianized Roma community, before his appointment as a Roma expert for the 
council. At some point they both ran for a position of local councilor for the Roma 
Party. However, only Dinica Sotu, supported by his sister Viorica, was elected 
councilor for 4 years.  
In 2005, when the government started the Roma expert program, Dinica Sotu 
undertook a period of training. In 2007 he became a local Roma expert in Costesti, 
based at the local council, in the social work office. The position was funded by the 
central government between 2007 and 2013, with the intention to be transferred to 
the local council. Dinica, as a local Roma expert, is expected to represent and 
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To be officially registered, political parties need a large number of members. Like other small Roma 
organizations, the Roma Party did not succeed in collecting the required number of signatures and 
established itself as an NGO. For this reason the government allowed the Roma NGOs to act as 
political parties. 
75 Details of the post-socialist transformations in the Roma politics are discussed in the Chapter on 






mediate on behalf of all Gypsies in Costesti (including the Caldarars). However, he 
rarely visits the Caldarars’ district, which is under the bulibasi control. However, he 
is known by both Roma groups as the ‘local council man’.   
In the meantime, Ioader undertook a police mediators’ training course and he 
considers himself to be a Roma mediator with the local police. However he 
principally acts as an informal leader. The Romanianized Roma recognize both 
Dinica Sotu and Ioader Candel as mediators, but not necessarily as legitimate Roma 
representatives or their leaders.             
 
Questions and theoretical references  
 
The roles of Roma leaders within socialism and post-socialism show no clear-cut 
distribution and classification of leadership forms among the two Roma groups. 
These forms of leadership are produced in interaction with transformations in state 
governance (Securitate under socialism, the government’s Roma expert and mediator 
networks under post-socialism), politics (the Roma Party's need for local 
representativeness), informal economy (the Caldarars’ businesses) and religious 
discursive practices (authority transfers from bulibasa to God76).  
Arising from these observations, the questions this chapter seeks to answer are:  
How did these interactions between Roma leaders and the transformations and 
contestations within the spheres of power, especially the state, constitute or alter the 
forms of Roma leadership?  
How did the state’s attempts to reorganize and integrate Roma groups through 
formalized networks of leaders transformed the Romanianized Roma and Caldarars’ 
forms of leadership, their practices and meanings?  
How did these transformations in Roma leadership from socialism to post-socialism 
produce the Gypsies’ subjection to state power?  
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76 Transformations in the Caldarars’ political leadership and its meanings are discussed in the last 






Leadership has been conceived either as an individual entity or as a social-relational 
construction (Uhl-Bien 2006). The entity perspective individualizes action and 
conceives of individuals as entities somewhat separated from their environments. 
They also emphasise ‘positions’ and ‘resources’ ‘owned’ by two categories of actors 
related to each other through exchange: leaders and followers (Brower et al. 2000; 
Graen, Scandura 1987; Graen, Uhl-Bien 1991, 1995; Hollander 1978, 1979). From 
the same perspective, hierarchical and relational ‘realities’ are already organized 'out 
there', and are easy to represent (Dachler 1992; Hosking, Morley 1988). Social 
network theory can be considered an example of an entity-approach as it looks at 
individuals and their interactions as instruments for network enactment (Uhl-Bien 
2006). It is a way of mapping social relationships “concerned with description (eg. 
who talks to whom, who is friends with whom) and taxonomy (eg. friendship 
network, advice network, ego network) of relational links (…) rather than [with] how 
relational processes emerge and evolve” (Uhl-Bien 2006: 660).  
On the other hand, the relational approach sees the production of 
transformative power in relations and emphasises the capacity of relatedness (Uhl-
Bien 2006; Pearce, Conger 2003; Pearce, Jay, Conger, Locke 2007). From this 
perspective, leadership is always shared, collaborative “with others for the 
construction of a particular understanding of relationships (…) [while] leaders and 
those with whom they interact are responsible for the kinds of relationships they 
construct together” (Dachler, Hosking 1995: 15). It is not a pre-established 
organizational reality, “but an emergent reflection of socially constructed realities in 
constant change” (Dachler 1992: 171). The relational constructionist approach 
(Meindl 1995) looks at leadership as a process in which both individuals and 
relationships undergo transformations (Hosking. 1988, 2000) in a historically and 
socially self-transforming environment (Uhl-Bien 2006).   
An analysis of leadership as a process is less about “traits, behavioural styles, 
or identifying particular types of leaders or people management techniques” (Uhl-
Bien 2006: 662), but from my viewpoint, it is rather about interactions between 
state/politics/economy transformations and the leaders’ actions. It is a relation 
established between Roma leaders, state apparatuses of control and governance and 





(Rost 1995: 133). Leadership is primarily a power relation for two reasons: 1) it 
releases power to transform the leaders’ positions and actions through interactions 
with other leaders and political actors and 2) it has the capacity to produce t 
empowerment and transformations in the Roma subjection to state power. Forms of 
Roma leadership, as power relations, transform themselves in interaction with post-
socialist transformations in the state, economy and politics. In order to understand 
political leadership in the making (Dachler, Hosking 1995), my thesis incorporates 
historical and social dimensions into the constitution of dynamic relationships of 
power.  
The dynamic between local state actors, Roma and central state/political 
leaders reveals further interesting similarities with the traditional and colonial 
leadership in African states. As Verdery and Chari (2009) suggested, post-socialism 
and post-colonialism provide a good empirical basis  for extended  analytical 
comparison.  
During both colonialism and socialism, tradition was “used as a strategic 
resource” (Keulder 2010: 152) to give “rapid and recognizable symbolic form to 
developing types of authority and submission” (Hobsbawm, Rangers 1994: 237). 
However, the ‘traditional’ leader’s authority is not necessarily connected to tradition, 
but to custom (Keulder 2010), which “does not preclude innovation and change up to 
a point, though evidently the requirement that it must appear compatible or even 
identical with precedent imposes substantial limitations on it.” (Hobsbawm 1994: 2). 
Customs are not “real” or “invented” (Keulder 2010), but in continuously in a state 
of change and in communication with social, cultural, and political meanings and 
practices. In this sense, customary law was both “the mechanism to enforce the 
colonial order” and the “site of contestation and struggle” (Keulder 2010: 151) 
within which ‘chiefs’ accepted some colonial claims while rejecting others. 
Similarly, bulibasa was the Caldarars’ traditional institution of leadership informed 
by customary forms of organization, which were altered and used by the socialist 
state as forms of control and oppression against their communities. In post-socialism, 
Romanianized Roma and Caldarar forms of leaderships were reconstituted and 
challenged by the post-socialist state through new parallel structures of governance 






struggles fits well with these observations on the Caldarars and the Romanianized 
Roma forms of leadership.  
The remaining parts of the chapter explore different forms of leadership, 
through individual interactions with historical transformations in the state and its 
programs of assimilation and social integration. The next section concentrates on the 
history of relations between Caldarars and the socialist state and the ways the 
institution of the bulibasa was transformed. 
 
 The Caldarars - socialist state encounters 
 
Until 1960s, the Caldarars were nomads, barely subjected to the control and 
identification mechanisms of the state. They were organized in small mobile groups 
under the guidance of an experienced Caldarar man able to deal with identification, 
documentation and authorization issues as they arose in various places of work and 
settlement. These customary leaders called bulibasi were part of the Caldarars’ form 
of self-governance aimed at representing community needs in dealings with local 
authorities.  
The 1960’s sedentarization brought about a period of stability for governance 
and state control over the Caldarars. It was also the period during which all the 
Caldarar groups from Costesti came under bulibasa Iancu’s control. Iancu was also 
the regional coordinator of all the other main bulibasi from neighbouring villages, 
who were, at their turn, collaborators with Securitatea. The main bulibasi served as 
the channel by which oppression by the socialist state of Caldarar communities 
operated. Nevertheless, the Caldarars continued to travel during the warm seasons, 
led by other bulibasi who had travelling responsibilities77, but less influence. The 
main bulibasi for the settled community – Iancu from Costesti, Traian from Liveni 
and Ionel Torea’s father from Moroieni - were mostly ‘sedentary’. They had given 
up travelling for work in favour of ruling multiple groups of Caldarars in the new 
settled communities.     
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77They used to negotiate various issues with the local councils and police at the places where they 






By entering into an exchange of power with Securitate, the Caldarar main bulibasi 
were both empowered and subjected to state power. They were primarily responsible 
for the Caldarars’ subjection to the socialist state's surveillance and repression. 
Mateiescu George is one of the Caldarars from Costesti who, after 1960s, continued 
traveling around the country. He frequently experienced state oppression and 
bulibasa Iancu’s control over his trade.       
 
C: Who helped you when the police came?  
G: He [the bulibasa for the mobile group] had been taking care of our 
tents as he was a bulibasa for our group. If someone else [from Cluj, for 
example] came to us, it wasn’t the same – he couldn't do anything to 
protect us. For instance when I was caught by the regional police, they 
beat me and asked me where I was living, and with whom. Then, they 
went to the local police station to ask how many people were camping 
there and how much equipment they had with them. Our bulibasa [for the 
mobile group] begged the local police to intervene [and mediate] and 
asked them to understand that our people could not give any information 
about that.  
C: What was then the difference between the leaders organizing the 
camping groups and those organizing the settled one?  
G: The one organizing the camping supported us while the other one 
(bulibasa Iancu) supported the police. (Mateiescu George, Caldarar man, 
Costesti). 
 
From George’s statement it is clear that the bulibasi for mobile groups were those 
who acted on behalf of the Caldarars and supported their interests. Yet, bulibasa 
Iancu had better connections with the regional police, which was subordinated, as a 
Ministry of Interior institution, to the Securitate. The Caldarars’ statements show that 
Iancu enforced the often violent rules of the state in his community, and that he 
provided information to the authorities about the Caldarars’ identities. Documenting 
identity was not an easy job for the police. The Caldarars had the same surname: 
Mateiescu. To seize their gold, the police needed to collaborate with bulibasa Iancu, 
who disclosed the identities of those possessing gold. Large amounts of gold and 
work tools and equipment were thereby seized by the state.   
The weakness of the links between the Caldarar bulibasi for mobile groups 
and the regional authorities often proved to be a disadvantage in the Caldarars’ 
encounters with the police and administration. These leaders had good links with 





were less able to protect the Roma mobile groups. Mateiescu George and Mateiescu 
Alexandra, two other Caldarars from Costesti, told me about their vulnerability in 
relation to regional authorities who used to team up with bulibasa Iancu. 
 
G: Even if a [local] mayor knew us, when we were caught by the regional 
police, the local police would refuse to honour the arrangement that they 
made with us, pretending that they didn't know anything about our 
presence: “We don't know when they arrived here”. They used to seize 
our buckets, our tools; we were pushed into wagons and sent home. Our 
children were beaten, and then our wives, they came  with dogs to search 
for us. We were sad, we lived in hard times. (Mateiescu George, Caldarar 
man) 
                                                 _____________ 
  
C: Was it possible to escape the police control by showing your trading 
license? 
A: If you gave something to the mayor, you could get a paper, but it  was 
only valid for that village. During Ceausescu’s regime, we were severely 
punished. They confiscated our papers, everything they found on us. 
(Mateiescu Alexandra, Costesti).  
 
As George and Alexandra suggest, the Caldarars always negotiated their activities 
with the local authorities (police officers and mayors). Yet, the man who could 
negotiate the issues was the bulibasa of the travelling group. The other people, 
lacking ID cards and birth certificates, were almost non-identifiable. The bulibasa for 
mobile groups was the legible and ‘legal’ actor. He always had an ID and was 
supposed to have a trading license too. Getting work permission for an area was 
however not sufficient for full protection in their relations with the regional 
authorities, who had the right to engage in unannounced controls and to seize gold 
and copper. Bulibasa Iancu was the only one who could resolve disputes and legal 
actions initiated by the regional police against the travelling Caldarars.  
Although sharing some of the Caldarars’ interests and sometimes rendering 
useful service, this new form of leadership tended towards a distant and non-
democratic form of governance of the Caldarars. However, the main bulibasi 
received significant support from their own communities who were many times 
protected from the state violent actions. As Bennett (2004) argued in the case of 





repudiated. So in order to maintain their positions, main bulibasi had to address their 
community’s problems.  
On the other hand, the less influential travelling bulibasi had more flexible 
relations with their fellow Caldarar tradesmen and generally developed a more 
democratic form of governance. Bulibasi for traveling groups were customary 
inheritors. Their power stemmed from their good relations with their communities. 
From this perspective, the Caldarars customary leadership was a genuine form of 
self-governance undermined by collaboration between main bulibasa Iancu and 
Securitatea and state police. The next section goes into the details of the 
controversial relationship between bulibasa Iancu, the state surveillance services, and 
the other Caldarars. 
 
The expansion of the Caldarar leaders’ power via the state’s 
surveillance networks  
 
In most cases, the collaboration with the security services was an exchange between 
the main Caldarar bulibasi interested in strengthening their power and the socialist 
state interested in the Gypsies’ gold. In this sense, this form leadership can be 
considered relational:”it assumes the existence of some people who follow one or 
more others (…) [it] is about influence, so it is social by its very nature.” (Pearce, 
Conger, Locke 2007: 287). Traian, the bulibasa from Liveni, offered me an 
interesting account on his subjection to socialist authorities. 
 
         C: What was the advantage from your collaboration with Securitatea?  
T: It was good because they used to help you. If you wanted to help 
someone who was arrested they were ready to free him. If it was about 
someone in jail, they lightened his sentence. If it wasn't a serious 
accusation,  a theft or fight, we used to go to the prosecutor and the head 
of police would intervene and say: ‘We'll let him off’.  
C: Which policeman? At the county-level?  
T: Yes, someone from the regional level. They were lieutenants, 
assistant-lieutenants. They arranged everything and told me: ‘Traian, you 
bring us 3 golden coins if you don't want your Gypsy to spend 2 years in 
jail’. He would give the gold to the police officer and then go to the 
prosecutor to declare that the Gypsy had donated some gold. And 
immediately they would release him.  





T: It was sent to the state bank and the police officer to a higher position” 
(Traian, bulibasa Liveni). 
 
In the conversation I used the term ‘collaboration’ to refer to many of the statements 
made by Caldarars suggesting a twofold meaning to the relationship, which produced 
both violence against Gypsies, but also some support for them in the conflicts with 
the regional police. For Traian and Iancu, the ‘collaboration’ meant a form of 
partnership in actions like the identification of Caldarar families and gold seizure.     
My interview with Traian reveals exchanges of favours between the socialist 
state and bulibasa. Police officers and prosecutors represent here the state’s 
pragmatic interest in the Caldarars’ gold, but also its ideological commitment to 
capturing and transforming individual property into collective property. The gold 
was not appropriated by police officers, prosecutors or governmental representatives, 
but taken to the state bank as the collective property of the socialist state. In order to 
seize their gold, the police used to raid the Caldarar settlements quite regularly.  For 
each forced “gold donation”, the Caldarars had receipts78 confirming the transfer to 
the state. In this context, bulibasa Traian was interested in strengthening his 
leadership and developing good relations with both the state and the Caldarars. The 
Caldarars who were fined or even imprisoned for trading copper needed Traian’s 
support to obtain their release. In all these exchanges, usually paid in gold, all the 
participants (bulibasa, police officers, Caldarars) received some “advantage”.  
However, the exchange between bulibasa and the Caldarars was quite 
unequal as the leader received protection and support from authorities, while the 
Caldarars were supported selectively by Traian. Those who had good relations with 
their main ‘bulibasa’ and had enough gold to offer were more likely to get 
protection. The others were often harassed. Thus, the state acted as a violent actor 
against the Caldarars through practices mediated by main bulibasi in an unequal 
power relationship. Nevertheless, Traian considers that he was able to support his 
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fellows more during socialism than in  post-socialism, when he lost his connections 
with the security services. 
 
         C: What about your actions?  Were the Gypsies unhappy with them?  
T: At that time, I was able to help them. Now there is not so much 
choice, they can be imprisoned anyway. It was the police who kept you 
in your position as bulibasa. When they came to ask ‘who Ion Mateiescu 
is’ - as we have 100 people here named Ion Mateiescu - they went to  my 
place for me to get me to give them the information needed. (Traian, 
bulibasa Liveni) 
 
Traian’s statement indicates that ‘the help’ given to Caldarars was manufactured as 
part of a planned exchange with the police. The socialist state manipulated a double 
form of violence: 1) the visible/open coercion and physical abuse and 2) the 
symbolic power (Bourdieu 1989), its ability to manufacture ‘services’, empowerment 
for bulibasi and ‘support’ for common Caldarars. However, while the main bulibasi 
lost large parts of their legitimacy in their communities, the Caldarars lost their gold 
and much of their ability to govern themselves was subject to continual alteration.   
It is important to note that the bulibasa’s double game strengthened his 
domination and control over Caldarars. Most Caldarars I have talked to emphasised 
both the negative and positive aspects of Traian and Iancu’s actions. They talked 
about both fear and appreciation in relation to the main bulibasi. These accounts 
raise the question from where did the main bulibasa’s authority come from: the 
Caldarar community or the state apparatuses? The partial restoration of the leaders’ 
legitimacy was produced through the socialist state’s manufactured ‘help’, which 
explains why the Caldarars portrayed Traian in Liveni and Iancu in Costesti as both 
good and bad. Traian’s statements confirm further his dual position and shared form 
of leadership with the socialist state.  
 
C: You said that police maintained you as bulibasa… 
T: Yes, the police, but the Gypsies did too. If the Gypsies would have 
rejected me as bulibasa… that would have not happened because the 
police supported my position… If you were a bulibasa, you were in the 
service of the state. (…) 
C: When you had to intervene in a local fight did you go alone?  
T: Yes, I used to go alone. There were not so many involved.  





T: I was not afraid because I had someone to support me. I had the 
telephone number of the general police in Bucharest and I had a paper 
certifying that I was a gold collector. (Traian, bulibasa Liveni)      
   
It is clear that main bulibasi were not only simple collaborators, but also gold 
collectors with clear responsibility in relation with the police. His role was certified 
by a document that strengthened his authority in relation to both police officers and 
the Caldarar community. The Caldarars were expected to submit to his orders. At 
other times, this document was a source of threat for those who opposed his actions. 
The official paper can be interpreted as an evidence of the legalized theft the socialist 
state used to practice with the support of community leaders. The Caldarar leaders 
and the state apparatuses of control played, more or less informally, a violent power 
game encroaching upon Roma individuals’ rights.  
Many stories coming from Caldarars, institutional representatives and the bulibasi  
themselves portrayed the main principal bulibasi (e.g. Iancu, Traian) as aggressors 
who used their connections to state institutions to obtain personal advantage and seek 
revenge. Bulibasa Traian told me the way he used to make abuse of the mechanisms 
of control in order to maintain and strengthen his leadership position.  
 
T: If someone annoyed me, I used to call the police to get him, even at night. In 
the morning he would already have been taken by the police. It was a kind of 
revenge… I was bad - I beat all the Gypsies [Caldarars] because they were not 
paying the electricity bills, because they were stealing. They were all afraid of 
me… I used to tell the police about their gold. I was an informer, I was a 
boss… That wasn't  good for Gypsies but they (the bulibasi) have always done 
both good and bad things altogether. (Traian bulibasa Liveni)    
  
Traian reflects back on his actions and repudiates and distances himself from his 
former leadership self constituted by socialist security services. He offers a 
remorseful portrayal of his previous form of leadership, shared with the Securitatea. 
He regretfully considers that his former actions, arising from pressure by the security 
services, affected his leadership position and authority in post-socialism. From these 
reasons he refers critically at his former leadership self as ‘informer’ and ‘boss’.  His 
self-reflexive narrative suggests the destructive character of the empowerment which 
gave him the power to exercise violence against the members of his own community. 





legitimacy, but also dehumanized his sense of belonging to a community, his sense 
of responsibility and his awareness of his actions against his fellows.  
Similar to Traian, Iancu from Costesti was well connected to the Ministry of 
Interior and he supported the traveling Caldarars from Costesti arrested for illegal 
commerce in other localities. The manufactured ‘help’ was paid by the Caldarars in 
gold which was “donated” to the state. Leonard, one of the present bulibasi in 
Costesti, portrays his father’s actions in terms of personal power and the capacity to 
overrule and negotiate with the authority of the socialist state. 
 
L: Everyone knew him. The police knew him. When Gypsies had problems in 
another county the police would call him and he would fix the problem. When 
he opened his mouth, the Gypsies [the Caldarars] listened to him (…).During 
Ceausescu, everything was restrictive. It happened once that some Gypsies 
were caught by police, tied up with wire and forced to donate gold. He [Iancu] 
brought the police to the old district where the Gypsies lived, and they started 
to beat them: ‘Give me 10 pieces of gold otherwise I won’t stop beating you’. 
My father didn't agree with this treatment. In the meantime, other Gypsies 
grabbed a policeman and beat him. My father received a call from the Goteni 
police, that one of their policemen was being lynched by Caldarars. He 
released the policeman and asked the police officers to release the Gypsies 
arrested in Focsani for illegal trading. (Leonard, Iancu’s son, bulibasa in 
Costesti)  
 
Leonard suggests that his father not only controlled and abused his community, but 
also negotiated the state's violence against Caldarars. Iancu, as a regional Caldarar 
leader, coordinated the activity of the bulibasi for traveling groups. His control over 
the expanded network of bulibasi made him a valuable connection for the police 
interested in seizing large quantities of gold from the Caldarar traveling groups ruled 
by different bulibasi. In this exchange, Iancu was able to negotiate with the state and 
give support to Caldarars. The supervision of the bulibasi network also produced 
Iancu’s access to significant power to negotiate his subjection to the state demand for 
control and surveillance of his community.  
The socialist need to patronize and capture individual properties and assets 
introduced the Caldarar main bulibasi to the higher power structures where the secret 
police, central state representatives and local authorities were formally and 
informally connected. Regional and central authorities produced bulibasa Iancu and 





other hand, these interactions and communications with the police state disturbed and 
transformed their selfhood, belonging, and legitimacy as leaders, and damaged their 
community’s customary forms of self-governance based on mobility and 
representativeness (the bulibasa as institution). Rather than an individual asset, these 
leaders’ power was produced both by their ‘collaboration’ with Securitatea and their 
support given to Caldarars. The main bulibasi performed leadership in a dynamic 
relation with opposing actors, and oscillated between support for their community 
and the enforcement of state rule.  
Therefore, Caldadar leadership was constituted by contradictory relations, which had 
the character of a power struggle, within which the leader was one of the main actors. 
Power struggles defined the Caldarars’ customary forms of leadership as a power 
relation continuously transformed through its main actors’ performances that 
changed and redefined the bulibasa’s institution under socialism. The bulibasi for 
traveling groups became less and less important and visible for their communities 
and state authorities, and in time lost their leadership roles. The socialist state 
centralized the Caldarars’ leadership and their actions became the new focus for the 
institution of the bulibasa, which is currently a site of  contestation  by  Caldarars. 
  
Post-socialist Caldarar forms of leadership: from centralization to 
multiplicity and loss of authority  
 
The centralized production of repression dissolved after 1989. The state’s withdrawal 
from the economy and politics brought rapid transformations and unpredictable 
socioeconomic changes (the emergence of a new sector of informal economy, 
inflation, unstable markets, and corruption and patronage politics) which transformed 
the Caldarars’ forms of leadership, their claims and their meanings. Caldarars, no 
longer forced “to donate” gold to the state, did not need the bulibasa’s “support” 
services. On the other hand, many Caldarars got wealthy and had no interest in 
following a leader who might serve to limit their authority. 
No longer supported by the authorities, the main Caldarar bulibasi have 
largely lost their authority and legitimacy in relation to all members of their 





leaders (both Romanianized Gypsies and Caldarars) and mediated by the local 
patronage politics (the mayor and deputy-mayor’s political interests). The ‘despotic’ 
rule of the Caldarar bulibasi ended. The bulibasa slowly became a peaceful mediator 
of community problems, positioned in a loose relationship to local and regional 
public institutions. Members of the Caldarar community made the comparison 
between aggressive socialist leaders and new ones who seem no longer as important 
and influential as they had been. Without representing one or the other, the Caldarar 
bulibasi reached a balance between the support offered to their community, on one 
hand, and to state authorities on the other.  Traian from Liveni told me about his 
experience of losing his authority.    
 
C: How was bulibasa after 1990?  
T:  It wasn't the same as during Ceausescu. He was much stronger then… 
He had good relations with the state and police and everyone was afraid 
of him… Now Gypsies expect you not to disclose any information about 
them. When there was such a thing as bulibasa, there was more authority 
[for the leader]. Gypsies and even the police officers were afraid… Now 
if you want to complain… Where can you do that? When you wanted to 
do that, before, you went to Bucharest or the prefecture and they came to 
investigate. If you want to be bulibasa for your people you need to be 
useful. But how can you work in this way without denouncing your 
Gypsies? I am bulibasa but I no longer have the authority to send a 
Gypsy to jail. 
C: Is it important to have a lot of money and houses to become a 
bulibasa?  
T: To become a bulibasa you need to support both the police and the 
Gypsies. Since I became a Pentecostal I stopped harming people. My 
bulibasa position is now lost. (Traian, bulibasa Liveni)  
 
Traian’s statement shows the contradictory workings of the destructive empowerment 
produced by the state: being able to do harm in order to ‘help’, restore what was 
damaged, and then to be able to harm again. As many Caldarars suggested, the 
bulibasi had the power to do good and bad things altogether. Without support from 
the authorities, the main bulibasi would have not been able to pass on information 
about Caldarars, or to send them to prison. They would have neither been able to 
offer support for the evil done nor to restore their legitimacy undermined by acting as 






main bulibasi was produced by the way they enforced state violence, which created a  
space for them to perform  the manufactured “help”.  
In his last sentences, Traian suggests that in so far as he is not able to support 
the police and produce harm in order to “help”, he is no longer able to be a bulibasa. 
Also, his ‘lost’ much criticized position, has been replaced by a religious discourse of 
reconciliation inspired by the practice of Pentecostalism. It is also interesting here to 
notice that Traian does not discuss the functionality and legitimacy of bulibasa as an 
institution of customary leadership practiced before 1960s. For Traian and Ioader, the 
bulibasi for traveling groups had little or no power because they only handled small 
mobile group problems and were not able to exercise or control state violence against 
Caldarars. During socialism, the role of bulibasa in representing the community, and 
legitimized by the community, was  replaced by the state’s violent control, which 
proved  to be considered a more powerful source of leadership based on the direct 
subordination of the Caldarars.        
Immediately after 1989, the state weakened its control apparatuses over 
Gypsies. The Caldarar bulibasi had to find new ways of preserving or reinventing 
their authority and legitimacy. Traian and Iancu started to get involved in the state's 
reparation and restitution of seized gold. They continued their collaboration with 
high-level state representatives and this time both the Caladarars and their leaders 
had some benefits. Bulibasa Traian narrated the story of the restitution of gold to the 
Caldarars.     
 
C: After 1989 you continued your links with the police?  
T: Yes, as we gave the gold back to the Gypsies. After the revolution me, 
Iancu, King Adrian [the self etntitled king of the Gypsies] from Cornesti 
went to Bucharest for a week. We knew the people whose gold had been 
confiscated. We then stayed a month in Goteni and took all the Gypsies’ 
gold back to the village. I would be lying if I didn't say that the Gypsies 
always gave us something in exchange. Those who received the gold 
back gave us 2,000-3,000 lei. And even now - if I do a good thing for a 
Gypsy I can't cannot say that he doesn’t give me 1,000-2,000 RON for 
that. I do not ask for cash anymore. When I was a bulibasa and a Gypsy 
asked me to get him out of jail, I demanded 5,000 RON in exchange. 
From that I gave 3,000 to the policemen, and the rest of 2,000 was mine. 







After 1989, the exchanges of favors between bulibasi and their communities 
continued but the level of inequality diminished due to the absence of authoritarian 
state institutions. Traian suggests that Caldarars offered money to bulibasi when they 
needed their support in matters of mediation with the police. However, after 1989, 
many Caldarars chose to deal directly with the state institutions and rely less on the 
bulibasa’s ability to mediate with the local and regional authorities. Through 
informal economic practices and through new religious practices they strived to 
become independent from  any external form of power (e.g. leaders).  
In Costesti, Leonard took over the main responsibilities from Iancu, his 
father, and continued to mediate at a lower level between the local council and 
police. However, the institution of bulibasa is now much more locally based  and is 
being challenged by other wealthy Caldarars. In Costesti, there are three people who 
all claim the same leadership position: Leonard (Iancu’s son), Razar, and Sterea. 
They all collaborate with the local authorities but lack  the necessary legitimacy from 
the Caldarars who think that ”they claim to be bulibasi, but no one appointed them 
so” and  “they are bulibasi for themselves”. In addition, bulibasi themselves consider 
that the bulibasa’s institution is dying, being challenged by the new relation towards 
the transformed state institutions. For example, Leonard considers no longer 
appropriate support to the police and provide information about Caldarars engaged in 
informal economic practices.  
 
C: What’s changed for the bulibasa now? 
L: Now they all have money and do whatever they want. It is very 
different now.  
C: Were they afraid before?  
L: Yes, they were because the police forced them to hand over  gold and 
every week someone would ask my father for help. Now it is different - 
they only come to me when there is a scandal or something. I only get 
involved  in minor issues – I can't help with  serious problems. If some of 
them fight and injury others, I can't secure their release  from jail.  
C: How many claim they are bulibasi in the Caldarars’ district ?  
L: My father was a bulibasa but now others claim that they are ‘bulibasa’ 
too. Whenever I go anywhere I don't  tell anyone that I am a bulibasa, I 
just introduce myself as Mateiescu Leonard. If I go to the police, they 
know me, but if I go to somebody else who does not know me I would 
not tell them: ‘You know who I am? I am bulibasa.’ I don’t have to 






Similar to Traian, Leonard suggests that he cannot offer manufactured “help” any 
longer.  Neither can he overrule local authorities’ decisions and secure the release of 
someone from jail. For these reasons, Leonard said he cannot claim he is a bulibasa. 
He even avoids using the term, which is associated by Caldarars with socialist state 
violence. Moreover, the bulibasa position is no longer legitimate in relation to both 
Caldarars and state authorities.     
Razar, the main contender for a bulibasa’s position in Costesti, confirms that 
the old leadership terminology is no longer appropriate. He is a wealthy Caldarar 
who participates in the county level-meetings organized by the government and 
regional Roma expert Corina Sotu. His leadership claim was strengthened by the way 
he started to forge links with regional and central institutions (police, local council, 
the Roma Party, PSD local/regional/central representatives) in matters of community 
issues. 
 
         C: What does it mean for you means to be a bulibasa? 
R: I call myself president.  
C: Since when have you been a president?  
R: I’ve been a president for the last 15 years. I do not like to be a 
bulibasa. That was during Ceausescu. Before 1989 we had no elections 
in Romania. Now we have started to have presidents, councilors, lots of 
types of things. I said I do not like bulibasa - I like ‘president’. 
C: How do people refer to you?  
R: They say I’m a representative, some call me on my mobile phone, 
others come directly to my house, and others find me at the local council. 
C: Do you go often to the local council?  
R: Yes, I go there and I act as a mediator between Romanians and 
Gypsies. The police also call me. (Razar, bulibasa, Costesti).    
  
The definition of bulibasa underwent transformations due to the interactions with the 
new forms of state power. These days, the institution of bulibasa is associated with 
the security services and state violence, which substantially diminish its legitimacy 
and its symbolic capacity of showing the ruler’s power. In this context, it has 
acquired the aura of being an undemocratic form of governance, which is in 
contradiction with the transformation of the state and bureaucracy and its 
terminology. Razar’s use of ‘president’ and the new bureaucratic language reveals 





of the local council bureaucrats and police officers takes his self-awarded title 
seriously. On the contrary, his statements are the target of their jokes and criticism. 
Given his low-level of formal education and his weak legitimacy among the 
Caldarars, they consider that the new vocabulary is entirely inappropriate.  
Traian’s, Leonard’s and Razar’s statements show the leaders’ attempts to 
redefine their positions in relation with the state and community, and to explore 
alternative sources of authority and power. The meanings of leadership are deeply 
embedded in the leaders’ practice of state violence and in their close ‘collaboration’ 
with the socialist state apparatuses. Leaders are now trying to distance themselves 
from the former meanings through different kinds of interactions with the 
restructured state and its newly devised democratic forms of governance aimed at 
Roma inclusion and development (e.g. meetings for Roma leaders, Roma experts and 
local/regional authorities organized by government).  
Both the Caldarar and Romanianized Roma leaders, interested in developing and 
strengthening their leadership positions, have been involved formally and informally 
in the government’s strategy of Roma integration (2005-2015). The lack of financial 
resources meant that local informal Roma leaders began to occupy positions of Roma 
experts and become paid state employees working for local councils or regional 
administrations. Roma expertise is not necessarily held by Gypsies who are members 
of a specific Roma community, but by those with modest resources obliged to work 
for and from within the state structures. Ionel Torea, Caldarar leader in Moroieni, 
and Dinica Sotu, Romanianized Roma in Costesti are Roma experts and relevant 
examples in this sense. The next section details their occupational histories and 
concentrates largely on two Romanianized Roma leaders – Dinica Sotu and Ioader 
Candel, and their relations with Romanianized Roma and the local authorities in 
Costesti. 
 
The post-socialist state and the Romanianized Roma forms of 
leadership  
 
As already mentioned in the first section of this chapter, Dinica Sotu, a 





expert at the Goteni prefecture to become an expert for the local council in Costesti. 
He completed governmental training in 2005 and occupied his post in 2007. As a 
local Roma expert, he is expected to work with both Romanianized Roma and 
Caldarars, and link them in with local institutions. Nevertheless, as a Romanianized 
Roma himself, he is more involved with the Romanianized Roma issues. As a state 
employee, he gets paid by the central government and he is expected to  implement 
locally the governmental strategy for  Roma social inclusion.  
The main four goals of the Roma expert program are: 1. “to increase the level 
of Roma representation in the structures of public administration for all 8 regions of 
Romania (…)”; 2. “the sustainable development of a national Roma expert network, 
which can support the implementation of measures for social inclusion (…)”; 3. “the 
development of the institutional capacity of the local public administration (…)”; 4. 
“facilitating the constitution of local working groups for the identification, 
organization, and implementation of actions that can lead to the socio-economic 
inclusion of Roma”79.  
However, in the Roma expert program, the Roma experts’ role of 
representing the Roma communities’ needs and interests in the local public 
institutions is not discussed.  Rather it is implied that the Roma experts are expected 
to mediate access and penetration of the state structures in the lives of the Roma. On 
the other hand, the Roma are expected to follow the state’s external form of 
governance. In this context, the Roma experts can be considered to be state 
representatives within Roma communities, rather than Roma representatives within 
state structures. Their official role and its implications trigger multiple difficulties for 
the Roma experts, who struggle to get recognition from their communities and be 
accepted as leaders.  
Dinica supports the Romanianized Roma by solving their difficulties related 
to identification papers, health and education services. In the early 1990s he has been 
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Inclusion Measures for Romani Minorities, a Vulnerable Group, Subject to Social Exclusion”- Project 
developed in partnership with the National Agency for Romani People, Romanian Government and 






an informal leader and a Roma Party representative teaming up with the present 
informal leader Ioader Candel. As Dinica stated in an interview, his early leadership 
positions and actions were part of the Roma Party’s national program for forming 
local action groups on Roma issues, a project initiated in the early 1990s by Nicolae 
Paun, president of the Roma Party. 
 
C: When did you start to deal with Roma issues? Was it a question of 
being a Roma representative?  
D: Since 1991. Yes, Mr Nicolae Paun organized us in teams and since 
then I have worked voluntarily for the local council. We were all 
members of the Costesti-Goteni team.  
C: Were you a Roma Party member?  
D: I was a member of the Alliance for Roma Unity and after a while I 
changed my membership to Roma Party. These are not proper political 
parties, but NGOs, and at some point, they amalgamated. They didn't 
collect sufficient numbers of signatures and that is why they are still 
NGOs. You know how Gypsies are. They do not want to see me as their 
boss, everyone would like to be in charge, and everyone would like to be 
a boss. So we get King Adrian with his supporters, Emperor Iodoran with 
his, Nicolae Paun with his followers. (Dinica Sotu, Roma expert, local 
council Costesti).  
 
Dinica‘s statements show the weak representation and support for the Roma Parties 
and the limited political power of the Roma as an ethnic group.. I will show later in 
the thesis that Roma politics became almost non-existent under the patronage of the 
Romanian governing parties. In the early 1990s, Roma political options were 
unevenly distributed amongst stronger parties (e.g. PSD, PNL, PDL) and small Roma 
political organizations. The Romanianized Roma, who started to receive state 
benefits, and the Caldarars, who received their gold back, both supported PSD, the 
governing party at that time. As compared with the Hungarian minority’s parties who 
always received support from the ethnic Hungarians and were always elected to the 
Romanian parliament, the Roma political parties, with minimal support from the 
Roma, remained in inchoate forms and never succeeded in getting into parliament. In 
the context of weak or almost nonexistent Roma politics, the local Roma Party 
representatives Dinica Sotu and Corina Sotu, with less financial resources, chose to 






 In Costesti, the Sotus are known as a respectable, well-off family. During 
socialism, they used to be renowned fiddlers. In this way, they differentiated 
themselves from other Romanianized Gypsies. After 1989, using their influence, they 
succeeded in securing key positions in the informal Roma political organization as 
Roma Party representatives. Corina is now the president of the Roma Party for the 
entire South-Eastern region, the president of Romani women at the county level, and 
the prefect’s councillor on Roma issues. Her cousin, Ioader Candel, remained an 
informal Roma leader and a Roma Party representative. He ran for an official Roma 
Party councillor position at the local council with no success though. To strengthen 
his informal leadership in the Romanianized Roma community he trained to be a 
police mediator. 
 
         C: When you were working with Dinica at the local council, you did not have 
any salary 
I: It was my ambition, I helped them with their houses during the floods, 
I petitioned at the prefecture for them, I helped them with everything, and 
Dinica won the place that was meant for me. All the mayors knew me 
and I knew how to deal with people… 
C: Did you attend any training?   
I: Yes, I went to mediator’s training [police mediator] for a year. The last 
time we met in Cluj - we were 100 people and a part of them were from 
the Roma Party.  
C: Who was there at the meeting?  
I: Only big men, it was just me and somebody from Loreni who were on 
a lower level, the rest were lawyers, prosecutors etc.  
C: Are you paid as a mediator? 
 I: No, absolutely not.  
C: So how do you benefit from being a mediator?  
I: Benefit? I gain honor in front of my people and I am requested [to 
mediate] everywhere. When the prosecutor asks, ‘Who deals with the 
Roma here?’, they say ‘Ioader!’. ‘Well, bring him here!’ (Ioader Candel, 
Romanianized Roma informal leader).    
 
Although not paid, both Dinica and Ioader have mediated between Romanianized 
Roma and local/regional institutions for a long time. Ioader considers that that main 
benefit of his informal position was the opportunity of getting into contact with 
‘important’ people from public institutions: mayors, lawyers, police officers etc. In 
addition, he suggests that his actions were able to bring him authority among 





for him, he refers to the Roma expert position now held by Dinica. To maintain his 
leadership role and to restore his authority among the Romanianized Roma, Ioader 
found new leadership roles as a police mediator. However, as mentioned in the 
Chapter on the informal economy, Ioader is not paid for his mediator’s role 80 and he 
lives off informal economic practices81. Taking the position of police mediator, he 
tried to restore parts of his authority lost in competition, not necessarily against 
Dinica Sotu, but against the new position of Roma expert that swept away his main 
role as a mediator between community and local public institutions. However, with 
no secure source of income, Ioader found himself pushed into the informal economy, 
which is inconsistent with his police mediator’s role. His role and its benefits  are 
part of the same pattern of movement I identified for the Romanianized Roma in the 
sphere of informal economy: a social navigation of local limited possibilities 
transformed in this case by new governance structures (the Roma expert/mediator 
network)..   
Ioader’s contradictory performance shows how informal leaders, in their 
struggle for economic wealth and leadership, can act in conflicting spheres of power 
struggle (state versus the informal economy), a movement stimulated by the state’s 
programs of expertise and mediation for local Roma communities. For these reasons, 
it can be considered that while Ioader Candel remained an informal leader, Dinica 
Sotu, as Roma expert, became a formal one.   
Between 2000 and 2003, Dinica worked and was paid as a school mediator as 
part of the government project for  Roma inclusion. New regulations were imposed 
and those with no high-school education were no longer eligible for the program. 
However, he decided to pass his position on to his daughter, and run instead for the 
position of a Roma Party local councilor. In 2004, supported by his sister Corina 
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Sotu, who convinced the Roma to vote for her brother, he was elected as a Roma 
Party councilor. He held this position until 2007, when the Roma expert network 
program was launched and gave him the opportunity for formal employment.  
Dinica suggests that his abandoning local councillor position was determined 
by his poor economic condition. It is interesting to note that the modest financial 
condition of both Dinica and Ioader pushed them into opposite directions. While 
Ioader became an informal dealer between Caldarars and Romanianized Roma, 
Dinica became a Roma expert, a state representative. Both struggled for a paid form 
of leadership but only Dinica succeeded.  
Dinica explained further the disadvantages that the Roma expert’s position 
poses in terms of representing the Roma communities. After the 2009 presidential 
elections, significant cuts in social welfare benefits were made by the local council. 
All councilors, including the PSD representatives and a PSD Romanianized Roma 
local councilor were no longer interested in the Roma’s votes and decided to re-
evaluate social benefit applications and raise the threshold for informal day labor and 
household expenditure included in the calculations of the minimum guaranteed 
income. The Romanianized Roma, local state welfare recipients, were much affected. 
Dinica described his position in this situation.  
 
D: I asked the mayor, ‘Why did you reduce the number of social 
benefits?’ and he replied: ‘Dinica, it was not mine, but the councillors’ 
decision’.  
C: What would have happened if you had been  a local councillor? 
D: I would have shown them my fist.  
C: But you resigned from your councillor’s position...  
D: Yes, I did, because I’m an old man and I have to get my pension, how 
am I supposed to live, otherwise? When I was councillor, Mr. Sorin 
Comsa [the village’s administrator/patron] knows, I showed my fist and I 
did what I wanted. Cristian Sotu [another Romanianized Gypsy] who 
represents the Social Democrat Party in the local council should have 
refused to vote for lower social benefits for the Roma. I reproached him: 
‘Why didn’t you raise your hand?’ [against the local council decision]   
 Gypsies have nothing to reproach me with. I helped them get water and 
electricity in their district. I sent their children to school… This is my 
role. (Dinica Sotu, Romanianized Gypsy, Roma expert).       
 
Dinica was not able to get involved in local decision, in so far as the Roma experts 





authorities and the Roma community. On the other hand, Cristian Sotu, the PSD 
councillor, a Romanianized Roma himself, had no objections to local council 
decision and he supported his political party. Dinica suggested that while a Roma 
Party councillor has some control over decisions, a Roma expert has none. His 
change in position from being a Roma Party councillor to a Roma expert entailed a 
loss in his capacity to represent the interests of the Romanianized Roma community 
and participate in local council decision making. The Romanianized Roma 
themselves confirmed that Dinica is no longer a Roma representative, but a local 
council employee who cannot afford to do more than what his superiors (e.g. the 
administrator, mayor) say.  
As Dinica stated, becoming an expert was an opportunity for some Roma to 
get a monthly salary with the promise of a pension and secure life. In a similar, but 
also contrasting way, another example comes from a Caldarar leader Ionel Torea, a 
Roma expert in a neighbouring village, Moroieni. His father was a bulibasa for 50 
years, but Ionel Torea decided to formalize his leadership position and became an 
employee of the local council. 
 
C: Why did not you run for a councillor’s position at the local council 
instead? 
I: The problem was money. It was a problem for me then. It is still a 
problem for me now. You cannot do too much for 4 children (and with 8 
people in the household) with 480 RON which is my salary. As a local 
councillor you receive 120 RON - can you believe that? And you have 
responsibilities for 1,730 souls [the Caldarars in Moroieni]. When it is 
about elections – yes, we vote for the candidate who supports us…  
C: You said that that the presence of 1-2 Roma councillors at the local 
council would [positively] influence local decisions…  
I: Yes, it would be different as I can't  make decisions alone, from my 
position at the moment. But I am respected as a colleague … there are 22 
of us employees [at the village hall]...   
C: As a Roma expert do you have more or less power than a bulibasa?  
I: I have more power than a bulibasa because I understand everything 
differently and I know the law. In case the Gypsies are fined I can 
intervene and they know that and stop doing illegal activities. (Ionel 
Torea, bulibasa/Roma expert, Moroieni) 
 
Keeping the customary leadership power – bulibasa - seems difficult when 






Ionel Torea, like Dinica, chose becoming a Roma expert,  a state employee with a 
regular salary. As Roma experts, both have experience of the impossibility of making 
political representation on behalf of the Roma concerning their queries/social 
problems. The alternative of being a local Roma councillor offers more possibilities 
for representing the Roma in local decision-making, but with lower and symbolic 
remuneration. In both cases, the low-income Roma leaders were drawn into the 
state’s organized forms of leadership. However, Ionel suggests that by working for 
the state, he gets training, state knowledge, and access to formal government 
networks, which are helpful for the poorer Caldarars, who need access to state 
services. Also, he still has an influence over his community, which can be used 
during local or national elections to get control over the local distribution of votes 
and strengthen his connection with local patronage. 
         C: Who do you help more: the Roma or the institutions? 
I: I think I help the institutions: the local council and even institutions 
from Bucharest were happy with the votes I secured from Gypsies. 
C: Are Roma supported in any way?  
I: They get support from the 416 Law [the social benefits/minimum 
income law]. They also get ‘support’ from lies and unfulfilled promises 
politicians make to them, but the story is going to be different from now 
on. In the next elections I will provide the voters’ names list, but no one 
will go to vote! (Ionel Torea, Caldarar, Roma expert Moroieni)  
 
Ionel’s statements express a discontent and reveal the Roma experts’ practice. They 
are expected to help institutions to deal with Roma issues, but not to directly help 
their communities. Interestingly, when he says he helps institutions he makes 
reference to patronage politics and vote-buying practices, which in Romania cannot 
be disconnected from state institutions, and are an established feature  of  post-
socialist politics. As Ionel suggests, these clientelistic exchanges82 (votes for social 
benefits) upheld by Roma experts, seem to bring little benefit to the Roma 
communities (eg. the Caldarars in Moroieni). With no access to the local decision-
making, Ionel suggests that he can use voting behaviour as the only instrument of 
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control over a local governance and patronage that pays minimum attention to the 
community’s needs.  
Both Corina and Dinica need to follow both the state’s interests and the 
interests which arise from the local patronage. From this viewpoint, community 
representativeness and active political participation by Roma experts in local 
governance are limited by the state’s definition of Roma experts as institutional 
representatives, and also by the dynamic of local patronage politics. These 
differences between Roma leaders and various forms of leadership show the 
continuities in the way in which the Roma leaders were connected to the 
transformations of post-socialist spheres of power struggle: the state and the informal 
economy. Post-socialist state structures did not capture informal structures of 
leadership, only the leaders with poor financial resources.  
Nevertheless, the state governance and the Roma expert network program facilitated 
connections between local Roma experts, informal Roma leaders and representatives 
of public institutions (Roma Party representatives, lawyers, mayors, police officers). 
The next section looks at the collaborative relationships between the Caldarar and 
Romanianized Roma leaders, and at the way leadership is shared and negotiated at 
different administrative levels. 
 
Collaborative leadership: loose and tight power webs    
 
Both the Caldarar and Romanianized leaders interviewed confirmed their role in the 
development of the Roma districts’ infrastructure and in mediation with 
local/regional authorities. Settling community problems and mediating with the 
police are among the strategies for strengthening their authority over their 
communities. However, the success of their actions depends on their collaboration 
with the local institutional representatives and other local Roma leaders.  
Caldarar Ionel Torea from Moroieni, bulibasa Traian from Liveni, bulibasa 
Leonard from Costesti, Romanianized Roma Ioader Candel and Dinica have known 
each other since socialism but their collaboration intensified after 1990, when the 
government developed new structures of governance (Roma mediators/experts). The 





institutional representatives, informal Romanianized Roma leaders, some Caldarar 
leaders, and institutional actors involved in community governance. Ionel Torea is in 
contact with the regional Roma expert Corina Sotu and collaborates with the 
Caldarar leaders from Costesti (Razar and Leonard) to solve community problems. 
 
C: Instead of asking state institutions or the local council, have you ever-
asked bulibasa Razar or bulibasa Leonard for help?  
I: I have never asked them. On the contrary, I stopped the state 
institutions who wanted to raid their Gypsies. Police from Goteni were 
just about to go into their community. Their parents married some minor 
girls, 5-6-years old… I talked to Razar and then to Ms. Corina Sotu. 
Then Corina talked to the Goteni police and we were left to solve the 
problem ourselves, in a Gypsy way. I helped him, and then he helped me. 
C: What makes you powerful?     
I: You know, what are the things don’t make me powerful? The fact that 
I don’t have a villa makes me less powerful, but as for the rest  I can get  
access to any institution immediately. (Ionel Torea, Caldarar, Roma 
expert Moroieni) 
 
Ionel Torea describes a situation of shared leadership in the informal management of 
community issues, which were solved without any institutional involvement. 
Compared to the informal leaders (bulibasi), Ionel Torea, as a Roma expert, was 
better able to negotiate the intervention of state authorities in community issues. 
Ionel’s access to power arises from his connections with and proximity to 
institutional actors. Yet, this form of power to which he gets access as a Roma expert 
is constituted by state forms of governance and often confined to formal roles and 
political interests (patronage politics)83. I call this form of power with high levels of 
subjection to state governance, accessed primarily by Roma experts, connectivity 
power, and the power of exercising state governance. In addition, Roma experts are 
not able to act independently in overlapping spheres of power struggle (informal 
economy, political brokerage, mediation with the state institutions), which are 
usually the preserve of the Caldarar bulibasi from Costesti  (Razar, Leonard, Sterea).  
To sum up, the informal leaders such as Romanianized Roma Ioader Candel, 
bulibasa Razar, bulibasa Leonard, are situated in a shared leadership nexus with the 
 






Roma experts and local/regional state and patronage actors (PSD representatives, 
mayor, vice-mayor, local administrator, and prefect). They are able to act within 
loose power webs in which the state is just an external partner. At the other pole, the 
Roma experts primarily enact the tight webs of power from within the state structures 
of governance. The Roma experts have wide-ranging connections to administrative 
levels in which they are not expected to negotiate the rules, but to fulfill the demands 
of the state administration. 
Why do I speak about loose vs. tight webs of power and not about weak vs. 
strong ties? Granovetter (1973, 2001) considers that the weak ties developed between 
spatially distant actors create a strategic perspective on resource management for 
individuals. Romanianized Roma Dinica Sotu and Caldarar Ionel Torea, as paid 
Roma experts, do get access to high officials (spatially distant actors). However, their 
ability to negotiate the community’s problems is limited and they are obliged to 
operate within the limits of the government’s definition of their formal role and local 
patronage politics entangled in state functionality. In this sense the experts’ position, 
acting from inside the state structures of governance, increases their subjection to 
state power and patronage politics and consequently minimizes the leaders’ ability to 
negotiate over community issues. In this context, the loose/tight webs of power 
emphasise degrees of constraint on the Roma leaders’ initiatives in the dynamic of 
power relations, rather than the positions of or the distances between the actors. 
These power webs are informed further by other spheres of power struggle (politics, 
informal economy, religion, community) within and across which the Roma leaders 




The Roma leadership underwent substantial changes in parallel with the state 
transformation from socialism to post-socialism. For the Romanianized Roma, who 
had been incorporated at the margins of the state and who had a recognized position 
within it, leadership took inchoate forms, mainly fulfilled  by members of Sotu 






On the other hand, before sedentarization of the Caldarars in the 1960s, 
leadership was organized by bulibasi over small mobile groups. From 1960s 
onwards, the institution of bulibasa was centralized and partially captured by the 
socialist state. While the Caldarars still continued to travel, their bulibasi for small 
groups became subordinate to a main bulibasa, who would serve as a collaborator 
with the state surveillance agencies and as a state broker in a shared control-dyadic 
relation of leadership with the socialist state. The relations between bulibasa, the 
socialist state and the Caldarars were inter-related and formed interdependent power 
relations or power struggles84, which institutionalized the new form of leadership and 
damaged the institution of bulibasa, its meanings and practices. However, to a 
certain extent, until the late 1980s, the Caldarars preserved their mobile approach as 
a form of self-–governance and they continued to be organized by their previous 
bulibasi in small mobile groups.   
Under post-socialism, with no support from the institutions of the state and 
with a de-legitimated institution of leadership associated by Caldarars with the 
violence of the socialist state, the main bulibasi lost a significant degree of their 
authority. On the other hand, the informal economy created opportunities for the 
Caldarars to improve their material position and for members of some wealthy 
families to claim the position of bulibasa, which decentralized and multiplied the 
Caldarars’ claims to leadership. The development of Roma NGOs/political parties 
and new structures of state governance (e.g. the Roma expert program) formulated 
and reformulated both the Romanianized Roma and the Caldarars’ forms of 
leadership. Informal Roma leaders, both Caldarars and Romanianized Gypsies with 
low resources agreed to become state employees (Roma experts) and to represent the 
institutions of state governance.  
Going back to the parallel between colonialism/post-colonialism and 
socialism/post-socialism, the customary leadership was always in communication 
with the institutions of state governance. In colonial states, customary leadership was 
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almost wholly absorbed by the British administration and untrained leaders became 
in effect state functionaries. This form of state governance, “decentralized 
despotism” (Mamdani 1996), gave extensive coercive powers to local leaders to 
serve the interests of the colonial states. However, some writers (Keulder 2010) have 
argued against this interpretation and have suggested that customary leaders often 
challenged colonial rules. The situation was analogous to Romanian socialism. 
Although the main bulibasi were empowered by Securitate to serve the interests of 
the state, the customary Gypsy leaders (bulibasi for small groups) were not totally 
drawn into its politics of violence. In their struggle for legitimacy over their fellows, 
the main bulibasi challenged the state’s actions and not all bulibasi agreed to 
collaborate with Securitatea. A large number of them (less influential) remained 
leaders of mobile groups.  
A total subordination of the customary leaders by the colonial or socialist 
state thus never existed. It is more than clear, however, that the legitimacy and the 
democratic workings of these forms of self-governance were seriously affected 
during both colonialism and socialism. Restoration of customary leadership was an 
aim for the post-colonial states (Murray 2004; Ray 2003), but not for the Romanian 
post-socialist state, which had no interest in supporting those customary Roma forms 
of self-governance and leadership that had existed prior to socialism. The Roma 
expert network works as a structure of governance, which serves the development 
and penetration of the administrative apparatus of the state into the lives of Roma 
communities and does not encourage community representation. On the contrary, it 
establishes barriers or even excludes the Roma experts from local decision-making 
processes. 
In their struggle to keep their positions as leaders, rather than trying to 
become able to represent their communities, the informal and formal Roma leaders 
gravitated around the institutions of state governance and local patronage politics. 
However, a formalization of Gypsy leadership has never been made or completed by 
the state, neither during socialism, nor in post-socialism. While during socialism, the 
Caldarars leaders were powerful ‘settled’ main bulibasi and less influential bulibasi 
for mobile groups, under post-socialism they either became Roma experts or 





In terms of my thesis’ general goal, the power relations and struggles 
involved in leadership acted in different ways in transforming the two Roma 
communities. Through their main bulibasi, the Caldarars became subjects of the state 
and lost part of their control over every day socioeconomic activities. I described this 
socialist empowerment of the Caldarar leaders a destructive empowerment, with a 
high level of subjection to state power and negative effects for both the empowered 
bulibasi and the Caldarar community. In post-socialism, as many Caldarars, 
including leaders, suggested, the institution of bulibasa is in a terminal phase. The 
relation between the socialist state and the main bulibasi succeeded in destroying 
their customary form of leadership. Yet, the forms of Caldarar self-governance were 
maintained through their practice of travelling. Mobility and the mobile approach to 
economic practice brought them opportunities for economic improvement on the 
move, especially in post-socialism.  
On the other hand, for the Romanianized Roma, the constitution of leadership 
through the Roma Party’s networks and state structures of governance did not bring 
them the necessary representation, but a consolidation of their position of 
subordination in relation to the institutions of the state and to local or regional 
patronage politics. The negotiations from within patterns of subordination (patronage 
politics, state governance) performed by the Romanianized Roma leaders encouraged 
Romanianized Roma to become dependent on the state and on local patronage, and 
blocked the development of self-governance and of local projects of social change 











Chapter 5. Local level politics: Patronage politics and 
Political patronage  


As I showed in the previous two chapters, Roma relations under post-socialism 
occurred at the intersection of spheres of power struggle (state, politics, and informal 
economy) which emerged in the wider post-socialist society. Therefore, politics 
cannot be treated separately or independently from the transformation of the state 
and informal economic practices. They come together at the level of local politics 
and political processes (e.g. patronage politics), and cannot be confined to local 
politics or central government. In this context, Roma politics has been transformed 
through these local and trans-local temporal dynamics of power relations, which 
occurred simultaneously at different administrative levels. The aim of this chapter is 
to analyse the transformations of Roma politics in the context of the larger political 
transformations, which took place in Romania after 1990 and explore their relevance 
for the empowerment or disempowerment of the two Roma communities. Roma 
involvement in the everyday politics is analysed separately in chapter six.  
 
Political and social organization of Roma leadership in Goteni and 
Costesti  
 
The early 1990’s were characterized by the emergence of political pluralism and 
democratization in the sphere of politics mainly through the practice of free elections 
at both national and local level. At present, the Roma Party is the most important 
Roma NGO and political organisation with its president, Nicolae Paun, occupying a 
deputy's chair in the parliament. For each region, there are Roma Party 
representatives who many times work as Roma experts for county 
councils/prefectures. The distribution of Roma Party representatives runs in parallel 
to the distribution of Roma experts. The latter act within a complex bureaucratic 





inclusion of the Roma (2011), which includes local and regional offices concerned 
with Roma issues.   
 “County offices for the Roma are functional structures organized at county level 
within prefectures. Their composition includes 3-4 experts [who] operate in 
subordination to the prefect” (p. 34). The Roma experts are nominated by the prefect 
and are responsible for organizing joint working groups (JWG) “composed of local 
representatives of ministries, members of Roma NGOs and delegates from 
communities of ethnic Roma citizens, including county/local counsellors. The JWG 
is established by order of the prefect”. Corina Sotu is the regional Roma Party 
representative and the Roma expert nominated by the prefect of Goteni. The Goteni 
JWG includes both informal and formal Roma leaders from Costesti: a. Dinica Sotu, 
Romanianized Roma, Corina Sotu’s brother, Roma expert and Roma Party 
representative; b. Ioader Candel, Roma Party representative, Romanianized Roma 
informal leader; c. Razar, informal Caldarar leader; d. Leonard, informal Caldarar 
leader, bulibasa.  
However, as I have shown in the previous chapters, informal Roma leaders do 
not act from inside of one sphere of power struggles or another (community 
representation, local politics, local state mediation, informal economy) and from this 
point of view their leadership position is controversial. As I have already shown in 
the chapter on the informal economy, the informal Romanianized Roma Ioader 
Candel is a police mediator for his community and is also suspected of being  
involved in the informal transfers of the Caldarars’ firms to Romanianized Roma. 
Informal Caldarar leaders, Razar and Leonard are both involved in informal 
businesses with pipes,  come from the richest local families and ’compete’ for the 
bulibasa position among the Caldarar community in Costesti. They both mediate 
between the Caldarar community and local authorities, especially the police and 
participate in the regional meetings of the JWG organized by Corina Sotu, the Roma 
expert at county level.     
At the local level, the government strategy includes local initiative groups 
LIGs) “made up of representatives of communities of Roma ethnics” and local 
working groups (LWG) composed of “local experts, representatives of local public 





organisations and a delegate of the local Roma community in the LIG.” The LWG is 
established by the local council. Here, besides the Roma leaders I mentioned above, 
during my fieldwork in Costesti I talked to 3 local council members, who were 
frequently active in the LWG: a. Dan Popescu, the president of the local PNL 
organization; b. Grinea, first mayor of Costesti, a PNL local councillor and sports 
teacher at the school attended by Caldarars, and c. Rodan, a PDL councillor. I 
intentionally chose to talk with councillors from local political opposition groups 
(PNL, PDL), who could offer different accounts of Roma leadership  in relation to  
public institutions from that  presented by the main local PSD patronage actors: 
Mayor Sorpaci, the deputy mayor and local administrator Sorin Comsa. While 
Sorpaci is the main supporter of Romanian inhabitants and known for his anti-Gypsy 
views, Sorin Comsa is a Romanian who grew up among Romanianized Roma. He 
was a teacher and a director of the school which the Romanianized Roma attend and 
he has always been a supporter of the Roma interests and helped Roma families 
directly (through social services,   employment and cash). In his official role he is the 
administrator of the village, while informally he serves as the local patron.  
Mayor Sorpaci has ruled  the local council since 2000, the year when, in order 
to get political support from the PSD ruling party, he chose to join the PSD just after 
the local elections and he appointed his PSD running mate Sorin Comsa, as a  deputy 
mayor.  In 2008, Sorin Comsa became a councillor at the Minister of the Interior 
Delu Nistor (PSD), a period during which he channelled governmental money to 
Costesti. In 2009 he returned and he was appointed by the same mayor as local 
administrator of the commune. These days both PSD leaders are interested in 
convincing the Roma to vote for their party in exchange for local council services or 
cash.   
However, at the county level, the administration adopts a different approach 
to the patronage politics. From 2005 (a situation which changed only in 2012), 
representatives of the liberal and conservative parties (PNL and PDL) held the 
position of prefect85. In order to serve as senior state officials, the prefects, as 
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representatives of the government appointed by the Minister of Interior, have to 
abandon their official political positions86. However, despite this official 
renunciation, they continue to maintain informal links with their political party. The 
prefects’ political interests often clash with their administrative role for the state. In 
this context, Corina Sotu, the Roma Party representative and regional Roma expert, 
appointed by the prefect, should  follow either the prefect’s political interests (PNL 
or PDL) or the Roma Party’s, which are opposed to the Costesti patronage politics 
(PSD) described above. This overlap between state administrative roles and 
patronage politics, which occurs at different administrative levels (PSD in Costesti 
and PNL or PDL in Goteni) creates conflicts among Roma experts and state actors 
dealing directly or indirectly with Roma issues. In matters of voting, Corina Sotu 
frequently found herself   in conflict with her brother Dinica Sotu (the Roma expert 
in Costesti) who is part of the local PSD network of patronage formed by Sorin 
Comsa and his followers. For these reasons, the two Roma experts, members of the 
same family, the Sotu, were often unable to collaborate and ensure development for 
the two Roma communities in Costesti. In this chapter, I examine the explanations of 
conflict and collaboration between the Roma leaders (both Roma experts and 
informal Roma leaders) and actors in the patronage politics in Costesti and I answer 
the following questions:   
Does Roma politics constitute an independent field of politics able to channel power 
to the Romanianized Roma and Caldarars?  
Can Roma experts or informal Roma leaders be the advocates of Roma interests and 
practice activism locally?  
 If not, what exactly prevented the development of Roma politics and diminished the 
effectiveness of both Roma experts and informal leaders in  local decision making 
and in determining the  social organisation  of Roma communities at the local level?  
I answer these questions by exploring connections between local and regional 
political organizations as they interacted with the larger transformations taking place 








Local-level politics as an incomplete field of action 
 
In post-socialist Romania support for the ruling party became a necessity for 
obtaining business, making social connections and obtaining  public positions and 
goods (Gadowska 2006). Overall, the intersectionalities between politics, the state 
and the informal economy favoured the development of patronage politics. As 
argued in the first chapter, post-socialist transformations did not necessarily bring 
about a”privatisation of power” in the shape of ’chiefdoms’ able to act independently 
from central government, as Verdery (1996) suggests, but led to a general politics of 
clientelism, in which local patrons become state representatives,  in control of local 
resources and the distribution of welfare, but dependent upon and subordinate to 
central governmental  and political actors.  
When clientelism becomes a rule at higher levels, in an authoritarian political 
system, where bureaucrats use personal contacts to allocate resources and ensure 
their own interests, the socio-political system is called patrimonial (Sandbrook 1985; 
Hilgers 2011). It is assumed that authoritarian regimes such as the socialist states in 
Eastern Europe (e.g. Romanian socialism) were based on repressive modes of 
organization making citizens the main clients of the system. When the political 
pluralism and competitiveness do not abolish the clientelistic character of the system, 
the „bureaucratic institutions function based on personal relationships and where 
officials use clientelism to ensure political order” (Hilgers 2011: 582), the social 
political system is called neo-patrimonial (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, Eisenstadt 
1973; Erdmann, Engel 2006; Hilgers 2011) and is generally characteristic of  post-
socialist Romania.  
Clientelism was a constant both in socialism and post-socialism. In socialism 
the centralized political organization aimed at restricting and controlling individual 
initiative and action. However, as Burawoy and Verdery (1999) argued, party 
bureaucrats and locals, through their everyday practices, domesticated the restrictive 
centralised distribution of resources by Communist Party. In this sense, socialism 
was both a paternalistic and patrimonial system with local clientelistic ways of 






 In post-socialism, the withdrawal of the state from the economy, 
privatization and the de-centralization of economy and politics generated informal 
inter-dependencies between the spheres of power struggles (politics, state, economy), 
which gave way to the development of new forms of clientelism, patronage and a 
neo-patrimonial system as a whole. Clientelism (dyadic relations between  a person 
with a higher rank and a client with lower rank) and patronage politics (distribution 
of administrative positions by actors organized around a political party) became a 
rule, taking place both locally and at the centre, and politicians became the main 
supporters of business actors and were often implicated in cases of corruption. 
Central and local politics were of equal importance in the complicated process of 
post-socialist transformation.  
As Swartz (1968) suggests, local-level politics is not local per se but has to be  
analytically examined, and treated as an incomplete field of action, involving 
negotiations with regional and central politics, in which local actors and their 
practices are engaged with  outside actors at different levels in the  political structure  
(national, regional, cross-regional). Neo-patrimonial politics is not only how 
governance is conducted but also the mechanism whereby power is manifested and 
negotiated through practices and relationships between local, regional and central 
politicians and state actors. In this context, Romanian neo-patrimonial politics is a 
sphere of action and power struggle ”defined by the interest and involvement of the 
participants in the process being studied and its contents include the values, 
meanings, resources, and relationships employed by these participants in that 
process” (Swartz 1968: 9). The local and central levels are not fixed points of 
reference in the individual’s relations and practices, but nodal points in a complex 
web of power relations.  
Moreover, as Swartz (1968) argues, “the spatial and temporal extension of 
political processes” (p. 6) are incorporated in the term of field of politics that “is 
composed of the actors directly involved in the processes being studied” (ibid.) and 
involves both continuity and change. For example, post-socialist patronage politics 
is an illustrative example of field of politics in which patrons and their followers, as 
representatives of parliamentary political parties, operate within different spheres of 





Through his positions in the local and central government, the local administrator of 
Costesti, Sorin Comsa, bridges different political and administrative levels. 
Patronage politics is an expression of the transformations occurring  in the 
neopatrimonial political sphere of power and an effect of a spatial and temporal 
extension of a political process (p. 6), which might incorporate and interact with 
other fields  of politics (e.g. political patronage).  
 
The local dynamics of patronage politics in the development of the 
Romanian neo-patrimonial political system  
 
After 1989, the politicization of social and institutional local life became the norm in 
the everyday local practices. In Romania it is generally known that political 
allegiance is the main criterion in the distribution of institutional positions and that a 
change in the government is usually followed by a change in the managerial structure 
of public institutions. Managers of public institutions are required to be members of 
the ruling party and pursue the governing party’s interests at the local and 
institutional level. In my field research, Grinea, the first mayor of the locality, a 
sports teacher and the local representative of the National Liberal Party in Costesti, 
indicated a strong connection between local institutional practices, the distribution of 
local positions and the growing politicization of the local public administration:   
 
C: Do you think that education is much more politicised now than before 
1989?  
G: Yes it is. It has never been worse than now. Once I was at the regional 
inspectors office and I heard a discussion in the hallway when the general 
inspector was telling to his deputy: “We need to change 65 directors in Goteni 
county”. The deputy replied: ”We need to slow down”. However, the general 
inspector said: ”No, we have the necessary leverage, we will change everything 
and we'll get our people in”.   
G: There has never been a politicisation like it is right now, not only in 
education, but in all areas. I used to talk with an engineer who was head of 
police. He got fired and they installed a man coming from a completely 
different field. While the first was a member of the PNL, the new man was the 
member of PDL [the governing party]. The new employee was looking for 
people to help him do his work. He didn't have a clue what he had to do, but 
the PDL man had to be there to oversee the institution. I had never seen such a 
thing in my life before! (Grinea, first mayor of Costesti, school director and 






Politicisation refers here to the direct intervention of the central ruling party in the 
distribution of managerial positions in local public institutions (schools, financial 
offices, hospitals etc.) and which is called in my thesis patronage politics. In this 
context, managers of public institutions can get easier access to central resources and 
connections. However, problems appear when central government is ruled by a party 
different from the local or regional patronage party (e.g. Costesti - PSD; Goteni - 
PNL/PDL). In cases where the local government (Costesti –PSD patronage) has a 
different political orientation from the central government (PDL), the distribution of 
local public resources to public institutions is blocked by the local council 
administration, which generally follows the direction of local patronage politics 
(PSD)87.  
Similarly to the second, in the first example above, Grinea makes references 
to the last decade  (2004-2008) when central government was run by a PDL majority, 
and when representatives of the local public institutions such as schools were 
replaced by people  who were  not necessarily qualified for those positions but who 
were members of the PDL. For Grinea, a PNL representative, the neo-patrimonial 
system was detrimental to his career as a teacher and school head. In 2008, when the 
PDL won the parliamentary elections and formed the government, the regional PDL 
office asked him either to change his political membership from PNL to PDL, or to 
resign. At that time, Grinea considered that it was more important to keep his PNL 
membership and risk his position (as head of the school). Later on, the regional 
education management replaced him with a PDL teacher who was less well qualified. 
From the accounts given by public institution managers and teachers from 
different local schools including Grinea, all those who were in the PDL kept their 
managerial positions, while others, from other parties, were either fired or demoted. 
Similarly, Dan Popescu, head of the PNL local organization, currently a local 
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councillor in Costesti, expressed his discontent with the post-1989 politics and 
economy.  
 
D: I expected the 1989 revolution to change the values and bring them back to 
their right place, but the opposite happened. Values were reversed: if you had 
money, you had everything. It does not matter if you are smart, educated, or if 
you work hard. You need to have money. It does not matter how you get it. 
And now we have the Gypsy-like model: arrogance and disdain are at the 
governmental level. The Caldarars have become rich, they speculated for 5-6 
years and were attached to a party.  
C: Which party?  
D: First, they were with the PSD [the Social Democrat Party], then with the 
PDL [the Liberal Democrat Party].They did the same and they got rich.   
C: Do you think they would have been able to succeed without being attached 
to a political party?  
D: No. Without public money you cannot succeed... Don’t you see that all 
businesses are legal ... (Dan Popescu, head of the PNL local organization 
Costesti) 
 
It is interesting to observe that Dan Popescu does not make a clear differentiation 
between local and central politics. On the contrary, he considers that all economic 
and political practices (local and central) are part of the same socio-political context. 
The post-1989 reality is not a one-way process from central to local practices, but a 
complex transformation in which politics and informality come together in the 
development of patronage politics and extended clientelistic relationships between 
individuals with unequal positions. In his analysis, the respondent transfers the 
characteristic of the Caldarars’ economy88 – informality - developed during both 
socialism and post-socialism, to the whole post-1989 neo-patrimonial system. In the 
Romanian context, it is a common perception that associates the Gypsies’ informal 
economic activities with the side effects of an uncertain transition, becoming in the 
process a symbol of informality and ‘illegality’.  
The so-called “reversal of values” is rather the experience of confusion and 
uncertainty generated by the irregular post socialist transformations89 (Burawoy, 
Verdery 1999). It also symbolizes a transition from a centralized authoritarian system 
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to the uncontrolled emergence of overlapping spheres of power (state, politics and 
informal economy) in which the political favouritism becomes the main basis for 
ensuring personal relations, institutional practices and success in business. This state 
of affairs was reflected and accommodated within local-level politics where 
patronage (a local team supporting one political party with access to local resources 
and distribution of resources) developed through successive forms of political 
governance and political favouritism. For the case of the Caldarars, clientelistic 
dyadic relations were developed in connection with representatives of both central 
and local ruling parties, thus alternating between the PSD and the PDL. Dan’s non-
specific answer to my question ’which party?’ suggests that clientelism was a 
constant in the Caldarars’ informal entrepreneurial activities irrespective of the 
political orientation of the central or local government. In the next paragraph I offer a 
brief history of the central politics linked to Costesti local-level politics, which shows 
connections between local elections and the succession of central governments. It is 
the story of the emergence of local patronage politics.  
In 1992, in the first democratic elections, the PSD (mostly composed of 
former party cadres) won the majority and formed the government. In 1996, a change 
was expected and the CDR (Romanian Democratic Convention), a democratic and 
conservative coalition won the elections. After 4 years of economic recession, in 
2000, the Social-Democrats won the elections again. From 2004 to 2012 a 
conservative-liberal party, the PDL, became dominant, setting a socio-economic 
agenda which was strongly contested by the opposition, especially over the last 4 
years.  
In 1992, 1996 and 2000 there were strong connections between central 
elections and local ones held in Costesti. The same political parties ruled at both 
central and local level. 2004 was different. While at the central  level the PDL took 
power , in Costesti, the same mayor, a PSD representative, was re-elected, a situation 
which reoccurred in 2008. This political dissociation between central and local 
results in Costesti dated back to 2000 when the representative of a small party, 
Sorpaci (the present mayor), won the local elections against his opponent, Comsa 
(the PSD representative, local patron). In order to get government support for his 





political membership to PSD, the ruling party at that time. The second candidate, 
Comsa, PSD representative, became his deputy mayor. Both mayor (Sorpaci) and 
deputy mayor (Comsa) became the local exponents of PSD politics and since 2000 
developed the PSD patronage politics locally.  
Starting with the 2000 local elections as a time reference, the history of 
patronage politics expanded through the actors’ connections to central level politics. 
In 2004, Sorin Comsa came in contact with Delu Nistor, a PSD vice-president of the 
central executive bureau of the PSD regional organization. In 2009, Delu Nistor, who 
had been named vice- prime minister in 2008, became the country's Minister of the 
Interior, and Sorin Comsa, now his councillor, left his deputy mayor position in 
Costesti to work for the central government. Sorin Comsa used his position in the 
government to channel financial resources to Costesti and develop local 
infrastructure (water, gas facilities, sports facilities for a local school, an open-air 
market etc.). In this context, he paid special attention to the Romanianized Roma 
district where he grew up. He supported developmental projects in the area with both 
information and money (water facilities and road improvement). He was highly 
appreciated by the locals, especially by the Roma, who generally considered him the 
most important political leader involved in the development of locality. The help he 
was able to extend owing to his position in the central government recommended 
him as the ’local patron’ of the village. In exchange, he expected allegiance for his 
party - PSD - from the locals and especially the Romanianized Roma.  
These new bonds between local state representatives (mayor, vice-mayor, and 
followers) and PSD representatives situated at upper level politics created the local 
level patronage politics, which, since 2004, has started to act independently from 
central elections and government. Local patronage politics thus developed can also 
stand as the main explanation for the political continuity of the Costesti dominant 
party - PSD - since 2000. Therefore, I call patronage politics the field of politics with 
its own constitutive and interactive history including relations between local political 
actors (e.g. PSD representatives, mayor and  deputy mayor Sorin Comsa) and 
central level politicians (e.g. Delu Nistor-PSD regional president and Minister of 





regionally but also a variety of local power struggles between Roma voters, political, 
state and institutional representatives (e.g. local council and schools).   
 
Local Patronage politics   
Clientelism is a dyadic direct personal hierarchical relationship between an actor with 
higher status, who is not necessarily an established patron (e.g local council 
bureaucrats, mayors) and one with a lower status.  On the other hand, patronage 
implies that the local patron and his followers make use of their membership to a 
main political party to stabilize local power as patronage politics of a main political 
party and get control over the local distribution of positions and resources. The 
patron maintains and develops relations with local clients and political brokers90, 
clients and upper-level party members for whom he often becomes a broker himself 
(Hilgers 2008; Remmer 2007; Hilgers 2008). In Costesti, the PSD was the patronage 
party and provided support for the local patronage actors (mayor, vice-mayor and 
local administrator) who were, in their turn, the governing party clientele. As 
Gadowska (2006) notes for the case of Poland, the local patron is not only the main 
actor in  local businesses, but also the main player in  local level politics .  
For Costesti, Sorin Comsa is the main actor in local patronage politics, 
connecting higher political levels with the local politics. Strong relations with central 
government underpinned his position as the main political leader, in other words, the 
local patron of the village. After losing his position as councillor to the Minister of 
the Interior, he was assisted by the present mayor, Sorpaci, (PSD representative), in   
obtaining the official position as village administrator. In this context, the patron’s 
informal position became institutionalised at the local level. Many controversial 
stories about his past and present positions and activities have been told by local 
political representatives, Romanians and Roma. Dan Popescu, president of the local 






I refer here as political brokers to all those, especially Roma leaders, who mediate between local 
communities, local governance and higher upper level politics and who also convince Roma to vote 




C: As I understand, Comsa made financial efforts for the village. 
D- No, not at all. He praises himself; he always pursued his own interests. 
However, to speak the truth, he is the one who leads the community politically. 
(Dan Popescu, head of the PNL organization, Costesti).  
                                                    ____________ 
G- Comsa wants the local council at any price. I have never seen a man so 
greedy for  power.  
C: Comsa holds a position with the local council at present?  
G: Yes, he is the administrator, but this is a strange position. All these 
administrative issues dealt with by Comsa used to be dealt with by the mayor 
and his deputy. Except for these trees on the side of the main road, Comsa 
hasn’t done anything. He goes to local council just to lock and unlock his 
office door. (Grinea, former mayor 1992-96, former school director, teacher of 
sports, local PNL councillor)         
 
The statements are critical as they come from two local PNL representatives who 
criticise the PSD’s local governance. Although both recognized Comsa’s leading 
political role, they strongly contested his position as an official administrator or 
manager of the commune. The two PNL representatives claim that his new official 
responsibilities  in  attracting European funding and organizing local infrastructure 
projects  and development are part of the role of the  mayor  and do not justify his 
new position in the local council. In this context, both of them suggest his official 
position as administrator of the village is an expression of his personal desire to 
institutionalise his leading position as informal local patron of the village. Comsa’s 
patron position overlapped with his administrative roles (former deputy mayor, 
present manager) in the local council, and local councillors have accused him of 
’abuse’ of administrative power by interfering  in the local government processes. In 
one of the interviews, Dan Popescu offered an illustration of this.   
 
D: The former deputy mayor at that time, Cornea had a farm and 2 hectares of 
forest, so he was a rich person. In the same period, Cornea had a fight with 
Comsa and decided to resign from the PSD. Cornea was going to vote against 
the PSD and Comsa was not going to get the same number of votes. Comsa 
told Racov [local chief of police] that Cornea has stolen something and then 
Cornea was charged with theft. At that time I told Racov ”Aren't you ashamed? 
Cornea has 2 hectares of forest, the same as me, how can you imagine me 
stealing?”.  The accusation was false but Racov was Comsa’s man at that time. 
I sent the whole story to a local newspaper. 'We, the local councillors were 
offended...' What was going on? Political police? Then they sued us for 
slander, but subsequently we have showed the military court’s decision to 





Comsa dropped the charges. (Dan Popescu, head of the PNL local organization 
Costesti)  
 
In the interview, Dan Popescu suggests that Comsa’s candidature for the position of 
mayor was threatened by Cornea's withdrawal from the PSD. Cornea wanted to run 
for the same local council position (mayorship). As Dan further suggested, Comsa 
(local patron) used his connections with the local chief of police to undermine 
Cornea and eliminate him from the election race. In this context patronage politics 
worked through informal, abusive collaborations between local authorities (police) 
and the main political leader.  
It is important to notice a distinction between a classic clientelistic relation 
and patronage politics. For the latter it is important to understand that political party 
membership plays a significant role in collaboration and control over state 
apparatuses of control. Patronage politics is more than a simple patron-client 
exchange relationship, as in Scott’s conception, in which, the patron exercises 
control or ownership of resources (Scott 1972, 1977). It is the binding power 
between the ruling party and state institutions. Moreover, it is the link between 
central and local politics, developed in parallel with the structural transformations 
occurring in post-1989 Romanian society at large.  
Students of Eastern European studies91 argued that the transition from 
socialism to post-socialism entailed continuous transformations in the state and 
economic spheres of power. Individuals did not experience it as a rupture, and were 
not subject to a dramatic shift from one source of power and another, but rather 
navigated the transition through clientelistic relations, which had existed during 
socialism, under the coercive, authoritarian patrimonial socialist system. Comsa’s 
position as a local patron has been built over time and is based on his connections 
with higher administrative levels, ever since socialism. In an interview, Dan Popescu 
offered an example of Comsa’s influence and his clientelistic connections under 
socialism.  
D: Comsa made an accident. He was not prosecuted, and the police did not 
even take his driving license. 
C: Do people know about that?  
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D: Of course they know.  
C: So why do they still vote for him and why does he have so much power? 
D: He is not the one who has the power. He gets his power through those in  
Goteni and Delu Nistor. They are on the same level. (Dan Popescu, head of the 
PNL local organization Costesti).  
 
In the interview, Dan Popescu suggests that Comsa made use of his connections with 
local authorities, which have existed since socialism. The narrative also contains 
elements of subjectivism, showing the discontent of local political representatives 
with the patron’s politics. It is also a challenge to the legitimacy of Comsa’s 
influence in the village. As Dan Popescu claims, although all locals know about 
Comsa’s power abuses, the majority still vote for him. Nevertheless, the explanation 
for this does not rely on the patron’s authority, his legitimate power or stabilization 
of power in Graziano’s (1976) terms, but from his relations of power with higher-up 
party members, which enable him to get access to governmental funding and 
therefore gain support from local populations and Roma communities.  
As Dan Popescu argued, Comsa does not effectively hold the power but 
sources it through his connections and relations with the senior political actors in the 
field of patronage politics. Therefore, once more it is clear that patronage politics is 
more than a classic clientelistic relation of domination. It is the manifestation of a 
web of power relations, which extend from local to central politics, from within 
which the local patron and patronage team control local resources, voting behaviour 
and  local governance. In this sense, local governance is more than governance. It is 
patronage politics and it affects the way the two Roma communities are represented 
by their leaders and their involvement in local decision making.  
 
Roma allegiances: from restitution politics to patronage politics  
 
For the Roma, patronage politics was less important in the 1990’s and gradually 
became more  prominent in the 2000s when the mayor and the deputy mayor became 
part of the same PSD political patronage grouping.  
However, in the early 1990’s, Gypsies, especially the Caldarars, were greatly 
affected by a different form of politics, which I call here “restitution politics”,  




that time (PDSR) aimed at reinforcing its legitimacy and solidifying its political 
power through the restitution of land to peasants and gold to Gypsies (Caldarars). In 
the 1990’s and early 2000, restitution politics was a source of political power for the 
PSD. Dan Popescu, president of the local PNL, as well as many other political 
representatives and Caldarars present a picture of Roma allegiance to PSD politics 
and its emblematic figure, former president Ion Iliescu.   
 
D: In 2000, the Caldarars supported the PSD and voted for the existing mayor. 
I had been in their houses. Inspectors from the regional financial offices came 
to look for them but they were afraid of going alone to the Caldarars’ district 
and for that reason I joined them. I went inside their houses and I saw posters 
with Iliescu [head of the PDSR, president in 1992-96, and 2000-04] on the 
walls, just like you sometimes see orthodox icons in Romanian peasant houses. 
(Dan Popescu, head of the PNL local organisation Costesti)  
 
In this historical context, Iliescu’s photograph has become the  symbolic iconography 
of the restitution politics. The analogy between religious and political icons made by 
my respondent is a proof of the symbolic process in which restitution politics endows 
the head of the PSD with authority and, in Graziano’s terms, with pure power 
(Graziano 1976). Pure power is produced in an unilateral relation in which the leader 
”increase[s] his own formal power by providing individual services to his 
subordinates, so as to 'obligate' them and make them comply with his orders 
’voluntarily’” (p. 167). The latter is generated through an unidirectional and indirect 
exchange between the president of the country (a symbolic patron) and the Caldarars 
(his clients) in which the patron expects returns (votes) by creating obligations 
among his clients.  
Compared to a classic client-patron relationship, which implies a direct 
exchange of goods or  money for votes, the pure power of national  PSD leader 
symbolic patronage is triggered by one single form of  exchange (gold restitution- 
PSD allegiance), established  by authority exercised from distance, manifested as 
respect and endorsed by its clients (Caldarars) in a long lasting relation.  
Restitution of gold substantially changed the Caldarars’s life trajectories. 
Many were able to become rich and affluent by investing it in their business with 
state enterprises. In this sense, President Iliescu, who opened the door for these 




figure in their everyday lives.  All these were perceived as major benefits brought by 
the act of restitution itself. However, the emergent symbolic attachment between  
gold/ land  restitution and the PSD  developed into what I call restitution politics (the 
politicisation of restitution) as part of a larger discourse on  justice (Mihailescu 1996) 
and reparation of  previous socialist forms of injustice. In a search for legitimacy, 
this type of discourse was promoted by both PDSR members and its leader Iliescu, 
who were accused of harbouring former communist convictions by other 
conservative and liberal political formations and by part of the population.  
Similarly, the PDSR ideology was considered to be a rehashing of the former 
Communist Party. This restitution discourse was integral to the party’s electorate 
attracting strategy for the first democratic elections, which took place in ’92. That 
explains, how in the 90’s, not only the Caldarars were happy to claim they voted  for 
PDSR and Iliescu, who gave their gold back, but also the peasants, who considered 
that Iliescu gave them back92 their land. The restitution was deeply politicised and 
created a relative stable PSD electorate among those Gypsies and peasants who were 
able to repossess their gold/land.    
By managing the local restitution of gold, the bulibasi were still important as 
Gypsy leaders and directly connected to the central politics and people holding 
important positions in the government. The old bulibasa Iancu of the Caldarar 
community from Costesti, a Securitate agent under socialism, acted as mediator for 
the gold restitution process. He was the main link between the Caldarar community,  
central government and the National Bank, where the gold had been stored. He 
would collect the receipts, the proof of the amount of gold confiscated, that the 
Caldarar families had received from the socialist authorities, and bring them to the 
National Bank. His Romanian driver related how, in the early 1990s he went with 
bulibasa Iancu to Bucharest, to the Cotroceni presidential palace. He was amazed at 
how bulibasa Iancu succeeded in getting permission to park his car in front of the 
presidential house and meet President Iliescu and his staff. In the early 90’s Iancu 
was still considered an influential Roma leader.   
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Nevertheless, bulibasa Iancu did not succeed in fully recovering the gold 
from the National Bank. There were also many allegations that an unequal and unfair 
distribution had taken place. Many Caldarar families claimed that they needed to pay 
bulibasa a percentage of the gold received (Fieldnotes, 9 Nov 2009). In the late 
1990’s,  bulibasa Iancu was not alone in being able to connect to the upper levels of 
governance,  other Caldarars, who claimed to be leaders, started to exert  influence 
on the Caldarars’ voting behaviour. I offer here two examples of the way local Roma 
leaders, both formal and informal, Caldarars and Romanianized Roma, from Costesti 
and Moroieni, created power relations through patronage politics. Ionel Torea is a 
Caldarar Gypsy, Roma expert in Moroieni (a village nearby Costesti) and leader of a 
poorer Caldarar community. As I discussed in the chapter on Roma leadership, as a 
Roma expert he became a leading supporter of the local patronage party (PNL), the 
mayor’s party. 
 
C: What happened in the 90’s when you came into contact with the local 
council?  
I: It was not a connection, but all of the candidates were looking to get more 
voters. And a part of us, the Roma, voted. Some went with the PSD, others 
with the PNL, the PDL. In the late 90s we went with the PNL. 
C: Why did you choose the PNL?  
I: For the first elections in the 1990’s we voted for the PSD because of 
President Iliescu who gave the gold back to us, along with all the rights taken 
away under socialism. The President came here, to our locality. My father 
[former bulibasa] had the chance to kiss President Iliescu.  President Iliescu 
came here in 1992 for the elections: ‘vote for me’...  
Before 1992, our mayor was from the PSD. Then we went with the PNL [the 
new mayor’s party]. The mayor is a respectful and polite person. He didn't 
differentiate between Roma and Romanian children. It did not matter if it was 
my child or somebody else’s. He was always considerate to everyone and my 
father [former bulibasa] talked to the Roma telling them that it was good to 
vote for him. (Ionel Torea, Caldarar, Roma expert, former bulibasa, Moroieni). 
 
This narrative shows a transition from restitution politics to patronage politics in 
Roma everyday politics. Ionel, a Caldarar Gypsy, a bulibasa’s son, confirms this 
transition. His answers differ in relation to the time reference. When talking about 
politics and voting in the early 1990s, the Caldarar leaders and all the other Caldarars 
either from Costesti or Moroieni tend to make references to the PSD and the 




leaders in Costesti and Moroieni became political brokers for their mayors’ political 
parties (Costesti – the PSD, Moroieni – the PNL) in both presidential and local 
elections. In Moroieni while the first mayor was a PSD member, the one elected in 
early 2000 was a PNL representative. In the interview Ionel suggests that, together 
with his father he convinced many Caldarars to follow the mayor’s political party 
and vote for the PNL in the last elections.    
In 2000 patronage politics became important for Romanianized Roma leaders in 
Costesti too. Ioader Candel, the informal Romanianized Roma leader, who fulfils 
what are sometimes contradictory roles (police mediator, mediator for the 
transactions of local commercial firms) gives here a detailed account of his 
progressive allegiance to the PSD.  
 
C: Were you interested in the PSD?  
I: Yes, we were interested. Because we support the PSD, I mean my brother-in-
law works for Vega [a regional gas company]. And if he works at Vega we 
support the PSD.  
C: Why? Vega is a PSD company?  
I: Yes. It is Delu Nistor ’s company and we go with Delu Nistor [former 
Minister of the Interior]. Since the 1990’s I have been friends with Delu Nistor.  
C: How did you meet?  
I: In official meetings! In the first meeting we had he asked me who was the 
Roma leader? Ioader Candel! [the respondent]. He came here telling us to vote 
for him.  
C: When was that?  
I: In 2004, when he was campaigning for the PSD, and he invited me to the 
meeting. Comsa and Sorpaci were in the same political party and I asked them 
to be candidates of different parties. One of them could work with the 
government, directly with Delu Nistor. I took Comsa to the local school in 
Coroieni [local name of the district where the Caldarars live]. Delu Nistor 
came with 12-15 people there, important people, and he asked me: What 
should we do with Comsa? And I said, Comsa should lead the PSD local 
organization and after that he [Sorin Comsa] became the head of the local PSD  
(Ioader Candel, informal Romanianized Roma leader).  
 
This interview excerpt illustrates how informal leaders circulate and connect central 
and local levels of power by the negotiation of local political positions.  Assuming 




PSD positions at the local level, Delu Nistor93, a representative of the central level 
PSD politics, asked an informal Romanianized Roma leader for advice. In this 
context, Ioader Candel, the Romanianized Roma informal leader, operated as a 
broker not only between the Roma community and local authorities, but also in 
relation with representatives of central politics. By taking responsibility for Roma 
voting behaviour, his advice became important in the local distribution of PSD party 
positions.  
Moreover, Ioader Candel’s voting options are not pre-determined by local 
patronage politics. In the interview he mentions Vega, the regional gas company 
associated with Delu Nistor’s interests, as an important reference for his voting 
options. He also mentions that he personally knew Delu Nistor (the PSD regional 
president and former Minister of Interior) from meetings organized by the Roma 
Party, most probably from 1999 onwards when the Roma Party established a political 
coalition with the PSD. The statement also shows his main interest lies in connecting 
with higher level PSD political representatives and strengthening his position as 
broker by being able to mediate between different political levels. In this sense, 
Ioader Candel can be seen as a power broker able to circulate between levels and 
spheres of power (informal economy, police mediation), able to come into contact 
with political representatives with different levels of influence and even to advise 
about changes  in their local position.  
As I already suggested in the chapter on Roma leadership, Roma experts act from 
within tights webs of power in the state bureaucracy and are patronage brokers. 
Informal Romanianized Roma leaders such as Ioader Candel and Caldarar bulibasi in 
Costesti, who convince the Roma to vote for different political parties, are power 
brokers who act across loose webs of power. The latter connect different political 
levels, exploit boundaries between spheres of power struggle (informal businesses, 
local authorities, politics), and even give advice that local political leaders follow. 
 
93Since 1996,Delu Nistor has held important positions in the parliament and the Social Democrat 
Party: deputy in the Chamber (since 1996), -deputy-president of PSD, Goteni county , member of 





Roma power brokers’ actions show how local and central-level politics are entangled 
and act together within the field of patronage politics.  
 
Roma politics:  Political patronage and patronage politics  
 
In the early 90s, the Roma were recognized as a minority and according to 
governmental Act 8/1990 they were allowed to set up political parties and NGOs. On 
the other hand, in agreement with governmental Act 21/1994 minorities have the 
opportunity to launch candidates in the local and presidential elections94. Since 1990, 
the Roma have had a Roma deputy in parliament, a representative of their main 
political formation, the Roma Party. In 1994, other 23 Roma organizations joined the 
Roma Party, which became the main Roma political organization. 
Nevertheless, 1999 was the year when the Roma Party agreed to have an 
official, open-ended political partnership with PSD, for both presidential and 
parliamentary elections, and nationwide local council elections95. According to this, 
Roma Party representatives are required to extend political support to PSD 
candidates. In exchange, the Roma Party expects to receive support in the promotion 
and representation of the Roma needs/projects related to education, social welfare 
and cultural rights. This political partnership engendered political patronage at 
different levels of organization in which leaders who are also Roma Party 
representatives96 are expected to convince the Roma to vote for the PSD in  both 
local and national elections.  
The transition from restitution politics to patronage politics and political 
patronage (the PSD-Roma Party coalition) discouraged the emergence, 
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istoric.html . 
96 Corina Sotu ( regional Roma expert), Dinica Sotu (Romanianized Roma expert), Ioader   Candel 





development, and representation of ethnic politics among Roma groups. The political 
patronage of Roma politics, which institutionalised at the central level, strengthened   
PSD local patronage power in Costesti. However, in other villages, like Moroieni, or 
at the regional level (Goteni prefecture), the general political patronage orientation 
(PSD) did not correspond to the political orientation given by the local patronage 
politics, the mayor’s or prefect’s political party (PDL/PNL). These contradictions 
between the mayor’s or prefect’s political orientation and the PSD-Roma Party 
coalition generated conflicts between Roma leaders, especially Roma experts, who 
follow either one political option or the other or alternate between parties.  
Most of the Sotu family members are either informal or formal leaders in 
Costesti and are Roma Party representatives in the regional area. Corina Sotu, as a 
regional Roma expert and prefecture employee, is expected to be a state 
representative for the Roma communities (including those from Costesti) and at the 
same time a political broker for the PNL regional patronage politics (the prefect’s 
party). In addition, as a Roma Party representative she needs to support both the 
Roma Party and the national Roma Party-PSD political alliance (political patronage).  
From her positions, the PNL regional patronage politics offered by the 
prefect’s political orientation and national PSD political patronage of Roma Party 
are contradictory fields of politics through which Corina Sotu needs to negotiate and 
mediate. On the other hand, in Costesti, all her family members including Dinica 
Sotu, local Roma expert, support the local PSD patronage. These divisions between 
Costesti and Goteni political orientation often generated conflicts between Corina 
Sotu and her brother Dinica Sotu. Due to the different political interests they needed 
to follow, they could not collaborate in matters concerning Roma community issues 
but were rather involved in political struggles. Each of them was interested in 
persuading the Roma to vote for one political party or another. Thus, the interference 
of PSD political patronage of Roma party and the variation in patronage politics at 
different administrative levels altered the role of Roma experts, who were not 
primarily interested in representing or handling Roma community problems, but 
rather in representing different political interests.      
The most delicate situation is that of Roma experts (patronage brokers), 





strategies of social integration and local patronage. However, the informal Roma 
leaders (power brokers) of both Romanianized Gypsies and Caldarars have more 
space for negotiation inside the two fields of politics: political patronage and 
patronage politics. Ioader Candel, the informal Romanianized Roma leader in 
Costesti narrated a brief history of his political brokerage and the transformations in 
Roma local voting behaviour.  
 
C: How were the Roma Party representatives established in Costesti?  
I: We announced that one week in advance. Who came then? The state 
secretary of the Roma who is also a Roma representative for the Roma Party in 
Goteni. Corina Sotu, who works for the prefecture, invited him. Corina Sotu 
told me: ’he is going to nominate you’. Now it is not as it was before - public 
elections. We had  5-600 people [attending the meeting]. 
C: Who were the other candidates?  
I: Only people from the Sotu family: Costin, my nephew, was 18 years old, 
and, overall, there were six of us. Those from Bucharest said [to all 
Romanianized Roma on the stadium] ’ raise your hands’ and they all raised the 
hands for me. 
C: And in 1992 you had the first elections for the local council. Whom did you 
vote for and how did you tell Gypsies to vote?  
I: Votes were distributed randomly. People [candidates] came with packs [of 
food] and asked the Gypsies to vote for them, and Gypsies divided between 
different parties.  
C: And how did you tell Gypsies to vote?  
I: It was not our elections to tell them not to vote for somebody.  
C: That means you had no interest in any candidate.  
I: No, none.  
C: When did you start to get interested in voting for one candidate or another?  
I: Since Sorpaci came, in 2000. I started, because we knew each other from the 
cooperative state farm. (Ioader Candel, informal Roma leader Costesti) 
 
This interview fragment shows how in the early 90s Roma politics started to take 
shape locally through community elections under the coordination of the Roma 
Party, which aimed to build an infrastructure of local political activism in all the 
regions of Romania. As Ioader Candel claims, these were community elections 
among the Roma, which were later formalized in local or regional elections for the 
position of Roma Party councillor, a position difficult to obtain in competition with 
main political parties (PSD, PNL, PDL).  
In the early 90s, the first community elections for the positions of Roma Party 






Roma Party candidates were all from the same family of fiddlers - Sotu, who were 
active in the socialist second economy and succeeded, after 1990, in becoming local 
or regional leaders and later on active political brokers in local and regional 
patronage politics. On the other hand, the Caldarars, who always acted as a separate 
group, did not participate in these elections and were still organized around the main 
bulibasa Iancu. More than that, while in early 90s, Caldarars were connected to 
restitution politics (especially those who received back their gold), showing 
allegiance to the PSD and former president Ion Iliescu. On the other hand, in the 
same period, Romanianized Roma were susceptible to vote buying and split their 
votes between different political parties.  
Interestingly Ioader Candel’s statement,  ’It was not our elections, to tell them 
not to vote for somebody,’ suggests that in early 90s he was not interested in 
convincing  Romanianized Roma to vote for  one  political party or another and he 
did not act as a political broker for political parties. He suggests that in the 90s the 
local mayoral elections were of little interest to Romanianized Roma. 
In the 2000s, he became interested in supporting the main candidate, Sorpaci, 
because, as he says, he knew him and in his terms that represented the main reason 
for his political and electoral assistance. However, it is not clear if his support for 
candidate Sorpaci came before the local elections, when Sorpaci was part of a 
different party, or after elections, when Sorpaci and Comsa formed a local PSD 
patronage team.  
My explanation for Ioader Candel’s late interest in political brokerage is that 
2000 was the year when the local PSD patronage team (mayor Sorpaci and deputy 
mayor Comsa) was constituted and Roma leaders were asked by local patronage 
actors to influence the Roma’s voting options in exchange for favours.  
That can be applied both to Romanianized Roma and Caldarar leaders (formal 
and informal) who found in the new PSD local patronage a source of power, which 
enabled them to strengthen their leadership positions. Forms of Roma leadership 
(Roma experts, Romanianized Roma informal leaders and bulibasi), weak in terms of 





patronage battling with the opposition97. From 2000 local patronage politics became 
a common political practice organized locally by Sorin Comsa (local patron) and his 
followers’ co-PSD team members such as mayor Sorpaci and Roma expert Dinica 
Sotu but also by Ioader Candel (informal Romanianized Roma leader) and other 
local PSD councillors and supporters. Ioader Candel told me more about the 
complicated voting options informed both by Roma Party and PSD local patronage. 
 
C: Did Corina Sotu support the PSD or the Roma Party?  
I: She was with the PSD then. When we did not have problems with our votes, 
we were with the PSD, for the parliamentary elections. When we needed votes 
for the Roma Party, we told them “brothers, we cannot vote for two people  
because Gypsies would vote for different people and thus cancel out each 
other's  votes. Those from the PSD said‚ 'It’s okay, Mr. Ioader.' (Ioader Candel, 
informal Roma leader, Costesti) 
 
Ioader Candel suggests that voting options for the Roma Party needed to be 
negotiated with local PSD patronage actors and central Roma Party representatives, 
who in 1999 entered a political coalition with the PSD, thus allowing  Roma leaders 
to support their Roma Party during different elections. However, in other situations, 
the Romanianized Roma leaders Corina Sotu (regional Roma expert), Dinica Sotu 
(Costesti expert) and Ioader Candel (informal leader) were expected to support 
regional/local patronage politics (regional PNL/PDL, or Costesti PSD), the Roma 
Party, or the coalition PSD-Roma Party (support for the PSD).  
This complicated picture created by overlappings between patronage politics 
(the mayor’s or prefect’s party) and political patronage (PSD-Roma Party alliance) 
is able to generate conflicts between Roma experts,  who act as patronage brokers at 
different administrative levels where mayors or prefects may have different political 
membership and voting options. That provides the main explanation for the different 
voting patterns proposed by local and regional Roma experts. 
In the 2008 parliamentary elections, while Corina Sotu advised Gypsies to 
vote for the Roma Party, Dinica Sotu, her brother, supported the PSD, (Costesti local 
patronage). In addition, in the last Euro parliamentary elections, Corina Sotu 
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supported the prefect’s party (PNL) and aimed to convince Roma from Costesti to 
vote for the PNL. She did not agree with her brother Dinica Sotu, who generally 
supported and acted as a political broker for the PSD local patronage. The Roma 
experts’ different political and voting options blurred the relevance of their kinship 
ties and for a long time they could not collaborate over Roma community issues. 
Dinica Sotu, Roma expert in Costesti, explained why he votes for the PSD rather 
than offering his support to the Roma Party. 
 
C: Who do you actually support?  
D: I go with the PSD.  
C: Why not the Roma Party?  
D: I also go with the Roma Party, but did the Roma Party come here to help 
me? I’m asking you. Did the Roma Party help me? Or was it the PSD?   
D: So why did they (the mayor, deputy mayor, and administrator/patron - PSD 
patronage team) help Gypsies? Because I was here and I told him: ’Mr. Sorin, 
they are poor’. Sorin Comsa has known the Gypsies since he was a teacher. 
They were his pupils at school. Go into Tiganie (the Gypsy district) and you'll 
see that no one speaks badly about him, about Sorin. Only a mad person would 
say something bad about him. All of them support him. Do they have water, 
electricity, gas? (a rhetorical  question).  
C: Who then supported Corina Sotu?  
D: Corina goes with Paun (the president of the Roma Party). (Dinica Sotu, 
Roma expert at the local council Costesti).  
 
Mayor Sorpaci and the administrator/patron Sorin Comsa are PSD local political 
leaders who support Romanianized Roma in their everyday difficulties 
(documentation, exemption from taxes, and social services) in exchange for their 
votes. As Dinica Sotu suggests, the Roma Party cannot offer the same benefits and 
social and economic support that local PSD patronage offers them. On the other 
hand, Dinica Sotu’s actions for the Romanianized Roma community are strongly 
supported by Sorin Comsa, who generally channels funding into local community 
development projects. 
In this way, Dinica Sotu as a Romanianized Roma leader became dependent 
on local patronage politics and a local patronage broker who needs to convince 
Gypsies to vote for the PSD. In this context he is almost unable to support the Roma 





expert) is the person who actively supports the Roma Party but, as I have shown, her 
actions are caught in the same contradictory problematic structure of patronage.  
On the other hand, as I showed in the previous chapter on Roma leadership, 
Dinica Sotu was a Roma Party councillor but, for financial reasons, he had to leave 
his position and become a Roma expert. As a Roma Party councillor he was more 
able to act against local council decisions, which were disadvantageous for the 
Romanianized Roma. These days the only way for him to support Romanianized 
Roma community interests is to ask local patronage actors for help. In this way he 
subordinates his leadership actions to PSD local patronage and he is less able to 
express his critical views on local governance for the Roma. 
 
C: How important is politics in the life of the Roma?  
D: They are not interested in politics. They vote because I tell them who to 
vote for. I go there and tell them: ’Look, Comsa is running for election in 2012. 
You know this man and you know what he does for you. If you could not get a 
paper because you did not pay the council tax he went and put a word in for 
you. You didn't have food, one day. You didn't have money. You went and 
asked for money, and he gave you money and that didn't happen only during 
elections’. This happened frequently. If someone else is elected, it means 
nothing to me. Nothing can happen to me. I could be fired. So what? If 
someone else comes into  the council I can choose not to cooperate with him as 
I do with Sorin Comsa and we minorities always have support in the 
government, as they need the Roma as institutional representatives. They can 
nominate someone else. If he does not appoint me as a Roma expert, the Roma 
Party will. (Dinica Sotu, Roma expert at the local council Costesti, 
Romanianized Roma)  
 
Dinica Sotu, who is a Romanianized Roma and a Roma expert mainly refers to his 
relations with the Romanianized Roma community and almost not at all to the 
Caldarar community, which officially should be represented by the same Roma 
expert, but is informally and institutionally mediated by the Caldarar bulibasi. In the 
interview fragment he suggests that in terms of politics, Romanianized Roma do not 
have ideological options and they mainly follow his advice in terms of voting. From 
the discussions I had with Romanianized Roma, it is clear that the voting goes 
through the local patronage politics and is not always influenced by Roma expert 





through a long term relationship and direct exchanges (cash, services for  votes), 
convinces the Roma to vote for his party (PSD).            
Moreover, Roma experts acting as patronage brokers experience the 
constraints of power relations imposed through both local patronage and the Roma 
expert state program. Dinica’s last statement shows the way he plays the game of 
independence from within these constraining power relations: local PSD patronage, 
Roma Party, central state. By looking at the contradictions inherent in his multiple 
subordination relations within and across overlapping spheres of power (local level 
politics and state governance) he envisages a possible escape route. Either the Roma 
Party or central government can nominate him as a Roma expert but collaboration 
with local patronage actors is the most important factor for his role and leadership 
activities. Through these collaborations he is able to support the Romanianized Roma 
in matters of social benefits, or applications for identity papers. Nevertheless, as one 
of Comsa’s followers and a supporter of his political options and interests, he cannot 
afford to be critical of local patronage actions and local council decisions.  
The existent local patronage politics was developed and maintained through 
local distribution of public resources and welfare. In the 90s, the Romanianized 
Roma who were seasonal workers during socialism were affected by chronic 
unemployment and became the main recipients of social welfare distributed by the 
local council. On the other hand, though not always eligible, the Caldarars were also 
interested in the welfare opportunities offered by the post-socialist state.  
Grinea, first mayor of Costesti, currently a PNL local councillor, remembers that in 
the early 1990s there were no social benefits and the Roma were rarely in contact 
with the local council employees, including the mayor and deputy mayor, who are 
now part of the same patronage team. 
 
C: Do you remember what else you have done for the Caldarars in your time as 
a mayor? 
G: They did not use to come to the local council, except for their house sale 
papers, when needed. It was mostly the poor who came for heating and other 
benefits.  
C: Do you consider they go to the council more often now?  
G: Yes, there are more Roma going to the local council now. They heard that 





say: that’s not my business’. (Grinea, former mayor and school director, local 
PNL representative) 
 
In the early 1990s, when the state had very few social welfare programs for those 
classified as ’disadvantaged groups’, including the Roma, local patronage politics 
and clientelistic relations were nearly non-existent and there were almost no informal 
exchanges between the mayor/administrator and the Roma. As there were fewer 
things to be exchanged (e.g. votes for social benefits/services), the Roma and local 
governance actors were less interested in each other. Things changed from 1995 
onwards when the state initiated the provision of social benefits for families with low 
incomes (Zamfir 1999). The program was designed to be implemented and organized 
by the local councils, who were responsible for distributing government funding 
(Lazar 2000). Since then, relations between the Roma and Costesti local council 
employees intensified, and welfare distribution started to work through clientelistic 
relations and later through the established local patronage politics.  
Lipsky (1984) suggests that extensions or rather cuts in the welfare provision for 
minority or poor groups change their relation with the state, increase or diminish 
their political participation as citizen in the local decision making. In the context of 
my research, the effect and reaction to the institutionalization of state welfare 
provision were different for the two Roma groups. The Caldarars with high levels of 
autonomy became very active in the interactions with the local state institutions, 
eager to claim their citizen rights, from an external independent position. On the 
other hand, the Romanianized Roma’s dependence on the state support became 
institutionalized and inscribed in their everyday discursive practice as a patriarchal 
relation with the state. Furthermore, from 2000 onwards, the relation with the state 
started to be mediated through local PSD patronage politics and the ways it was 
managed and negotiated revealed the Caldarars’ high levels of externality in relation 
to state and local patronage and the Romanianized Roma’s high levels of 
subjectivation to state and patronage politics. These aspects are discussed in the next 
chapter on Roma-state encounters, where I show how Roma, usually get access to 
the state’s welfare through the back door of local patronage, where either the 
administrator of the village, the patron, or the mayor, are ready to help them when 





In this sense, Rodan, a PDL councillor, explained his discontent with local PSD 
patronage, which makes use of local welfare distribution to create a political 
monopoly on Roma political voting options.   
 
C: Are the Roma politically important?  
R: They are not only important, but extremely important for a certain political 
group.  
C: Why are they not so important for the opposition?  
R: Because they are manipulated through the social benefits they receive from 
the government. Everything is done through the local council where the same 
team has been in power for 12 years now. There are people who have been 
working there since 1990 and they have control over the Gypsies.  
C: Do you have any Roma who support your party?   
R: We try, but everything is monopolized. It does not work with those from the 
valley – [the Romanianized Roma]. I talked to them personally and they 
promised they would vote for my party; then, on the next day, the whole PSD 
commando [ironically-representatives and supporters] were there, putting 
pressure on the Roma. They use pressure and blackmail. (Rodan, PDL, local 
councillor) 
   
Rodan’s statements suggest that the local distribution of state welfare, which is made 
through the local council, has become a key instrument of political monopoly  for 
those who lead the local governance (mayor, deputy  mayor and administrator) and 
their followers. The local patron/administrator of the village Sorin Comsa is 
surrounded by council employees, who need to please his Roma clients, and the 
Roma brokers (Roma experts and informal Roma leaders). Usually, Romanianized 
Roma brokers negotiate in the best interest of both concerned parties: votes for  local 
patronage by the PSD  and Romanianized Roma’s  applications for state welfare. In 
some cases, as Rodan suggested and Romanianized Roma confirmed, Roma voters 
are threatened by local patronage main actors with losing their local social benefits. 
Moreover, the Roma patronage brokers (Roma experts) and their followers, who also 
engage in political campaigns, maintain the local patronage politics and do not leave 
space for representatives of other political parties or the Roma Party itself to get 










The main pattern of change that affected the post-1989 Roma politics is the change 
from restitution politics to patronage politics and political patronage. Restitution 
politics started in the early 90s and mainly influenced Caldarars’ voting options. For 
a long period Caldarars were interested in voting for Iliescu’s party (PSD) and had 
almost no interest in giving their support to the Roma Party. Local PSD patronage 
politics was institutionalized in 2000, when mayor and vice-mayor joined the same 
PSD team and started to assist Romanianized Roma in everyday problems and 
interactions with the local council in exchange for votes.  
However, the patronage politics, the expression of this intersectionality 
between state and politics varied according to the dominant political party of the 
region/locality (PSD, PDL, and PNL)98. It served primarily to transform Roma 
leaders like Dinica Sotu and Corina Sotu into patronage brokers, who started to 
follow the prefect’s or mayor’s political interests and to convince Roma to vote for 
their parties. Roma leaders became less able to participate actively in local decision 
making, to represent Roma communities and to react to acts of injustice (e.g. 
distribution of social benefits), done by the local government to the Romanianized 
Roma.  
Therefore, restitution politics, which was much more effective for Caldarars’ 
voting options and later on, local patronage politics, prevented both Caldarars and 
Romanianized Roma from voting for Roma parties and precluded the local 
development of Roma politics.      
Moreover, from 1999 onwards the political alliance between the PSD and the 
Roma Party established a central political patronage within Roma politics, which 
extended to local levels and affected Roma Party representativeness and leadership. 
Roma Party representatives, who are local Roma leaders were expected to support 
the PSD in elections and extend their support to the Roma Party only in negotiation 
with PSD representatives and patronage actors.  
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98 ’Cine conduce Romania! Harta baronilor locali din Romania. Baronii vechi si noi’ [Who rules 






While in the early 1990s, the field of Roma politics was overshadowed by the 
field of restitution politics, in the late 1990s was almost totally absorbed and 
captured by two other fields of politics (political processes): patronage politics and 
political patronage. At the local level, these two fields of politics, which overlapped 
or contradicted each other, complicated the positions and actions of the formal and 
informal Roma leaders, who needed to accommodate both. It generally obstructed 
the active participation of Roma experts in the local decision making process but also 
obstructed Roma communities’ political support for the Roma Party, main Roma 
political formation.  
Tracing the practices of mediation between public institutions and the Roma 
communities, I described the Roma experts as state/patronage brokers and the 
informal Roma leaders as power brokers. Being directly connected to central level 
political actors, such as Delu Nistor, informal Roma leaders, such as Romanianized 
Roma Ioader Candel, are able to give preferential support to the local patron or 
political actors from the opposition, but do not necessarily represent and support 
Roma communities. Nevertheless, neither the Roma experts-patronage brokers, nor 
the informal Roma leaders-power brokers can be characterized as genuine Roma 
representatives or activists, who focus primarily on Roma interests and actively 
participate in their communities’ development.  
The transition and overlapping between fields of politics (restitution politics, 
patronage and political patronage) undermined the development of an independent 
field of Roma politics, which could have become a bridge between different Roma 
groups (e.g. Caldarars and Romanianized Roma) and a strong source of Roma 
representation and participation in both central and local decision making.  
In terms of the aim of my thesis, which is to explore sources of empowerment 
vs disempowerment for the two Roma groups, the transformations occurring in 
Roma politics through power relations established at the centre (PSD political 
patronage of the Roma Party), and also locally through patronage politics, 
obstructed the development of forms of self- governance among Romanianized 
Roma, which had been encouraged by the Roma Party in early 90s.  
Moreover, the under-development of Roma politics served to maintain the barriers 




encouraged to form links and continued to exclude each other. On the other hand, 
Caldarars were precluded from reformulating their form of bulibasa leadership, 
which transformed in time into political brokerage. However, political power 
brokerage performed by bulibasi, aimed at convincing Caldarars to vote for different 
parties, did not limit their form of economic self-governance, shaped by a mobile 






















Chapter 6. Membership without Belonging. Roma 
Encounters with the State: Documenting Identity and 
Levels of Subjection to State Control  

The present chapter is a continuation of the one on Roma leadership, which 
developed the historical dimension of Roma leaders' interaction with both the 
socialist and post-socialist state. It questions Roma subjection to state power and 
identifies changes brought by post-socialism in the relations Roma have with the 
state. In the chapter, I explore variations and differences in the relations Roma 
groups established with the local state, which bring differential access to 
opportunities and constraints in their socio-economic organization and forms of self-
governance.   
The state is an everyday presence in the lives of individuals and communities, 
which acts more or less repressively. It can constrain individuals and groups’ 
practices and actions as much as it can offer spaces for interactions and negotiations 
of identity. For the Romanian Gypsies, the state has always been an important actor, 
defined and approached differently in various periods. While the socialist state was 
constructed as a centralized and a repressive structure with harsh mechanisms of 
control and surveillance, the post-socialist political and economic transformations 
generated gaps of authority and legality. As described in the chapter on ’Historical 
transformations’, the withdrawal of the state generated a high level of insecurity and 
inequalities due to monopolies of power99, but also informal opportunities to be 
exploited further. As I analysed in the previous chapters on ’Roma leadership’ and  
’Local level politics’, representatives of the local patronage politics (mayor, deputy-
mayor and the administrator of the village) have control over the local distribution of 
welfare and process of obtaining identity documents.  Roma relations with the local 
state are often mediated through patronage politics. In this chapter, I aim at exploring 
 
99 Bridger, Pine 1998, Grødeland 2006; Humphrey 2002 a,b; Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley 1998; 





in detail this type of mediation between local state authorities and members of both 
Roma communities. The questions I seek to answer are the following:  
Are the two Roma communities subjected to state power or local patronage politics?  
How are Caldarar and Romanianized Roma communities affected by clientelism in 
their relations with bureaucrats? 
What are the consequences of the clientelistic mediation between Roma and the local 
state representatives on forms of self-governance and community organization?  
 
In the next section, I will present the main forms of interaction with the local state 
and with the main state actors and patronage followers in Costesti. 
 
Local state actors, local government and Roma   
 
During my fieldwork, I made regular visits to the local council administrative and 
social work offices, where I actively observed the interactions between the Roma and 
state workers. I participated in these interactions and on occasion tried to mediate 
conflicts between Roma local council workers and to support Roma with advice 
about documentation issues. Both the Romanianized Roma and Caldarars come often 
at the local council to claim the certificates and documents required for social benefit 
applications. The volume of claims is overwhelming for the local state workers. Even 





Figure 22 Entrance of  Costesti  local council,  Romanianized Roma, guardian of the local 
council during the weekends, Photo taken by the author 2010.  
 
The local council is a medium-size building with 8 or 9 office rooms of which three 
are occupied by the mayor, deputy-mayor and the administrator of the village. I 
frequently observed many Roma standing in the hall ways of the council’s building, 
especially Caldarar families with their children, waiting to get in and ask for 
information and documents. The atmosphere was always tense and full of anxiety 
and there were frequent quarrels between Roma and local state employees. I had 
informal conversations with social workers and was present in their offices during 
opening hours when most of the Roma would come and ask for documents or apply 
for social benefits. I used to visit two offices: the council’s agricultural registry office 
and the social assistance office where I witnessed informal conversations between 
local social workers and members of Roma community.  
I was mainly in the council agricultural registry office of inspector engineer 
Moraru, who, together with his office mate, was responsible for the identification, 




He was the principal person involved in quarrels with Roma, especially with 
Caldarars. Although he was a supporter of the PSD's political ideology and their 
local representatives (local administrator Comsa, mayor Sorpaci and PSD 
councillors), he disagreed with the local practice of patronage and with Comsa’s 
strategy of supporting Roma in exchange of votes. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Comsa is the most important local state and political leader, the local patron 
of the village, interested in accessing political power through clientelistic relations 
and exchanges with the two Roma communities. Bureaucrats are often unhappy 
about these practices, as they interfere with their capacity to fulfil their 
responsibilities and override the legal procedures they need to follow in their 
everyday professional practice.  
In the social assistance office, three social workers were responsible for state 
social benefit applications made by both Romanians and Roma. I should mention 
here social worker Rodica Sterea with whom I often had informal conversations 
about Roma applications and queries. In the same office Roma expert Dinica Sotu, 
who is responsible for mediating between Roma communities and local bureaucrats, 
helping social assistance workers prepare the necessary documentation for Roma 
social benefit applications. He would also join local officials on their visits to Roma 
districts, especially to the Romanianized Roma district, but only occasionally on 
visits to the Caldarars’ district. Dinica Sotu explained that as a Romanianized Roma, 
he usually avoids the Caldarars’ district and he pays visits to the Caldarars’ area only 
when there is an urgent need or local officials need to contact a Caldarar family to 
resolve legal problems/issues. He was present in the office on several occasions, but 
most of the times he was out dealing with Roma issues.  
All the local council, employees emphasised the problematic nature  of local 
patronage represented by the mayor Sorpaci, the local administrator of the village 
Comsa and his supporters, PSD councillors, whose principal aim is to satisfy Roma 
demands in return for their votes.  The two Roma communities’ problems provide a 
key underpinning for the structure of local patronage politics, which exerts pressure 
on local council employees to deal with Roma problems.  
The secretary of the local council told me that the commune of Costesti has a 




communes which have only either ‘poor’ or ‘rich’ Gypsies. From her point of view, 
the rich are those who cause problems for the local administration because they do 
not pay taxes for their firms and houses, for which they have no papers. She 
considers that ‘poor’ Romanianized Roma are not a source of big problems for the 
local council. She considers it is easy to communicate with them and they generally 
pay their debts to the local council. In cases where they do not pay taxes, they are 
registered and easily identifiable by the local council representatives, unlike the 
Caldarars who generally lack official papers (Field notes, 13 October 2009).  Most of 
the local officials I talked to considered the Caldarars to be the most problematic 
group, as they manage to avoid state control and identification.  
 I also had informal conversations about the issue of identity documents with 
both Roma and police officers dealing with local issues, which included Roma 
districts, and a formal interview with the former local officer in chief, Racov, who 
gave me details about how the police deal with  identification and control among the  
Caldarars. In the next section, I will present the general theoretical outline, which 
informs the ethnography of this chapter.   
 
State encounters and documenting identity  
 
The state categories are not only those of surveillance and control, criminality and 
illegality, but also those of welfare, which mark out the limits of legibility for 
applicants. As Caplan and Torpey (2001) argue, the transition from a police state 
(e.g. Romanian socialism) to a welfare state has entailed the development of new 
categories of identification and criteria of eligibility for citizens. The ‘legibility 
effect’ (Scott 1988) is generated through documentary practices, which indicate “the 
double sign of the state’s distance and its penetration into the life of the everyday” 
(Das and Poole 2004a: 15). In order to be governed, to fall within the scope of the 
state’s welfare net, individuals need to be identified and quantified through 
documentation procedures (Caplan and Torpey 2001).  
Documenting identity is one of the identification mechanisms that intervene 
in any citizen’s life, it has both ‘repressive’, and ‘emancipatory’ effects, it grants and 




Therefore, individuals seem to be challenged to place themselves either inside or 
outside the state's sphere of action. Those who accept documenting and identification 
procedures get permission to use state services and benefits but become, at the same 
time, subjects of its control and surveillance. Moreover, through the documenting 
process, individuals can be partly ‘expropriated’ (Caplan and Torpey 2001: 8) of 
their own identity and subjected to the state’s classificatory categories and they 
become identifiable governable subjects.  
Nevertheless, the performative element involved in identity challenges the 
fixed identity categories (Ferme 2004, Fraenkel 1992, Jeganathan 2004, Poole 2004) 
proposed by the state and its classificatory procedures.  Nelson (2004) argues that the 
state can have a double face and produce in individuals’ reactions of both fear and 
desire. In this sense, I consider that membership and belonging are not individual or 
institutional choices, but subscribe to the logic of encounters with state actors, who, 
sometimes, coincide with local patronage ones. In these interactions and encounters, 
Roma can be subject to state power and local patronage politics.  
Individuals can fear belonging but desire membership in so far as state laws 
offer both constraints and opportunities. The most significant encounters Caldarars 
have experienced with the state were those of identification, programs carried out by 
both socialist and post-socialist states with or without their collaboration. My 
ethnographic study on the Roma encounters with the state goes beyond apparent 
binary and sharp oppositions between being inside or outside the state mechanisms 
of control and identification, between the “repressive” and “emancipatory” powers of 
documents. It shows the ways in which relations with the state rules, procedures are 
performed,  negotiated between Roma, state workers/bureaucrats and local patronage 
actors. In this sense, Lipsky’s (1971, 1980, 1984) discussion on ‘street level 
bureaucrats’ as “ambassadors of government with particularly significant impacts 
upon the lives of the poor and of relatively powerless minorities” (Lipsky 1971: 392) 
is relevant. Lipsky (1971) considers that an efficient interaction between bureaucrats 
and citizen is deterred by a series of factors : ‘inadequate resources’ (technology, 
information), ‘physical and psychological threats’, ‘contradictory or ambiguous role 
expectations’ and ‘conflicting role expectations’ (p.393-5). In this context, it is useful 




Roma and what exactly causes inefficiency, dissatisfaction and stress for both parts 
involved (state bureaucrats vs. Roma). It is also worth mentioning that in the 
Romanian case, street -level bureaucrats are not simply government ambassadors as 
Lipsky (1971) defines them in the context of American society, but they are or 
expected to be local patronage followers. This kind of overlapping roles adds another 
source of conflicting interests, stress and impediments in the relations between state 
bureaucrats and citizen. In the next sections I mainly concentrate my attention on 
present Roma interactions with the local state bureaucrats (e.g. police officers, local 
council workers) in matters of identification, benefit applications, family and 
community problems.   
 
Romanianized Roma and their interactions with the local authorities  
 
During my fieldwork sessions at the local council and in the Romanianized Roma 
district, I was particularly attentive to the everyday interactions Romanianized Roma 
have with the local authorities and to their accounts of these interactions. In the next 
two paragraphs I present two vignettes from my field notes, which will reflect the 
way Romanianized Roma interact with the local authorities and the main local PSD 
patronage actors (mayor, village administrator, deputy-mayor).  
Marina is a Romanianized Roma who lives on state social benefits. On one 
occasion, she was asked by the local doctors to pay for the health certificates needed 
to register her child at school. Marina refused to pay and she went to the local 
council accompanied by two other women to ask for help. The mayor, Sorpac, PSD 
representative, offered to help the Gypsy women himself. He called the local clinic in 
order to resolve the problem but he was unable to convince the doctors to exempt the 
Gypsy women from paying for the health certificates for their children. However, the 
mayor decided to give them the amount of money (4 RON each) needed to cover the 
price of the health certificates (Field notes, 21 October 2009).  
Adina, another Romanianized Roma woman, had a different experience in her 
interaction with the local council. She told me a story about how she approached the 
local council to ask for access to EU benefits (mainly food products: packs of flour 




threatened to call the police. Adina did not give up and she continued to pay weekly 
visits to the local council. One day when a commission from Bucharest was present 
at the local council she decided to challenge the mayor’s decision by entering the 
council meeting room unannounced and expressing her discontent with regard to the 
distribution of EU benefits. At that moment, the mayor, who was alarmed and 
worried by her unanticipated approach, declared publicly that he would provide the 
food products to eligible beneficiaries as soon as possible. However, the mayor did 
not keep his promise and Adina continued to pay visits to the local council for 
several weeks with no success (Field notes, June 2010).   
The above accounts offer two different stories about the same mayor, who is 
sometimes helpful to the Roma, and at other times discriminates against the Roma. 
An explanation for this behaviour is given by multiple positions local patronage 
actors (mayor, local administrator) occupy across spheres of power (state and 
politics) and interest. Both mayor Sorpaci and local administrator Sorin Comsa are 
state representatives but they are at the same time main PSD patronage actors who 
are interested in getting Roma’s votes.   
The mayor does not have a consistent approach in relation to Romanianized 
Roma and Caldarars. It is well known that he is supportive of the Romanian 
community and less so with his Roma clients. However, in many cases the mayor 
provides clientelistic support to the Roma as part of the system of local patronage 
politics.   
On the other hand, actions of local institutions are sometimes discriminatory 
and work as a deterrent in their everyday life. The Romanianized Roma report they 
are confused in their relations with the local administration as they are not sure 
whether they can rely on institutional support or not. Rather, they have expectations 
of support from mayor Sorpaci and administrator Sorin Comsa, who are interested in 
solving their problems in exchange for their votes and political support. 
Romanianized Roma queries are institutionally rejected, but they are always solved 
through the backdoor of local patronage politics. Sorin Comsa, the main Social 
Democrat representative, the local patron of the village, who previously had a central 
government role, is one of the people who was always able to obtain Romanianzied 




The Romanianized Roma are aware of these differences between important 
local political actors and institutional practices and they know that in their everyday 
issues they need to negotiate with the PSD officials rather than with the local state 
bureaucrats. The result is the maintenance of clientelistic relationships between 
Roma and main local patronage actors, based on contradictory feelings of obligation, 
appreciation but also discontent.  
 
The state signature and procedures of identification: Caldarars 
interactions with the local state 
 
Documentation of identity is produced through individual - state encounters, 
negotiable interactions between the Roma and local state workers performed at the 
intersectionality between state and politics (patronage politics). The state procedures 
of documenting identity are often domesticated and conducted through unofficial 
means by local patronage interests. In this section, I provide an analysis of the 
interactions and debates the Caldarars have with the local state authorities (local 
council, police) in matters of welfare distribution and access to state services. 
Caldarars predominate in everyday interactions with the local state. They usually 
come with their families to solve issues regarding documenting identity and 
obtaining the documentation needed for social benefit applications. Their strong 
visible presence and insistence is the source of much debate and even quarrels with 
the local council employees.  
On the other hand, Romanianized Roma, who hold identity documents and 
are main recipients of the state welfare, pay fewer visits to the local council and have 
less conflictual relations with the local employees. In this section and the following, I 
will focus primarily on issues of documenting identity, faced mainly by Caldarars in 
interactions with the local council employees.  
Caldarars are locally known as those who avoid the documentation of their 
properties. Most of them have neither property papers nor construction certificates 
for their buildings. Their houses are very large – approximately 500 square meters 
each - and in each courtyard, they build more than one building. Most of medium 
level income families buy one piece of land on which they build separate houses. 




avoiding identification by the local authorities. This lack of property documentation 
creates many problems regarding tax collection and for these reasons the local 
council has frequently been fined by their regional and national financial 
headquarters.  
There are many situations in which the Caldarars, who are not eligible for 
state social benefits100, insistently visit the local council and ask for housing and 
child social support benefits.  In these instances, the council workers are not usually 
able to help them. (Field notes, 27 October 2009). For any kind of state support, the 
Caldarars have to have proof that they do not run a firm. Local council workers 
frequently get annoyed about the fact that the rich Caldarars always attempt and 
sometimes succeed in getting state or social benefits by avoiding the identification 
process.  
For instance, engineer Moraru explained how Caldarar families succeeded in 
applying for the housing benefits usually granted to single youths. Although 
Caldarars live together with their partners and children, they lack marriage 
certificates and property documents. Caldarar men hold all the properties and firms 
in their partner’s name, which gives eligibility to at least one partner to claim state 
benefits (heating subsidies, state assistance for lone parents).  
On the other hand, it is interesting to notice, as many other local officials   
told me, how some Caldarars come to the local council in their expensive Jeep 4X4 
cars in order to apply for social benefits, which usually represent only very small 
amounts of cash. This attitude can be associated with their commercial spirit, which 
they use in any sort of negotiations, and from which they expect to gain maximum 
returns.       
The local council functionaries are frequently upset and stressed about the 
whole situation, as they know that many Caldarars are much richer than they are, and 
yet still manage to obtain social benefits. As Goffman (1956) argues, ‘servers’ who 
experience a lower socio-economic position in relation to their clients engage subtle 
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because  they either lack the necessary documentation or they are involved in informal businesses 






forms of aggressiveness in their attitudes. That underlies the tense interaction 
between the two parts, which many times erupts in quarrels.  
On the other hand, many Caldarars do not understand why some of them are 
eligible while others are not. Few of the cases are clear-cut, which are usually the 
older people who have received reparations for their deportation during the Second 
World War to Transnistria. Both parts (Caldarars and bureaucrats) accuse each other 
of defiance. While the bureaucrats consider that, the Caldarars are rich and not 
entitled to claim state benefits, the Caldarars claim they are discriminated by the state 
workers.   
However, eligibility is the product of communication between state 
functionaries and Roma applicants. Documents are subject to negotiable meanings by 
both parties (Das and Poole 2004 a, b). In the following paragraphs, I present an 
account of a quarrel between local council workers and a young Caldarar man who 
wanted a certificate to confirm his address in the village so as to be able to renew his 
ID card. Engineer Moraru, the local inspector on building issues, advised him to ask 
the people he lived with and share the same house and probably had property papers, 
to help him with this matter. The young man came back with his mother and they 
told engineer Moraru that they could not find the other person they live with but they 
really needed the certificate.  
 
Engineer Moraru aggressively refused them: If you are Gypsies, you 
have to live in your Tiganie [Gypsy quarter]! 
The Caldarar man: Why don’t you hit us? What do you want? Money?  
Moraru, smiling nervously: Yeah, that would probably work. 
The Caldarar man: We need ID cards to vote for your party [the PSD 
patronage party]. 
This was the moment when engineer Moraru became really annoyed and 
yelled at them.   
The Caldarar man: Why are you being so mean?  
Engineer Moraru, almost yelling: ‘I’m simply telling you how it is, I am 
sincere.’ At the same time, he asked his female colleague: ‘Do not give 
up, do not surrender to them, if you do that I will never help you again’.  
To the Gypsies: ‘God will give you justice!’ Then he asked them loudly 
to get out: ’Take your ID cards and get out now! Then he remarked 
ironically to his colleague: ‘You should bring him to my house. Give him 
this, give her that and then when you go to their house they would put 





The mother of the young Caldarar man told me that several days before, some police 
officers together with bulibasa Razar came to bring their certificates to remind them 
that they would have to renew their ID cards if they wanted to vote  
(Field notes, 12 November 2009).   
The story reveals some of the common tensions between local bureaucrats 
and Caldarars who usually have informal claims, which cannot legally be fulfilled. 
Patronage politics is the main source of confidence for Caldarars, as well as a source 
of stress and disruption for local bureaucrats who are required and entitled to apply 
the state laws to solve documentation problems. Local council bureaucrats are aware 
that Caldarars’ performances are supported by relationships they have with main 
local PSD actors (administrator/patron Comsa and mayor Sorpaci) and they need to 
decide whether to follow the law or the local PSD patronage interests. These 
contradictory directions produce inconsistency in their actions as state bureaucrats, 
who many times feel overruled by the local patronage actors (e.g. mayor, vice 
mayor) who give access to state welfare to those ineligible Roma. In this context, 
Roma-state interaction ‘situation’, in Goffmanian terms, is never clearly defined. It is 
rather continuously negotiated between Roma, state bureaucrats and local patronage 
actors. ‘The situation’ is a space of negotiation between state laws, Roma claims and 
patronage interests. The latter can variably support or reject the Roma’ s state benefit 
entitlement. Therefore, the source of information needed for a clear definition of ‘the 
situation’ of interaction (Goffman 1956) between bureaucrats and the Roma is highly 
unstable. With this lack of coordination of the role expectation and performance, 
interactions between Roma and state bureaucrats remain in a state of “anomie that is 
generated when the minute social system of face-to-face interaction breaks down” 
(Goffman 1956: 6). In Goffman’s terms the interactions lack what defines as 
‘working consensus’, which takes place between “participants [who] contribute to a 
single overall definition of the situation which involves not so much a real agreement 
as to what exists but rather a real agreement as to whose issues will be temporarily 
honoured”(p.4). Real agreement is also made in order to avoid “an open conflict of 
definition of situation” (p.4). In the absence of this kind of tacit agreements over the 
definition of interaction, the encounters between Roma and local council bureaucrats 




in the case of local council workers interactions with the Caldarars, there is a 
generalized lack of agreement, which also includes non-agreement in issues of 
documentation and proofs of documented identity.   
During one of my visits, the two social workers of the local council told me 
that a Roma social worker was needed. In this way, they could avoid direct 
involvement with their problems. I asked them why the Roma expert Dinica Sotu 
does not manage the situation. Their answer was that he usually does not want to get 
too involved. However, the Roma expert is not allowed to undertake the social 
workers’ responsibilities. His role is to mediate between the Roma communities and 
state functionaries but not necessarily to solve their applications and queries directly. 
Moreover, the Roma experts are state employees with separate funding from a 
governmental strategic project that ends in 2013. Therefore, the employment 
condition of the Roma expert is highly dependent on the governmental structures and 
he is, in this sense, directly subjected to their powers. Through his position within the 
local council, Roma expert Dinica Sotu in Costesti feels in a vulnerable condition 
and therefore subject to the functions of local state which frequently overlaps with 
local PSD patronage politics represented by mayor Sorpaci and local administrator 
Comsa. 
Often these claims and queries centre on exchanges between Roma interested 
in state benefits and the local council interested in tax collection. The mayor and the 
deputy-mayor decided that before being able to get certificates, papers and 
applications, the Roma must pay their fines and their local taxes. However, the 
exchanges are contextualized and mediated by political interests. The mayor and the 
administrator, who are local PSD representatives, have a considerable interest in 
attracting more Roma supporters to their party. They are the ones to establish the 
rules and they change them to suit their own preferences. Those Roma who promise 
to vote PSD are exempted from paying council tax. In this context the exchange, 
local council tax-documents vs. benefits, is a mechanism of control over Roma 
voting behaviour (both Romanianized Roma and Caldarars).   
During the 2009 presidential elections, Caldarars would come in large 
numbers to renew their ID cards. In order to renew their ID cards, locals need to get a 




administrative area of the village. Official proof of an address is given on the basis of 
the property papers for buildings or land used. However, as already stated, Caldarars 
do not have any property documents and frequently use the affinities between local 
politics and the local state’s administration in order to get new identity papers. As 
happened frequently during my fieldwork, a Caldarar man, who had no contract for 
his land and buildings came to the local council to ask to renew his ID card.  
 
 M: He has not paid the council tax. Aren't you Romanian? Why don't 
you   pay the council tax? Why do I pay it? They come before elections 
without ID cards and they say they want to vote and we cannot refuse 
them.  
His office fellow added: We cannot refuse their right to vote. We need to 
let them vote.  
M: Maybe they want to take advantage of the local council’s desire to get 
their votes for the local ruling party in the presidential elections. They are 
going to see what will happen after these elections! (Engineer Moraru, 
local council official, Field notes, 27 October 2009).  
 
Inspector Moraru’s actions seem to be caught somewhere between enforcing the 
state’s rules and protecting the mayor and local administrator’s interests. Local 
patronage interests have, in Goffmanian terms, a disruptive character for the ‘self-
conceptions of personality’ of state bureaucrats, who are overruled by patronage 
actors’ promises and actions. For these reasons, many times, local council workers 
feel discredited and lose or even lack authority as bureaucrats who are entitled to 
apply the state law.   
In Moraru’s discourse and practice, the difference between local council and 
local patronage politics is blurred. His statements are interesting as they show how 
spheres of power (state and politics) communicate and overlap to the point where 
they can get mixed up in the local council workers’ experience. On the other hand, it 
shows Moraru’s discontent with the local patronage politics, which blocks his 
authority and undermines his role as a state bureaucrat, who needs to enforce the law. 
He frequently mentioned that Comsa and his followers undermine bureaucratic 
authority.  
When I asked him why they didn't have a system for identifying Caldarars, 
who do not pay taxes,  he replied by saying that he was still waiting for the elections 




council to claim papers, promising to vote for the local ruling party. He then added 
that in this way the administrator of the village, PSD representative, Comsa 
compromises himself. He suggested that Comsa is the person who asks the local 
bureaucrats to close their eyes and tolerate the Caldarars’ non-payment of council 
taxes.    
Most of the time Caldarars’ clientelistic expectations are raised before and 
during elections. They define from the beginning their encounters with state workers 
as connected to local patronage interests. As Goffman (1956) argues, that is a way 
“the individual starts to define the situation and starts to build up lines of responsive 
action.” (p.5). Although, as I already mentioned, in general lines, they do follow the 
game of local patronage, local council workers do not necessarily agree with this 
definition which undermines their authority as bureaucrats.  
A Caldarar man explained to me how he succeeded in getting a new birth 
certificate from the local council. The local council officers asked for the house 
construction license and Caldarar man could not provide the document, so he decided 
instead to threaten them by saying: ’I have many friends and during the elections you 
will need me!’ This proved to be a very good strategy as he received the certificate 
he needed (Field notes, 22 October 2009). Another example comes from a Caldarar 
woman who wanted to renew his ID card:  
 
Razar [bulibasa] told us that we needed to go to the local council and 
renew our ID cards because we had to vote! And we are afraid of him. 
We do as all the others do and we vote the same sign [PSD political party 
logo]. (Field notes, 18 November 2009).     
 
The examples show the way common Caldarars exploit the interrelatedness between 
state and politics, expressed in local patronage politics and are able in this way to 
threaten the local bureaucrats, when their demands are not met. It also reveals how 
sometimes Caldarars subordinate their interactions with local council workers to the 
controllers of these exchanges and interconnections:  political brokers. The latter are, 
most of the time, their informal leaders ‘bulibasi’ who perform the brokerage 
between different political parties and the Caldarar community and open the 
community’s doors to the main local authorities and institutions. Voting is the main 




next section I show how supported by clientistic relations Caldarars create ’identity 
fictions’ to get access to state welfare.  
 
Identity ‘fictions' and identity recognition: the difficulties of the 
local authorities in identifying Caldarars  
 
 
Many Caldarars who buy houses from Romanians demolish the old buildings and 
construct new larger ones without the necessary authorisation. On the other hand, the 
local council is pressurised by the regional and central institutions to report the 
payment of state revenue for the areas built on. This is a reason why the Caldarars 
frequently find themselves in conflict with the local council. Due to these tensions, 
the local council resorts to the police force to get the precise size and other 
measurements of the Caldarars’ constructions. Usually, when these inspections 
occur, the Caldarars shut their doors and refuse to speak to or even harass the local 
council representatives, and that is why police are often considered to be more 
effective in this form of control over Gypsies’ ‘identity’. This  form of identification, 
which is enforced by the police does not require recognition from those identified 
rather it is  imposed and established along the lines of general identificatory 
categories, classified forms of identity, used by the police and state mechanisms of 
surveillance: residency and official names. Police officers use both formal and 
informal mechanisms in identifying Caldarars. The former chief officer Racov was 
able to give me more details about this.   
 
C: Have you ever had problems in identifying the Caldarars? 
R: No. I knew them all. Their name, nicknames, their parents, relatives. I 
know their whole family.     
C: How did you get to know them? 
R: From my direct contact with their district. I used to go there often and 
try to get a feel for the area.  
R: There are 20 people with the name Mateiescu Ion and 30 others called 
Mateiescu Maria. I had the names and their pictures and so they couldn't 
hide from me. It was a way to prove that I knew them and that they didn't 
need to run from me because they couldn't escape.   
C: Where did you have their pictures from?  
R: Besides the fiscal files, we had lots of other things for which the 




C: Who was a good informer for you? A bulibasa or an ordinary Gypsy 
[Caldarar]? 
R: The ordinary Gypsies. I have never given them [bulibasi] any more 
attention than they deserved. 
C: Were they interested in supporting the police or the community?  
R: They played a double game. They were supportive when they could 
see an advantage for themselves. (Racov, former chief officer, Costesti).  
 
The officer’s confidence in being able to identify those Caldarars who have the same 
names relies on his close experience with the Caldarar community. The relationship 
does not always need mediation from a Caldarar bulibasa, as this would reduce a 
police officer's control over the Caldarars’ actions. Racov suggests that Caldarar 
bulibasi cannot always be trusted as they have multiple interests (personal, 
communitarian or political) in different circumstances, supporting either the 
community or the institutions of the state. On the other hand, the connection between 
police officers and bulibasa is still maintained as it provides fast access to the 
community in urgent situations.  
Besides data bases with pictures and biographical details, Racov, as a police 
officer, used his personal local experience in the village and his carefully cultivated 
informal relations with members of Caldarar community to identify people by name 
and residence. In this case, the local police mechanisms of identification are upheld 
by a well-developed local relational dynamic between police officers and community 
members. As Migdal (2004) argues, “people can accommodate multiple boundaries 
and multiple senses of belonging, even ones with radically different principles 
underlying their practices” (p. 22).  
However, this form of identification made by the local police officers has an 
external character compared with the negotiated and performative character of 
interactions between Roma and local council bureaucrats. Caldarars’ profiles are 
often obtained through databases, which offer details about criminal convictions. 
Identification is made in a one way direction, by a police officer who may work 
under cover and who gathers information through daily interactions with members of 
the Caldarar community. Therefore, the general features of this form of identification 




The other main mechanisms of identification are those used by local council. 
The cadastral campaigns101 of the local council are part of the local procedures of 
collecting taxes on land that has been built on, and constitute one of the main 
mechanisms for the identification of Caldarars’s properties. This could clarify the 
matter of their addresses, which are often not officially known.  However, Caldarars 
have always tried to avoid the official cadastral service and have always obtained 
their land through negotiation and built the houses they own.  
The address is a well-known state mechanism for identifying individuals and 
controlling their social activities: “it does involve the ability to locate and take 
various forms of action, such as blocking, granting access, delivering or picking up, 
charging, penalizing, rewarding, or apprehending. It answers a 'where' question 
rather than 'who' question” (Marx 2001: 312). For the case of the Caldarar 
communities, the state considered the 'where' questions to be more important than the 
'who' questions. As the Caldarars used to be nomads without a fixed address, the 
socialist state was always interested in a clear answer to the 'where' question and in 
their identification through settlement.  
Although these days the Caladarars have settlements, they are still mobile, 
without official proof of their place of residence. On the other hand, Caldarars have 
ID cards, but they do not have property papers for the buildings and land they own, 
which are needed for ID renewals. However, by asking local administrator/patron 
Sorin Comsa and mayor Sorpaci for help they manage to renew their identification 
papers without the proof of an official address. (Field notes, 9 November 2009).   
The lack of documents creates a lot of problems and annoyance for local 
council employees, who need to close their eyes to the informal local patronage 
arrangements. Nevertheless, it is intriguing to notice that in their ID cards, their 
address does not appear.  According to local police officers, this seems to be the 
common procedure for the ID cards issued in rural areas. The name and the location 
(village, in this case) are the only identification references mentioned in the ID cards. 
 
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This weak identification procedure together with local patronage politics assist the 
Caldarars’ avoidance of mechanism the state uses for identification.  However, all 
these ambiguities related to their IDs and documents needed for social benefit 
applications become flexible points of reference in the interactions with local council 
employees.  
During my observation trips, at the social work office, a Caldarar woman wanted to 
apply for child benefit, but she did not have any proof of her husband’s income, 
which is an important criterion for eligibility.   
 
The Caldarar woman responded to the local council requirements by 
saying: ‘I do not have kids with him [her partner], I don’t have anything, 
and I am not married.’ On the other hand, she confirmed that her partner 
has a business.  
Dinica Sotu, the Roma expert at the council, asked her ironically: ‘But 
who did you make the kids with? With your dog?’ The Caldarar woman, 
visibly annoyed, replied: ‘With you!’ (Field notes, 18 November 2009).  
 
After this incident, it was interesting to hear how the Roma expert Dinica Sotu, a 
Romanianized Roma and the social workers characterised Gypsies, especially the 
Caldarars. They laughed while saying:  
 
‘They are tricksters, liars, opportunists, dirty, noisy, and responsive to 
what you tell them’.   
The Caldarar woman disappeared for a few minutes, then, she came back with her 
partner asking him declare that he was the father of her child. Her partner replied to 
the local council employees:  
 
‘I have a business but I do not have any marriage papers; what other 
papers do I need to bring?’ and then, a bit irritated, ‘This is how things 
work at this local council. I think this law is made only for Gypsies.’ 
The social worker replied ironically, for the benefit of myself and her 
colleagues, ‘So they think that they are the only ones who need to bring 
papers, that no one else has to do that. Look [showing some papers] - she 
is Romanian and she has all the necessary documents in order to apply 
for social benefits.’ 
Then, the Caldarar man contradicting his previous statement replied by 
saying he had no firm. Another social worker added: ‘So why don’t you 




that he doesn't have a business and that he is eligible for some social 
benefits (Field notes, 18 November 2009).  
 
This short snapshot of interaction between bureaucrats and the Caldarar couple  can 
be analysed through Goffman’ analytical conceptualizations of performance and 
dramaturgy, engaged more or less successfully by the participants. First, the dialogue 
between the parts misses what Goffman (1956) calls ‘tact’: “image of disinterested 
involvement in the problem of the client while the client responds with a show of 
respect for the competence and integrity of the specialist” (p.4). Local council 
employees know the Caldarars’ expectations, which are considered to undermine 
their authority as state bureaucrats. For these reasons, they reject the Caldarars’ 
‘definition of the situation’ by showing their open disavowal from the beginning. On 
the other hand, with no alterations in the course of interaction, the Caldarar couple 
continue to play the ‘card’ of informality and lack of papers, which, if successful, can 
source their eligibility for the child benefit.   
It also can be seen, from this example that the Caldarar couple was trying to 
create an identity story and negotiate their eligibility, without success in this case.  
They created an identity fiction in order to avoid state restrictions and control (Cave 
1988: 489). The two Caldarar partners devised a combination of identity elements in 
order to fit the state classificatory categories required for an application for social 
benefit. It is interesting to observe how they performed their relationship in terms of 
both togetherness and separateness. They were affirming an intimate relationship to 
prove they are the parents of the child and at the same time, they showed the lack of 
an official connection that represented an advantage in accessing the child benefit.  
At the beginning of the interaction, the woman performed separately from her 
partner, attempting to get access to benefits as a single mother. However, her status 
was informally connected to her partner’s through her child. In this case her partner 
was required to produce a 'performance' of his legal eligibility (the lack of firms or 
additional sources of income) to secure the child benefit. The man confirmed and 
denied, at the same time, that he runs a commercial company. Although, his 
statement looks like a paradox and untruthful statement, it reveals a 





using Romanianized Gypsies’ documented identities102, which are officially non-
existent. On the other hand, Caldarars are not officially married. In this sense, his 
accounts are evidence of non-formalized relations and practices: a long-term intimate 
relationship without a marriage certificate, a commercial practice without a legalized 
status. Caldarars are aware that the informal nature of their intimate relationships and 
economic practices would give them access to social benefits. In this sense, the 
couple aimed at performing a disjunction between informal practices/relationships 
and their legal status. They performed  eligibility through an identity 'fiction', a  
'story' about their identities, which is not necessarily true or false but corresponds to 
the informality of their practices which can assist them in getting  recognition of the 
legible status. The ‘fictionality' of their performances was mainly connected to the 
absence of documents, rather than to their actual practices/relationship. In this 
context, the state workers, who are locals too, challenged their documented identity 
and not the one they were familiar with in their local informal everyday life 
practices.  
During the encounter and dialogue, they used the ‘tease’, in Goffmanian 
terms, as a technique of testing their performing abilities. However, the Gypsy 
couple’s performance was poor, as the local council functionaries were laughing and 
mocking them in the end, refusing to accept their claims. The contradiction in 
statements about the father’s child, the sudden appearance of the father and the 
bureaucrats’ impolite reactions generated a ‘scene’ which arise “when team-mates 
can no longer countenance each other’s inept performances and blurt out immediate 
public criticism of the very individuals with whom they have to be in dramaturgical 
cooperation” (Goffman 1956: 133). The scene took the form of an ironic quarrel, 
which as Goffman (1956) argues has the effect “to provide the audience with a 
backstage view and another is to leave them with the feeling that something is surely 
suspicious about a performance” (p.134). The Caldarar woman sought to answer at 
Dinica’s ironic question -‘With whom you made your kids? With your dog?’- by 
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102 These informal arrangements between Caldarars and Romanianized Roma are detailed in the 





leaving the room and inviting his partner to come and face the bureaucrats. That 
made available to local council employees a backstage view of the Caldarars’ 
performance. In this new context, the Caldarar couple was pushed to discuss the 
issue of firm/business ownership, an important criterion of the child benefit 
eligibility.    
During the interaction, the local council employees acted from both positions: 
as state workers and residents of the locality, neighbours who are familiar with their 
informal practices. As Das (2004) argues, there is no sharp difference between state 
functionaries and the community. However, the boundary between the two categories 
of actors lies with the law and its classificatory categories, which grant or restrict 
access to welfare and are negotiated and domesticated through performances in daily 
encounters with the local council workers.  
Caldarar couple performed eligibility while simultaneously avoiding 
documentation. As Caplan and Torpey (2001) suggest, documents are signs that 
individuals are not always in the control of their identity.  For these reasons, the 
Caldarar couple negotiated the control over their identities in such a way as to have 
access to state aid and services but to escape restrictions of documents and of 
belonging to state structures/categories. As the title of this chapter suggests, in their 
state encounters, the Caldarars have accounts of membership to state institutions, but 
they avoid belonging to state structures. They are interested in hiding those elements 
of their identity that would expose them directly to the state mechanisms of control. 
In this context, Caldarars manage to navigate state rules and classifications and play 
at its margins and often exploit these new intersectionalities between state 
administration and local politics. Compared to the identification made by police 
officers, which is an external, unidirectional performance of law enforcement,  
identifications made in  interactions with state workers are  performative and 
Caldarars are active actors in the negotiation and domestication of the categories of 







State-politics boundary and patronage politics  
 
The Roma’s performances in relation to local council employees reveals the strong 
relation between state and local politics as a source for Caldarars’ escape from state 
identification procedures and the Romanianized Roma’s escape from discrimination 
performed by local public institutions. The local patronage politics also mediates 
Roma access to state welfare. These interpretations are confirmed by observations I 
made during a regional meeting on Roma issues, organized by the government.   
As I described in the previous chapter, the governmental project for the social 
integration of the Roma involves monthly meetings at both regional and local level 
with Roma experts (local and regional), informal Roma leaders, Roma experts and 
mediators, state representatives and public authorities (police officers, lawyers). 
During a regional meeting in Goteni county, Corina Sotu, regional Roma expert and 
prefect’s councillor on Roma issues, addressed the Roma mediators in the following 
way:  
Corina Sotu : Good relationships with the local authorities entail good 
results. However, there is still a problem with some mayors who do not 
understand that.  
A Roma representative complained that some local authorities would not vote 
in favour of important council decisions for the benefit of local Roma 
communities. In this context, Corina Sotu made a public statement to all the 
Roma representatives, participants in the meeting:  
If I hear that, someone from the Roma community has voted for the 
mayor’s party I will kill you. There is nothing more to say on this matter. 
(Field notes, 8 July 2010) 
 
It was an allusion to a specific mayor, present at the meeting, who had refused to 
release the necessary funding for projects aimed at the local Roma communities. 
Corina Sotu has also criticized other local mayors, who only seek to please the state 
employees, part of the mayor’s local patronage politics. To her statement, a mayor 
from a nearby village replied:  
 
Thanks so much to Mrs Corina Sotu, I have the highest regard for her. 
However, we have our party bosses who control us, we have party 
responsibilities, and you all have to try to understand this, because we 





The vignette shows clearly the way in which mayors, who are, most of the times, the 
local patrons and give the directions of local patronage politics, mediate good 
relationships between Roma communities and local councils. The latter seems to be 
the most important boundary Romanianized Roma and Caldarars need to exploit in 
order to have access to state welfare. In this context, Roma leaders become the 
political brokers who mediate between Roma communities and state 
governance/patronage politics and convince the Roma to vote for the local patronage 
party in exchange for public services.  
The politics/state accommodations and exploitations constitute the back door nature  
of  Roma encounters with the local state and are part of the neopatrimonial context 
emerged  in the transition from a centralized source of power to a decentralized state 
entangled in its practices with patronage politics.  
 
Conclusions 
Under socialism, Romanianized Roma, former members of Sotu family, without 
necessarily being leaders, were those able to deal with issues of documentation and 
mediate between Roma community and local state representatives. For Caldarars, the 
main bulibasa Iancu, a collaborator with security services, was the state broker who 
facilitated the socialist state control over the community, its mobility and its gold. 
With sedentarization in the 1960s, Caldarars started to be subjected to central state 
power and control more frequently than they formerly were.  Only the bulibasa Iancu 
was the one able to exploit the boundary between the state and community and 
strengthen his leadership position. In post-socialism bulibasa institution suffers a 
substantial decrease in its legitimacy and bulibasi are less recognized by community.  
For Romanianized Roma, the Roma expert governmental program and Roma 
Party need for administrative representation produced an institutionalization and 
development of forms of leadership, which nonetheless became subordinated to local 
or regional patronage politics. These new forms leadership received little legitimacy 
from the Romanianized Roma. On the other hand, local development of the PSD 
patronage politics (see chapter on local level politics) brought both Romanianized 




(mayor Sorpaci, local patron Comsa) and their followers with whom they were able 
to negotiate their queries.   
These changes in Roma leadership (both groups) and local level politics 
produced an individualization of the Roma encounters with the state, a reduction in 
the group leaders’ control but also a direct engagement of Roma in local clientelistic 
relations with state bureaurats and patronage actors. Both Caldarars and 
Romanianized Roma know that in their interaction with the local council workers, 
they can claim the expected exchange, votes for social services, as part of the local 
patronage politics. Many Caldarars spoke of their preference for the individual 
management of issues of documentation and social benefit applications, and of direct 
interaction with local state workers and patronage actors with whom they negotiate 
their identity documentation and access to state welfare. 
While under socialism, the state was a threat for the Caldarars, these days the 
state is an actor they want to negotiate with and use to get access to its services. 
Caldarars achieved a presence within the local state institutions and started to be 
interested in accessing the state welfare. For Caldarars, relations with the state 
mediated through backdoor of local patronage politics are just a new opportunity that 
they have discovered and want to exploit further. However, the mobile economy 
remains their primary economic source of existence/affluence and the state welfare 
serves as an additional external opportunity. 
On the other hand, for the informal Romanianized Roma, relations with the 
state and local patronage are rather one of survival and dependence, and are not 
actively negotiated. On the contrary, it is strengthened by their leaders (Roma expert 
Dinica Sotu and Ioader Candel), who are predominantly political patronage brokers.  
To sum up, the social change in Roma encounters with the state from socialism to 
post-socialism was triggered by the development of patronage politics and the 
decentralization of Caldarar Roma leadership. For Caldarars the new relation with 
the state did not affect their forms of self-governance, which as I show in the 
penultimate chapter, are enforced more through religious discursive practices. For 
Romanianized Roma, relations with the state mediated by local patronage become a 
main source of survival, which creates a high-level subjection to state welfare 




Romanianized Roma and Caldarars’ voting behaviour in the everyday politics and 
































Chapter 7. Roma and Everyday politics: Patronage, 
Brokerage and Clientelism  

As I showed in the previous chapters, post-socialist intersectionalities between state 
and politics and the development of the informal economy were important 
transformations and prerequisites for the emergence of patronage politics, which 
links political actors and Roma leaders from local to central administrative levels in a 
complex web of hierarchical exchange relations of favours and obligations.  
The chapter on local level politics revealed how the development of two 
overlapping fields of politics (patronage politics and political patronage) blocked the 
development of an independent field of Roma politics and undermined its potential 
to act locally as a force for civic engagement and empowerment of Roma 
communities. The chapter on Roma leadership showed how patronage politics acts 
through both local (patron, Roma brokers) and central level actors (government 
representatives, central level politicians –Delu Nistor) and in this context Roma 
leaders become political brokers, who do not necessarily represent Roma 
communities but pursue their own political interests and convince the Roma to vote 
for the main political parties.  
The present chapter analysis focuses on the dyadic clientelistic relations (e.g 
patron and clients and patron and brokers) performed in everyday politics, which 
affect the Roma communities in terms of self-governance and subjection to 
constraining forms of external governance (e.g. patronage, state). Everyday politics 
is the laboratory, the performing capillarity of power that answers Foucault’s 
essential questions (1980) on how power is practised through relations and how the 
exercise of power provokes change in relations.   
As I showed in the previous chapter on Roma encounters with the state, 
clientelism is a general characteristic of the post-socialist neopatrimonial state, 
performed between state representatives and citizen. Clientelistic relations have 
different functionalities for the two Roma groups. While for Caldarars, local 
clientelism and PSD patronage are instruments of negotiation and exploitation of 
state welfare, for the Romanianized Roma they are mainly sources of survival and 




context, I am interested in exploring the degree to which Roma clients and different 
Roma brokers' actions, in everyday local level politics, can challenge the relations 
the Roma groups established with the state and local patronage. The questions for the 
present chapter are the following:  
What is the role of Roma brokers in the democratization of the relationship between 
patrons and clients?  
Are Roma brokers from each group able to challenge the already established local 
patronage and create bases for independent social and political organization for 
Roma (Caldarars and Romanianized Roma)? 
Are Roma (Caldarars and Romanianized Roma) clients captive voters in the vote-
buying exchanges?  
In the following sections, I explore the everyday local level clientelistic relations 
between local patrons, Roma brokers and Roma clients in the context of the 2009 
presidential elections. The next section is a brief presentation of the main actors in 
patronage politics: the local patron, his main followers and Roma brokers.   
 
Local patron and Roma brokers in Costesti 
 
As I showed in the previous chapters, the performance of local level politics is 
strongly connected to local PSD patronage politics and the actors, who follow or 
interact with this form of politics: local patron Comsa, mayor Sorpaci and their 
followers and Roma patronage brokers (e.g. Roma expert Dinica Sotu) and power 
brokers (e.g. Caldarar bulibasi Razar, Leonard, Sterea).   
Everyday politics and local patronage in Costesti is organized around Comsa 
and his followers. During my fieldwork, I frequently noticed him driving expensive 
cars to the local council or walking the main roads with a confident, rigid attitude. He 
is always present in community life and in direct contact with Roma with whom he 
speaks often and offers them the help needed (see chapter on Roma state encounters) 
in services or cash. In one of the interviews, Dan Popescu, the president of the local 
PNL organization discussed this issue. As I showed in the chapter on local level 




political monopoly and his newly institutionalized position as administrator of the 
village.     
 
D: Comsa likes to be seen and he is a ubiquitous presence in the village. 
He is everywhere, in the market, at the council, on the street, as his 
interest is to run for village mayor in the upcoming elections and win. 
Anyway, he has a good perspective on things, experience, and is 
supported by Delu Nistor (former vice prime-minister, PSD). He was his 
state secretary in Bucharest. He has a good chance. (Dan Popescu, head 
of the PNL Costesti).  
 
Many Romanianized Roma and local political leaders I spoke with confirmed 
his permanent visible presence in the village and his availability in relation to locals 
and especially the Romanianized Roma and Caldarars. Comsa’s direct support for 
the Roma provoked feelings of appreciation and attachment for Romanianized Roma 
leaders and clients. In this sense, his availability and visibility are essential 
characteristics of local patronage, which strengthen his position as local patron.  
I succeeded in having an informal conversation with him in which he talked 
about his work in helping the two Roma communities, through governmental 
projects coordinated by his local PSD team103. He was also proud of getting Roma 
leaders, especially Romanianized Roma, involved in the local party politics. 
However, Romanianized Roma I talked with presented a twofold picture of Comsa’s 
attitude: arrogant, but often helpful. However, Romanianized Roma leaders, expert 
Dinica Sotu and the informal leader Ioader Candel, support Comsa.  
 
C: Who would you vote for if local elections took place this autumn?  
I: Of course, Comsa - there is no one better than him. To respect a man 
means to respect yourself. Gypsies go to him and ask for cash. 
Sometimes he tells me: Ioader, someone came at midnight and asked for 
50 RON for his mum in the hospital. Then I found out that his mother 
was not in hospital. The Gypsy boy [19 years old] gambled the money 
and lost and I told him give the money back to Comsa. (Ioader Candel, 
informal Romanianized Roma leader, patronage broker).  
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Ioader Candel, as an informal leader is not as dependent on local patronage as Roma 
expert Dinica Sotu is. However, beyond his pragmatic and personal interests, he 
experiences feelings of respect and loyalty in relation to Comsa who directly 
supported Romanianized Roma and infrastructure development in their area. Most of 
the Romanianized Roma told me that when they cannot get access to benefits, 
documents, or when they urgently need money they ask Comsa for help. On the other 
hand, Caldarars rarely get in direct contact with Comsa. In situations where they are 
not eligible for social benefits they try to access them by promising they will vote for 
PSD, the local patronage party. However, Comsa can influence Caldarars’ voting 
behaviour through his direct relation with their bulibasi/power brokers (Leonard and 
Razar), who are the people most able to give directions for voting in their 
community.  
Comsa, through his informal (locally developed relationships) and formal 
positions (administrator of the village) is an influential person, rather than the 
possessor of legitimate authority, over Roma leaders and his Roma clients. His 
patron position has become formalized in later years, as he officially became the 
main administrator/manager of the village. On the other hand, this institutionalization 
was not necessarily welcomed or appreciated. With respect to everyday local 
patronage politics which involves not only the local patron’s actions but also PSD 
councillors’, local bureaucrats’ and Roma leaders’, Roma and locals expressed 
contradictory feelings :appreciation, friendship, but also discontent. 
Romanianized Roma and Caldarars expressed discontent with the way their 
everyday queries are solved by Roma expert Dinica Sotu and local council workers 
who support the local PSD patronage team. Dinica Sotu, Roma expert and 
Romanianized Roma leader, is Comsa’s most loyal follower, who mediates between 
the community and the local council but also convinces Romanianized Roma to vote 
with PSD.  
Both Romanianized Roma and Caldarars consider his actions not so useful 
and supportive. In many conversations I had with them they portrayed Comsa as the 
“local council’s man” and “the man who works for the local council”, who is not 
able to do too much for the community in practical terms.  Many Romanianized 





solve their problems (documentation, social benefit applications). On the other hand, 
as I showed in the chapter on Roma leadership, Dinica Sotu explained that he feels 
constrained by his Roma expert position and he cannot act as an activist for Roma 
queries. He only deals with Roma issues, which can be solved bureaucratically and 
with the agreement of the local patronage politics. 
Locally, Comsa’s Roma followers are members of the Sotu family, 
Romanianized Roma, former fiddlers during socialism. They convince 
Romanianized Roma to vote for the PSD or organize vote buying during local, 
presidential and parliamentary elections. On the other hand, council workers at the 
local council support the PSD but do not fully agree with the support Comsa offers 
his Roma clients. I give here two examples, which were discussed in previous 
chapters: engineer Moraru, a council employee who deals with property registration 
and Rodica Sterea, a social worker who deals with social benefit applications. 
Although they support the PSD, they expressed critical views about the main actors 
in the local patronage team (administrator/local patron Sorin Comsa and mayor 
Sorpaci) who support Roma queries without qualification, especially during elections 
and thus overrule the existing legal procedures.  
The patron’s influence and control over the Roma electorate is mediated 
through Roma brokers: Razar, Leonard and Sterea (Caldarar informal leaders/power 
brokers), Romanianized Roma expert Dinica Sotu (patronage broker), and informal 
leader Ioader Candel. Razar, Leonard and Sterea are bulibasi who mediate between 
the Caldarar community, local council and police, support both the PSD and the PDL 
and encourage Caldarars to vote for either party. However, Caldarars are not 
influenced that much by their directions with regard to voting, as they usually do not 
rely on bulibasi to solve problems they have at the local council. They are not 
usually satisfied with their leadership activities, which tend to prioritize political 
interests. The only mediation Caldarars are content with is that done on their behalf 
with the local police. In case of scandals and fights, bulibasi intervene promptly, call 
the police and support the members of their community. 
On the other hand, Dinica Sotu and Ioader Candel do usually persuade 
Romanianized Roma to vote for the local patronage party – the PSD. However, while 




actions cannot be easily classified. He is most of the times Comsa’s supporter and he 
can be considered a patronage broker. However, he does not occupy a formal 
leadership position, but acts across spheres of power as a police mediator (within the 
state sphere of power), a middleman for informal economic transactions between 
Caldarars and Romanianized Roma (within the informal economic sphere) and a 
PSD broker for local patronage.  
His informal position allows him more freedom of movement and relative 
independence in relation to the state and its political actors for which he becomes an 
advisor in local political games and, from this point of view, he can be seen as a 
power broker. Nevertheless, as I showed in the chapter on Roma leadership, the two 
categories of brokers (power brokers and patronage brokers) act differently in their 
relation with political and state actors and have different access to power. State-
patronage brokers, such as Dinica Sotu and Corina Sotu, act from within local and 
regional state structures, which are bound up with patronage politics (at local/county 
level).  
On the other hand, power brokers operate outside the state, at the boundaries 
between state and politics (e.g. bulibasi Leonard, Razar, and Sterea) and have 
relative independence compared with local patronage actors (mayor Sorpaci, Comsa, 
other PSD councillors and supporters). Generally, brokers are the actors who can 
strengthen, connect or disconnect Roma communities from everyday local patronage 
politics. In this context, the 2009 presidential elections were a relevant event, which 
created direct contact between all the actors involved in local patronage politics 
(local patron, his followers, local political representatives, Roma brokers and Roma 
clients). In the following section, I discuss theoretically the main concepts and ideas 
used in this chapter (clientelism, brokerage and patronage) in the context of a 
Romanian neopatrimonial state.   
 
Questions of clientelism, patronage, brokerage and vote buying   
  
Political clientelism has many meanings, but it is usually defined as the dyadic 
exchange relationship between two individuals with unequal status (e.g bureaucrat or 




services to a person of low status in exchange for political support, money or labour 
(Scott 1972).  
Authors who studied clientelism (Scott 1972; Graziano 1976; Hilgers 2008, 
2011) debated whether the nature of this relationship is coercive or voluntary, a short 
or long-term relationship, direct or indirect, equal or unequal. Both Graziano (1976) 
and Gouldner (1977) agree that clientelistic exchanges are not purely instrumental, 
but grounded in well-developed, long-term relationships that can expand into 
valuable social bonds like friendship and loyalty (Flynn 1975). Along the same line 
of thought, Scott (1972) and Hilgers (2008, 2011) note that clientelism, as a long-
term personal relationship, involves clients’ voluntary participation:  “longevity, 
diffuseness, face-to-face contact and status inequality” (Hilgers 2011: 573). 
Nevertheless, the balance can sometimes incline towards either the economic aspect 
of the relationship or the social one.  
As I already explained in chapter on ‘historical transformations’ and as 
Hilgers (2011) argues, clientelism is different from patronage,  but also from vote 
buying. Vote-buying is a “one shot direct exchange” between clients and patrons 
before or during the elections. Money, goods, services are exchanged for votes 
(Schaffer 2007; Hilgers 2008). Although there are important differences between 
patronage, clientelism and vote-buying, they cannot be perceived as being separate 
and independent from each other. In terms of hierarchical relations, clientelism is the 
smallest unit of analysis and occurs between state representatives and citizen situated 
in an unequal informal exchange. In the context of my research, the dynamics of 
clientelistic relations, patronage, and brokerage performed at different administrative 
levels as extensions of Romanian post-socialist economic and political 
transformations form the field of patronage politics discussed in the previous chapter 
on politics. 
Another discussion developed around the concept of clientelism is that of 
democratic or non-democratic social and political exchanges where clients might 
find themselves in coercive or voluntary relationships. Some authors (Flynn 1975; 
Putnam 1993; Kurer 1993) considered that clientelism develops general negative 
effects for civil society, restricting “political freedom and participation while 




clientelism is based on an external point of view that conceives ideological autonomy 
as being more important than the social rewards clients receive in exchange 
(Hellman 1994).  
Furthermore, as Scott (1972) argues, subordination and coerciveness are not 
necessarily sufficient for clientelistic exchanges to occur. They need to be supported 
through reciprocity and bargaining between the parts. Clients are not always ’captive 
voters’ (Wang and Kurzman 2007) as  patrons frequently have to compete for their 
clients (Hilgers 2011), who are not totally subordinated to their coercive powers. 
Coercion might be a last option for patrons in the management of their domination 
and exchange relationship with their clients (Fox 1994; Graziano 1976; Hall 1977; 
Lemarchand 1981; Wang and Kurzman 2007). Moreover, a clientelistic relation has 
an indirect relationship with an affectionate base – diffuseness - that insures the 
survival of the relationship in periods of social change and uncertainty. Kinship ties 
and feelings of loyalty and affection are elements of clientelism’s diffuseness (Scott 
1972). As Hilgers (2011) suggests, clientelism “should be seen as a continuum that 
may involve repression or relatively participatory exchanges between patrons and 
clients” (p. 575). Fox (1994) distinguishes between authoritarian clientelism and 
semi-clientelism. In the first, the subordination relationship is maintained through 
coercive means. In the latter, the person with a higher rank maintains his position and 
control over his clients through strict management of the rules of exchange in which 
the clients’ return is determined by the fulfilment of their promised obligations (e.g. 
votes).  
Furthermore, Graziano (1976) brings light to the relation of personal 
influence versus authority and democratization. From his perspective, patrons cannot 
obtain authority or legitimate power, just influence. However, in Romania not only 
patrons face this problem but also the legal authority of public institutions, which do 
not always enjoy popular support. Moreover, as in the case of my field research, the 
patronage can be institutionalized, with the local patron becoming the village 
administrator/manager (e.g. Sorin Comsa).  
Furthermore, as Hilgers (2011) and Graziano (1976) argue, the micro-level 
politics of clientelism is always connected to larger structures, but the relationship is 




on the social and political system as a whole). On the contrary, both national policies 
applied from above and clientelistic relationships practised from below challenge 
and shape the status of citizens. In the case of Mexico and other Latin countries, Fox 
(1994) shows how anti-poverty policies (Mexico’s Solidarity program) can be a 
source for either further civic movements or clientelistic control and maintainance of 
local patronage through distribution of resources. In this sense, for my case study, it 
is interesting to explore the contradictory roles and enactments of the Roma expert 
network program, which aims at supporting Roma citizenship rights but seems to 
strengthen clientelistic ties and local patronage politics.  
Based on the results of the previous chapter on politics, in the next sections I 
inquire into the performance of local patronage politics and clientelistic simple 
exchanges during the 2009 presidential elections. I look at local-level presidential 
elections as an event during which long-term power relations between the patron, 
Roma brokers, and voters are performed. I am especially interested in the way 
control is exercised over the Roma electorate before and during the elections.   
 
 Presidential elections 2009: context  
 
Due to changes in the country’s Constitution, in November–December 2009 for the 
first time Romanian presidential elections did not occur at the same time as 
parliamentary ones. It was also the first time when the final results showed only a 
small difference (less than 1%) in the distribution of votes (Tufis 2012) between the 
two candidates: Traian Basescu (Liberal Democrat Party - PDL) and Mircea Geoana 
(Social Democrat Party - PSD). The political campaign was characterized by 
tensions and a tight battle between the two political organizations.  
In the second round, the PSD and the PNL entered into a coalition (USL) 
against the PDL and its candidate Traian Basescu. During the campaign, all the 
national surveys singled out Mircea Geoana as the favourite (Gheorghita 2012; 
Rotariu 2012, Tufis 2012). Surprisingly, the final count confirmed Basescu’s victory, 
with a difference of only 70,000 votes (Rotariu 2012). The main explanation was that 
Basescu gained a lot of votes from Transylvania (Rotariu 2012) and as Tufis (2012) 




voting intentions from the beginning to the end of elections), Geoana was not able to 
attract the large proportion of undecided voters (only 33%) in the second round. On 
the contrary, PDL and Basescu, with a percentage of 47% stable voters, succeeded in 
attracting 42% new supporters from the undecided camp.  
 In the 2009 elections, supporters of the two main parties differed in relation 
to place of residence (urban/rural) and form of employment (public/private) (Tufis 
2012). During presidential elections, the PSD had a 56% stable electorate in rural 
areas and 72% employed in public sector. On the other hand, the PDL had only a 
47% stable electorate in rural areas and a proportion of 47% employed in the public 
sector (Tufis 2012). The public/private gap can be partially and relatively explained 
through a similar association between public sector and local PSD patronage politics, 
which sets the main direction of voting. As mentioned in the chapter on historical 
transformations, journalists identified 65 local 'barons' in the main cities of Romania, 
out of which 37 were PSD, 17 were PDL, 8 were PNL, 2 were Conservative Party 
and 1 was Hungarian Democrat Union. The map of local barons is much more 
extensive in medium and small localities, including Costesti, frequently ruled by 
PSD mayors/deputy mayors.
Additionally Tufis (2012), Armeanu (2012) and Fesnic (2012) show that 
while PSD supporters “are older, have a lower level of education and come from 
rural areas” (Tufis 2012: 143), the PDL has a large proportion of “supporters who 
work in the private sector” (Tufis 2012: 143). Who and why people voted in the 2009 
presidential elections was another question to which Romanian political scientists 
answered with models of voting behaviour. Comsa (2012) showed that “the rate of 
participation was higher for those who identify themselves with a political party 
(67%)”, those “contacted by a party (69%), those persuaded by someone to vote with 
a candidate (65%), or those who, during campaign, received a gift from a 
party/candidate (60%)”104 (p. 167). Based on a statistical evaluation, Comsa (2012) 
showed that “men, people around 50-65 years, Roma, people with an average  level 
of education, those who attend church services or who live in Moldavia” (p. 166-7) 
had higher rates of participation.   
 
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It is also well known that Moldavia (Eastern Romanian region) is one of the 
poorest regions of Romania and the inhabitants give a high level of support to the 
PSD. In 2008, five of eight county councils in Moldavia, were under the control of 
the PSD105.   
In Costesti, village situated in Moldavia, the rate of participation in the 
presidential elections was 52.48% (for the county, participation was 55.67%, and 
nationally it was 54.5%106). In the presidential elections of 2009, a positive 
correlation was found between the mayor’s political membership and voting 
decisions of those with no clear attachment to a political party (Gheorghita 2012). As 
I showed in the previous chapters, the Roma are not interested in the ideological 
aspects of politics and, normally their voting decision follows the direction of local 
patronage politics. In Costesti and nearby villages, to which I went on short field 
trips, aspects of patronage politics can be seen in the number of votes that supported 
either Geoana or Basescu.  






Votes for Geoana 
(PSD) (%) 
Votes for Basescu 
(PDL) (%) 
County 55.67 52.10 47.89     
Goteni City 53.66 49.17 50.82       
Costesti (mayor 
PSD) 
52.48                                                        58.16 41.84 





55.30 55.32 44.67 
Source: Electoral Central Office - second round, 6 December 2009 (BEC, 
www.bec2009p.ro).  
 
105 ‘Alegeri locale 2012. Rezultate finale: Noua harta politica a Romaniei. Cine a castigat in orasul 
tau.’[Local elections 2012. Final results: New political map of Romania. Who won in your city],  
11.06.2012, Available at : www.gandul.info






The vote count suggests that patronage politics works well during elections. In 
Costesti, where the PSD is the local ruling party, patronage party, 58% of the 
electorate voted for Geoana, and only 41.84% for Basescu. In the nearby villages, 
voting went in the same direction as local patronage. In Liveni, where the mayor is a 
PDL representative, the highest percentage of votes went to Basescu (54.62%). In 
Moroieni, where the mayor is a PNL representative, the population voted for the 
PSD-PNL coalition (USL) against Basescu and gave their support to Geoana to the 
tune of 55.33%.  Finally, the local PSD patronage politics, supported by local patron 
Comsa and mayor Sorpaci, their followers and brokers can support the high Costesti 
support for the PSD candidate. 
Another explanation comes from the high level of Roma participation in the 
elections. The Roma count for 10% of Costesti’ population (approximately 1000 
people are of voting age). Romanianized Roma, the main recipients of patronage 
politics, participated in large numbers. Many of them were convinced to vote by 
Roma brokers (Dinica Sotu, Ioader Candel and others) and brought directly to the 
polling stations. As documented at national level, voters were well informed, 
deriving their knowledge from conversation (52%), TV shows (71%), radio (26%), 
newspapers (23%), and internet (6%) (Comsa 2010)107.  
Nevertheless, in rural areas these rates can be much lower for all media 
sources. During the campaign of 2009, I noticed that the main source of information 
and orientation for Roma (groups) was the TV, but also daily conversations with 
local patron Sorin Comsa and Roma brokers (Dinica Sotu, Ioader Candel and 
bulibasi Leonard, Razar) who were committed to convincing them to vote for the 
PSD or the PDL candidates. In the next section, I look at the roles Roma brokers 
(state/patronage/brokers) played during elections, and I describe their local activities 
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Internet) were calculated separately in relation to frequency use (once a week, several times a week, 




Political brokerage: Caldarar power brokers  
 
As developed in the previous chapters, Roma leaders, participate both formally and 
informally in local and regional meetings organized by the state as part of 
governmental strategy of social inclusion. In the sphere of politics, Roma experts 
Dinica Sotu (Costesti) and Corina Sotu (county level) follow the directions of the 
local or regional patronage actors. Informal Roma leaders, especially the Caldarar 
bulibasi Razar and Leonard support different political parties, play different sides 
and connect with the upper-level politics.  
 
C: What party you support?  
R: The PSD!  
C: Have you ever supported the Roma Party?  
R :Yes! I go with the PDL too because we go with Basescu.  
C: Why have you not gone with the Roma Party?  
R : I do not go with the Roma Party because the Gypsies are not united. 
You live in the village and you need to survive. I go to every council 
meeting but the majority of poor Roma don’t participate. Sometimes, our 
council does not issue the papers claimed. It is true that there are many 
who cannot pay their debts [taxes] to the council.  
C: If you have, issues to solve where are you going: to the local or to the 
county council? Which one do you trust more?  
R : The local council first, but if we don't  trust them we go to the county, 
or the prefecture.  
C: Do you personally know someone at the prefecture?  
R: I know the president of the Goteni council. He is from the PSD. I’ve 
been going with him for years, and we know each other and I was also 
very close to Delu Nistor who was a Minister of Interior. We know each 
other and I supported him whenever he needed votes. So, I could reach a 
high level (Razar, bulibasa in Costesti). 
 
Razar confirms that Roma leaders do not usually give their support to the Roma 
Party and do not influence Roma voting behaviour in this direction. In the interview, 
he argues that the lack of an electorate for the Roma Party makes the party a 
fragmented force. Roma dependence on local patronage is responsible for this sort of 
fragmentation of political support for the Roma Party. Razar and other Roma leaders, 




and the local council or other public institutions are mediated by local patronage 
actors (e.g. administrator Comsa, mayor Sorpaci).  
On the other hand, he is aware that mediation between the community and 
local authorities, which upholds his leadership position, needs to be performed 
through patronage politics in order to be successful. He is still important for the 
community inasmuch as he is able to negotiate with local council representatives on 
community issues (access to gas facilities, cancellations of fines). He is important for 
local PSD patronage in so far as he is able to convince Caldarars to vote for PSD. 
The two relations are interdependent and are the main source of power for his 
leadership position.    
However, Razar is more than an informal Roma leader. He is a  power broker, 
a leader who acts informally in multiple spheres of power (business, politics, state 
mediator) and frequently aims at convincing the Roma to vote the PDL (national 
governing party) and sometimes for the PSD (local patronage party). His connections 
in the sphere of politics are not made directly with the local patron, Comsa, but with 
various actors in the broad range from the political fields (patronage politics and 
political patronage) to central government politics.  
Power brokers like Razar and the informal Romanianized Roma leader Ioader 
Candel tend to stress their interactions and familiarity with the central-level 
politicians like the regional PSD representative Delu Nistor, or president Basescu, 
rather than with the local patrons and other state actors. Interestingly, both Razar 
(Caldarar bulibasa) and Ioader Candel (informal Romanianized Roma leader) 
emphasised their connections with Delu Nistor, who held the position of deputy 
prime minister for a short period. The political leader is invoked as a symbol of 
access to upper politics. “I reached a high level”, as Razar claims. It is also a 
demonstration of surpassing barriers of local-level politics and positioning 
themselves in the expanded field of patronage politics where local patrons and 
central-level politicians are linked through complex webs of power relations. 
Escaping the confinement Roma experts experience in relation with local state and 
patronage, power brokers like Romanianized Roma leader Ioader Candel and 
bulibasi Razar and Leonard circulate between different levels of power and vary 





former main bulibasa during socialism) explains the changes in his political support 
and brokerage actions (convincing Caldarars to vote with different parties) during the 
2009 presidential elections.    
 
C: Politically, what party you support?  
L: We decide during elections. Now we cannot say that we will go with 
one or another.  
C: In the last elections [2009 presidential] who did you go with?  
L: I can’t say that any more. It is not clear now with whom. While me 
and Sterea [Caldarar bulibasa] went with the PDL, Razar (Caldarar 
bulibasa) went with the PSD. 
C: Why did you support the PDL?  
L: Because Razar took the PSD and we had to choose someone else.  
C: Is there any reason when you chose the party?  
L: Now to tell you the truth. We went twice to presidential elections – 
two rounds of voting. For the first, we supported the PSD, and for the 
second, we went with the PDL.  
C: So you don’t need to have a definite political opinion right from the 
beginning?   
L: Yes, but Razar goes with many others. He goes to the PSD [the local 
organization] and tells them he goes with them, and then he goes to the 
PDL and says “I'll go with you too.” He does the same with the PRM 
[Great Romania Party].  
C: What about you? What party you support?  
L: I said to myself: let’s see: if I am not with the PSD [the local 
patronage party], what’s going to happen. I wanted to show that I have 
more influence on the Roma and in this locality [as compared with other 
Caldarar leaders]. (Leonard, bulibasa in Costesti). 
 
As bulibasa Leonard shows in this fragment, the November 2009 presidential 
elections set the stage for Caldarar bulibasi (power brokers) to demonstrate their 
influence and strengthen their position in the dynamics of local patronage politics. As 
already mentioned in previous chapters, after 1989, several Caldarar leaders claimed 
the position of bulibasa: Leonard, Sterea and Razar. From this interview fragment, it 
is clear that power brokerage does not entail ideological options but rather degrees of 
influence over the Roma electorate (Caldarars), which will confirm or contest the 
Roma leadership position. The most influential Caldarar bulibasa would be able to 
convince more Caldarars to vote for one political party or another. Leonard, in 




leadership (bulibasa), chose a different strategy: to show the local patronage actors 
including Comsa how much can be lost without his brokerage support for the PSD.  
The confirmation came through the patron and his followers’ ability to count the 
number of the ballots given to the PSD at each polling station and especially in the 
districts where most of the Caldarars live. On 22 November 2009, I could notice how 
both the mayor Sorpaci and the manager/patron of the village (PSD) Comsa checked 
the number of votes hourly at the polling station in the Caldarars’ district. 
Nevertheless, these struggles for influence among the Caldarar Roma brokers 
lessened the local/regional political leaders’ trust (Comsa - PSD, Grinea and Dan 
Popescu - PNL, Rodan - PDL) in the Caldarars’ political support. One of the PDL 
councillors, Dorin, told me that Caldarars who never vote for his party disappoint 
him. Caldarar bulibasa Razar promised him to convince Caldarars to vote, but as 
Dorin said “Razar plays a double game, he promised to bring 100 people for a 
meeting organized in support for Basescu and he did nothing”. Teacher Grinea, PNL 
councillor, also showed his distrust in the Caldarar brokers’ informal actions because 
, as he said, they usually change their options during elections and do not keep their 
promises.   
Additionally, it should be also said that while Romanianized Roma follow in 
large numbers the direction given by the PSD local patronage actors, the Caldarar 
voters do not follow invariably their leaders’  instructions, which are divided anyway 
between different political parties. While they were split between different bulibasi, 
supporting one or another, they were also aware that individual votes are 'secret’ and 
nobody can control that. They expressed contradictory attitudes but many of their 
statements showed their personal options. During my fieldwork, especially in the 
pre-election time, I had many informal conversations with both Romanianized Roma 
and Caldarars about their voting behaviour. Illustrative in this case is a conversation I 
had with a middle-income Caldarar man (Fieldnotes, 16 November 2009). I asked 
him whom he was going to vote for and, at first, he told me the PSD. Then I noticed 
his orange t-shirt (with the sign and colour of the PDL) and he told me laughing that 
there are people from the PDL who come to their district and distribute buckets and 
t-shirts with the party’s label. He also mentioned that Razar told them whom to vote 




(Leonard or Sterea) told them to vote for the PSD too. However, he showed 
confidence by saying that the vote is anonymous and nobody could find out who his 
vote was given to. He told me that he would normally vote for Basescu, as for the 
last years of the PDL's office he had succeeded in making good business. In the last 
18 months, he had made 2.5 billion old lei. He also acknowledged that other 
Caldarars might have different options as their businesses have probably worked 
better during the Iliescu’s regimes (PSD) and for these reasons, they would probably 
choose to vote PSD 
Generally, informal conversations with Caldarar voters confirmed the 
relationship between voting behaviour and the success of family business. The 
Caldarars tend to support governing parties that prove to be favourable for the 
development of their informal economic activities. However, that does not exclude 
the possibility of influence coming from Caldarar power brokers (bulibasi), who 
often intervened to solve family conflicts and problems. Sometimes, they are also 
influenced by the local patron Comsa who facilitates their access to public services.  
Among the Romanianized Roma, voting behaviour is more homogenous. 
Although they are frequently in conflict with the patron’s attitudes and local 
governance, they seem to be trapped in a constraining relationship with the local 
patronage actors, who facilitate access to state welfare and services. Local political 
actors from the opposition (Grinea and Dan Popescu - PNL, history teacher Bratita 
and councillor Dorin - PDL) are aware of the PSD’s local patronage control 
mechanisms over the Romanianized Roma community. In interviews, they criticised 
the monopoly the PSD holds over local governance, especially in feeding Roma 
dependence in relation to the local council through the exploitative control of local 
state welfare.  
C: How is the PSD represented in the Romanianized Roma community?  
G: Dinica Sotu [the Roma expert in the council] is there and forces them 
to vote. In the whole village, there are more than 400 applications for 
social benefits [Romanianized Roma are the main recipients]. All of the 
Romanianized Roma vote with the power, to keep receiving the state’s 
money. That is clear! The mayor and Comsa fooled them and they 
succeeded [in elections] (Grinea, local PNL councillor, teacher and 




From his position as a PNL councillor, Grinea is critical of the patronage actors’ 
techniques of strengthening and locally reproducing their power. He suggests that the 
local distribution of welfare is the main controlling instrument over the Roma voting 
options. When he says ’they fooled them’ he refers to the limited and short term 
benefits Roma receive in this form of exchange, which does not produce, in  the long 
term, a basis for social development. Grinea is also very critical of Dinica Sotu’ 
actions of political brokerage made for the PSD patronage actors (mayor, vice-
mayor, local patron). As I showed, in previous chapters, Dinica Sotu is a Roma 
expert and also a patronage broker, who feels obliged to persuade his community 
members to vote for the patron’s party. His mediation of an exploitative dependence 
on local political governance reproduces both his own subordination and the 
Romanianized Roma community’s dependence on local patronage.  
 
Clientelism and Vote buying/bartering among the Romanianized 
Roma and the Caldarars 
    
In the following paragraphs, I give examples of everyday interactions and exchanges 
the patron has with his Romanianized Roma clients.  
Dorina was one of my Romanianized Roma friends I often used to visit. We 
used to chat about interactions she had with the local institutions. She once told me 
she was worried that she would not be able to renew her expired ID card, as she had 
not paid the council tax (200 RON). She considered that the local council’s practice 
of making renewal of her  ID card conditional upon her paying her council tax to be 
unfair . “This is not the law”, as she told me. However, her husband renewed his ID 
just before the 2009 presidential elections. On his first attempt, the local council’s 
employees refused her husband for exactly this reason, non-payment of his council 
tax. However, the man pursued his application and asked Roma expert Dinica Sotu 
and administrator Comsa for help. Comsa answered his plea by asking the council 
employees to renew his ID: “Renew this man’s ID, please, because he has to vote”, 
he said. At the time as we had that conversation (May 2010), Dorina was confused 
about the whole situation and she felt ashamed to ask Comsa to give her similar 




Another Romanianized Roma woman, Adina, told a similar story. She needed 
running water in her household. At first, she asked the mayor, who refused her 
repeatedly. After a while, she went to the local patron/administrator of the village 
and told him: “Mr. Comsa, please help me, I am a poor woman”. Comsa invited her 
and other women to his council office. He asked them show their ID’s. Checking 
their IDs carefully, he told the women, smiling: “I know you voted for me, do not 
worry - I am going to solve this”. He made a short call and in three days Adina had 
access to running water. (Fieldnotes, 14 May 2010). In the first case, both 
Romanianized Roma and local patronage actors were interested in renewing the ID 
cards, which are a necessary condition for voting. The exchange was made on the 
promise that Roma will vote with the PSD patronage party.  However, in this case, 
Dorina experienced feelings of shame when trying to obtain something, which was in 
the interest of local patronage too. As many authors of clientelism studies argue, this 
form of restraint constitutes the very basis of the clientelistic relation, diffuseness 
grounded in developed feelings of trust, loyalty, and even shame (Scott 1972&1977; 
Graziano 1976; Gouldner 1977; Hilgers 2008, 2011). 
In the second example, by checking their IDs108, Comsa exercised a direct, 
face to face form of control and exchange, close to vote buying, which is a one-shot 
exchange. Often Romanianized Roma are in a direct patron-client relation with 
Comsa, which does not need mediation from Roma leaders/brokers (Dinica Sotu, 
Ioader Candel).  
Comsa’s direct clients are usually Romanianized Roma, who experience the 
poorest conditions in the village and with whom he has developed relationships since 
he was a child. He was born in their district and lived there for many years. He was a 
teacher of their children and director of the school where most of them go for their 
primary education. Many of the Romanianized Roma, now eligible voters, were his 
pupils in school. In informal conversations, both Comsa and Romanianized Roma 
confirmed the importance of the relationship as a source of trust and reciprocity in 
direct exchanges. Comsa also suggested that by getting to know them, he has their 
trust and can rely on their votes. Nevertheless, Romanianized Roma showed 
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contradictory opinions about their local patron, ranging from appreciation to 
discontent. They appreciated his efforts to help with everyday claims and assist in 
their relations with representatives of the local state, but disliked his “arrogant 
attitude” and the distance he displayed in public. It is clear there is not just a simple 
clientelistic exchange between the local patron and his Roma clients, but, as Hilgers 
(2011) suggests, “a personal relationship... a series of interactions that play out over 
time” (p. 573). The Romanianized Roma perceived the relationship with their patron 
as a continuous source of resort in their everyday life interactions with the local 
authorities.  
Although the classical schema (Scott 1972; Graziano 1976; Gouldner 1977) 
states that only clients feel obliged to return the service, my research data shows that 
the local patron is also under pressure to perform, to offer “availability”, to answer 
and solve the Gypsies’ complaints. Comsa always showed an increased willingness 
to protect Roma interests (both groups) in the local council or in relation with other 
local public institutions.  
The regional PSD campaign president told me that, as compared with the 
mayor (PSD representative), Comsa has always been kind and sympathetic to the 
Gypsies’ problems (Fieldnotes, 8 November 2009). Results were visible during local, 
presidential and parliamentary elections when a large proportion of the Roma 
supported the PSD. In an informal conversation we had, Comsa defended the 
Gypsies’ interests, especially the Caldarars’. He told me that when he was a 
councillor of the vice prime-minister Delu Nistor, he succeeded in channelling 43 
billion old lei to the local budget in Costesti. The latter statement came as a 
justification of his informal support for the Caldarar community, who do not pay 
taxes and lack documents, and towards whom the local state employees need to 
“close their eyes”. I asked him if the local council would be able, after the elections, 
to collect the council tax from Caldarars. His answer was negative and was 
connected to his intention to run for the next local council elections. In this context, a 
local decision to tax the Caldarars’ belongings would work against his own interests. 
If he forced the Caldarars to pay their dues, they would no longer vote for him in the 
next elections (Fieldnotes, 9 November 2009). In the meantime, the cancellation of 




the local council meetings109. During the presidential elections campaign, three 
Caldarar families, relatives of Caldarar bulibasi asked for the cancellation of fines 
due for the non-payment of council taxes. The PDL councillors, including Dorin and 
Rodan rejected the application and were very critical of the PSD local councillors’ 
decision of cancellation. 
 
D : The PSD can promise anything to Caldarars as they have 8 people as 
members of the council. In a local PDL meeting, Razar [Caldarar 
informal leader-bulibasa] told us ’Why did you not vote for cancelling 
our fines? You will see that my time will come and I will get rid of you, 
all of you who are against us [the Caldarars] and only the PSD will 
remain here.’ They think that if the PSD wins, they will pay nothing [no 
fines]. There were no discussions about them before, but now, because of 
the elections, they have started to talk about all these issues. Gypsies 
pressure you until you give them something. (Dorin, PDl councillor- 
Fieldnotes, 13 November 2009). 
 
By claiming, he will succeed in convincing all Caldarars to vote for the PSD, 
bulibasa Razar threatened opposition local councillors, with withdrawal of his 
support for any political party different from the local patronage party. However, in 
the final meeting most of the councillors voted pro the cancellation of their fines.  As 
a power broker, Razar is able to influence Caldarars’ voting behaviour in different 
directions. In this sense, his threat refers to his capacity of convincing Caldarars to 
vote only for the PSD, which would leave no space for other political representatives 
(e.g. PDL, PNL) to be elected by the Roma as local councillors or mayors.   
In this context, the classical model of clientelistic relation, proposed by Scott 
(1972), which emphasises the superiority of patrons over clients is challenged. While 
I agree that clients and patrons do not share a similar status, the latter do not always 
have control over the relationship.  Control was negotiated in this case by Caldarar 
power brokers. The source of power is in relationships themselves, through which 
control is negotiated. In many other conversations I had with local governance actors 
and Roma I noticed that local patronage is always under pressure to perform not only 
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in terms of availability, but also in  terms of  the expected exchange (e.g. votes for 
fine cancellations) and, sometimes, by showing off  pro-Gypsy attitudes. However, 
the local administrator /patron and the mayor do not entirely manage to retain their 
self-control and often show arrogance, disrespect or even disdain against Gypsies. 
Both the Caldarars and Romanianized Roma confessed that often when they go to the 
local council to ask mayor Sorpaci for help, they face hostility and strong language. 
However, despite his arrogance, local patron Comsa is always there to give them 
support.  
Caldarar power brokers become more influential in pre-election times when 
they can raise claims for public services, pose threats or organize meetings with local 
patronage actors. In November 2009, during the presidential election campaign, I 
used to visit the local PSD campaign office where local patronage members (mayor, 
deputy mayor, village administrator/patron), some Roma brokers (Roma expert 
Dinica Sotu; Marius, bulibasa Razar’s brother) and PSD supporters met and talked 
about the elections. I heard many stories during the campaign, which show the 
flexible relationship the local patron Comsa has with the Caldarar brokers. One 
evening, there were just a few people around, including the local patron, Comsa, 
Marius and Marius’ business partners. Marius is well known for his informal 
dealings involving old technology. After some initial pleasantries, chat I asked 
Marius what his main occupation was. Visibly pleased with the opportunity to 
answer my question, he smiled and began to play with a thick golden bracelet, which 
he had taken out of his red, PSD jacket, and he started speaking quickly and with 
humour about his informal businesses.  
After several stories about his business failures, he remembered an incident 
he had involving the regional police. Whilst driving his Mercedes in the city, the 
police stopped him. He showed his ID and then he asked the policeman: “What’s 
wrong with you? Don’t you see who I am and what my name is? Mateiescu!”  
Marius related how the police officer suddenly changed his attitude and said, “Sorry, 
I didn’t recognize you this morning”. Before leaving, he gave 50 RON to the 
policeman. Marius explained that this happened after a long evening drinking session 
and that was the reason for not being recognised by the police officer. Other stories 




used pipes from Goteni for high prices. All these stories were told in a very relaxed 
posture in the presence of the former councillor of the Minister of Interior, Mr. 
Comsa, the village administrator and local patron. During his story telling, the local 
patron looked visibly uncomfortable, although pretending he was enjoying the 
stories. In a way, Comsa had to accept a performance that contested his authority, 
influence and respectively the importance of his position as the local patron of the 
village.  
The ethnographic snapshot shows the way the patron’s power is subjected to 
the brokers’ performances. Although acting in an unequal relationship, the patron 
does not possess power or influence as Scott (1972) and Graziano (1976) suggest. 
His influence is always mediated through his clients and power brokers’ practices 
and by a certain discipline, he needs to develop in relationships with all these actors 
who support with votes his position as patron and local patronage team.  
These performances and interactions between Comsa and the Roma power 
brokers became more visible during the 2009 presidential pre–election process. 
During my visits to the PSD local office, the campaign staff told me how members of 
the local governance/local patronage mayor, deputy mayor, administrator/local 
patron) were invited by bulibasa Razar at his house, for dinner. They were impressed 
to see the house’s decorations and the dining room: “The table alone - a deputy’s 
table - might have cost 2-300 million old lei”. I had a similar impression when I 
visited Razar at home for an interview. The room resembled a venue in the 
Romanian parliament, an interior arrangement in line with Razar’s claim to be a 
president, not a “bulibasa”, a term that he considered inadequate for his new role 
and position in the village and Caldarar community. In the interview I had with a 
PNL councillor Grinea, I obtained details about the post-dinner discussions:   
 
G: I understood that Razar gave a dinner for PSD members at his house 
and a few days later, he went to the local council to ask for a paper, and 
he made a big scandal: “I invited you in my house to eat and you do not 
want to give me a paper?” (Grinea, PNL councillor, former mayor of the 
village).   
 
The dinner at the Razar’s place with the main members of the local governance was a 




among Caldarars. In addition, it was the expression of an expected exchange between 
brokers and the local patronage actors. However, as Grinea shows, expectations are 
not always fulfilled and the exchange is not performed. After the visit at Razar’s 
house, the Caldarar leaders’ relatives were exempted from fines but not from the 
council tax payment. The relation between the Caldarar power brokers and the patron 
is thus fluid, uncertain and characterized by lack of trust. Caldarar power brokers 
collaborate with members of the local patronage but they never play just for one side, 
or from the same position. Similarly, the Caldarar electorate shows loyalty to neither 
brokers nor the local patron. After the second round of voting in the presidential 
election, at a dinner in support of the PSD, (the local patron's party) organized by 
another Caldarar broker, Sterea, one of the participants confirmed the duality of 
Caldarars’ political options: 
 
Here, at this dinner, we are all split between different political parties; 
some go with Geoana [the PSD candidate in the presidential elections of 
2009] and others with Basescu [the PDL candidate], but we do not want 
to fight here. (Field notes, 29th November 2009).  
 
The continuum that runs from coercion to free exchange that is involved in 
clientelistic relations is dependent on the degree of influence performed by patron 
Comsa and Roma brokers. While Caldarars are generally influenced by different 
directions given by Caldarar bulibasi/power brokers (Razar, Leonard, Sterea), 
Romanianized Roma follow Comsa and generally the PSD’s local patronage 
direction. A common coercive practice, used by Comsa and Romanianized Roma 
brokers (e.g. Dinica Sotu) and followers during elections, acknowledged in the 
literature on clientelism (Wang and Kurzman 2007, Fox 1994; Hilgers 2011), was 
the transportation of citizens to the polls. In Costesti, Comsa’s followers organised 
transport for Romanianized Roma for both the 1st and 2nd rounds of presidential 
elections.   
The day before the second round of presidential elections, I visited the 
Romanianized Roma, PSD local councillor who had invited me to his house, visibly 
one of the largest in the Romanianized Roma district, the poorest area of the village. 





assigned by Comsa to organize the transport for Romanianized Roma voters to get to 
the polls. I asked him why he was so sure that the Romanianized Roma were going to 
vote for the PSD. Avoiding a straight answer, he told me that he himself was an 
important person in the village. He has a construction company and he was able to 
provide temporary, seasonal jobs to most of the Romanianized Roma who are now 
unemployed and he claimed:”These Gypsies have the obligation to vote as I say. 
They will always vote PSD”. However, from this discussion and others I had with 
many Romanianized Roma, I found out that few of them were actually working for 
his construction business. The PSD councillor’s expectations were higher than the 
practical exchange offered to his Romanianized Roma clients.  
However, patronage followers and brokers (Roma expert Dinica Sotu and 
PSD councillors) were confident about the Romanianized Roma voting. The 
explanation of this trust in the exchange can be partly attributed to the Romanianized 
Roma’s dependency on the local state provision of welfare, jobs and exchange 
arrangements during elections, such as the organized transport to the polls. 
Moreover, the Romanianized Roma brokers (members of Sotu family) are for most 
of the time, loyal followers of the local patronage who aim at convincing the Roma 
to vote for the PSD. On the other hand, in order to raise the turnout, Comsa directly 
buys votes from the Roma. Many of Romanianized Roma I talked to confirmed the 
practice. In the last elections, they used to receive both food and money, directly or 
indirectly, from Comsa.  
 
 Election days, 22 November and 6 December 2009  
On the election days (1st and 2nd round), I had numerous informal discussions with 
Roma voters (both Romanianized Roma and Caldarars) in their district and at the 
polls. A Romanianized Roma woman confessed that she was confused and she did 
not know who to vote for as no one helped her. She told me that Comsa gave cash to 
people and that he gave 100 RON to one of her friends, but just 20 RON to her. 
However, she did not feel she wanted to vote and was not sure whether she was 
going to do it or not. Disappointed, she related how she leaves her ID card as credit 





On the same day, in the middle of a chat I had with some Romanianized 
Roma, Dinica Sotu, the Roma expert at the local council - patronage broker - came 
by car and picked up the Romanianized Roma to take them to the polls. Interestingly, 
after getting out of the polls, Romanianized Roma whom I knew to live in harsh 
housing conditions were proud to show me their stamped ID’s110. In the context of 
their everyday marginalization, practised by local authorities, voting was an 
opportunity for an individualized experience and an assumption of social importance 
in relation to the local governance and patronage. Nevertheless, the controlled 
character of clientelism during elections, through vote-buying and arranged transport 
to the polls, stimulated criticism and reflection among Romanianized Roma, which 
was revealed in the conversations we had.  However, vote-buying as “one shot direct 
exchange” (Schaffer 2007; Hilgers 2008) was complemented by the diffuse 
relationship established between local patron Comsa and his Roma clients, who 
succeeded in reaching  the  necessary voting level among Romanianized Roma. 
In the Caldarars’ district, at the poll station (the district school), rich 
Caldarars made an overwhelming parade of their wealth by wearing fashionable 
suits, sun glasses and driving expensive cars. Razar, one of the main Caldarar power 
brokers, was in the courtyard of the polling station for most of the time, pretending to 
supervise the proceedings. However, due to official restrictions governing polling 
stations, the local police asked all Caldarars to move their cars 200 metres away from 
the school (polling station) and Razar to leave the courtyard. Contrary to restrictions, 
the members of the local patronage (mayor, manager, deputy mayor) regularly 
visited the polling station to check the number of votes. It is also relevant that 
common Caldarars were not transported by car by their brokers/bulibasi, but came in 
person to vote and none of them told of vote buying.     
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Figure 23Caldarars with their cars on the Election Day 2009 in front of the polling station 
(Caldarars’ local school), Photo taken by the author 2009.   
 
Figure 24On the Election Day,Caldarar man with his driver, close to his Mercedes, in 





Are the two Roma groups captive voters in the local level elections?  
 
Through vote-buying exchanges and controlled voting, the Romanianized Roma 
seem to get trapped in coerciveness. Nevertheless, the exchanges of votes for  social 
services and cash, are  frequently performed on the basis  of a long-term relationship 
developed with the local patron Comsa, for whom Romanianized Roma experience 
feelings of respect and loyalty. Contrary to the classical definition of clientelism as a 
non-democratic exchange, but in agreement with Fox’s (1994) arguments for the 
case of Mexican clientelism, the patron-client relationship between Comsa, his 
followers and the Romanianized Roma can be seen as an alternative to citizenship 
rights through which they can get access to state welfare and services. In this context 
exchanges often are issues of vote barter, rather than vote buying. Nevertheless, the 
long-term reliance on state social benefits make Romanianized Roma the subjects of 
a strong clientelistic relation with the local patronage actors and confine their 
possibilities for socio-economic improvement to the local patronage politics able to 
channel resources and services.     
On the other hand, the Caldarars do not seem to be captive voters at all. As 
Wang and Kurzman (2007) argue for Taiwan, clients can avoid the trap of total 
subordination in a context where numerous actors act as patrons. In my research, the 
Caldarar power brokers – the bulibasi - create the possibility of alienation from local 
patronage politics and a random distribution of votes. The multiplicity of brokerage 
and their divergent directions leave space for Caldarars’ personal options, which are 
often connected to their perception of interdependencies between politics and 
informal economic practices (ruling parties facilitating their businesses). On the other 
hand, Caldarars successfully involved in the informal economy are interested in 
hiding their property, avoiding paying council taxes and at the same time getting 
access to state welfare and ID renewals. All these interests bring them into a semi-
clientelistic relation with the PSD local patronage actors mediated by bulibasi 
brokers.  
 Clientelistic relations between local patron, Roma brokers and Roma clients 




Costesti, the Roma expert is a Romanianized Roma whose main interest is to 
convince members of his community to vote for the local patronage party. In this 
context, Roma experts are patronage brokers in a relationship of direct subordination 
with the local patronage, required to follow political interests and almost unable to 
promote Roma interests. The whole Roma expert program is mediated locally by the 
dynamics of patronage politics (distribution of resources by a local team supporting a 
political party) and direct clientelistic relations with local patronage actors and 
followers which, as I showed, are not always inefficient or unhelpful in solving the 
Gypsies’ problems.  
 
Conclusions 
In every day local level politics, clientelism proved not to be a one-way relationship 
of subordination and thus challenged the classical definition of clientelism (Scott 
1972; Hilgers 2008), which implies a subordinated relation between two partners. In 
Costesti, the local patron Comsa does not always control his Roma clients’ political 
options, as far as Caldarar power brokers put pressure on the local patronage actors’ 
actions. The local patron acts in relation with the Roma power brokers, who do not 
always fulfil the expected exchange (number of votes expected).  
In the following sentences, I summarize the answer to the main question of my Ph.D. 
thesis and show how the performed power relations at local- level politics intersect 
with the differentiated socio-economic configuration of the two Roma communities. 
The multiplicity of power brokers, their duality and divergence leave space 
for democratization of voting behaviour among Caldarars and a relative 
independence in relation to the politics of local patronage. In terms of constraints or 
opportunities for socio-economic improvement, Caldarars are able to act outside of 
local direct clientelistic relations and patronage politics, or at its boundaries, and to 
preserve a relatively independent form of action, organization and expression of their 
political options. 
  More importantly, in this context, they exploit their relative independence 
from local patronage and from power brokers’ actions and they are able to keep 




practices (e.g. Pentecostal religious discursive practices discussed in previous 
chapter).   
For the Romanianized Roma the clientelistic relations are established by 
direct contact with the main local patronage actors (administrator Comsa, deputy 
mayor Sorpaci). Moreover, the informal Romanianized Roma leader Ioader Candel, 
who generally follows the lines of local patronage, and Roma expert Dinica Sotu 
who acts as a patronage broker, reproduce the clientelistic relations between local 
patron Comsa and Romanianized Roma. In this context, Romanianized Roma are not 
politically represented by leaders at the local council meetings and their individual 
struggles for economic opportunities and access to state welfare are always mediated  
through patronage politics. Taking into account the conclusions of the chapter on 
informal economy and local level politics, Romanianized Roma’s economic practices 
are confined to limited local economic possibilities. Moreover, the Romanianized 
Roma’s struggles for representation and participation in decision-making processes 
(politics) are captured by local clientelistic relations and patronage politics. For these 
reasons, they are almost unable to develop forms of self-governance to counteract the 
ubiquitous force of patronage politics and resulted clientelism, within which they act 
and are constituted as subjects of local governance politics.  
Lack of genuine Romani politics and representation, lack of forms of social 
and political organization and a local approach to social relations and economic 
practices, which is unable to go beyond the structure of local patronage politics serve 
to block an improvement of their socio-economic condition.    
The chapter also reveals the necessity that, whilst exploring modes of empowerment 
in a neopatrimonial system, one should pay special attention to both patronage 
brokers who reproduce patronage structures and power brokers who challenge 
patronage politics and leave space for the circulation of power and the development 






Chapter 8.Caldarars’ Pentecostalism: Empowerment 
and Subjection to Power 

Religious foundations in Costesti and associated attitudes  
Under socialism, both Roma communities in Costesti used to be Orthodox believers. 
There are two Orthodox churches in the village where both Romanians and Roma 
used to attend services. As the priest and many locals suggested, the central church 
was always overcrowded during the key religious feasts (Christmas and Easter), 
when peasants, Caldarars and Romanianized Roma used to come in large numbers. 
However, congestion was not the main reason for setting up a Pentecostal church.  
Cristian Diaconu, the first Pentecostal preacher, told me the story of how the 
Pentecostal church came to be in Costesti. He is a Romanian Pentecostal believer, 
who wanted to establish a single church for Romanianized Roma and started to 
preach informally at his house. He came from a different region and settled in 
Costesti after his marriage to a Romanianized Roma woman. He was a Pentecostal 
convert from the beginning and he decided to bring Pentecostalism first to the 
Romanianized Roma and Caldarars and then to the whole village.    
In the beginning, in order to make the Pentecostal gathering more attractive to 
the Romanianized Roma, at each religious service he used to provide food and 
packages to poor families. As he complained, the Romanianized Roma were regular 
attendees as long as food and material help were provided. When he was no longer 
able to obtain funding for his charitable gifts, he decided to invite, attract and 
convince Caldarars to convert to Pentecostalism. As he told me, Caldarars were not 
just interested in conversion, but were also very receptive to the Pentecostal 
preaching and prayer. He portrayed them as superstitious and worried about the 
future of their finances and informal businesses. He has been quite happy to give 
private religious services to Caladarar families experiencing conflicts or just worried 
about their informal economic activities. 
At one point, the preacher Cristian Diaconu received financial support from 




initiatives were often challenged or even thwarted by the Orthodox priest of the 
central church and by the Romanianized Roma Dinica Sotu, the Roma expert, who 
attempted to put pressure on the local authorities and the population to reject the 
Pentecostal church project (Fieldnotes, 9 November 2009). Both the Orthodox priest 
and the Roma expert explained their aggressive refusal in terms of worries they had 
about an imminent loss of control over Romanianized Roma. In their views, fewer 
Romanianized Roma would have attended the Orthodox Church service and listened 
to their Roma leader and expert, Dinica Sotu.  
In the meantime, Caldarars decided to have their own building for church 
services and prayer. In the years that followed, they struggled to find the money to 
buy the land and pay for the construction of the church. In 2008, the building was 
erected, and the Caldarar believers, as well as some new ones who had joined the 
congregation, started to attend church services at the new venue, built in the 
Caldarars’ district. At the beginning, Cristian Diaconu, the Romanianized Roma 
founder of the local Pentecostal union, was invited to be the main preacher but, in 
time, a rich Caldarar with medium level of education, Mateiescu Doru, who had 
attended some religious training sessions, replaced him and started to preach the 
gospel in the Romani language to the Caldarar converts. He is one of the few 
Caldarars with sufficient formal education to enable him to read and interpret the 
Bible. Many of the Caldarar families either lack formal education or have no more 
than four years of schooling.  
This change was beneficial for the Caldarar converts interested in a Caldarar 
preacher who could preach in their language and come closer to their cultural needs. 
On the other hand, Mateiescu Doru worked to maintain his informal position as 
prophet and provided private religious services for Caldarars, who considered him to 
be endowed with divine powers and able to solve their family problems. 
However, since then no Romanianized Roma have attended church services and the 
Pentecostal church in Costesti has become the Caldarars’ church. That happened for 
two principal reasons. First, Caldarars maintain a caste boundary with the 
Romanianized Roma, who are considered impure, poor and not real Gypsies. Most of 
the time Romanianized Roma are rejected or marginalized by Caldarars and this 




a common social space111. In this context, the Romanianized Roma are not welcomed 
and are not interested in Caldarars’ Pentecostal church. Secondly, they lacked a 
specific interest in Pentecostal religion and were more interested in getting economic 
support from the church, which was not longer provided.  
According to Mateiescu Doru’s estimate, in 2008 there were only 45 Caldarar 
converts.  By 2010, their number had reached 135, which shows an increased level of 
conversion among Caldarars. Interestingly, in an interview I had with Doru, Cristian 
Diaconu’s initiative was barely mentioned and generally downplayed.  
 
C: How did those from Costesti hear about the Pentecostal church? 
D: We heard about it in Sibiu, where they have a Pentecostal church.  
C: Did the project started among the Romanianized Roma? 
D: No, there were so many poor people there. There were too many of us, 
so we needed our own church. Brother Daniel Mateiescu went to Cluj 
and found someone who wanted to fund our project. (Interview with 
Mateiescu Doru, Caldarar Pentecostal preacher).  
 
Mateiescu Doru gives a different explanation and claims the foundation of the 
Pentecostal church in Costesti. He suggests that the Christian Roma Centre organized 
by the self-entitled ‘president of the Roma’ Miron Codrea, himself a Pentecostal 
minister, supported the construction of the Costesti Pentecostal church.         
Both Doru Mateiescu and Daniel Mateiescu, members of the church 
administration, considered that the advice of president of the Roma, Miron Codrea, 
was much more important for the local Pentecostal church than Cristian Diaconu’s 
initial local project. The local religious initiative of bringing together both groups of 
Roma failed from the start. While poor Romanianized Roma were mainly interested 
in material benefits, the Caldarars wanted to differentiate themselves from other 
Gypsies and build their own cultural environment with a new local congregation: 
preaching in Romani, having a Caldarar preacher, enjoying a dramatic style of 
praying on themes of general interest to Caldarars, such as overcoming troubles with 
their informal economic practices.  
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Pentecostalism brought changes in the interactions between Caldarar 
believers, Romanian and Roma non-converts. All converts claimed to have 
renounced bad habits (alcohol consumption, fighting, partying) and that there was a 
strengthened sense of cohesion and egalitarian values. Locals confirmed the change 
in behaviour and said there had been a general decrease in alcohol-related violence 
and aggressiveness. However, not all Caldarars converted to Pentecostalism. Some of 
the believers told me that only ‘the poorer’ Caldarars joined the church, those who 
hoped for more equality and community cohesion. It is well known locally that rich 
Caldarars despise the poor and they maintain an almost a caste-like boundary with 
both the Romanianized Roma and the less wealthy Caldarars. They do not even greet 
or talk to them in public. In this context, the Pentecostal church offers a new 
possibility to the poorer Caldarar families, a transformation from an unequal form of 
social organization to a more egalitarian one.  
Moreover, the Pentecostal conversion brought changes in the way the 
Caldarar approach the local authorities and in their form of leadership, bulibasa. It 
was also an opportunity for several formerly rich Caldarars who had been 
unsuccessful in business to become socially important and get prestige in the eyes of 
Caldarars converts. In Moroieni, a neighbouring village where Caldarars are much 
poorer than those from Costesti, Ionel Torea (a bulibasa’s son) who became a Roma 
expert set up the Pentecostal church. It was an attempt on his part to strengthen his 
authority over the Caldarars community. In this sense, it can be claimed that 
Pentecostal conversion has led to both continuities and changes in the Caldarars’ 
local social structure and hierarchy.  
In an article112 in The Economist it is suggested that the conversion to 
Pentecostalism brought changes in Roma lifestyle: fewer Roma pupils drop out of 
school, young married girls continue to attend school, and violence, criminality and 
alcohol consumption are significantly reduced.  
In Costesti the general feeling about the role of the Pentecostal church is 
similar to that presented in the mass media. Both Romanians and Roma claim that 
Caldarars fight less and they have left their drinking and aggressive habits behind. 
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Many Caldarars I have talked to emphasised this change, and the different lifestyle 
they need to follow -‘Godly ways’- which mark a significant distinction between  
themselves  and the rest.  
Caldarar converts rhetoric about a new lifestyle is promoted by Pentecostal 
doctrine which encourages a symbolic detachment from the past and a rebirth into a 
new life purified of bad habits (drinking, crime, domestic violence, entertainment 
and partying) (Brodwin 2003; Wacker 2001). However, as acknowledged by scholars 
of Pentecostalism, the ethics is ‘profoundly localized’ (De Bernardi 1999: 77), 
“addressing local issues in locally comprehensible terms” (Robbins 2004: 129). In 
this sense, Caldarars’ conversion to Pentecostalism did not bring important changes 
in many other aspects considered wrong by the state. Early marriages and informal 
economic practices (the non-payment of state taxes) continue to play an important 
role in Caldarars’everyday lives. 
Interdictions and changes to ways of living vary from one congregation to 
another and are able to create the basis for empowerment and cultural revival 
(Peljmans, Vate, and Falge 2005). As Wanner (2007) suggests for the case of 
Ukrainian believers, Pentecostal conversion does not bring a complete rupture with 
the past, but a reformulation of the self in interaction with the Other, a possible 
transfer from one subjection to another.  
In this context, it is interesting to explore in which ways Caldarars’ 
conversion to Pentecostalism becomes a form of  empowerment or rather a new form 
of subjection to power, submission to religious doctrine. Furthermore, I am interested 
in understanding how religious conversion changed the discursive practices and 
power relations into a new language of power. 
Does this new language of power differ from state projects of empowerment (Roma 
expert and mediators program) and challenge the existing forms of authority?   
Can Caldarars’ conversion to Pentecostalism be seen as a form of self-governance?  
In the following section, I present alternative theoretical explanations for conversion 







Conversion to Pentecostalism: alternative explanations  
 
The religious revivalism in Eastern Europe has often been explained as a reaction to 
repressive socialist measures against religion113. In socialist Romania and generally 
in Eastern Europe religions were repressed but religious practice was informally 
tolerated. 
Pelkmans (2009) suggests that, in the Soviet bloc, socialist modernization 
involved transformations in religious meanings and practices and, generally, an 
objectification of religion. Religious identities were attached to ethno-national 
categories and in this way became manageable by the state and instruments of power 
(Bratosin, Ionescu 2009). 
Similarly, in Romania, the Orthodox Church was subordinated to socialist 
national ideologies and mechanisms of control (Fozto 2006; Cioroianu 2007). 
Religious belonging constituted an ethnic marker for those ethnic minorities for 
whom the rights of cultural expression were restricted. However, the religious 
identities of the Roma, have not necessarily been specific (Achim 2004). Different 
Roma groups were Orthodox, Catholics or Protestant believers corresponding to the 
historical regions of Romania114. In their case, the socialist repression was oriented 
primarily towards their ethnic identity, which was largely subsumed by the socialist 
state within that of Romanian and socialist proletarian identity.  
After 1989, Romanians and Eastern Europeans were free to choose and 
practice their religions. At the same time, post-socialism opened the doors for global 
religious movements, especially neo-protestant, such as Pentecostalism, to develop 
locally in Eastern European societies (Clark 2009, Horton 1971, 1975a, 1975b; 
Lankauskas 2009; Steinberg and Wanner 2008). Some groups of Roma adopted 
Pentecostalism. An explanation was that Gypsies looked for their own ethnic-
religious category to offer a distinct identity (Foszto 2006). If being a Hungarian 
means being Catholic or Protestant, being a Romanian means being Orthodox, it is 
 
113See Peljmans, Vate, Falge (2005), Pine and Pina -Cabral (2008), Vallikivi (2003), Vate 
(2009),Werth (2000).  
114While in Walachia and Moldavia Orthodox religion is the predominant one,  in Transylvania there 




likely that being a Gypsy could mean being Pentecostal. However, this explanation 
seems far too general. The religious landscape looks more complex and highly 
particularized locally. For instance, in my research case study, while the 
Romanianized Roma were not interested in conversion, Caldarars were very 
receptive to these new religious practices and built their own Pentecostal church. 
These differences can be rather explained by looking at the interactions of each 
Roma group with the transformations from socialism to post-socialism.   
On the other hand, the post-1990 religious revival has sometimes been 
associated with low/moderate economic performance and political instability, plus a 
decreased sense of life security (Norris and Inglehart 2004). However, the 
transformation seems much more complex and Pippa and Inglehart’s arguments 
probably do not suffice to explain the continuous process of Roma conversion to 
Pentecostalism during the last 20 years. In the article from The Economist devoted to 
Romanian Roma religious belonging, Ilie Dinica, president of the National Agency 
for the Roma, stated that the Romanian Gypsies’ conversion to Pentecostalism is 
steadily increasing. The statement came as a confirmation of research conducted by 
the Roma Education Fund, which “suggests that a fifth of the country’s Roma may 
now belong to smaller religious denominations, mostly Pentecostal, but also to 
Catholic and Islamic sects.” In the same article, a Roma expert gives a rough 
estimation of the growing rate of Protestant conversion among Roma in Romania: 
“6% a year compared to less than 1% for Romania’s non-Roma”. 
The religious revival among the Roma in Romania is not necessarily a sign of 
a ‘traditional’ practice or strategy of survival but, on the contrary, may  represent the 
expression of a non-secular modernising process that might bring alternative forms 
of modernization (e.g. understanding and reading the Bible as a form of literacy) 
(Meyer 1996, Werth 2000). It has been shown that, for example, in the case of 
Lithuania, Pentecostal religious practice and belief are part of an alternative 
modernising discourse that brings authority directly to believers and Bible is 
considered a modern writing (Lankauskas 2009). 
Social scientists offered multiple alternative explanations for conversion 
(Hefner 1993). I consider that an important explanation for Roma conversion to 




organized locally (De Bernardi 1999, Gerlach and Hine 1970; Robbins 2004). 
Pentecostal churches are organized in small congregations and they do not always 
merely reproduce the main doctrines but adapt themselves to local understandings 
and practices. In Costesti, all preachers and believers are Caldarars, who stress in 
their preaching, during the church services, issues related to community life and the 
experience of informal economic activities. In this sense, as Ries (2007) argues for 
the case of a different community of Caldarars in Romania, the Pentecostal church 
integrates these religious and social meanings into a community of common values 
(Ries 2004, Slavkova 2003), which are nonetheless  subject to the religious doctrine. 
Other examples come from Siberia and Kazakhstan, where indigenous groups 
who used to live under the Soviet rule accepted, after 1991, their conversion to neo-
protestant Christianity (Vate 2009; Clark 2009). The emergent religious belief was 
the result of a process of contextualization and domestication of new Christian values 
which were conflated with local non-Christian local cultural elements (Clark 2009; 
Pelkmans 2009). In this sense, it could be claimed that conversion to Pentecostalism 
is neither a totally atomistic experience, nor a discourse entirely colonizing the 
individuals’ consciousness (Pelkmans 2009) and involves both the adoption and 
domestication of new meanings.    
Moreover, Pentecostalism often served as a form of empowerment or 
resistance to state power for those groups, whose culture was suppressed by the state 
power. In the case of the Chuckchi of Siberia and other ethnic groups of Siberia, 
Pentecostal conversion brought opportunities for empowerment (Peljmans, Vate, 
Falge 2005; Vate 2009) and cultural revival. Conversion was interpreted “as an 
attempt to regain agency” (Vate 2009: 41), previously captured by the Soviet state, 
and to challenge the accepted Russian Orthodox status that frequently opposed their 
‘pagan’ religion. Vallikivi (2003) asserts that the Nenents of Siberia easily accepted 
conversion to Baptism as they considered Baptists “less harmful and more 
trustworthy partners than other Russians” (p. 60). In this context, conversion became 
a form of resistance to the state’s forms of control.  
However, conversion to Pentecostalism does not bring a total rupture with the 
cultural past. Wanner (2007) argues that Ukrainian converts experienced a 




former Soviet self to a new form of subjectivity” (p. 158-9). Conversion can bring 
about an individual’s disconnection from various forms of authority and a 
reformulation of self-authority through objectification (Vallikivi 2003) and the 
transition from one form of power to another. Individuals can simultaneously adopt 
alternative narratives, which can be “hegemonic” - reproducing the existing 
structures of power - or “subversive” challenging different layers of power (Ewick 
and Silbey 1995). For the Ukrainian Pentecostal believers, Wanner (2007) argues 
that the conversion narratives contain both “subversive” and “hegemonic” elements.  
 In the case of Caldarar believers, discursive entanglements between politics, 
religious practices and new forms of leadership may acquire forms of resistance and 
subversion. In this sense, conversion to Pentecostalism can cast new meanings upon 
“cultural categories such as agency and power, familiar and foreign, space and time” 
(Wanner 2007: 167) as well as upon old and new forms of leadership. In the 
following sections, I explore local religious domestications and the way in which 
conversion to Pentecostalism brings changes in Caldarars’ discursive practices, 
understandings of leadership, politics and authority.   
 
Pentecostalism: local domestications  
 
As already mentioned, many poorer Caldarars joined the new Pentecostal church, 
forming almost a separate cultural group from the rest of community, with different 
values and norms. Most of them looked for a different form of identity, in opposition 
to that imposed by the rich Caldarars who usually stigmatize them. The latter 
consider them inferior, dirty, and marginal.     
As already documented, in  the post–soviet space (Vate 2009; Clark 2009), 
Pentecostalism is not a discourse imposed from above, but is usually adapted to local 
needs, and gets expression in cultural domestications performed by both believers 
and preachers. On the other hand, Pentecostalism promotes an egalitarian doctrine 
and offers equal opportunities to believers with different levels of education and 
financial resources (McGuire 1975, Noll 2001, Willems 1967, Wilson and Clow 
1981) to experience God as inspirational authority (Corten 1997, Cucchiari 1990, 




The Pentecostal church in Costesti follows this model of a small congregation 
that does not reproduce a rigid doctrine but, on the contrary, incorporates or 
negotiates local cultural norms and the Caldarars’ experiences and expectations. For 
several months, I carried out participant observation and I attended church services, 
witnessed songs, testimonies and speeches performed by preachers and believers, 
which revealed the way cultural meanings about poverty, the informal economy and 
education are presented and negotiated in religious discourses. In general, the 
atmosphere during the Caldarar church services is quite different from that in a 
Romanian Pentecostal church, where believers follow pastor’s directions and listen 
in silence to his prayers, sing in the choir and pray in a moderate tone. In the 
Caldarars’ church believers pray loudly, speak in tongues and do not seem to follow 
a program initiated by the preacher.  
Mateiescu Doru, a rich Caldarar, is the preacher at the Caldarars’ Pentecostal 
church. He is a charismatic leader who uses a strong intonation to give powerful 
speeches and to convey religious examples connected to the problems of everyday 
life for Caldarars. In his preaching he often called for the dissolution of differences 
between rich and poor Caldarars. At one church service, a young woman performed a 
song, a call for the rich Caldarars to give money to the poor. In exchange for their 
good actions, the rich would receive rewards from God.  
On a different day, a different Caldarar woman on her way to the church 
contemplated the rich Caldarar ‘palaces’ and told me that their wealth means nothing 
in God's eyes. (Fieldnotes, 15 November 2009, around the Pentecostal church). 
These discursive practices draw attention to the way belief in God can blur the 
boundaries between the poor and the rich. It also serves as a pure normative 
statement or suggestive of a plan for local social change. Moreover, it seems that the 
preacher and the members of the church administration (rich Caldarars) do not 
necessarily agree with a clear-cut division between rich and the poor, which from 
their point of view would generate conflicts among Caldarars. In the light of this, the 
church set up has been vehemently opposed by bulibasa Leonard, who was afraid of 
losing control over the Caldarar community, and made a short aggressive intrusion 
into the church and, since then, both preachers and believers have shown more 




It is also interesting to notice how discourses about the role of belief and 
religion vary in relation to the preachers’ identities. Irrespective of their cultural or 
ethnic background, pastors from other Pentecostal churches are often invited to 
preach at the Caldarars’ church. On one of these occasions, a Romanian pastor, 
Teodosie, from a nearby village, was invited. His discourse was different from 
Doru’s, and followed the logic of controlled governance imposed from above. He 
mentioned in his speech that Caldarars should avoid doing informal commerce. He 
gave as an example an illiterate woman who used to cheat at the market and, after 
she became a Pentecostal believer, without being able to read the bible, she received 
the Holy Spirit and gave up cheating.  
However, Teodosie’s discourse was not very well received. His preaching 
was rather didactic, with questions from bible to which no one knew the answers. 
Many of the Caldarar believers either started laughing or left the church.  At the end 
of the service pastor Teodosie informed me about his views on the Pentecostal 
religious practice, which he saw as a form  of education, literacy and promoting the 
reduction of criminality  among Roma in general. He indirectly confirmed that his 
preaching aimed at producing a similar effect. It was a different way of approaching 
Pentecostal religious practice, as a form of teaching and modernization imposed from 
above, to be accepted by Roma believers.  
However, Caldarar preachers and administrators of the church follow the 
local, contextualized, character of Pentecostalism, and predicate a softer version of 
change which does not exclude the so-called “traditions” (early marriages, informal 
economic practices).  Domesticated religious practices are documented by other case 
studies on Gypsy Pentecostalism in Western and Eastern Europe (Slakova 2003, Ries 
2004, Delgado 2010) which confirm that local religious practices underpin  “ethnic 
reaffirmation by means of cultural reinvention” (Delgado 2010:256). 
Mateiescu Doru, the Caldarar preacher in Costesti, confirmed he follows the 
rules of the Caldarar community, and thus marries his children at young ages. In this 
context, Pentecostalism does not necessarily produce the expected modernization 
(changes in cultural practice, integration in state structures) but rather encourages 
self-transformation and the domestication of religious practices. It is also a discourse 




section, I concentrate attention on transformations brought by Pentecostal ethics and 
practice in Caldarars’ understandings of power, authority and leadership. 
 
Figure 25Caldarars’ prayer inside the Pentecostal church, Photo taken by the author 2009.  
     
From Bulibasa to God: changes in the language of power and 
leadership  
 
In many informal conversations about leadership, Caldarar believers claimed they do 
not ‘listen’ to bulibasa or bulibasi any more, as far as their roles are limited to 
mediation between community and police, when needed. The presence of God 
became more important and even replaced the leading role of bulibasa in their 
everyday lives. As I have already shown in the chapter on Roma leadership, after 
1990, bulibasa as a leadership institution has gradually lost credibility and authority 
over Caldarars. The enrichment of Caldarars and decentralization and multiplication 
of leadership was another stage in this sense and Pentecostalism was a further step 
that actually severed the authority of bulibasi over Caldarar believers. Many 




one of the church administrators, Mateiescu Daniel, the transfer of authority between 
bulibasa and God was clearly stated.  
 
C: Do they [Caldarars] still listen to bulibasa?  
D: Who listens to bulibasa today? He does not matter anymore. We listen to 
God. Why should I listen to bulibasa? Does he give us anything?  
C: Who gives you support? Bulibasa or God?  
D: Long before, bulibasa helped us. Now it is finished with bulibasa [as an 
institution].   
C: What he does now?  
D: He handles police claims or intervenes when there are fights amongst us, 
and that is all. 
C: Do you have other bosses? 
D:   No. We just listen to God.  
C: Why are they bulibasi then ? 
D: It is just that they consider themselves bulibasi.  
C: What role they have in relation to you? 
D: They have no role... Instead of helping the poor they tell everything to 
police. (Interview with Mateiescu Daniel, Pentecostal church administrator) 
 
As with many other Caldarars I talked to, Mateiescu Dumitru explained that the 
Caldarar bulibasi are self–appointed and are part of the self-interested rich 
community who play almost no beneficial role and lack authority among the poorer 
Caldarars. Mediation with the police is again mentioned as the single role customary 
leaders still play. On the other hand, Pentecostalism as practice and belief seems to 
blur the division between rich and poor and generate a transfer of authority from 
bulibasa to God and, finally, to the Caldarar themselves. It gives to individuals a 
sense of empowerment, and they are no longer in a relation of dependence upon an 
external source of authority.  
Mateiescu Dumitru is a Caldarar believer from a moderately wealth family, 
who was involved in the pipe business for several years. After a while, he 
experienced a decline in his informal dealings and had to re-orientate towards much 
simpler informal economic activities, like roof painting and manufacturing copper 
and steel products. He is one of the Caldarar Pentecostal believers who claimed that 






C: But who is bulibasa now?  
D: Everyone is his/her own master. Bulibasa deals with police issues only. It is 
just a word: bulibasa. They are bulibasi, but not our masters - we have Jesus.  
C: Do you fear him [bulibasa]? 
D: We feel fear because he is our bulibasa, but we have no issues with him. If 
they [bulibasi] help you, they ask for money. It is better to manage yourself.  If 
you are weak and don’t know what to do - you still go to him [bulibasa]. He 
sometimes says - come to me, if you do not come, I’ll beat you. We have our 
bulibasa, that is, Jesus.    
C: Can you still have a bulibasa here, or is Jesus the new bulibasa?  
D: Bulibasa is a name, but we are masters of ourselves. If someone comes to 
me to harm me, I go directly to the police and complain, I'll go to courts and 
ask for his arrest.  (Interview Mateiescu Dumitru, Pentecostal believer)  
 
Similarly to many other Caldarars, when referring to the roles and importance of 
bulibasa for the Caladarar community, Dumitru’s statements are contradictory: “we 
feel fear because he is our bulibasa” vs. “they are bulibasi but not our masters”. The 
distinction indicates that bulibasa is no longer an authority but just a source of fear 
and control for those ‘weak’ people who ask for his mediation services in relation 
with the local authorities. The Caldarar believers’ strength in their relation with 
external forms of control comes through self –mastery and a private relationship with 
God. In this sense, Dumitru’s statements become very relevant: “Everyone is his/her 
own master” and “We are masters for ourselves”. As documented in my article on 
Pentecostal Gypsy Travellers’ religious experience (Voiculescu 2012) believers tend 
not to differentiate between divine authority (God, Jesus) and themselves and claim 
to be both masters of themselves and have Jesus or God as master of their private 
lives. This seems to be a common feature of neoprotestant cults which imply that 
“the supreme spiritual authority can be the inner self or some form of ’divine within’, 
or both.” (Lambert 1999: 322).  
Dumitru’s remarks suggest the way the new Pentecostal belief and relation 
with divine authority brings personal independence and autonomy in relation to the 
customary leadership and other external authorities or forms of control. In this 
context, the religious partnership with God is a “process of ’self–mastery’ [or ’self-
mediation’] through which believers get control over themselves and over relations 





intimate partner, the Caldarar believer gets ‘power over himself’ (Wilson, Clow 
1981). Caldarars gain individual authority through the personal relationships they 
develop with God. 
In this context, empowerment is made through religious practice, 
commitment and adaptation to a religious ethic and cultivation of self-control. 
Compared to state projects of integration (e.g. state education, Roma experts and 
mediators) religious empowerment is made from within self and community through 
local religious organization and self-mastery. Conversion implies both affirmation of 
self in decision-making and submission to the Pentecostal religious doctrine. The 
double process of religious experience as empowerment through submission is 
explored in an interesting ethnographic study concerning women’s mosque 
movement in Egypt (Mahmood 2001), which emerged as a reaction to the newly 
secularized understandings of Islam, mainly produced by the liberal state. Mahmood 
(2001) argues that women who decided to teach, transmit Islamic doctrine and 
practice, piety, ethics, perform agency and show resistance to state secularization and 
objectivation of Islam culture. Mahmood (2001) considers that the direction of 
religious acts, like piety, should be disconnected from the liberal understandings of 
subordination. They should be rather explored in their subjective meanings 
connected to “desires, motivations, commitments, and aspirations of the people to 
whom these practices are important” (p.255). In the context of my research, Caldarar 
believers use the Pentecostal religious experience to exercise individual authority and 
to challenge external forms of authority. Conversion to Pentecostalism changed the 
locus of authority, from external actors (leaders-bulibasi) to the self and community, 
and generated a form of empowerment from within.   
It is interesting that Dumitru and other Caldarar believers consider they do 
not need bulibasa as mediators or representatives. In other words, a form of self–
governance gained through the new religious Pentecostal experience and partnership 
with God, replaced leaders’ mediation of their everyday problems. Pentecostal 
conversion becomes a form of near-genuine empowerment, yet mediated by religious 
doctrine, which needs to be internalized. However, as Lambert (1999) argues, in the 




the social life of the believer, but “they must be legitimated through personal 
experience” (p. 322) 
On the other hand, the transfer of the locus of control and authority to an 
inner religious self brings Caldarars into a much closer relation and interaction with 
local authorities (police, local council). Many of them claimed they can approach 
state institutions directly and solve their problems with no help from bulibasi. The 
change in the Caldarars’ approach to state institutions is also a result of a whole 
process of decentralization of Roma leadership in the transition from a repressive 
centralized society to a neopatrimonial one, which was documented in detail in the 
chapter on Roma leadership. 
 
Voting and religion  
 
The new local cult is not disconnected from the sphere of politics. Although they 
gain authority over others and locate control in their private relations with God and 
themselves, Caldarar Pentecostal believers are still influenced in their voting options 
by the preacher and church administrators who have their own political interests. 
When asked, many Caldarar Pentecostal believers avoided to give a clear answer 
whether their voting option is influenced by others or not, and they mainly claimed 
that they do not ‘listen’ to others. In the same interview I had with Mateiescu 
Dumitru, I tried to find out his voting intentions for the presidential elections and his 
explanation for his choice.    
 
C: If Daniel Mateiescu [administrator of the church] told you who to vote for, 
would you follow his advice? 
D: Yes, we could do that. If they told us good things, that wouldn't be a bad 
lesson.  
C: Did Mateiescu Daniel tell you with whom to vote? 
D: It is a secret - I cannot tell you that. (Mateiescu Dumitru, Pentecostal 
believer)  
 
Dumitru Mateiescu avoided telling me clearly whether Daniel Mateiescu, one of the 
administrators of the Pentecostal church, influenced him in his voting options, but 
admitted that in certain matters he would listen to the administrators of the church 




exclusion of external sources of influence or control (informal leaders, state 
representatives), but makes a substantial change in the locus of authority for the 
Caldarar believer who situates his options in the intimate sphere of private relations 
with God, which ultimately might hide the influence of others in the decision-making 
process. However, in an interview, Daniel Mateiescu, one of the church 
administrators, showed his newly emerging influence on the Caldarars’ voting 
options. 
     
C: What kind of connections you have with Miron Codrea [the king’s son]? 
D: We have no connections. We only went to his church. He has never visited 
us.  
C: Do you recognize him as the President of the Roma? 
D: Yes, he is, and he is with Basescu [actual president, and former PDL – 
democrat-liberal -  leader].  
C: I know that Gypsies voted PSD [Social-Democrats]. 
D:  No. All of us from the church voted with Basescu. He [Miron Codrea] 
helped us with the church registration. (Interview with Mateiescu Daniel, 
Pentecostal church administrator) 
  
Daniel explains why Caldarar believers voted with the PDL and not with the PSD, 
the local patronage party. The influence, in this case, arose from a source different 
from local patronage. The self-entitled Roma President Miron Codrea, founder of the 
Christian Roma Centre, who supported the founding of the Pentecostal church in 
Costesti is an important reference here. From Daniel’s statement, it seems that 
Caldarar believers followed his direction, given by Miron Codrea’s political 
preferences, and voted for the PDL in the November 2009 elections. On the other 
hand, it is interesting to notice that Daniel claims that there are no direct links 
between Miron Codrea and the Caldarar community of Costesti. His statement is 
something of a paradox: Caldarar believers and administrators of the church are 
influenced by Miron Codrea’s political options, but have in almost no personal links 
with him. The relation between Miron Codrea and administrators of the Pentecostal 
church is a clientelistic relation, but in a loose sense, as the parts are not in direct 
contact with each other. Daniel’s statement also implies that Caldarar believers 
followed the administrators of the church in their voting choices, confirming that a 




clientelistic relations had changed  and developed in a different way, in the realm of 
religion.  
What seems to serve as the intersection between the spatial crossovers of 
state, politics, and religion, is the domain of patron-client relations. However, for 
Caldarar believers, Pentecostal conversion does not primarily bring a change of 
patrons and brokers, but instead a significant change in the language of power and 
their understanding of authority, which is primarily located in the private sphere of 
relations with God. As documented in my article on Pentecostal Gypsy Traveller 
believers’ religious reflexivity, the privatization of relations with God becomes a 
source for individual authority and contestation of normativity, without excluding the 
pastor’s external influence (Voiculescu 2012). In Costesti, many Caldarar believers 
confessed they did not follow church administrators’ advice, but neither did they 
deny the preacher’s influence upon their voting choices. Therefore, the relation 
between God (or self) and believer receives priority compared to other forms of 
relationality, which are nonetheless not necessarily excluded from being influential 
in the everyday forms of social existence. This hierarchy of relational significance 
(self/divine authority and then Others) leaves space for contestations and individual 
authority among Caldarar believers. 
 
Discussion: Pentecostalism discourse of empowerment and power 
 
Many Caldarars claimed they gave up drinking, partying, and fights. Interestingly, 
peasant neighbours and pastors, or non-Pentecostals, in general, interpreted this form 
of religious discipline as ‘normalization’, and a form of ‘education’ for Caldarars, 
who, from their point of view, had created so many problems in the village’ s past 
(fights, aggressive behaviour). The media also seems to propagate the same discourse 
about Pentecostalism as a successful social ‘taming’, a substitute for state programs 
of integration, which helps to produce submissive Roma115. Moreover, experts in 
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115 “1000 de Tigani urland din toti bojocii:”Glorie, osana, marire!”. Cum s-au facut mielusei sectanti 
cei mai fiorosi oameni din vagaunile Moldovei” [How the most angry people form the outskirts of 
Moldavia become lambish sectants] Radu Tutuianu, Evenimentul zilei, 05 June 2012  Available at 
:,www.evz.ro,; “Toflea, usa de biserica”, [Toflea church door] Viata Libera Goteni  , 4 April 2011. 




minority and Roma issues have strengthened and institutionalized this distortion by 
translating the Roma religious initiative into the state language of integration116. In 
an interview offered to newspaper ‘Adevarul’, sociologist Horvath Istvan117 claims:  
 
If we refer to the change of behaviour in  these communities, and the forms of 
coexistence with the others, then we can say that the church, especially the 
neoprotestant one, has succeeded in integrating them into society (...) We 
cannot compare what the state does with what the church has succeeded in 
doing  for them.  
 
The interview fragment suggests that state officials translate the form of 
empowerment from within (religious Pentecostal practice) into the classic discourse 
of social integration from above exercised primarily by state actors. The analysis of 
these meanings assigned to the Roma Pentecostal conversion raises challenges for 
the legitimacy of the state program of integration that could be considered an 
unsuccessful project of ‘social taming’, pursuing instrumental rationality, rather than 
a program of genuine empowerment.  
On the other hand, Pentecostalism produces an individualization of the space 
of decision, which is not in any sense a space of responsabilisation or an expression 
of ‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck, Giddens, Lash 1994) that can easily be translated 
into the liberal understanding of ‘free will’. As documented in my article on Gypsy 
Travellers’ religious reflexivity, responsibility becomes rather blurred in the private 
relation with God, which becomes the source of both right and wrong decisions.  
Individual decisions are not the expression of a ‘free will’ but, on the contrary, 
decisions considered wrong by the state and the proxy Other are transferred to  the 
responsibility of God – ‘what God speaks’ -  the uncontested authority which cannot 
be challenged from within the religious discourse, pervasive and incorporated in their 
everyday social lives (Voiculescu 2012). In this sense, by claiming the supreme 
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116 Cluj: VIDEO Minunile din Biserica Tiganilor [Cluj VIDEO. Wonders from the Gypsy church],  
Adevarul- News from Cluj-Napoca, 15 November 2009.  Available at : 
http://www.adevarul.ro/locale/cluj-napoca/VIDEO-Minunile-tiganilor-biserica-
din_0_153584987.html. 
117 Istvan Horvath is a director of the Institute for the Study of National Minorities and Reader in the 




authority of God, Caldarars feel more able to manage the relation with external forms 
of authority and control and manipulate discourses on wrong and right, good and 
bad, which  are normally structured by state power through institutions, norms and 
laws.  
Furthermore, as already stated, Caldarar Pentecostal believers no longer 
submit to their leaders but instead transfer the locus of authority to the private space 
of relations with God. Yet, Pentecostalism as a form of empowerment from within 
the community and believer’s self produces a partial subjection to religious doctrine. 
The latter imposes a change in the daily habits (alcohol consumption, partying), and 
a form of internal discipline or, in Foucault’s (1990) terms, a form of self- mastery 
through which individuals control their desires to build their individual authority (see 
Voiculescu 2012).  
The relation between Pentecostal believers and God is an expression of self-
reflexivity and control in which God and self are not clearly distinguished 
(Voiculescu 2012). It is part of a process of subjectivation discussed by Foucault 
(1997) through which the individual is both a subject endowed with power and 
constituted by power, enable to resist some norms and adopt others. Therefore, on 
one hand Caldarars endorse a domesticated Pentecostal ethic and on the other expand 
their private decisional space over the interactions and relations with external sources 
of authority (state, leaders), which ultimately are mediated by the religious self. 
These new understandings pose challenges to state forms of integration, which are 
largely devised to be implemented with the help of Roma leaders (informal, Roma 
experts), who, nonetheless, are no longer ‘authorities’ among the Roma Pentecostal 
believers.  
Pentecostal believers consider that God is their new bulibasa and that they 
are now masters118 of themselves able to negotiate access to state services in direct 
interaction with local authorities. Therefore, while the relation with God (religious 
ethic, moral self) is strengthened, that with bulibasi is minimized. On the other hand, 
direct contact with local state authorities is encouraged.  
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Through new forms of religious reflexivity, Caldarars became more confident 
in negotiating relations with the state and play at its boundaries claiming membership 
and rejecting belonging. Aspects of membership claims/ accounts with no belonging 
are discussed in the chapter on state encounters. Therefore, through religious self-
mastery Caldarar Pentecostal converts succeeded in escaping the double 
subordination trap: state and customary leaders (bulibasi). In the power triangle, 
Caldarar believers, bulibasi and the state, God is the “symbolic interface and 
signifier who can delegate authority to believers” (Voiculescu 2012), “a relational 
partner in a process of self-mastery through which believers gain control over 
themselves and relations with others” (p.6.1). In this way, Caldarar Pentecostal 
believers are more able to negotiate their interactions with leaders and state 
institutions, play at the boundaries of the state in their own interest and escape 
submission to institutional or leadership power.  
Furthermore, localized Pentecostal practice and forms of organization leave 
space for the domestication of religious doctrine, which does not entail the 
submission expected by state actors but rather a release from its control and 
empowerment from within self and community. The latter can be translated into self-
governance in which the religious self-situates itself in an external negotiated 
relationship with state and bulibasi and in a collaborative and equally shared 
relationship with God (religious self). Pentecostal religious discursive practice 
strengthens and internalizes the centre of individual decision making, in relation to 
God, which informs the moral self and underpins the expropriation of other forms of 
authority (state institutions, bulibasi) in their everyday life. Therefore the agential 
power is more than performative (Butler: 1997), it is predominantly relational, 
sourced by shared, negotiated or domesticated relations with relevant Others, 
including divine authority. 
For the purposes of my thesis, religion as a discursive practice brings 
substantial changes among Caldarars and lowers grades of subjection to external 
forms of power. It constructs a new form of self-governance aimed at healing and 
replacing the trauma caused by the violent intrusions of the socialist state into their 
leadership and forms of social and political organization. It provides opportunities 




relation in their own interests. It provides a foundation for those oppressed by former 
bulibasi and the state, to consolidate new grounds for a long-term social and 
economic autonomy, which does not rely on formal employment and state organized 
forms of social existence (e.g. formal education). That also explains why Caldarars 
were more receptive to Pentecostalism. Pentecostalism restored their self-expression 
and authority cultivated by their mobile life style, which was subject to a 
considerable degree of repression by the socialist state. 
On the other hand, Romanianized Roma felt less attracted to Pentecostalism 
as a religious practice and were less receptive to its forms of self-expression and 
empowerment. The Romanianized Roma are Orthodox, and often receive help from 
the local priest119. At the beginning, enticed by the humanitarian aid offered, some of 
the Romanianized Roma agreed to participate in Pentecostal religious services given 
by preacher Christian Diaconu. One explanation for their lack of interest in 
Pentecostalism is given by their attachment to and dependence on state forms of 
governance, which engender expectations in relation to external sources of support. 
Since socialism and even before, their lives have been organized by the state, which 
appears in their language as a paternal figure governing their survival and shaping 
their lives. There is a sharp contrast between the statements coming from the two 
Roma groups about the role of the state in their life: “The state should help us, we 
had jobs during socialism” (Romanianzied Roma) vs. “The state did not do anything 
for us, on the contrary they beat us and took our gold, why we should do anything for 
the state?”.  
The differential relation with the state indicates a differential relation of the 
individual with an external authority, which is strongly challenged by Caldarars and 
appropriated and incorporated by Romanianized Roma in their world views and 
socio-economic existence. Romanianized Roma, in a continuous search for a paternal 
source of support and reliance in their daily existence, could not be fulfilled by 
Pentecostal religious practice, which generally promotes self-expression and locates 
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119 Local orthodox priest from the central church praised his personal social assistance actions and he 
related how he helps Romanianized Roma with cash, food or exemptions for registration fees for
marriages or christenings. He also offers informal scholarships for Romanianized Roma children to 




the believer’s authority in the relation with God/religious self. These explanations 
can be connected to the mobile/sedentary distinction, which plays an important role 
in explaining flexible or rigid projections of the self in relation to the state and higher 
authorities, and are discussed at length in the chapter on the informal economy.   
To sum up, while for Caldarars, Pentecostal religious discursive practices brought 
new opportunities of self-governance to those altered by the socialist state, 
appropriate to their world views (mobility and independence in relation with external 
authorities and the state), for Romanianized Roma, Pentecostalism was an almost 
unknown language, at odds with their ways of seeing themselves in relation to 































Chapter 9. Conclusions: To Speak Truth to Power 
 
My thesis inquired comparatively into the historical life trajectories of two Roma 
groups - Romanianized Roma and Caldarars - with strikingly opposite socio-
economic conditions of existence and revealed complex mechanisms of power 
relations which challenge the general discourse of ‘social integration’ promoted by 
national and transnational forms of governance (the World Bank, the UNDP, the 
OSCE, EU institutions) and extended into academic social research120. The state and 
all the other transnational organizations seem to bring under the same discourse of 
governance different Roma populations who experience different social/ economic 
conditions, leadership and forms of social and political organization. In their policy 
oriented research, they use fixed categories of identification as categories of 
governance -’the poor ’‚’the vulnerable’, ‘the marginalized’, ‘the excluded’
(European Commission 2012, UNDP 2003a, 2006, WB 2005). These are expressions 
of ’symbolic power’, in Bourdieu’s terms (1989, 1991), which place the Roma in  a 
position of subordination in relation to  other European populations and external 
forms of governance. They act, in what Rose (1999) terms, as ‘regimes of 
enunciations’, which participate in the constitution of what Foucault (1980) called 
‘regimes of truth’, in a logic of governmentality which hardly becomes contested.  
Social integration is this kind of problematization of governance, which acts 
both as a regime of ‘enunciation’ and as a ‘regime of truth’. It carries the 
characteristics of  development programs produced by neoliberal governance, which 
have been heavily criticised for following  an economic rationality and reproducing 
the status quo and not necessarily empowering the ’marginalized’ (Ferguson 1994, 
Harris 2001, Inglis 1997, Miraftab 2004). It produces a relation of subordination and 
‘suspension’ in which Roma are left in waiting in an endless process of integration, 
experiencing a “liminal unprocessed identity” (Voiculescu 2012:1.4). From the 
position of ’marginalized’ and ’excluded’, the Roma cannot receive the 
empowerment promised but only a continuous engagement in an ’imagined’ struggle 
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for an equal status, which preserves their status quo. Furthermore, categories of 
governance for the Roma (e.g. ’poverty’, ’marginalization’, ’vulnerability’) and the 
key terms of neoliberal governmentality are  easily and un-reflexively taken for 
granted as objects of study in the Romani studies research. In this context, my thesis 
followed the opposite route of governance and policy research and mainly constitutes 
itself as a critique of the social integration as a problematization of governance for 
the Roma.  
Throughout my thesis I explored the history of power relations and discursive 
practices of two Roma groups (Romanianized Roma, Caldarars). It was a historical 
ethnography of Roma relations and interactions with relevant others (state 
institutions, Roma leaders and state representatives) in different spheres of power 
(economy, politics, state, religion) from socialism to post-socialism. These relations 
either constrained or facilitated their access to socio-economic opportunities. In my 
analysis, I followed both the movement of individuals’ trajectories, their discursive 
practices and relations, and the transformation of these spheres of power struggles. In 
this sense, I considered the relational dynamic and their interaction with the 
continuous movement of power spheres (economy, politics, state, religion) the main 
source and agent of transformations in their lives.   
In the following section, I follow the main patterns of transformation, which 
affected the trajectories of the two Roma groups in terms of relations and discursive 
practices from inside and across spheres of power struggles, from socialism to post-
socialism. In the last section I express the main points I have challenged throughout 
my thesis and seek to answer the question: how do all those producing knowledge 
about Roma can speak truth to power and challenge the current neoliberal mentality 
of governance for the Roma populations in Europe.    
9.1 Patterns of historical change among the two Roma 
groups  

State projects of assimilation and integration, though inefficient and repressive, 
affected the two Roma groups differently. Besides being repressive, the socialist state 




mappings’ with a narrow perspective on the complex cultural and social reality of the 
groups targeted. They excluded the Caldarars’ approach to sociocultural existence 
and generally ignored their individual/group mappings. During socialism, state maps 
acted as “technologies of power”, representations of a simplified reality which 
imposed “a layer of apparent coherence laid over alternative voices by the dominant 
power” (Massey 2005: 110). Nevertheless, as I showed in the chapter on the informal 
economy, the Caldarars developed in post-socialism their own ‘tentative mappings’ 
as orientations in an uncertain environment. They used their practical knowledge 
(trading and manufacturing abilities) as a flexible reference, which supported the 
management of continuously self-transforming social, economic and political spheres 
which, as Massey (2005) suggests, are both the product and the source of on-going 
histories.  
On the other hand, Romanianized Roma, being already sedentarized, were 
more subject to state projects of integration. They used to work as unskilled 
labourers for state farms, cooperatives, factories, and had minimum state education. 
Most of the Romanianized Roma were not permanently employed, but were seasonal 
workers for state farms which, from their viewpoint, offered the best possible 
earnings given their qualifications and educational level. However, state control over 
socio-economic life pushed Romanianized Roma into a direct relation with state 
institutions and apparatuses of control.  
Being settled or mobile made a significant difference to the way different 
groups of Roma were subject to the centralized state and connected to the socialist 
economy. While Romanianized Roma, as identifiable subjects and unskilled workers, 
acted at the margins of the state socialist economy, the Caldarars, almost 
unidentifiable, struggled to stay outside the state formal economy and used their 
mobile approach and a different understanding of economic practice to navigate 
opportunities in the  socialist ’second economy’. 
In post-socialism, large scale processes like state decentralization and the 
retreat from the economy, de-industrialization, the privatization of property and a 
lack of institutional control led to the development of a large informal economy 




The informal economy was the most uncertain sphere of relations, which very 
quickly made winners and losers. Many Caldarar families who got rich in the 1990s  
lost  what they earned and went back to ’traditional’ occupations or mixed them with 
’modern’ ones. This instability of the informal economy did not create clear positions 
for Roma groups and individuals, but complex social relations between groups and 
individuals prepared to collaborate and exploit the irregularities of the new markets. 
However, it seems that while many Caldarar families from Costesti were more able 
to exploit the opportunities of the new informal markets, Romanianized Roma were 
confined to local informal economic practices with low returns.  
Although the gold Caldarars received back from the state was an important 
resource for investing in further business, not all Caldarars succeeded. In different 
locations (Moroieni, Veresti – other locations in Moldova) Caldarars experience 
poorer economic and living conditions (Radu 2007). Therefore, resources 
accumulated under socialism are not the main explanation for Caldarars’ enrichment 
and their adaptation to the post-socialist market. The mobile and independent 
approach in relation to the socialist state and economy and the fast transformation of 
the post-socialist economic sphere can be considered to be a more adequate 
explanation. In this sense, I conceptualized the unsettled movement of the newly 
emergent informal economy as a sphere of relations encompassing fields of 
opportunities and possibilities, which were accessed differently by the two Roma 
groups. I also summarized the relations the two groups have had with the socialist 
state and the ways they acted in both socialist and post-socialist economies in two 
types of interaction with the economic sphere. As I already mentioned throughout my 
thesis, these two patterns do not correspond absolutely to all Caldarar groups and 
Romanianized Roma in Romania.  
 
The mobility approach and limited subjection to the state in the economic sphere 
corresponds mainly to the former nomad Gypsy groups, especially Caldarars and 
Gabors in Transylvania (Voiculescu 2004a, 2004b, Radu 2007a, b) but also to 
Romanianized Roma fiddlers, who acted within the socialist second economy. Both 
had a mobile understanding of their economic practice, which enabled them to exist 




transformations of the economic sphere. On the other hand, the mobility approach 
was opposed to the sedentarist ideology of the socialist state, which imposed itself 
through repressive mechanisms of control. For the Caldarars, relations with the state 
were always ones of avoidance. State acted and was perceived as a repressive 
external actor. Acting from inside the state structures and being mobile were 
fundamentally contradictory. On the other hand, the sedentary approach entails 
settlement, identification, control and subjection to state forms of power. Mobile 
interaction within the economic sphere refers to a more complex movement, which 
involves both imaginary and territorial movement. The imaginary aspect of mobility 
is very well expressed in the Caldarars’ idiom ’invention’, which indicates fast 
management and envisioning of successful solutions in the unsettled and uncertain 
environment that usually characterizes the informal economy and unstable social and 
political spheres.  
Although Caldarars did not succeed in acting completely outside state control 
and its programs (identification, sedentarization), they continued to have a mobile 
approach in their economic practices and in their interactions with the economic 
sphere. Mobility and associated creative tentative mappings offered them access to 
the  field of opportunities provided by the contingency of the relational dynamic of 
the post-socialist informal economy situated at the intersectionality with others 
spheres of power (politics/state - neopatrimonial context). In this context, mobility is 
a cultivated form of interaction with the socio-economic sphere,  called in my thesis 
self-governance. Mobility acts as a ’verb’ which characterizes their existence on the 
move, relatively detached from the fixity of state institutions and structures and 
expressed in their translocal entrepreneurial economy and world views on self-
management in a fast transforming environment.    
 
The sedentarist approach is in opposition to mobility. Romanianized Roma 
interactions with the economic sphere were expressions of a sedentarist approach, 
dependence and subjection to state institutions and social services developed in 
different historical regimes. The direct relation of subjection to the state limited their 
access to opportunities offered by the transformation of the economic sphere. Local 




limited field of possibilities generated by those able to access opportunities in an 
unsettled and self-transforming economic sphere (Caldarars, patrons, leaders). 
However, as argued in the chapter on informal economy, the settled local approach 
does not involve a total inertia but a navigation of a limited field of possibilities121 
within the local labyrinth, which reveals the Romanianized Roma’s active 
engagement with the socio-economic transformations.  
Opportunities released by transition from socialism to post-socialism were 
affected by large scale socio-economic processes, which triggered either limitation or 
expansion of the fields of possibility. In the case of the two Roma groups discussed, 
the field of opportunities was mainly a result of the process of 
deindustrialization/dismantling of old enterprises, which followed the route of 
clientelistic relations. In the 1990s, many Caladarars from Costesti who were able to 
make informal transactions with state enterprises became wealthy enough to build 
their big ‘palaces’ for which they needed a local labour force. Romanianized Roma 
were those who fulfilled this need and thus accessed the economic possibilities 
offered locally. However, in early 2000s, the privatization of former state factories 
produced a drastic fall in the informal transactions in second-hand materials and 
technology, which led to contractions in the field of opportunities, accessed by 
Caldarars and consequently in the field of local possibilities accessed by 
Romanianized Roma. These two patterns clearly point out two forms of movement: 
1) movement/transformation of the economic sphere and 2) Roma interaction with 
the socio-economic transformation.  
These two patterns of interaction with continuous socio-economic 
transformation correspond to two forms of governance and constitute the key answer 
to the major question of my thesis. ”How can the significant gap in living conditions 
between the Romanianized Roma and the Caldarars be explained?” While 
Caldarars’ mobile interaction with the socio-economic sphere is an expression of 
self-governance, Romanianized Roma’s sedentary, locally confined navigation of 
economic possibilities is the historical product of high levels of subjection to state 







uncertain, unstable post-socialist environment in continuous transformation. It 
indirectly brought about low levels of adaptation and perpetuated poor conditions of 
living.     

Transformation of Roma leadership and the state: brokerage and 
fields of politics 
To have a comprehensive and complete understanding of power relations I paid 
special attention to the transformation of Roma forms of leadership. In the Romanian 
neopatrimonial context discussed in the chapter on local level politics, Roma leaders 
are not necessarily representatives of their communities but political brokers for 
local/regional political parties and patronage politics. This contextualization 
substantially challenges the depoliticised equation and language of development122 
and empowerment of the Roma devised by the state and transnational organizations. 
Most of the time Roma leaders are involved in implementation of programs of 
inclusion and development, which aim at raising the level of participation in  civil 
society, and represent the Roma communities in local and regional meetings. 
Nonetheless, Roma leaders’ actions are defined by the neopatrimonial context and 
confined to local/regional patronage politics. These features characteristic of the 
Romanian political sphere and Eastern Europe in general seem to be ignored or 
silenced by transnational neoliberal actors in development (European Commission 
2012, UNDP 2003a, 2006, WB 2005) which continue to use a depoliticised language 
to hide structural inequalities of power (clientelism, patronage) and qualitative 
differences relating to the historical paths of transformations among the Roma.  
Forms of leadership were perhaps the most affected aspects of Roma socio-
political organization in the transformation of state and politics from socialism to 
post-socialism. Compared to Romanianized Roma who developed forms of 
leadership later in post-socialism, the Caldarar groups had their own customary 
leaders called bulibasi, responsible for the mediation between Caldarars and local 
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authorities in matters of camping, trade and other economic activities. From the 
1960s onwards, when the sedentarization was enforced by the socialist state, one 
bulibasa became the collaborator with the state surveillance services and the 
controller of Caldarars’ economic practices and gold possessions.  
One of the most coercive measures enforced by the state apparatuses of 
control (Securitatea) was the transformation of the Caldarars’ customary leadership 
into a mechanism of control, surveillance, and gold seizure. The main bulibasa 
became the broker of the repressive state surveillance service, ’empowered’ to deal 
with community problems and negotiate the gold seizure demanded by the state. 
However, different other bulibasi with limited responsibilities continued to organize 
and represent small travelling groups in their relations with local authorities. 
Therefore, while subjection to state mechanisms of control came through the main 
bulibasi, collaborators with the security services, relative independence was 
perpetuated through the mobile groups organized by bulibasi with limited mediation 
responsibilities. Yet, the empowerment of the main leader made by the socialist state 
progressively destroyed one important feature of their form of self-governance – the 
institution of bulibasa - and subjected Caldarars to violent state control. I called this 
process and violent intrusion of the state, destructive empowerment.  
After 1989, the decentralization of the state and the emergence of multiple 
spheres of power outside its direct control (informal economy, politics, religion) 
brought important additional transformations to the Roma leadership, especially the 
Caldarars’. The bulibasa ‘institution’ of the settled community was no longer 
supported by apparatuses of control and lost part of its authority and legitimacy 
among Caldarars. On the other hand, the emergence and development of the 
informal economy and its intersectionalities with the neighbouring spheres - state and 
politics  - created fields of opportunities mainly exploited by Caldarars. As a result, 
the position of bulibasa was claimed by some of the newly enriched Caldarar 
families, but this was often contested by the rest of community. Therefore, the main 
transformation for Caldarars’ leadership from socialism to post-socialism can be 
described as decentralization, multiplication, and role limitation (limited only to 




On the other hand, the post-socialist development of the sphere of politics 
brought a whole struggle for power, which created opportunities for the new bulibasi 
to source their power in local patronage politics, get involved and convince 
community members to vote for one party or another and become power brokers. 
However, state brokerage was not completely dissolved, but recreated by post-1989 
governmental strategies for Roma inclusion, which organized a complex multi-level 
governance for the Roma. At both regional and local levels, informal Roma leaders 
were invited to participate as Roma experts and state representatives. While one of 
the Romanianized Roma in Costesti became Roma expert, most of the Caldarar 
bulibasi decided to collaborate informally with state structures of governance and 
participate in their meetings. These changes in forms of state governance generated 
two types of brokerage. 
a. State/patronage brokers are all those informal leaders (both Caldarar and 
Romanianized Roma) who became Roma experts and, consequently, state 
employees, mainly under the control of both central and local state governance). The 
Roma expert network was created as a parallel structure of governance of the Roma 
aiming to strengthen the state presence and its bureaucratic expansion into its 
peripheral areas of governance and local communities situated at its margins of 
control (involvement in informal economy, lack of identity documents, property 
papers). Empowerment by state structures meant a direct exposure and subjection to 
local patronage politics, expression of intersectionality between politics and state 
(neopatrimonial context). In this context, Roma experts are not only state brokers but 
also patronage brokers who follow the political interests of the local or regional 
patronage politics (mayor/ deputy mayors, prefects etc.). They convince Gypsies to 
vote with the patronage party and they are one-sided players during the elections. 
Those who decided to become Roma experts are usually informal Roma leaders with 
low financial resources and minimum access to the economic opportunities.  
State/patronage brokers’ practices are circumscribed to what I call tight webs 
of power produced by state structures of governance and patronage politics. Within 
these webs, Roma experts are expected to follow multiple contradictory interests in 




responsibilities and forms of subordination overshadow or even expropriate them of 
the capacity to represent the interests of their own communities.    
b. Power brokers are those Roma leaders (both Romanianized and 
Caldarars) who decide to remain informal and convince the Roma to vote for 
different political parties including the patronage party. They are under the control of 
neither patronage politics nor state institutions but maintain contact and collaboration 
with main actors (patrons, politicians, state representatives) through what I call loose 
power webs. As power brokers, they are able to support any political party and 
withdraw their allegiance whenever they feel it is necessary to do so for the political 
actions they want to initiate. During elections, they play multiple sides and promise 
Roma’s votes simultaneously to different local politicians/local patrons. They 
participate in local and regional meetings organized by the government and mediate 
with the local police. The navigation of these overlapping(s) between politics and 
state and their connection with important local and regional and national  politicians  
and state representatives gives them ’permission’ to deal or act as intermediaries in  
informal economic activities123 with high returns without sanctions.  
This typology of brokers brings the political aspect back in the 
understandings of Roma leadership and reveals the inequalities of power, constrains 
of action and representation (e.g. Roma experts as patronage brokers) and leaders’ 
personal political interests nourished by patronage politics (e.g power brokers). In a 
depoliticised language of development, Roma brokers are purely informal/formal 
leaders considered to represent the interests of community. However, my 
ethnographical analysis shows that patronage politics in its local dynamics impedes 
and substantially alters the main function of Roma leadership: community 
representation. 
In this context of neopatrimonial transformations of state and politics, new 
political processes (field politics) with relevance for Roma governance have been 
developed. In an anthropological understanding, these are fields of politics (Swartz 
1968), spatial and temporal understandings of political/power relations, which are 
not localized and include actors who act at different levels of power (local, regional 
 
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state, and political representatives). I identified two major fields of politics of direct 
relevance to political activity of Roma brokers: patronage politics and political 
patronage.  
The field of patronage politics is mainly a product of establishment of local 
and regional patronage teams, in contact with high level party members and state 
offcials, which support a parliamentary party and have control over the local 
distribution of resources and positions. Within this field, state/patronage brokers 
(Roma experts) are expected to follow the ruling party patronage interests (e.g PSD 
or PDL), which vary according to the mayor’s or prefect’s party membership and 
might be different for each administrative level. For power brokers and Caldarars 
involved successfully in businesses, the field of patronage politics can represent a 
field of opportunities to support different parties and patrons in exchange of relations 
and influence. For Romanianized Roma clientelistic realtions involved in local 
patronage politics, sometimes based on vote buying and vote barter, are part of the 
local field of possibilities, which give them access to local state services and welfare.    
The field of political patronage is generated by the political alliance between 
the Roma Party and the Social Democrat Party, which expects political support in 
elections from Roma representatives, who might be Roma experts (state/patronage 
brokers) or informal Roma power brokers. Most of the Roma experts are Roma Party 
representatives who, during elections, find themselves in the delicate position of 
supporting the PSD rather than their own Roma Party. In this way, the field of 
political patronage blocks the development of Roma ethnic politics and the sense of 
civic activism.   
The transition from restitution politics to political patronage and local or 
regional patronage politics prevented the development of a genuine field of Romani 
politics, which was captured into this double structure of patronage. In this sense, the 
Roma experts (patronage brokers) are expected to follow both directions (patronage 
politics and political patronage) and are, in this sense, the most affected in their 
representation actions. Furthermore, the instrumentalized character of the Roma 
expert position reveals the main interests and workings of the Roma expert state 
program, which acts as a deterrent to the development of forms of self-governance 






workings of state governance, hampers the active participation of Roma experts and 
Roma communities (especially Roma groups) in the local decision making process. 
Moreover, it prevents the Roma from giving political support to their main political 
formation – the Roma Party.  
Moreover, Romanianized Roma seem to be the most affected by patronage 
politics. They are directly involved in clientelistic exchanges with the local patron 
and in a relation of dependence with local patronage actors. Therefore, local 
patronage politics and the presence of patronage brokers from inside their 
community expropriate them of forms of political and social agency and deprive 
them of foundational references for a progression into a community specific form of 
self-governance able to improve their socio-economic conditions of existence. On the 
other hand, the multiplicity of power brokers leaves more space for action and 
generates a democratization of voting behaviour among Caldarars. It facilitates the 
preservation of forms of autonomy cultivated through their mobile economic 
practices since socialism.   
Overlapping(s) between fields of politics engender a social dynamic that can 
be portrayed as an interactive map of power relations. The main intersectionality 
developed within the post-socialist neopatrimonial context is that between the 
spheres of state and politics (e.g field of patronage politics). Both Romanianized 
Roma and Caldarars exploited state-politics boundaries, which created possibilities 
for the first and opportunities for the second. Voting was the main mechanism of 
exploiting the new state-politics boundary. While Caldarars made use of local 
clientelistic relations involved in the local patronage politics to set up informal 
businesses and avoid identification and legal documentation of belongings, 
Romanianized Roma used simple clientelistic relations, with the local patron and 
bureaucrats, to access state services and benefits.  
Similarly the interrelatedness between other spheres of power struggle (state–
politics- religion) are explored by Caldarars and exploited by 
preachers/administrators of the Pentecostal church. For the Caldarar Pentecostal 
believers (especially the poorer ones), privatization of the relation with God, brings 
disengagement with external sources of authority: state representatives, Roma 





voting options. Caldarar believers succeed in individualising their voting decisions 
and follow suggestions from preachers/pastors only with reluctance, if at all.  
In terms of discursive practices and how they participate in the differential 
transformation of the two Roma communities religion is an important reference. 
Pentecostalism is a discourse of power and empowerment, which brings different 
practical enactments and opportunities for action. As I already mentioned, the 
socialist state destroyed the Caldarars’ main element of self-governance: the 
institution of bulibasa, which used to uphold their mobile economic practices. The 
solution came from Pentecostalism, which as a discursive practice, changed the locus 
of authority from leaders to the relation with God/self through which believers 
became ’masters of themselves’, able to negotiate directly their relations with the 
Other, including state institutions. It is a form of empowerment from within the self 
and the community, which produces an individualization of the space of decision 
making, and strengthens and reinvents new form of self-governance. It opens new 
opportunities for self-expression and underpins the independent management of 
Caldarars’ socio-economic practices in interaction with an unstable economic sphere.     
9.2. Questioning the question: from governmentalized 
knowledge to  reflexive governmentality  

My analysis of power relations and discursive practices offers a relational 
understanding of power, a bottom-up analysis following individuals’ practices into 
the large transformations and policies of governance aimed at social integration. It 
has the capacity to analyse power without reproducing the language of governance, 
which carries the characteristics of ’symbolic violence’ (’the poor, ’the vulnerable, 
’the marginalized’) (Bourdieu 1991) and imposes fixed identities, in terms of 
conditions of living, values, on a diversified population, deprived of the right to 
define themselves and have their own forms of governance.  
In this sense, Roma are governed through unilaterally constructed identities 
(’the poor’, ’the marginalized’, ’the vulnerable’ of Europe) which assign a specific 
direction of governance (social integration). Roma as ’the poor’ are not governed 
from a position of equality, like any other European ethnic minority, but from a 





the Roma equals governing ’the poor, ‘the marginalized’ and ’the vulnerable’ of 
Europe and governing ’the subalterns’. These discursive practices and symbolic 
categories or projected identities are instruments of governance, part of the larger 
problematization of neoliberal governance which reproduces the status quo of Roma 
as the ’marginalized’ and ’the excluded’ of Europe. It also reveals what Foucault 
(1991, 2010) has argued, that government and thought are constitutive in the act of 
governance.   
The discourses of governance about Roma ‘marginalization’ and ‘poverty’, 
’social integration’ are often approached as forms of ‘absolute knowledge’ and 
sometimes as an uncontested ’truths’ in social science production of knowledge (see 
also discussion in Introduction), which in this sense becomes heavily 
governmentalized. Foucault’s (1991, 2003, 2010) generally conceptualized 
governmentality as the ‘conduct of conduct’ and ‘art of government’ manifested both 
in institutional and discursive practices with the power to constitute themselves as 
‘regimes of truth’. These ‘regimes of truths’ generate what I call governmentalized 
knowledge, a process through which categories of governance are transferred un-
reflexively into academic knowledge and social research. In this sense, the field of 
Romani studies (see many citations in the Introduction) seems to treat objectively 
and answer to questions already defined by the existing mentality of governance 
(marginalization/exclusion/social integration) and thus it is governmentalized, in 
broad terms. The categories of ’marginalized’ and ‘poor’ are taken for granted and 
considered ’realities’, ’problems’ which need to be studied and solved, rather than 
“regimes of enunciations” (Rose 1999), part of larger ’problematizations’ of 
governance, which can be challenged and changed for more effective social 
intervention.  
In this sense, my thesis questions the object of Romani studies, which is often 
influenced by the neoliberal agenda of social development, its symbolic categories of 
governance able to constitute Roma as subaltern subjects. It deconstructs a polarized 
manufactured discourse of governance which portrays and identifies Roma as 
defeatable powerless (’poor’, ’marginalized’, ’excluded’ Roma) in a continuous 
struggle to achieve an equal status in relation with invincible omnipotencies 





Therefore, my thesis distances itself from all studies that follow and are 
defined by the current neoliberal discourse of governance. It has intentionally a 
different object of studies (power relations) and different lens through which it 
makes available a comprehensive, reflexive (Roma meanings about their own 
histories), holistic view of power relations and discursive practice among Roma in a 
historical processsual understanding, which aims at challenging and changing these 
flawed neoliberal mentalities of governance for the Roma. It suggests that poverty vs. 
affluence among Roma are connected to presence/development or lack/weakness of 
forms of self-governance rather than degrees of social integration which constitute 
the main focus of current neoliberal problematization of development for the Roma. 
Empowerment should be recreated from inside Roma communities through forms of 
local organization in which all those Roma experiencing poverty, who proved to be 
very active but confined to local informal economy and patronage, to get fully 
involved in social and political life as both Roma ethnics and Romanian citizen.    
In practical, concrete terms, forms of self-governance and local organization 
of Roma, were advanced as a Hungarian governmental project aimed at increasing 
the Romani political participation but also to provide neighbouring countries with a 
model for their Hungarian minority populations. The programs started “in 1993 as 
part of the Act regarding the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities...[and] allows 
for any Hungary’s 13 recognized minority communities to establish local, regional, 
and national self-governments.” (NDI 2006: 5). The elected self-governmental 
bodies are permitted to take decisions “in the areas of local education, language use 
in public institutions, printed and electronic media, and the protection of their 
traditions and culture” (NDI 2006: 5). In my view, these institutionalized forms of 
self-government give sense to and a context for ‘citizenship participation’ and 
‘political struggle’ against dominant external discourses which place Roma culture 
and world views in opposition to the state, market and majority. It can reawaken and 
enhance Roma community representation, which, in Romania, is reduced to 
patronage politics and state programs of bureaucratic expansion (e.g. the Roma 
expert network program).   
Therefore, without starting from pre-defined categories of identification 





poverty/marginalization as social problem, my thesis is a reflexive way of 
understanding how different Roma populations (and other populations highly 
subjected to power as governance) can be empowered and how their forms of self-
governance can be strengthened. It also challenges the whole problematization of 
governance as ’social integration’ and answers to a broader question that stands at 
the core of my thesis : how do we (academics, policy makers, practitioners and all 
those who produce knowledge about Roma) speak truth to power of neoliberal 
governance of Roma as ’social integration of the marginalized and the poor’?  
9.3 To speak truth to power: tentative answers  

I consider that contestations developed from within the current mentality of 
governance, through resistance and activism cannot bring about major changes in the 
effects produced by the problematization of social integration as van Baar (2011) 
claims. An important change in the status quo becomes possible only through a 
reflexive process that needs to involve at least three main aspects.  
1. The most important aspect that challenges the omnipotent capacity of 
‘governmental power’ is the history of everyday power relations, which brings the 
political aspect of struggles and contextualisation back into the understanding of 
social reality. It enables a view from below, from within Roma communities, where 
power is not a stable reference point, but circulates through relations, and it is both 
transformed and transforming. Moreover, by understanding the history of power 
relations and discursive practices among different Roma groups, the definition of the 
problem of governance can be challenged, questioned, and reformulated in order to 
reconceptualise or support the existing genuine forms of empowerment (e.g. 
Pentecostalism, mobile economic organization).  
Without reflexive accounts of the social history of the different Roma groups, 
the problem of governance of Roma  has moved within the same paradigm - from 
‘assimilation’ to ‘social integration’ and has failed to create a genuine base for 
empowerment.  
2. Another solution to this matter is to create a space for reflexive 





discussed and challenged. Different populations in the world (Jews in Europe, Blacks 
in Americas, Mapuche in Chile, Maori in New Zealand, Ciukci in Russia) 
experienced the authority of assimilationist, integrationist policies and state 
interventions through their forms of social and political organization. A reflexive 
governmentality approach recommends a communication between different 
governmentalities in order to avoid the indigenization of populations’ problems and 
challenge the existent “regimes of truth” and give way to genuine forms of 
empowerment. On the other hand, this reflexive communication can bring about an 
awareness of the exchanges and borrowing of concepts, categories of identification 
performed between academic knowledge and governance (e.g. social capital use by 
the World Bank), which are constitutive to discourses of power.  
3. The third new aspect I would like to suggest is that of study of translation. 
The World Bank (2005) showed how governance research has pretences of 
reflexivity, which are partly legitimated through qualitative case studies, but affected 
by subtle forms of ’depoliticisation’, ’closure’ and, what I call here, translation. The 
latter shows the way complex realities are reinterpreted and individuals/groups’ 
interpretations of their own actions are translated into a pre-defined problematic of 
governance. In my thesis, I also showed how state representatives and important 
actors in policy research translate Pentecostalism, the Caldarars’ new form of self-
governance, into the state discourse of social integration (’social taming’). 
Sociological work could explore and draw attention to these forms of translations 
exercised by governance.  
All these three points offer some answers to the question ’how do we speak 
truth to power’. The question is mainly  inspired by Schepher Hughes’s (1995) 
discussion of  militant anthropology and about the role of social researcher in 
‘speaking truth to power” by acknowledging suffering and becoming actively 
involved  in finding solutions for the ‘weak’ and ‘powerless’. Following this 
understanding we can ask ourselves whether treating people as ‘weak’ and 
‘marginalized’ would actually help them.  In addition, before starting any form of 
activism we need to reflect on the problematization of governance from within which 
we act and write, and on the ‘regimes of enunciations’ involved. It would be 





reproduces ‘relations of force’ and ‘preserves the status quo’ criticised by authors of 
post-developmental studies (e.g.  Escobar 1995, 2000, Ferguson 1994, 2009, Li 
1999, 2007) and it would not be useful to those studied.  
As Foucault (1991, 2003, 2010) and Rose (1999) suggested, governmentality 
is not only an effect of governance research but the product of discourses produced 
by multiple and different institutions and actors, among which are sociologists, who 
have access to the mechanisms of ‘symbolic power’, in Bourdieu’s terms (Bourdieu 
&Wacquant 1992). Sociologists have the capacity to categorize and speak on behalf 
of others and, to participate in the “struggle over the truth” and “establish models of 
reality” (p. 58).  
Therefore, if we have this power to “define what the social world is” (p. 58) 
then we can use it to challenge mentalities of governance and the pre-existing 
governmentalized knowledge, which reproduces the power inequalities. A 
comparative history of power relations opens up the study of the contextualized 
dynamics of power relations and meanings formulated by the governed, and provide 
the opportunity for comparative research of different populations who faced similar 
problems in relation to the state and dominant forms of governance. In this way, it 
directly supports the project of a reflexive governmentality approach.  
In this sense, my thesis challenges the whole paradigm/mentality of 
governance of social integration and proposes to speak instead about Roma autonomy 
or self-governance, a model inspired by Caldarars’ successful form of self-
governance.  
As I showed throughout my thesis, the Caldarars resisted state intervention 
and mechanisms of control and preferred to stick to their own models of self–
governance. Less ’integrated’ in the state structures and at large in the mainstream 
society, they kept their distinctive world view (practical knowledge, wealth, 
mobility, entrepreneurship and independence). They successfully managed through 
their mobile approach to the fast transforming economic sphere to become wealthy. 
On the other hand, Romanianized Roma, who experienced the sendentarist model 
and were relatively socially ’integrated’ during socialism, albeit at the margins of the 
system, became dependent on external forms of governance and these days 





regard to the neoliberal direction of governance is the following: why do the Roma 
need to follow the ‘social integration’ model in so far as it has proved to have the 
negative/opposite effects and produce poverty, isolation and dependence on external 
intervention? And why is the Caldarar’ self-governance/autonomy model, as a 
successful alternative to ’social integration’ vision of governance, proposed by 
national and transnational neoliberal governance, discounted?  
From my viewpoint self-governance can represent a much better 
model/framing of governance which presumes an equal starting point,  from which  
Roma groups can ask for more powers (social, economic, cultural) to separate from 
external discourses of governance, sometimes expressed in the same terms of  
’exclusion’, ’stigmatization’ and ’marginalization’. It creates both the conditions for 
human development and detachment from the dominance of the state and 
transnational governance.  
Therefore, my thesis research raises further questions for all those who 
participate in the constitution of the existing problematization of governance of the 
Roma - members of transnational governing bodies, state/NGO representatives, 
social scientists - who mainly promote the discourse of ‘social integration’.  Do the 
Roma always need external governance or their own forms of self-governance? Does 
the problematization of governance need to be framed in terms of ’social integration 
of the marginalized and the poor’ or, as I suggested, in terms of self-governance? I 
will leave these questions open for further study. This problematic of governance and 
governmentality for the Roma in Europe is an area I would wish to continue to 
explore in future research projects.  
In conclusion, my  thesis showed  that the ’sedentarist’ and the ’mobile model’ of  
Roma historical life trajectories are essential features for understanding  Roma socio-
economic conditions of existence, which can inform a genuine reflexive governance 
and re-evaluation of the existing problematization of ’social integration’ for the 
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